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Abstract 
 
The Mexican water polity underwent a deep process of Neo-liberal State-
transformation, oriented at modifying the relationship between the State and society 
and through the implementation of a range of State-strategies. These State-
strategies produced a number of drawback and contradictions. One of such 
strategies was the establishment and institutional development of multi-stakeholder 
platforms for groundwater resources management (MSPs), a form of socio-political 
governance arrangement allegedly created to enable a more democratic social 
participation and stakeholder cooperation throughout the water resources 
management process.  As a result of a ‘critical juncture’ two models of MSPs were 
established, one supported by the central-State and another by the state-level 
authorities in the state of Guanajuato.  They had important differences in that the 
latter represented a more serious attempt to truly enable a socio-political governance 
arrangement. Today, regardless of the initiative, these MSPs remain extremely weak 
and their contribution to a more participatory, cooperative and democratic 
groundwater governance is very limited.  The central hypothesis of the thesis is that 
the principle factor –the culprit– behind these drawbacks and limitations is the State, 
but that still the MSPs for groundwater governance have generated some form of 
‘countervailing power’ –an opportunity inherent to these governance arrangements– 
that supports some small, but important democratic effects.  
 
Through the integration of a ‘heuristic-analytical’ device supported by various 
theoretical developments –including governance and democratic studies, but mainly 
underpinned by a Historical Institutionalist approach–, this thesis analyses different 
critical aspects of this phenomenon. Accordingly, this device is structured in six 
different moments of analysis that focus on different aspects of the process of Neo-
liberal State transformation and the institutional development of the MSPs. The 
device ultimately seeks to develop and understanding of the prospects and 
challenges of the MSPs, assess their democratic performance, and investigate the 
role of the State in the process –including the reasons or factors that determine this 
role. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. The PhD Project and the Research Problem: Some Choices and Some 
Contingencies 
 
I started this PhD research project in 1998, so a lot has changed, and many 
situations and developments have influenced its final output, the current version of 
this PhD thesis.  So, through this introduction I will comment on some of the most 
relevant situations and developments that had a strong bearing over the form and 
content of this PhD thesis.  Of course one immediate reflection to make is that 
keeping a PhD project alive for such a long period of time represents a challenge in 
various dimensions: academically, professionally, financially, and personally.  So, as 
time passed by, the vagaries of life generated conditions that were both enabling and 
disabling for the PhD research endeavour to continue. Imminently, this PhD thesis 
reflects this situation, and so attempts will be made to be honest about its 
appropriateness and limitations. Still, there are also some advantages to this 
situation that I hope to highlight throughout this introduction, in the methodological 
chapter and concluding chapters of this thesis. 
 
Through this unusually long period of time, this PhD project devoted efforts to study 
the Neo-liberal State-transformation process in the Mexican water polity, 
characterised by important changes in the orientation, role and structure of the State 
and the implementation of a number of Neo-liberal State-strategies, including 
amongst them the establishment of governance arrangements –represented in this 
case by multi-stakeholder platforms for water resources management (MSPs). 1  
These MSPs were ‘allegedly’ established to enable greater social 
participation/involvement and stakeholder cooperation in an attempt to harness wider 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A governance arrangement is to be considered an institutional form established by a social 
actor –most of the times the State– in order to enable greater social participation/involvement 
and stakeholder cooperation in an attempt to harness wider societal resources –ideas, 
organisation, finance, technical and managerial capacities, etc.– to address complex, 
interdependent and cross-cutting governing challenges. Accordingly, governance 
arrangements are established to respond to specific drivers and are underpinned by specific 
rationales and policy objectives. The multi-stakeholder platforms for water resources 
management (MSPs) are precisely socio-political governance arrangements oriented at 
allowing greater social participation/Involvement and stakeholder cooperation. The concept of 
‘platform’ evokes conditions of stakeholder inclusion, political equality and democratic 
decision-making. MSPs are usually established at the river basin, micro-basin and aquifers 
levels. 
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societal resources to solve complex governing problems and implement integrated 
water resources management (GWP, 2000, 2011; Warner, 2007; Garcia, 2008). 2  
 
The National Water Commission (Comisión Nacional del Agua, CONAGUA) 
established these MSPs at the river basin, micro-basin and aquifer level across the 
country.3  My interest in this research subject derives from the scholarly concerns 
regarding the important drawbacks and contradictions in the implementation of these 
Neoliberal State strategies, that in the case of the establishment of the MSPs for 
groundwater management is represented by a failure to constitute them as 
meaningful socio-political governance arrangements capable of effectively 
addressing severe groundwater management challenges.  
 
An important item to address at this very initial part of this PhD document concerns 
the need to change the title of the thesis. In this introduction I have an opportunity to 
make amends.  Accordingly, a more accurate title for this PhD thesis is: “The 
Process of Neoliberal State-transformation and the Establishment of Multi-
stakeholder Platforms for Groundwater Resources Management in the Mexican 
Water Polity: A Democratic and Meta-governance Challenge”.  I encourage the 
reader to take note of this important change, because titles do serve to orient and 
prepare readers for the narrative and content that follows.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 IWRM is a water resource management policy paradigm that claims that water resources 
management should be managed through a coordinated approach linking water resources 
with natural resources management (i.e. land, forests, bio-diversity) and development 
planning.  It also maintains that water resources can only be managed through a participatory 
process that includes all relevant stakeholders in decision-making processes. It makes 
provision for gender-awareness throughout the water resources management process, 
including policy design and implementation.  Finally, and a bit more controversially, because 
of its implications, it considers that water is an ‘economic good’, and thus the economic and 
social value of water should be taken into consideration in policy decisions (GWP, 2000).  
3 The CONAGUA is the government apex-institution in the water policy sector. It has a federal 
remit, and it is a de-concentrated body of the Secretary of the Environment and Natural 
Resources (Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, SEMARNAT).  The politico-
legal figure of ‘de-concentrated’ body in the Organic Public Administration Law (Ley Orgánica 
de la Administración Publica, LOAP) implies that the CONAGUA depends from the 
SEMARNAT, in that the General Director responds to the Secretary of State of SEMARNAT, 
and the CONAGUA receives its yearly budget from the overall SEMARNAT’s budget (roughly 
70% of its total goes to Conagua). In practice the CONAGUA is mostly independent in 
administrative, legal, and political terms, and the General Director of CONAGUA takes 
decisions independently, and mostly through political accords with the Office of the 
Presidency (Oficina de la Presidencia de la Républica) and the State Governors. This, of 
course, has a negative impact in the ‘greening’ of the CONAGUA’s institutional objectives and 
actions, but it is part of the predominant political culture. In practice, in the Mexican political 
system, the CONAGUA is considered to be ‘more powerful’ than the SEMARNAT and the 
figure of its General Director commands more political attention than that of the Secretary of 
SEMARNAT. 	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At the beginning of my doctoral research, the literature on the ‘governance 
phenomenon’ fascinated me and attracted my academic attention, because it 
somehow pursued the study of an emerging and widespread social phenomenon 
through a comprehensive, perhaps systemic approach or perspective. This had great 
appeal to me, as throughout my academic and even professional life I have 
attempted to be more of a ‘generalist’, rather than a ‘specialist’, and enjoyed putting 
different pieces together.  So, it is possible to consider that the overall research focus 
and orientation of this PhD thesis seeks to offer a more ‘generalist’ perspective of the 
phenomenon under study, highlighting a number of critical factors and aspects that 
are relevant in scholarly terms.  This personal orientation may also explain the 
reason why I have been drawn to use Historical Institutionalism (HI) as a source of 
theoretical inspiration to sustain important elements of this doctoral research 
endeavour, as the reader will soon realise. In my opinion, it is truly compelling how 
some HI scholars really manage to mesh together, through a coherent explanatory 
narrative, ideologies, policy ideas, institutional innovations, political forces and social 
struggles (Huntington, 1968; Barrington, 1966; Skocpol, 1979; Peters, 2000; 
Steinmo, 2008).  This PhD seeks to somehow honour this tradition, because I 
consider that it in order to study the process of Neoliberal State-transformation in the 
Mexican water polity it will be necessary to look precisely at how the aforementioned 
elements interplay, and then construct a coherent and insightful narrative of the 
research subject and a research problem.  
 
Towards the mid 1990s scholarly studies on the ‘governance phenomenon’, referring 
to the process of State-transformation and the implementation of governance 
arrangements oriented at enabling greater social participation and stakeholder 
cooperation to address complex governing polices in polities around the world were 
not that commonplace.  So, it was only possible to find a few interesting theoretical 
works that attempted to develop comprehensive theoretical perspectives on the 
‘governance phenomenon’, its main drivers, characteristics, institutional 
arrangements, policy mechanisms, and impacts over polities (Kooiman, 1993; 
Kickert, Klijn and Kppenjan, 1997; Pierre, 2000; Pierre and Peters et al., 2000). In 
those days it was even more difficult to find robust appropriations of the ‘governance 
notion’ in other policy fields rather than that of the political sciences –perhaps the 
urban policy sector being the exception and representing the vanguard (Brindley, 
Rydin, and Stoker, 1995; Stoker, 1996; 2000; Healey, 1997; Pierre, 1999; Gualini, 
2001).  
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It was not until around 2002 when the first academic and specialised documents on 
‘water governance’ started to appear in the water policy community, following more 
or less a discontinuous evolution, and also initially showing also some important 
misunderstandings or misappropriations in the use of the concept (Rogers, 2002, 
GWP, 2003, Solanes and Jouravlev, 2006).  Most of these works attempted to 
retrieve ideas from different discourses on governance in the political sciences, and 
somehow only managed to describe the ‘water governance phenomenon’ mostly 
from the perspective of ‘good governance’ (i.e. from the perspective of analysing the 
necessary State capacities that have to be in place in a polity to provide for 
successful governing outputs or governability), and thus failing to capture the 
usefulness of the ‘governance notion’ as a means to analyse the prospect and 
challenges in the enablement of new socio-political governance arrangements.  
Perhaps it was not until the mid-2000’s when this situation started to change, and 
more insightful work on water governance was produced (Allen, Davila, and 
Hoffman, 2006; Castro, 2007, Warner, 2007; Perret, Farfoli and Hassan, 2007).  So 
back in the beginning of 2000’s, at that very initial stage of my doctoral research 
there was definitely a research void that represented a clear opportunity to innovate.  
Of course as time passed, this void was gradually filled, a situation that later 
demanded actions to update and adjust the theoretical framework, a point I will 
address later in this introduction.  
 
The task ahead then was to select which type of MSPs to analyse for the case study 
and between the RBCs, river basin commissions and the COTAS.  I chose the 
COTAS for reasons that I will explain below. The COTAS are MSPs for groundwater 
resources management that exist in the 2004 National Water Law (2004 NWL and 
valid today) as auxiliary institutional bodies of the RBCs and have been established 
in the Mexican water polity since 1997. 4  They are established at the territorial-
administrative level of aquifers, and allegedly are articulated or embedded in the 
institutional structure of the RBCs as auxiliary bodies, and with the objective enabling 
greater social participation/involvement and stakeholder cooperation in groundwater 
management processes. With this knowledge in hand, I chose the COTAS, because 
the phenomenon under study would be relatively more simple and localised in a 
smaller geographical area –the aquifer, against the river basin, a situation that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  This notion of ‘auxiliary bodies’ of the RBCs will be clearly explained later in this document, 
but, putting it simply now, it refers to the notion that the COTAS are embedded in the 
institutional arrangements of the RBCs and in order to give them voice in policy decisions at 
the river basin level, but that affect groundwater management also.  In practice this 
representation is extremely weak, as I will discuss later in this document.  	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demanded trips to different riparian states throughout the fieldwork.  Also, many civil 
servants at CONAGUA emphasised that the ‘socio-political and institutional aspects’ 
surrounding groundwater management were mostly underdeveloped, a context that 
created a relevant scholarly research opportunity.  
 
At that time the Mexican water polity was beginning to acknowledge severe 
groundwater over-exploitation problems, as of the 653 aquifers in the country, close 
to 135 were being severely over-exploited, putting at risk the water security of 
various human settlements and the livelihood of communities across the country.5  It 
became ‘clear’ then for the CONAGUA that the traditional centralised and 
hierarchical legal policy instruments had been inadequate to address sustainable 
groundwater management challenges, and so the establishment of the COTAS was 
considered as an alternative strategy.  This policy choice was greatly influenced by 
the ideas regarding Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) supported by 
the World Bank (WB) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), as well as 
the wider context of Neo-liberal State-transformation impelling for ‘enabling 
decentralisation and social participation’ –at least at a discursive level. Initially, there 
were high expectations that the COTAS could support the much-warranted 
participatory, democratic and sustainable groundwater management that the 
Mexican water polity so desperately required. Unfortunately, the passage of time 
proved those expectations wrong, and for a number of reasons that I will address in 
this thesis.  
 
It is then, that through interviews with government experts, it was possible to pinpoint 
initially one COTAS as a research sample for the PhD research, the Queretaro 
Valley COTAS, that according to the opinion of governments officials in the 
CONAGUA it was the most advanced MSP for groundwater management of its kind 
in Mexico, and so perhaps some interesting scholarly observations could be made 
about its institutional development process, its prospects and challenges. This 
COTAS was part of a World Bank groundwater management programme to support 
sustainable groundwater resources management, The Sustainable Management of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Water security is defined as: “The capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access 
to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human-well 
being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne 
pollution and water-related diseases, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace 
and political stability.” UN-Water, 2013, vi).  In Mexico, as in many places of the world, human 
settlements and productive activities may depend on groundwater to a very high percentage, 
sometimes even 90% or more.  This situation in Mexico makes groundwater over-exploitation 
a matter of water security(Conagua, 2000). 
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Groundwater Programme (Programa de Manejo Sostenible de Aguas Subterráneas, 
MASAS).  
 
After this initial exploratory fieldwork and through further engagement with the latest 
governance literature at that time, it was possible to identify some more refined 
elements of a research problem.  A number of governance scholars (Fung and 
Wright, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2003; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Castro, 2007) were 
addressing important concerns regarding the democratic performance of socio-
political governance arrangements, as according to them they presented important 
risks of being either co-opted by State institutions; captured by powerful actors; 
remaining simply unrepresentative and exclusionary; and simply of being more 
generally ineffective. These scholars also criticised the post-political view of 
governance –that almost ‘enshrines’ its positive traits as a political strategy–, 
otherwise highlighting that the State and power are at the centre of socio-political 
governance arrangements, and thus it is important to be more critical about them.  
Hence, these scholars in the governance field were then working  –and are still 
working– on the development of appropriate analytical frameworks to study the role 
of the State and power in the functioning and development of socio-political 
governance arrangements (Jessop, 2002, 2008; Torfing and Trinatafillou, 2011; 
Torfing, Peters, Pierre and Sorensen, 2012), and also on the study of their 
democratic performance (Swyngedouw, 2006; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Torfing and 
Trinatafillou, 2011; Torfing, Pierre, Peters and Sorensen, 2012). In response to this 
scholarly concern I devoted my attention to find a way to support the systematic 
study of the role of the Mexican State in the establishment and institutional 
development of the MSPs for groundwater resources management and to also study 
of their democratic performance.  
 
In order to address the study of the democratic performance of the COTAS, I 
reviewed different theories of democracy that could prove useful for this endeavour, 
a process that concluded with a fruitful encounter with the associative and 
deliberative democratic theories (Cohen and Rogers et al., 1997; Dryzek, 2000; 
Elster et al., 1998; Smith, 2006; Warren, 2001; Bacstrand, Khan, Kronsell and 
Lovbrand, 2010).  In my opinion, the associative and deliberative democratic theories 
offer clear insights on the contribution that associative and deliberative activity has 
over the democratic performance of institutional arrangements and polities, including 
socio-political governance arrangements. Together both theories present a number 
of potential democratic effects of associative and deliberative activity and also 
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describe the conditions that seem to affect the development or attainment of such 
potential effects. Consequently, both theories offered a suitable analytical power to 
study the democratic prospects and challenges of the MSPs.  Thus, I had found a 
pathway to address the second aspect of the research problem.  
 
Then the PhD research process suffered somewhat of an episodic interruption and 
re-engagement phase that lasted for several years –more than 8 years.  Simply life 
got in the way of the PhD project and due to a number of personal choices and also 
some unforeseen and compelling contingencies.  Still, during this period of time, I 
had the opportunity to work for two years (2002-2004) at the River Basin Councils 
Management Office of the CONAGUA.  During this period of time I was involved in 
coordinating technical assistance through diverse projects aimed at supporting the 
institutional development of MSPs.  Most relevantly, this opportunity allowed me to 
travel and witness some of the associative and deliberative activity behind the 
organisation and activities of the RBCs and the COTAS, and also to have contact 
with water users –who frankly were not very happy about the role and structure of the 
RBCs and the COTAS at that time.  
 
After these two years, I shifted jobs, but remained working at the CONAGUA (2004-
2007), this time at the Deputy Planning and Programing Office, where I participated 
in a number of initiatives, including the national water planning and programming 
processes, and the organisation of the 4th World Water Forum (2006).  Working at 
the IV World Water Forum Secretariat was interesting, amongst other things –and 
relevant to this PhD research– because I had the possibility to organise a High-Level 
Panel on Empowerment and Democratisation in the Water Sector, and through which 
a number of initiatives from around the world were shared precisely on the topic of 
democratisation of local water polities and the empowerment of social actors through 
progressive socio-political water governance arrangements.  Finally, during this 
episodic interruption I also had the opportunity to work for UN-Habitat under the 
Water and Sanitation for Cities Programme (2007-2013), a situation that allowed me 
also to work on pro-poor water governance projects in many peri-urban areas of the 
country. It was then in October 2011 when I decided to officially re-engage with the 
PhD project.     
 
Today ‘governance’ has become a buzzword across policy sectors –including the 
water policy sector– and so what was once really a ‘vanguard’ topic, is now 
absolutely commonplace.  Scholars are now even ‘rethinking governance’ or 
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‘revisiting governance’ (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).  I suppose these are the problems 
of taking too much time to finish research work, the innovative edge is easily lost. 
Still, also time worked in my advantage, because it allowed for the phenomenon 
under study to unravel through a longer period of time and so some of the 
observations made today could not have been made if I had finished earlier. Current 
studies on the ‘governance phenomenon’ offer a quite rich grasp on a number of 
different manifestations of such, to the point that it is possible to find many different 
‘governance connotations’ each referring to the different ‘faces’ of the phenomenon 
(i.e. global governance, good governance, corporate governance, governance and 
the New Public Management (NPM), multi-level governance and socio-political 
governance)(van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004). It is also possible to find 
several approaches (i.e. the society-centred, state centric and state centric-relational 
approaches) each attempting to gain analytical insight over governing processes by 
looking at different aspects of the process of State-transformation and the 
governance phenomenon (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).   
 
These recent theoretical findings demanded to position this PhD project within this 
comprehensive ‘governance concourse’.6   Accordingly, I had to decide to focus on 
one of such ‘governance connotations’, and also to position the PhD vis à vis the 
different governance approaches.  For matters that will be thoroughly explained in 
chapter 2, this PhD is placed within the governance studies that focus on the socio-
political governance connotation, and following the State-centric relational approach.  
Briefly, the most basic argument behind this decision is that, as such, this PhD 
research is interested in the process of Mexican State-transformation, the role of the 
State in the establishment and development of MSPs for groundwater management, 
and the functioning and performance of such, including their democratic 
performance, as already mentioned.  
 
With this latest engagement with the governance studies literature, I confirmed that 
my research questions remained valid and new debates and concepts were found 
that supported the PhD research endeavour and also helped to maintain some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6 Here I borrow from J Dryzek’s (1996) description of a democratic concourse. Accordingly a 
concourse represents a place where ideas, positions, opinions, arguments, criticisms, models 
and theories run together; it is the sum of communication on any topic.  In this case the use of 
the notion of ‘concourse’ may also be applied to the governance phenomenon, as the debate 
still seems to be very much alive, open-ended and uncertain, and so remaining subject to 
contemporary contributions and innovations. Please see: Dryzek, J (1996), Democracy in 
Capitalist Times, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press. 	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innovative edge.  Firstly, I could corroborate that the debate regarding the democratic 
performance of socio-political governance arrangements is still very much alive 
(Torregrosa, Paré, Kloster, and Vera, 2010; Torfing and Trinatafillou, 2012; Torfing, 
Peters, Pierre and Sorensen, 2012).  Scholars are still attempting to find ways to 
study the democratic performance of socio-political governance arrangements 
(Torfing and Triantafillou, 2011). Secondly, I came across with the ‘meta-governance’ 
notion, a concept that scholars started to use to refer to the strategies and capacities 
that the State is using to govern over new socio-political governance arrangements 
(Jessop, 2004; Meuleman, 2008; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Torfing, Peters, Pierre 
and Sorensen, 2012).  Hence, from this last attempt to update the theoretical 
engagement, it was possible to confirm that assessing the democratic performance 
of socio-political governance arrangements is still a timely scholarly research 
question, and that there is a need to study the State’s meta-governance strategies 
and capacities. Thus, the long journey of underpinning the production of this thesis 
came to fruition when I managed to identify the relevance and room for innovation 
afforded both through the theoretical lens adopted and the empirical conditions of the 
case study. 
 
The following task was to reengage with fieldwork again (Summer 2011), only to find 
the need for some radical new adjustments.  Unfortunately, the case study selected 
many years ago, the Queretaro Valley COTAS, had ceased to function since some 
years back, and after having very little influence over groundwater management 
processes.  There were, of course, some aspects to be commented on this situation; 
especially regarding the lack of support from the State in its institutional 
development, but the main problem was that case study was ‘dry’.  A new mega-
aqueduct had been finished, bringing water to the Querétaro Valley from afar, and 
diminishing the pressures and the need for water demand management strategies     
–such as establishing and developing governance institutional arrangements, like the 
COTAS.  This situation also pointed to traditional supply-driven approaches and a 
lack of true commitment to IWRM.  Still, many changes in the local actors, scant 
possibilities of further pursuing primary data collection, and the presence of very 
week democratic effects –if at all–, greatly hindered the possibilities and convenience 
of continuing with the study of the Queretaro Valley COTAS. Overall, this situation 
offered important barriers to continue with this case study, so an alternative had to be 
pursued.  
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It was then that after having new interviews with academics and government officials, 
as well as with the engagement with new sources of secondary data collection 
(Marañon, 2010, Wester, Sandoval, Hoogesteger, 2011), that the informed 
impression was that the COTAS in the State of Guanajuato –and the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS in particular– offered a richer and even ‘positive paradigmatic’ experience 
concerning to the institutional development process of the COTAS and their role in 
groundwater management. This is due to the important and initial support from state-
level government institutions, most relevantly the Guanajuato State Level Water 
Commission (Comisión Estatal del Agua de Guanajuato, CEAG) and more recently 
the CONAGUA’s State Office in Guanajuato.  So the next undertaking was to engage 
in a second fieldwork conducted (Summer of 2011 to Winter 2012) to gather 
information on the COTAS in the State of Guanajuato, and specifically the Laguna-
Seca COTAS. This situation, again, represented some logistical and financial 
challenges that had to be addressed in the best possible way.  
 
This PhD thesis produced insights regarding to the efforts made by the Mexican 
State to consolidate the Neoliberal Statehood project in the Mexican water polity 
through the implementation of a number of State strategies. Regardless of these 
efforts, most of these State-strategies show some important drawbacks and 
contradictions that in time have produced an important deterioration and depletion of 
water resources, and a governing crisis across the Mexican water polity.  The thesis 
goes on and focuses on the implementation of one of such State strategies, the 
implementation of MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS, looking at their 
prospects and challenges, including their democratic performance –and through the 
particular case study of the Laguna-Seca COTAS.  The PhD also looked at the 
existing meta-governance strategies and capacities of the Mexican State to govern 
over the MSPs, COTAS and to support their institutional development, only to find 
that these are only very weak.  Finally, some interpretations are made regarding the 
role of the Mexican State in the institutional development of the COTAS, highlighting 
that this role is full has been mostly limiting and contradictory. 	  
1.2.  Constructing a Heuristic-Analytical Device to Interrogate the Process of 
Neoliberal State-transformation in the Mexican Water Polity and the 
Establishment of MSPs for Groundwater Resources Management 
 
In order to support the study of the Neoliberal State-transformation process in the 
Mexican water polity and the implementation of a number of Neoliberal State-
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strategies, including the establishment of governance arrangements –represented in 
this case by MSPs for water resources management–, their prospects and 
challenges, –including their democratic performance–, and the role of the State in 
their establishment and development, it was necessary to develop a heuristic-
analytical device. 7  This heuristic-analytical device’s architecture is supported by 
different theoretical sources and also by my own professional experience working in 
the CONAGUA. The heuristic-analytical device presents six different ‘moments of 
analysis’ that support different ‘study stages’ or ‘study focuses’.  These moments of 
analysis are carried out sequentially, and together seek to provide a comprehensive 
and ‘generalist’ perspective of the social phenomenon under study.  Accordingly, the 
heuristic-analytical device is comprised by the following moments of analysis. 
 
The first moment of analysis (i. Theoretical Engagement and Explandum) 
corresponds to the general identification and description of the social phenomenon 
under study  (i.e. the research problem) and the theoretical developments that 
support its study.  This moment of analysis develops a coherent description of what 
is to be studied and the reasons why it should be studied (i.e. the explanandum). It 
presents the theoretical sources that support and justify the research project, that in 
the case of this PhD correspond to the following theoretical fields: governance 
studies, Historical Institutionalism, State theory –mainly the post-Marxist and 
Strategic-relational approach–, power theorisations, the associative and deliberative 
democratic theories, and the more recent meta-governance studies. Together these 
theoretical sources support the definition of the research problem and underpin the 
analytical power of the heuristic-analytical device.   
 
The second moment of analysis (ii. Historical and Contextual Institutional Analysis) 
provides a historical and contextual analysis, that in this case represents a historical 
and analytical narrative of the different Statehood formations in the Mexican water 
polity and their pertaining State-projects and strategies, including –briefly– the State 
and Nation-building Statehood formation, the Developmental-Interventionist 
Statehood formation, and –in more detail– the Neo-liberal Statehood formation in the 
Mexican water polity. In practice, although some important facts of the first two 
Statehood formations are presented, the narrative is kept short –for reasons of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I am grateful to Dr Adriana Allen for pointing out the virtues of developing an analytical 
device and also for suggesting revising David Harvey’s device to study socio-ecological 
transformations. Please see: Harvey, D (1996) Justice, Nature and the Geography of 
Difference, Oxford, UK, Blackwell Editorial.  
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space–, and only highlighting some important consequential impacts that exert some 
path-dependencies.  In reality this moment of analysis focuses in the process of 
Neoliberal State-transformation, developing a more thorough narrative of the different 
State-strategies implemented to transform the Mexican water polity, including the 
establishment of MSPs for water resources management. Very importantly, this 
moment of analysis seeks to highlight some important drawbacks and contradictions 
of the Neoliberal State-strategies in an attempt to offer a critical and overarching view 
regarding the process of Neo-liberal State-transformation.  
 
The third moment of analysis (iii. Socio-political Governance Arrangement’s 
Institutional Analysis) focuses on the description and assessment of the actual 
institutional history, design and development of the socio-political governance 
arrangement under scrutiny, the MSPs for groundwater resources management in 
the Mexican polity, the COTAS.  It engages with a short history of groundwater 
management practices and institutional arrangements in the Mexican water polity, to 
then turn to describe the institutional design features of the MSPs. Once the general 
characteristics of these MSPs are established, it then provides a general comment 
on the main drawbacks in the institutional development of the COTAS.  Then, it turns 
to the specific study of the State of Guanajuato COTAS, highlighting some important 
progressive and reformist characteristics, but also some drawbacks and 
contradictions.  Here it is important to establish that they are two different 
approaches to the design and implementation of the COTAS, one represented by an 
initiative led by the CONAGUA (central offices), and another by the Guanajuato State 
Water Commission (Comisión Estatal del Agua, CEAG) and the CONAGUA’s State 
Office in Guanajuato.  Both initiatives are compared, highlighting some important 
conceptual differences, and also some important divergences in the role of the State 
(at the level of the local state) in their institutional development. 
 
The fourth moment of analysis (iv. The Socio-political Governance Arrangement’s 
Democratic Performance Assessment) focuses on the study of the democratic 
performance of the selected MSP for groundwater management, the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS. This sample was selected for its exemplary work and social recognition. The 
democratic performance assessment of the Laguna-Seca COTAS is backed by the 
analytical power harnessed by the associative and deliberative democratic theories, 
and that supports the identification of some ideal-type ‘potential democratic effects’ 
that are later measured against what really has been attained by this COTAS.  Also 
some explanation is given regarding the necessary ‘preconditions’ that seem to have 
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affected the democratic performance of this COTAS. Overall this engagement helps 
then to elaborate on the prospects and challenges of the Laguna-Seca COTAS, and 
perhaps through some form of generalisation to extend some wider comments 
regarding the COTAS in Mexico. The democratic performance assessment of the 
COTAS is very important for this PhD work, because a key assumption is that they 
can contribute to democratise their local water polities against the drawback of a 
highly centralist, hierarchical and even autocratic State.  
 
The fifth moment of analysis (v. The State Meta-governance Capacity Assessment) 
focuses in the study of the State’ meta-governing strategies and capacities, that in 
this case are represented by two different approaches, CONAGUA’s (at the level of 
the central State) and the CONAGUA State Office in Guanajuato.  So, this moment 
of analysis devotes attention to the description and assessment of important meta-
governing strategies and capacities, including amongst them: steering and 
coordinating capacities; resourcing and technical support; democratic vigilance; and 
monitoring and evaluation.  So the task was to assess of these strategies and 
capacities in the context of the Mexican water polity –and implemented over the 
COTAS. 
 
Finally, the last moment of analysis (vi. The Role of the State in the Establishment 
and Development of Socio-political Governance Arrangements) offers some 
concluding reflections on the overall process of Neo-liberal State-transformation, and 
the most important drawbacks and contradictions in the establishment and 
institutional development of the MSPs. This moment of analysis seeks to comment 
on the nature and orientation of the Mexican State, that shows an important bias 
against truly enabling and authentic and democratic social participation/involvement 
and stakeholder coordination, and in favour of reproducing the existing socio-political 
relations of economic power and the enablement of new forms of capital 
accumulation –accumulation by dispossession. Overall this situation regarding the 
role of the State has affected the prospects of the MSPs, and more broadly water 
resources management. Still the MSPs for groundwater resources management offer 
a glimpse of hope, as in the end the virtue of socio-political governance 
arrangements is that they are political venues where socio-political struggle renders 
political outcomes open-ended, uncertain, and contingent. 
 
• The Main Research Questions 
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What have been the main characteristics of the Neo-liberal State-transformation 
process in the Mexican water polity?  What were the main State-strategies 
implemented and what did they achieve? What have been the main drawbacks and 
contradictions in the implementation of these State strategies? 
 
What is the institutional history of groundwater management in the Mexican water 
polity? What are the institutional design features of the MSPs for groundwater 
management, COTAS? What are the prospects and challenges of these MSPs for 
groundwater management at a national level and also in the State of Guanajuato? 
 
What has been the democratic performance of the Laguna-Seca COTAS? What kind 
of democratic effects has it attained, and what preconditions have affected this 
process? Are the COTAS a source of democratisation in the context of the Mexican 
water polity? 
 
What are the main meta-governance strategies capacities of the Mexican State over 
the MSPs for groundwater Management, the COTAS? 
 
What has been the role of the State in the establishment and institutional 
development of the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS? What does this 
role tell us about the nature and characteristics of the Neo-liberal Statehood 
Formation in Mexican water polity? 
 
• The Research Hypothesis 
 
The Mexican State went through a complex Neo-liberal transformation process that 
entailed the implementation of series of State-strategies that sought to transform the 
water polity. Overall, these strategies show important drawbacks and contradictions 
that ultimately have created serious governing problems and path dependencies       
–deliberate and inadvertent. In the case of the establishment of MSPs for 
groundwater resources management (COTAS) –like in the case of the other State-
strategies–, the role of the State in their institutional development has been mostly 
contradictory, at best inconsistent.  In the case of groundwater management, the 
Mexican State appears mostly concerned with enabling economic development and 
the process of capital accumulation, at the expense of a more sustainable, 
participatory and democratic groundwater management, and thus there has been a 
contradictory interest in enabling the institutional development of the COTAS.  
Consequently, the COTASs’ performance –including their democratic performance– 
has been meagre and peripheral in terms of addressing groundwater management 
challenges and democratising the local water polity. Still, it is possible to recognise 
some prospects, especially through the ‘countervailing power’ that has been 
generated at the centre of the COTAS, and also through the recent implementation 
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of some apparently more enabling meta-governance strategies implemented by more 
‘progressive’ cadres of the CONAGUA’s State Office in Guanajuato. This confirms 
the assumption that the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS, are not devoid 
of politics; they remain open-ended and uncertain institutions with outcomes that 
seem contingent to the array of social forces in and around them, and that socially 
construct them. 
1.3.  On the Thesis’ Structure  
 
This PhD thesis is divided subsequently in an introduction and 6 chapters as 
follows.  Chapter 1 on the governance phenomenon describes the general 
theoretical and analytical pathway and research focus of this PhD research.  
Relevantly, this theoretical chapter –alongside chapter 2– supports the architecture 
of the heuristic-analytical device.  It starts with a description of the ‘governance 
notion’ as an evolving an increasing prevalent State-strategy and part of a broader 
process of State-transformation, its main drivers, characteristics and concerns.  It 
also depicts the appropriation of the governance debate in the context of the water 
sector. It then presents the main approaches to the study of the governance 
phenomenon, the society-centred governance approach and the State-centric 
governance approach, and its corollary the State-centric relational approach; 
stipulating that this PhD is situated under the State-centric relational approach and 
for reasons that will be clarified later in this document.  
 
Then the chapter offers also an engagement with three important concepts: 
institutional analysis, the State and power in the context of the socio-political 
governance phenomenon. This section ascertains the role of Historical 
Institutionalism –compared to that of Rational Choice and Sociological 
Institutionalism– in the study of the process of State-transformation and the 
establishment of socio-political governance arrangements, hence, ascertaining HI 
as the preferred approach for this PhD.  Accordingly HI is interested in unfolding 
the relationship between ideologies, policy ideas, institutional structures, and social 
struggles, an important aspiration of this PhD. Then there is a concise presentation 
on the concept of the State, based on a post-Marxist and the strategic relational 
approach interpretations. This brief engagement with the concept of the State will 
help provide analytical power to study the role of the Mexican State in the 
establishment of socio-political governance arrangements, and more broadly water 
resources management.  Afterwards, there is also a brief engagement with the 
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concept of power, and from the perspective of its role in the context of socio-
political governance arrangements –power in, power of or countervailing power, 
and power over socio-political governance arrangements. This engagement also 
generates some analytical edge to later study power relationships in the context of 
the MSPs for groundwater resources management in the Mexican water polity.  
The chapter also devotes efforts to describe the MSPs for water resources 
management, as a form of institutional innovation for socio-political water 
governance.  It develops some general considerations and important dimensions 
regarding their characteristics as an institutional form, such as: scale, scope and 
structure; the form of stakeholder participation –rights, responsibilities and roles of 
the stakeholders–; and the effectiveness, efficiency and equity attained.  These 
dimensions are later –in chapter 6– established and described in the context of the 
MSPs for groundwater management, the COTAS. These theoretical engagements 
later support the analytical power of the third moment of analysis (iv. Socio-political 
Governance Arrangements’ Institutional Analysis) 
 
Afterwards, it presents the quandary regarding the democratic prospects and 
challenges of socio-political governance arrangements, reviewing some scholarly 
positions and theoretical advancements regarding this topic.  This engagement 
serves to clarify the relevance to further the study of the democratic performance of 
socio-political governance arrangements, and so the pertinence of engaging with 
the associative and deliberative democratic theories –in chapter 2.  Finally, the 
chapter engages with the meta-governance concept, a fairly recent conceptual 
innovation.  The section on meta-governance presents some of the most relevant 
elements regarding the State’s meta-governance strategies and capacities, such 
as: coordination, steering, enabling, resourcing, democratic vigilance, monitoring 
and evaluation, etc. This engagement will then support the analytical power of the 
fifth moment of analysis of the heuristic-analytical device (the State’s Mega-
governance Capacities Assessment). Overall, these actions support the 
presentation of the general theoretical debate that supports the formulation of part 
of the research problem or explanandum. 
 
Chapter 2 engages with the debate on the associative and deliberative democratic 
theories. The purpose of this theoretical engagement is based on the assumption 
that both theories can support the study of the democratic performance of socio-
political governance arrangements. Accordingly, this chapter presents both 
theories’ main tenets and concepts, followed by an elaboration on an exposition of 
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‘ideal type’ potential democratic effects of associative and deliberative activity in 
the context of institutional settings, and characterised as: developmental, public 
sphere and institutional effects. So this engagement, as already mentioned, serves 
to construct the fourth moment of analysis of the heuristic analytical device (iv the 
Socio-political Governance Arrangement’s Democratic Performance Assessment). 
Consequently, the democratic performance of the Laguna-Seca COTAS will be 
studied according to the attainment of these potential democratic effects. The 
discussion continues by establishing the preconditions for associative and 
deliberative activity, and in this case characterised under: institutional design 
features and contextual background conditions.  So these preconditions are again 
studied in the case of the Laguna-Seca COTAS.  Overall this reflection supports 
the assessment of the democratic performance of the Laguna-Seca COTAS, and 
also serves to develop part of the research problem or explanandum.   
 
Chapter 3 presents the heuristic-analytical device, outlined in the previous section.  
 
Chapter 4 represents the methodological chapter. This chapter elaborates on 
different methodological aspects, including the research strategy –a qualitative case 
study–, and the research methodology and research methods –including some words 
on the literature review and fieldwork. It then engages with a brief narrative on the 
interpretation of the case study findings, theory building, and the development of 
generalisations. It also presents some ethical and other considerations. Finally, it 
presents the chosen research inquiry paradigm –Critical Realism–, elaborating on 
some relevant aspects and goals of this approach. 
 
Chapter 5 represents an account of second moment of analysis of the heuristic-
analytical device (the Historical and Contextual Institutional Analysis).  This chapter 
presents a brief narrative of the main characteristics of the Nation- and State-building 
and the Developmental-Interventionist Statehood formations in the context of the 
Mexican water polity, highlighting some consequential impacts that have imposed 
some path-dependencies. Through this brief narrative, the chapter presents some 
important historical facts, State-strategies, policy ideas and institutional innovations 
of each of these Statehood formations.  It then turns to develop a more in-detail 
narrative of the process of Neo-liberal State-transformation, and the main State-
strategies implemented, including: the ‘pursuit of integrated water resources 
management (IWRM), an important institutional and administrative-territorial re-
organisation of the water polity, a new National Water Planning process, the 
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decentralisation and municipalisation of water supply and sanitation services, the 
opening for private sector involvement in water supply and sanitation services (WS & 
S services), the irrigation districts decentralisation or transfer process, the 
establishment of system of water property rights –and hence the enablement of 
water markets–, and the establishment of MSPs for integrated water resources –river 
basin councils (RBCs), river basin commissions, and groundwater technical 
committees (COTAS).  Overall this chapter attempts to highlight important drawbacks 
and contradictions in the implementation of such State Strategies, and that somehow 
affected the consolidation of the Neoliberal State project in the Mexican water polity. 
This chapter also serves to begin to illustrate the role of the Mexican State in water 
resources management.  
 
Chapter 6 represents the implementation of the third and fourth moment analysis of 
the heuristic analytical device (iii. Socio-political Governance Arrangement’s 
Institutional Assessment, and iv The Socio-political Governance Arrangement’s 
Democratic Performance Assessment).  This chapter starts with a brief historical 
presentation of groundwater management practices and institutions in the Mexican 
water polity, leading to the establishment of the MSPs for groundwater 
management, COTAS at the end of the 1990s, and as part of the repertoire of 
Neoliberal State-strategies. Subsequently, it presents the institutional design 
analysis of the COTAS, by engaging in the study of their institutional design 
features, considered through the perspective of the MSPs literature. It then 
continues with the presentation of the establishment and institutional development 
of the COTAS in the State of Guanajuato, highlighting some important paradoxical 
aspects and also some drawbacks and contradictions.  After this action, another 
section engages with the democratic performance assessment of the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS –the first MSP for groundwater management established in the State of 
Guanajuato–, describing its main democratic effects and the preconditions that 
seem to have affected the attainment of such effects.  As the reader will see the 
democratic effects, although being meagre, remain, in principle, important. 
 
Chapter 7 engages with implementing the fifth and sixth moments of analysis (v. 
The State’s Meta-governance Capacity Assessment, and vi. The Role of the State 
in the Establishment and Development of Socio-political Governance 
Arrangements).  Accordingly, this chapter will describe the main meta-governance 
capacities of the CONAGUA and the CONAGUA State Office in Guanajuato, 
including amongst them: steering and coordinating capacities, resourcing and 
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technical support, democratic observance, monitoring and evaluation. This action 
will include the presentation of some general meta-governance strategies being 
currently considered by CONAGUA (central office) and the CONAGUA’s State 
Office in the State of Guanajuato. On this aspect, I will present some basic aspects 
of the Integral System for the Management of Aquifers (Sistema Integral para el 
Manejo de Acuiferos, SIMSA) that as already mentioned seems to be an 
interesting and progressive meta-governance strategy.   This chapter concludes 
with some reflections on the role of the State in the institutional development of the 
MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS. 
 
Chapter 8 develops some overall end-comments regarding the doctoral research 
process the thesis. It reflects on the most important limitations and attainments.  It 
considers some future research pathways to complete and further the research 
endeavour on the Study of the process of State-transformation and the establishment 
of MSPs for groundwater management, including the possibility of providing some 
form of policy recommendations to support the performance of the MSPs for 
groundwater management.  It also presents some other interesting research 
pathways identified from the research process.  
 
Annex-A presents the ‘constitutive act’ of the Laguna-Seca COTAS, and for the 
interested reader (in Spanish). In this document the reader will appreciate certain 
aspects the institutional design of the Laguna-Seca COTAS. 
 
Annex-B presents the 2012 Agreement of Cooperation between the CEAG and the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS and the Annual Workplan. In this documents the reader will 
have an opportunity to review the form of relationships between the State and the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS. 
 
Annex-C represents the list of key informants.  
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Chapter 1. The Study of State-transformation Processes and Socio-political 
Governance: The First Moment of Analysis 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The governance notion refers to important processes of State-transformation and to 
changes in the way polities are being organised to enable greater social 
participation/involvement and stakeholder cooperation in an attempt to harness wider 
societal resources to face old and emerging governing challenges.  As a conceptual 
construct and an empirical phenomenon, governance has had important impacts 
across policy sectors and polities around globe. One can read about economic, 
urban, climate, international, energy, water governance, etc. Politicians across the 
ideological spectrum refer to it indiscriminately, almost as a ready-made solution to 
all governing challenges.  Laymen and common citizens grasp to understand –and 
also to contest– its definition and also its practice and implementation. Expectations 
are high on governance bringing about positive socio-environmental change. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be some confusion regarding its meaning and 
characteristics.  Very relevantly, there are also some important normative concerns 
derived of empirical findings that contest some of the optimistic theoretical 
suppositions on governance. 8  
 
Indeed, processes of State-transformation and the rise of the ‘governance notion’ 
can be found in the context of water sector –which is the sector I focus on in this PhD 
thesis.  Water polities have appropriated the concept and attempted to establish new 
institutional forms and policy mechanisms to address complex, interdependent and 
crosscutting water resources management challenges through greater social 
participation/involvement and stakeholder cooperation.  As this chapter will show, 
governance, as a concept and as a social phenomenon, is still very much in a 
process of definition and redefinition, subject to innovation as scholars reflect on it 
conceptually; politicians, civil servants and practitioners work in the design, 
establishment and institutional development of governance arrangements; and 
people –that is concrete water polities– experiment and are governed through them. 
It is important to highlight now that in the context of this PhD a governance 
arrangement is to be considered an institutional form established by a social actor    
–most of the times the State– in order to enable greater social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In this introduction I refrain to establish the bibliographical references, but later in the next 
sections of this chapter extensive references are clearly established.  
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participation/involvement and stakeholder cooperation in an attempt to harness wider 
societal resources –ideas, organisation, finance, technical and managerial 
capacities, etc.– to address complex, interdependent and cross-cutting governing 
challenges.  
 
This chapter is about the process of State-transformation and the rise of the 
governance phenomenon as one central element of this process.  Ultimately, it seeks 
to present some important and relevant aspects of this debate in order to develop a 
research problem or explanadum of this phenomenon, as well as to harness some 
analytical tools to ultimately purport an approach or pathway to study real-life 
process of State-transformation and the establishment of socio-political governance 
arrangements. Therefore, in the first section of this chapter, efforts are made to 
explain the rise and consolidation of the ‘governance notion’ in the political imaginary 
of contemporary polities and its ‘influence’ or ‘effect’ in the water policy sector.  This 
section highlights amongst other things, that there are many connotations regarding 
the governance notion, and thus demarcating socio-political governance –one of 
such connotations– as an important research subject of this PhD.  Furthermore, an 
attempt is made to elaborate on the socio-political governance’s definition and 
meaning; that as the reader will find is still rather slippery and contested.  Certain 
misunderstandings and contestations still abound, perhaps showing that there are 
different `political projects’ and ‘political forces’ behind different understandings and 
practices of the governance phenomenon.   
 
To support the clarification on the socio-political governance phenomenon another 
section is devoted to the description of the main drivers behind it.  These drivers are 
very diverse in nature and thus mapping them out helps to understand some of the 
causes or origins behind the governance phenomenon.  When studying particular 
case studies, these drivers provide clues about specific ‘political projects’, ‘strategies’ 
and social forces affecting the establishment and the institutional development 
process taken by the governance arrangements under study.  As it will be later 
explained, it is possible to consider that the drivers behind specific governance 
arrangements, including which political force or social actor is behind them, 
somehow determine their characteristics, their institutional development process, and 
seemingly also their democratic performance (i.e. the drivers create some form of 
path-dependency in terms of their institutional development).  Although it seems also, 
that once socio-political governance arrangements are established, they also gain a 
life or energy of their own, and that albeit conditioned by different parameters or 
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‘structural constraints’ they still can develop in relatively uncertain path, and through 
the exercise of ‘countervailing power’. 
 
Subsequently, there is also section that elaborates on how the governance notion 
has been applied or used in the context of the water policy sector.  This ‘disciplinary 
migration’ from the realms of the political sciences to the water sector has not been 
very swift, and only until recently the full spectrum of the governance notion –as a 
conceptual construct and social phenomenon– has been fully entertained by scholars 
and practitioners in this field.  Accordingly, it is also possible to find today in the water 
policy sector a debate on the many different connotations of the governance notion.  
This section again demarcates that the object of study is socio-political water 
governance, against the other common connotations, highlighting that socio-political 
governance arrangements are embedded in wider processes of State-transformation.  
In this chapter, I also present a definition of socio-political water governance that 
attempts to integrate a number of critical reflections made by different scholars –and 
presented in this chapter– and with whom I generally concur.  This understanding 
regarding socio-political governance also supports some central elements of the 
main hypothesis of this PhD.   
 
Currently, there are two main approaches to the study of the governance 
phenomenon, the society-centred and the State centric-relational approach, each of 
these approaches focuses on different aspects of the governance phenomenon.9  So 
another section of this chapter elaborates on some of the most relevant differences 
in their underpinnings and analytical orientations.  As the reader will realise, this PhD 
research will follow the State centric-relational approach for several reasons that will 
become clear later through the document, but mainly because one of the main 
research objectives of this PhD is to study the process of State-transformation and 
role of the State in the institutional development of socio-political governance 
arrangements, represented in the case study by the efforts made by the Mexican 
State to establish MSPs for groundwater management and in a context of a profound 
Neoliberal State-transformation process.  
 
As such, this chapter introduces three central ‘characters’ in this PHD research, the 
State, power, and MSPs.  The State is at the centre of the governance phenomenon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In reality in the literature it is possible to identify three different approaches, the society-
centred, the State-centric and the State-centric relational approach.  Still the third is really 
only a corollary of the second, and thus for practical purposes, in the context of this PhD both 
approaches will be treated as one. Still I will also distinguish certain features of each.  
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and is a principle in the distribution of power in society, playing a fundamental role as 
a guarantor and defender of democracy and social equity –at least theoretically 
speaking.  Still, the State is another complex social phenomenon and its role in 
socio-political governance arrangements –and the process of socio-ecological 
transformation for that matter– is subject to heated debates, and not without due 
reasons. The State has been a central actor in driving both very negative and very 
positive processes of socio-ecological transformation. Critical scholars studying the 
governance phenomenon warn us regarding the unclear and even negative role of 
the State in governance arrangements. Therefore, a brief and succinct section 
makes an attempt to present some ideas, animated by post-Marxist and the 
Strategic-relational interpretations on the nature and characteristics of the State. 
These interpretations stress that the State can be best understood as a social 
relation and not as a monolithic and autonomous block. According to these 
interpretations, Statehood formations (i.e. nation-building, developmental-
interventionist, neo-liberal, etc.) deploy State-strategies in attempt to consolidate 
State-projects, an aspect that is explored in this PhD thesis. This specific 
conceptualisation on the State has implications for developing an understanding of 
the role of the State in governance arrangements, an aspect that will be developed 
also in this chapter, and then later in this document, when attempts are made to 
study the role of the Mexican State in the establishment and development of MSPs 
for groundwater management.  An important element of the debate worth highlighting 
now is that the State-relational approach emphasizes that frequently the 
implementation of certain State-strategies and institutional innovations –like 
governance strategies and socio-political governance arrangements– take time to 
consolidate, and sometimes fail to do so or do so incompletely, as a result of 
contradictions, path-dependencies, and even social struggles, or ‘countervailing 
powers’, using A Fung’s (2003) terminology. 10 
 
Governance has been ascribed with very positive connotations, as a governing 
strategy or process that harbours and enables very constructive and productive 
socio-political relations such as greater social participation/involvement and 
stakeholder cooperation.  Still, more critical scholars have more reserved and 
tempered opinions, bringing back into attention in the context of the governance 
debate issues of power and politics to centre stage.  These concerns and reflections 
are certainly warranted, because empirical research points out to important problems 
experienced in socio-political governance arrangements, where asymmetries in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 An explanation on the notion of ‘countervailing power’ will be explained later in this chapter.  
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power are seen to affect the normative outcomes of such arrangements –such as 
their democratic performance–, frequently in detriment of the less powerful and 
marginalised stakeholders.  For this reason, a section of this chapter devotes some 
effort to unravel the second ‘character’, power, as it has been considered to manifest 
in the context of governance arrangements, and to later deploy this theoretical 
reflection to the case study analysis. 
 
The third ‘character’ is the MSPs for water resources management. MSPs are an 
innovative form of socio-political governance arrangement established to solve 
complex, interdependent and crosscutting water challenges, such as integrated 
water resources management and sustainable groundwater management. MSPs 
present institutional designs with particular characteristics, and geared at enabling 
precisely the warranted democratic social participation/involvement and stakeholder 
cooperation required to address complex water resources challenges. In the end 
MSPs are innovative institutional forms, and thus in order to study them it is 
important to develop a theoretical understanding about institutions, their 
characteristics, and the process of institutional change and development. Therefore, 
a section is devoted to clarifying certain institutional design features of the MSPs that 
will support afterwards the study of the MSPs for groundwater management in the 
Mexican water polity. Consequently, this background theoretical knowledge 
regarding institutional analysis will help then to support the study of the MSPs for 
groundwater resources management in Mexico.   
 
Central to this PhD is the study of the democratic performance of governance 
arrangements.  I concur with the more critical scholars of socio-political governance 
that socio-political governance arrangements may very well harbour very positive 
socio-political processes, such as social participation/involvement and stakeholder 
cooperation; but there are also important risks that they may turn into highly 
autocratic, tokenistic and exclusionary institutional forms. Therefore, one section of 
this chapter focuses in describing how scholars are attempting to study their 
democratic performance.  It is an innovative supposition of this PhD, that traditional 
theories of democracy, that focus on the role of electoral reforms and party politics, 
democratic transitions and consolidations, government accountability and 
transparency structures, etc. are ill-equipped to support the study of the democratic 
performance of socio-political governance arrangements, and thus, it turns to the 
associative and deliberative theories of democracy for inspiration.  The reason 
behind this theoretical choice is that the functioning of socio-political governance 
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arrangements, as mentioned previously, rests in the associative and deliberative 
activity of and between stakeholders. Accordingly, both theories study the potential 
capacity of these activities to provide for such democratic performance (i.e. their 
capacity to produce democratic effects).  Consequently, both theories will support the 
democratic performance assessment of socio-political governance arrangements, 
represented in this case by the MSPs for groundwater management.  This debate will 
be presented in more detail in the next chapter, but it is worth mentioning it now, 
because the democratic performance assessment is an integral part of the heuristic-
analytical device presented in chapter 3.  
 
To support the study of the role of the State in the establishment and institutional 
development of socio-political governance arrangements scholars are currently also 
deploying the notion of meta-governance, and referring to the strategies and 
capacities that the State may use to govern over socio-political governance 
arrangements. There are different meta-governance strategies and capacities that, 
as I will attempt to prove, reflect wider strategic orientations on behalf of the State to 
influence the institutional development path of socio-political governance 
arrangements, and ultimately also influencing the consolidation of specific State-
projects.  Consequently, efforts will be made in another section of this chapter’s to 
highlight the most important meta-governance strategies and capacities identified by 
scholars to later undertake a meta-governance capacities assessment of the 
Mexican State water institutions in terms of their capabilities to govern over the 
MSPs for groundwater resources management.   
 
Overall, this chapter seeks to present the most relevant aspects of the debate 
surrounding the process of State-transformation and the governance phenomenon 
and to problematize some important ideas and concerns that deserve to be subject 
of further scholarly research (i.e. it seeks to develop a research problem or 
explandum).  It also brings together a number of conceptual and analytical tools to 
then support the design of a heuristic-analytical device to study specific processes of 
State-transformation and the establishment and institutional development of socio-
political governance arrangements (i.e. to offer an approach or pathway to develop 
an explanans).  The following diagram represents the theoretical-analytical route or 
theoretical analytical mental map for this PhD.  In this mental map I attempt to 
highlight the central elements of this research, the main research subjects, and the 
main theoretical approaches that support the heuristic-analytical device. 
 
	   40 
Figure-1: Theoretical and Analytical Pathway (Mental Map, developed for this doctoral research) 
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1.2.The Rise and Consolidation of the ‘Governance Notion’ in the Political 
Imaginary 
 
Since its inception in the political imaginary in the 1990s, the ‘governance notion’     –
as a conceptual construct– has been rather slippery and contested.  It has been 
attributed with many different connotations with diverse meanings such as for 
example: global governance, good governance, corporate governance, governance 
as the public management, multi-level governance, and socio-political governance 
(Kjaer, 2004; Bavir, 2012).11  All these different connotations can be considered to be 
part of a greater ‘governance concourse’ that is still constantly changing and 
evolving, despite already existing for more than 20 years now. Overall, these 
connotations have been deployed to study diverse facets of an empirical 
phenomenon, the process of State-transformation, broadly characterised by changes 
in the rationale, structures and processes of governing across polities and policy 
sectors in an attempt made by the State to enable greater democratic social 
participation/involvement and stakeholder cooperation throughout the governing 
process, amongst other objectives.   
 
In the context of the water policy sector it is possible to find also a prolific debate on 
the process of State-transformation and the rise of the ‘governance notion’. This 
debate started approximately during the last years of the 1990’s decade, and 
borrows elements from the descriptive and analytical debate on the process of State-
transformation and ‘governance’ taking place within the realms of the political 
sciences. This is to say, that it also refers precisely to broad and encompassing 
changes in the rationale, structures and processes of governing across water polities 
in an attempt to address sustainable water resources management, water and 
sanitation service provision, and water security challenges (GWP, 2003; Solanes and 
Jouravlev, 2006, UN-Water, 2013).  It is important to emphasize that there are some 
important misunderstandings in the use of the governance notion, especially in the 
initial work produced on the subject matter, a point I will address in more detail later 
in this chapter.  
 
I would like to know proceed to narrow down the focus of this PhD research –in 
relation to the different governance connotations– by stating that it will concentrate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  If the reader is interested in a more comprehensive description of all the different 
connotations and meanings of the ‘governance phenomenon’ please see: Kjaer, A. M. (2004) 
Governance, Cambridge, UK, Polity Press.  Also for a more general overview please see:  
Bevir, M. (2012), The SAGE Handbook on Governance, London, UK, Sage Editorial.  
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mainly on socio-political governance –or what some authors refer to as ‘governance’ 
or also interactive governance (Peters et al., 2012).  Reason being, that the socio-
political governance notion is best equipped to systematically study the process of 
State-transformation and the establishment of new socio-political governance 
arrangements to enable greater social participation/involvement and stakeholder 
cooperation. Thus, there is a conscious and relative disregard of the other 
governance connotations that deal with other important themes that are also 
encompassed under the wider debate on the process of State-transformation and the 
water governance debate. 
 
Whilst there are many different interpretations and also misunderstandings on the 
meaning of the ‘governance notion’, there seems to be, at least amongst political 
scientists –specially in the European literature on the subject matter (e.g. Kickert, 
Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997; Pierre and Peters, 2000; Peters, 2000, Torfing and 
Triantafillou, 2011)–, some form of shared understanding on the nature and 
characteristics of this phenomenon. This shared understanding is that the 
‘governance notion’ seeks to describe and explain important changes in the 
rationale, structures and process of governing in response to important ideological 
and material drivers identified in contemporary polities since almost two decades 
ago, and to a lesser or greater degree in different countries of the world (Pierre and 
Peters, 2000; Backstrand et al., 2010; Peters et al., 2012).  Supporting this meaning 
of socio-political governance is R.A.W. Rhodes, one of the first political scientists that 
drew attention to the ‘governance phenomenon’ and already writing systematically 
about it since the mid-1990s:  
 
“Unfortunately, even the most cursory inspection reveals that ‘governance’ has 
several distinct meanings. A baseline definition is essential, therefore, and where 
else to look other than a textbook. Sammy Finer defines government as: the 
activity or process of governing or governance; a condition of ordered rule; those 
people charged with the duty of governing or governors; and the manner, 
method or system by which a particular society is governed. Current use does 
not treat governance as a synonym for government. Rather governance signifies 
a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing, 
or a changed condition of ordered rule, or the new method by which society is to 
be governed.” (Rhodes, 1996: 562-653) 
 
Several scholars after R.W. Rhodes continued to characterise the ‘governance 
phenomenon’ focusing on clearly differentiating ‘government’ –as the traditional 
activity, and entity/structure for governing or governor– from ‘governance’ –as the 
new strategy, structures and processes for governing oriented at harnessing wider 
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societal resources through new types of socio-political governance arrangements to 
address contemporary governing challenges (Kooiman, 2003; Hajer and Wagenaar, 
2003).  It is important to mention that the ‘governance notion’ has also received other 
treatments that seem to equate ‘governance’ to ‘governing’ (i.e. as the broad activity 
of governing); ‘governance’ to ‘good governance’ (i.e. as a range of normative and 
prescriptive principles that convey gonvernability to polities), and ‘governance’ to 
‘governability’ (i.e. as the necessary conditions that convey polities the necessary 
socio-political and economic stability for development) (Kooiman, 2003, GWP, 2003, 
Allen, Davila and Hofmann, 2006). These misunderstandings and ambiguities 
somewhat deplete the ‘governance notion’ of its analytical edge and of its power to 
systematically analyse and support innovative and progressive socio-political 
governance arrangements. Thus, also ultimately hindering its capacity –as a 
conceptual construct– to imagine and enable socio-political governance 
arrangements oriented at supporting positive socio-environmental change (Fung and 
Wright, 2003; Wright, 2010). 12 
 
In the context of the water policy sector, the socio-political governance notion is 
frequently misunderstood and some inconsistencies, like the ones mentioned above, 
abound in the discourse. It is often possible, for example, to find that ‘governance’ is 
equated to the notion of ‘governability’ or ‘good governance’, and as it will later be 
exemplified (GWP, 2003; Solanes and Jouravlev, 2006).  Perhaps then a useful way 
to try to understand with more precision the meaning and implications of socio-
political governance is by turning to the drivers that have impelled and prompted its 
development as a conceptual construct and as an empirical phenomenon across 
polities and policy sectors.  
 
1.2.1. Main Drivers of the Governance Phenomenon  
 
The emergence of the ‘governance notion’ does not occur in a historical and 
institutional vacuum. ‘Governance’ has been considered to be a form of State’s 
response or strategy in attempt to face a number of governing challenges that, on the 
one hand, started to impose important limitations to the State’s capacity to provide 
for the governability of polities since the beginning of the 1990s, and on the other, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Distinguishing these concepts is important, because it is possible to consider that in order 
for socio-political governance arrangements to be able to provide for the governability of 
polities, there is a need to understand what elements provide for their good governance in 
order to build the necessary conditions to support their pursuit.  
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that have impelled for changes in the socio-political relations between the State and 
civil society throughout the governing process (Pierre, 2000; Kooiman, 2003).  In the 
latter sense, governance has also been considered a response to a number of social 
pressures ultimately striving to change the centralised, hierarchical, top-down, and 
even autocratic governing processes across different policy sectors in order to 
reorient them towards more progressive, participatory and empowering governing 
processes (Fung and Wright, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2003, Castro, 2007; Peters et al., 
2012). Some of the main drivers and forces highlighted in the literature are briefly 
described in the following paragraphs.13 
 
• The Fiscal Crises, the Neo-liberal Ideology, and the State’s Retreat  
 
The State’s fiscal downturn resulting from several global economic and financial 
crisis, paired with the rise and expansion of Neoliberalism, pushed for the State’s 
retreat, triggering increasing State budgetary constraints that had direct 
consequences on the reduction of public spending, public programmes’ curtailment 
and strong privatisation moves (Gamble, 2000; Rosneau, 2000; Harvey, 2005).  This 
strenuous fiscal situation and the Neo-liberal ideas regarding the State’s function and 
role prompted the State to find new and creative ways to engage the private sector 
and other actors in civil society in the pursuit of public policy goals and the provision 
of public services.  A number of new forms of institutional innovations appeared, 
such as public private partnerships, cooperative regimes, entrepreneurial zones, 
quangos, amongst others socio-political governance arrangements (Jessop, 2002; 
Hay, Lister and Marsh, 2006; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).  
 
Certainly the water policy sector was also hit by these economic and financial crises 
–as well as being influenced by Neoliberalism– with a direct impact in the orientation 
and role of the State’s water sector institutions in the pursuit of sustainable water 
resources management, water and sanitation provision and water security (Shiva, 
2002; Biswas, Unver and Tortajada, 2004; Castro, 2005).  In the water policy sector 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For a more elaborate discussion on the drivers behind the governance process please see: 
Pierre, J (ed.) (2000), Understanding Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy, 
Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press; and Pierre, J. and B. Guy Peters (2000), Governance, 
Politics and the State, London, UK. MacMillan Press. A critical and insightful view of socio-
political governance that attempts to make an explicit attempt to link socio-political 
governance with democratisation and empowerment processes is the work by E. O. Wright. 
Please see: Wright, E.O. (2003), Deepening Democracy, Institutional Innovations for a more 
Empowered and Participatory Governance, Wisconsin, USA, University of Wisconsin 
Editorial.  
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the State’s budgetary constraints and the Neoliberal ideology prompted important 
government efforts, for example, to decentralise water and sanitation services at the 
state and municipal levels and to provide water and sanitation services through 
several forms of private sector involvement –with very diverse and contested impacts 
(Barlow and Clarke, 2002; Castro and Heller, 2009; Mandri-Perrot, 2009; PPIAF, 
2009).14  Efforts were also made to achieve greater private sector involvement for 
agricultural water management –for example through the devolution of irrigation 
districts to local water user associations–; and water conveyance infrastructure 
construction and financing through public-private partnerships (Perret, Farolfi and 
Hassan, 2006; IWMI-FA0, 2007; Crase and Gandhi, 2009; Gimsey and Lewis, 2007). 
15   Other important measures were the creation of property rights systems and 
subsequently the enablement of water markets.  
 
•  The State’s Legitimacy Crisis  
 
The important State’s limitations to deal with emerging policy problems through 
traditional institutional structures and policy instruments, and the rising citizen 
demands from an increasingly differentiated society, produced also what was 
perceived as a State’s legitimacy crises (Rhodes, 2000; Stoker, 2000; Jessop, 2002). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For an interesting scholarly work on the restructuring of water and sanitation services 
around the world as a result of the neoliberal ideology –and its contestations– is: Castro, E 
and L Heller (2009), Water and Sanitation Services: Policy and Management, London, UK, 
Earthscan Editorial. Also, a very interesting and particular case of the decentralisation of 
water and sanitation process paired with the evolution of local democracy is the case of 
Bolivia’s water sector, and of course as a result of the great social discontent produced by 
failed private sector involvement during Hugo Brazner’s second mandate (1997-2001), and 
that opened up for a global Suez to provide services in the city of Cochabamba. Please see 
Faguet, J P (2012), Decentralisation and Popular Democracy: Governance from Below, 
Michigan, USA, University of Michigan Press. On the issue of private sector involvement in 
water and sanitation an interesting interdisciplinary project with broad material worth 
reviewing is: “Barriers and Conditions for the Involvement of Private Capital and Enterprise in 
Water Supply and Sanitation in Latin America and Africa: Seeking Economic, Social and 
Environmental Sustainability”, and coordinated by Dr Esteban Castro. Please see: 
www.prinwass.org. Also a comprehensive approach to the phenomenon of public-private 
partnerships is presented in Johnstone, N and L. Wood (eds) (2006), Private Firms and 
Public Water: Realising Social and Environmental Objectives in Developing Countries, 
Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar.  
15 Two interesting cases of agricultural water management decentralisation processes to 
irrigation districts are the case of India and Mexico. Please see: Crase, L and Gandhi, V 
(eds.) (2009),Reforming Institutions in Water Resource Management, London, UK, Earthscan 
Editorial. See also Torregrosa M.L. (2001), “Modernización del campo en México y crisis de 
las identidades tradicionales: el caso de los distritos de riego en México”, in Pérfiles 
Latinoamericanos de Ciencias Sociales, num 14, p.p. 149-174. Another comprehensive 
reading on the case of water governance in agricultural water management across Asia and 
Africa is: Perret, S; Farolfi, S and R. Hassid (2006), Water Governance for Sustainable 
Development, London, UK, Earthscan Editorial.  
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This legitimacy crisis, together with the evolution of more pluralist, differentiated, 
informed and political active societies –demanding for more responsive, transparent, 
accountable and participatory government institutions and policy process– impelled 
the State to devise new socio-political governance arrangements to meet these 
contemporary policy problems and to address rising societal demands (Hirst, 2000; 
Dryzek, 2000; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003).   
 
The centrality of water in socio-economic development and in sustaining social 
livelihoods certainly exercises a continuous and increasing pressure over the State 
water institutions to address all forms of sustainable water resources management, 
water supply and sanitation provision challenges, and water security concerns.  Due 
to the complexities inherent to these challenges and concerns, a State’s legitimacy 
crisis across different regions of the globe has gradually been evolving and now is 
widely recognised. In the case of the water policy sector this legitimacy crises is 
represented by the term of ‘the water governance crisis’ (Hunt, 2004; Jimenez and 
Marin, 2004; UNESCO, 2006; Whtiley, Ingram and Warren, 2008).  Accordingly, the 
‘water governance crisis’ –that to my mind should be termed differently to avoid 
misunderstandings, perhaps the water governing crises– has prompted international 
institutions, States and civil society to promote the organisation of socio-political 
governance arrangements, such as MSPs for IWRM. Indeed social needs and 
demands for sustainable and equitable water resources management, water and 
sanitation services for all, and water security have been left widely unmet across the 
globe (UNESCO, 2006; UNHABITAT, 2003; UNDESA, 2012, UN-Water, 2013). 
These drawbacks and challenges have prompted, on the one hand, the State to 
develop more decentralised, participatory and democratic forms of water governance 
arrangements –albeit sometimes only to share the governing burden in an 
irresponsible and inefficient way–, and on the other hand, for civil society to self-
organise to address these challenges and press States around the world for their 
right to water.  On this, many examples abound of community-based partnerships 
and co-production (Swyngedouw, 2004; Allen, Davila and Hoffman, 2006).16   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The literature on this subject is very extensive, but a comprehensive and interesting review 
of this topic is represented by: Berry, K. and E. Mollard (eds) (2010) Social Participation in 
Water Governance and Management, London, U.K., Earthscan Editorial. Also, the case of 
peri-urban and rural areas is paradigmatic of the water governance crisis, because peri-urban 
areas offer very particular water and sanitation services challenges that deter water utilities to 
attempt to provide services in these areas. On this topic please see:  Kurian, M. and P. 
McCarney (eds.)(2007), Peri-Urban Water and Sanitation Services, London, U.K. Springer; 
and AVINA (2011); Modelos de Gobernabilidad Democrática para el Acceso al Agua en 
América Latina, Cordoba, Argentina, Fundación Avina. Another interesting part of the debate 
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• The Rise of Complex and ‘Wicked’ Policy Problems 
 
The rise of complex and ‘wicked’ policy problems demands greater social 
participation and stakeholder cooperation. These new range of policy problems have 
triggered the rise in the institutionalisation of socio-political governance 
arrangements (Kanie and Haas, 2004; Adger and Jordan, 2009; Delmas and Young, 
2009).  The emergence of for example global and transboundary policy problems, 
such as climate change, drug and human trafficking, and terrorism demands greater 
collaboration amongst States and within States, impelling for different forms of multi-
level governance (Rosneau, 2000; Bache and Flanders, 2003).  
 
Water polities around the world definitely confront complex sustainable water 
resources management, water and sanitation and water security challenges.  It is 
also widely accepted that water is itself a crosscutting, transboundary and global 
policy problem (Hunt, 2004; UNESCO, 2006, GWP, 2012, 2013).  This appreciation 
is very much represented by the concept of ‘integrated water resources 
management’. As such integrated water resources management is a socio-political 
and technical process that seeks to promote amongst stakeholders the coordinated 
development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to 
maximise the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems (GWP, 2012).  The IWRM 
paradigm attempts precisely to address the complexity, interdependence and 
crosscutting nature of water resources management. Accordingly, the level of 
complexity of the IWRM’s policy objectives demands for institutional structures and 
policy processes that truly enable social participation/involvement and stakeholder 
cooperation at the river basin, groundwater and even transboundary levels 
(Falkenmark and Rockstrom, 2004; World Bank, 2007, Garcia, 2008; GWP, 2013).  
On this it is relevant to mention that the literature studying IWRM frequently focuses 
also on the role of MSPs as the ‘ideal type institutions’ to pursue it. 17 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that for reasons of space cannot be addressed is the issue of adequate technological choice 
and appropriate and decentralised technologies in the water and sanitation sector.  On this 
topic interesting networks and organisations offer thorough material on the subject matter in 
their webpages. Please see: www.susana.org. www.borda-net.org, and www.ecosanres.org. 
17 Again the literature is quite extensive but interesting work on the subject matter, especially 
on Latin America is the work produced by the ECLAC. Please see: Dourojanni, A, Jouravlev, 
A and G Chavez (2002), Gestión del Agua a Nivel de Cuencas: Teoría y Práctica, Santiago 
de Chile, Chile, ECLAC. The case of the Confederaciones Hidrogáficas in Spain is also 
extremely interesting, because it represents a gradual process of institutional development. 
On these please see: Vera, J A (2008), La gestión institucional del agua en España 1978-
2008, Valladolid, Spain, Editorial Liteam. The river basin councils in Mexico are also an 
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• The Pursuit of Democratisation and Empowerment  
 
Finally, the erosion of the affirmative-developmental-interventionist State and the loss 
of democratic vitality in society, felt in polities across the globe, has prompted, on the 
one hand, the Right to support the implementation of Neoliberalism, and on the 
other, the Left –and other progressive forces– to reconsider the role of the State in 
governing.  Both political forces purport ‘socio-political governance’ as a new strategy 
to support ‘greater’ decentralisation, democratisation, and empowerment throughout 
the governing process –albeit probably having different understandings of each of 
these processes.  Socio-political governance is then considered an opportunity to 
foster the warranted decentralisation, democratisation, and empowerment processes 
that will also, in turn, advance positive socio-environmental change. Under this last 
perspective and also through under the more Leftist views, socio-political governance 
can be considered in itself, not only a mechanisms or process for governing, but also 
a driver –per se– of greater decentralisation, democratization, and empowerment 
(Barry, 2000; Fung and Wright, 2003; Wright, 2010).   This aspect of the debate is 
important for this PhD research.  
 
Unfortunately, the water policy sector is plagued with injustice and inequality 
(Chatterji, Arlosoroff, and Guha, 2002; Whitley, Ingram and Warren, 2008, CAF, 
2013).  It is frequently the case that powerful stakeholders –usually supported by the 
State– benefit disproportionally from their access to water resources.  Frequently, for 
example, poor and marginal communities have deficient or no access to water and 
sanitation services, and as a result of protracted and structural social inequalities 
(Allen, Davila and Hoffman, 2006; Castro, 2009, GWP, 2011).  This has led to the 
creation of a many diverse and innovative socio-political governance arrangements –
frequently supported in financial and technical terms by NGOs, CBOs, 
philanthropies, universities and research centres– that aim to help marginalised and 
poor local water polities to gain access to water resources for their sustainable 
livelihoods.18  What is interesting about these innovative forms of socio-political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
interesting experience of MSPs at the river basin. Unfortunately, despite gradual process of 
limited institutional development, the general criticism is that they do not truly allow for a 
representative and legitimate social participation.  On this please see: Chavez, G (ed) (2001), 
Memoria de la Primera Reunión de Consejos de Cuenca en México, Mexico City, Mexico, 
Conagua. Finally an interesting global comparative study on decentralised water resources 
management is: Kemper, K; Bomquist, W and A Dinar (eds) (2010), Integrated River Basin 
Management through Decentralisation, Berlin, Germany, Springer. 
18 There are several organisations that support this type of processes. Interesting work is 
carried out for example by: BORDA, Building Partnerships for Water and Sanitation, Charity 
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governance arrangements is that they have at their core, strategies to truly support 
local communities’ decentralisation, democratisation and empowerment.19  On this 
Allen, Davila and Hoffman (2006) develop some insights: 
 
“The debate on governance has expanded significantly in the last 15 years.  This 
has been associated with an increased focus on the responsibility of the 
international community to both understand and to improve the general 
conditions for policy making through adopting values of participatory democracy, 
social justice and environmental sustainability.  This preoccupation has resulted 
in an often prescriptive debate about the most appropriate governing processes 
to promote cooperation and co-responsibility among different social actors.  In 
some cases, the outcomes of this debate have even become organised as 
conditionality prescribed by international institutions, as in the debate 
surrounding ‘good governance’. (Allen, Davila and Hoffman, 2016: 45) 
 
The above exposition on the drivers of socio-political governance is brief, but allows 
us to grasp the idea that there are many different factors behind the rise and 
consolidation of socio-political governance.  Some of these factors are ideological, 
some of them have to do with technical and efficiency concerns, and some have a 
root in ‘material’ conditions faced by local polities on a daily bases and that have 
prompted them to self-organise to address them. Overall these challenging 
situations, in turn, produce the many diverse ‘faces’ or ‘sides’ of the socio-political 
governance phenomenon.  It is time now to elaborate in more detail on the socio-
political governance phenomenon’s characteristics.  	  
1.3.  The State-transformation Processes and Socio-political Governance: Main 
Characteristics and Application in the Water Sector  
 
Socio-political governance, as an evolving and increasingly prevalent governing 
strategy and process aimed at enabling greater social participation/involvement and 
stakeholder cooperation throughout the governing process, has had important 
implications in the way governing processes are being conceptualised, designed and 
implemented (Guy Peters et al., 2012).  M. Hajer and H. Wagenaar (2003) reflect on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Water, Development Planning Unit, Fundación Avina International Institute for Environment 
and Development, IIRC, UCN, SNV, SEI, SIWI, UNHABITAT, Water Aid, Water.org, WSSCC, 
WSUP, and the WSP, amongst many others.  
19  The issue of empowerment and democratisation in the water sector was strongly 
highlighted during the 4th World Forum by the ‘Empowerment and Democratisation High Level 
Panel’, chaired by Dr. Julia Carabias, former Secretary State for the Environment in Mexico 
and moderated by Dr. Adriana Allen of the DPU in London. The panel presented interesting 
examples of empowerment and democratisation processes in the water sector, around the 
world, and highlighted the challenges and opportunities faced by progressive socio-political 
governance arrangements.  
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some of these important implications characterising the socio-political governance 
phenomenon:  
 
“The new vocabulary of governance seems to capture important changes in both 
the nature and the topography of politics. A new range of political practices has 
emerged between institutional layers of the state and between state institutions 
and societal organisations.  The new language is rooted in the appreciation of 
the importance of these new political practices. (…) The prominence of the new 
vocabulary of governance also illustrates a widespread dissatisfaction with the 
limited reach of ‘set solutions’ to thorny political issues imposed through top-
down government interventions. Many pressing problems no longer comport with 
the established systems of politics, administration and society. Practical needs 
drive the development of cooperative efforts among new constellations of 
actors.” (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; 1-2) 
 
Hajer’s and Wagenaar’s (2003) intervention highlights several aspects that are 
central to the socio-political governance phenomenon.  According to them, across 
policy sectors there is new way to conduct politics and public policy through which 
different social actors in the political system are enabled to interact in order to 
address the State’s limitations, complex policy challenges, and collective action 
problems. There is also reference to the appearance of a new type of socio-political 
actor or entity, the policy network, amongst other new institutional entities.20  There 
seems also to be an implied optimism regarding these ‘new’ types of positive socio-
political relations and new types of “constellations of actors”, something that is 
recurrent in the context of the contemporary discourse on socio-political governance. 
This optimism is warranted, but as this PhD will describe later, deserves careful 
scrutiny.   
 
The notion of ‘socio-political governance’ brings to the fore criticism to the sole and 
privileged use of market enabling strategies and mechanisms aimed a harnessing 
market forces and regulating societal behaviour to avoid socio-economic and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The concepts of ‘policy networks’ and ‘governance’ accompany each other as conceptual 
constructs in a large segment of the specialised literature on the governance notion.  As such 
the concept of policy network is used to depict patterns of relations between interdependent 
social actors that participate in a policy process, where no individual actor considers having 
the necessary capabilities to pursue his or her own interest, nor the public interest. The 
concept of policy network appeared in the political imaginary approximately at the same time 
as the governance notion did.  It is worth highlighting that the more recent literature on 
governance centres a lot of its attention in the study of governing strategies, processes and 
mechanisms to govern policy networks. If the reader is interested in this debate please see:  
Kickert, J, M, Klijn J K and J Koppenjan (1997) Managing Complex Networks, London, UK 
Sage Editorial; John, P (1998) Analysing Public Policy, London, Pinter; Kooiman, J (2003), 
Governing as Governance, London, UK. Sage Editorial; and Torfing, J. and P. Triantafillou 
(2011), Interactive Policy Making, Meta-governance and Democracy, Colchester, UK, ECPR 
Editorial.  
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environmental externalities, and thus swerving away from the exclusive and orthodox 
use of market like mechanisms.  According to this view, the governing limitations and 
drawbacks of these traditional and orthodox governing modes have prompted a 
process of State-transformation and response oriented at attempting to harness an 
extensive array of societal resources by favouring the use of new governance 
arrangements, like cooperative regimes, governing commissions, PPPs, ad-hoc 
development corporations, co-management and self-regulation institutions, policy 
networks and multi-stakeholder platforms, etc. (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Torfing 
and Triantafillou, et al., 2011; Peters et al., 2012).  E. Swyngedouw (2005) comments 
on some of these aspects of socio-political governance (or “governing beyond-the-
state”): 
 
“Governance as an arrangement of governing beyond-the-state (but often with 
the explicit inclusion of parts of the state apparatus) is defined as the socially 
innovative institutional or quasi-institutional arrangements of governing that are 
organised as horizontal associational networks of private (market), civil society 
(usually NGO) and state actors.  These forms of apparently horizontally 
organised and polycentric ensembles in which power is dispersed are 
increasingly prevalent in rule making, rule setting and rule implementation at a 
variety of geographical scales. (...) They exhibit an institutional configuration 
based on the inclusion of private market actors, civil society groups and parts of 
the traditional ‘state apparatus’ (Swyngedouw, 2005: 1992). 
 
E. Swygedouw touches on two interesting aspects of the governance phenomenon. 
First, he also highlights the idea that these new forms of socio-political governance 
have actually created new institutional or organisational ensembles, previously not 
seen or recognised in polities, such as polycentric ensembles (e.g. policy networks, 
public private partnerships, cooperative regimes, and multi-stakeholder platforms).  
Secondly, he captures an important political implication, the idea that power has 
been dispersed across the polity and between the social actors participating in these 
polycentric ensembles.  Indeed, how and even whether this power has been 
dispersed across the polity and to what purpose and extent is something that has 
become a central aspect of the more critical scholarly research on the emergence 
and consolidation of socio-political governance arrangements.  Later in this chapter 
efforts are made to address the issue of power in the context of socio-political 
governance arrangements, only to find that literature considers that power manifests 
in many different dimensions in the context of such arrangements.  
In the water policy sector there is widespread recognition that sustainable water 
resources management, water supply and sanitation, and water security challenges 
cannot be addressed by the State in isolation, and that greater social 
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participation/involvement and stakeholder cooperation is required (Allen, Davila, 
Hoffman, 2006; Grigg, 2011; GWP, 2012; Lele, Klousia-Marquis and Goswami, 
2013). Perhaps one of the first systematic efforts in addressing the meaning and 
conceptual contribution of the socio-political governance notion in the water policy 
sector is the one offered, some time ago, by the GWP (2003).21   As the next 
quotation shows, the treatment offered by the GWP, at that time, still shows certain 
level of ambiguity and perhaps even misunderstanding on the meaning of socio-
political governance. This situation was the norm in the water sector for the initial 
works on the subject matter, when the socio-political governance notion first 
expanded or migrated to the policy sector. The next quotation by the GWP is 
perhaps self-explanatory of this situation: 
 
“Governance is the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to 
manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes, 
and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, 
exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. 
Water governance refers to the range of political, social, economic and 
administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water 
resources, and the delivery of water services, at different levels of society. 
Governance is already practiced in all countries and the aim is to make it more 
effective. To achieve more effective water governance it is necessary to create 
an enabling environment, which facilitates efficient private and public sector 
initiatives and stakeholder involvement in articulating needs.  Governance covers 
the manner in which allocative and regulatory politics are exercised in the 
management of resources and broadly embraces the formal and informal 
institutions by which authority is exercised. The new term for discussing this 
combination of formal and informal institutions is called distributive governance 
(Kooiman, 1993), which is discussed later.” (GWP, 2003: p7) 
 
The above definition of water governance on behalf of the GWP is to a certain extent 
confusing.  Initially in this definition, ‘governance’ seems to be very much equated to 
the overall notion of ‘government’ as the overall activity and structures of governing, 
something that as already mentioned is a common problem when attempts were 
made by specialists from other policy sectors to address the governance debate.  
There is also a vague or ambiguous mention to the idea that effective water 
governance should facilitate greater public and private interaction, as well as 
stakeholder engagement, but it is as far as it goes.  Finally, at the end of the 
description there is some mention that governance also implies the use of formal and 
informal institutions, through a new form of governing strategy or practice, in this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This case is relevant, because the GWP is an influential network in the water sector and its 
technical papers have widespread influence in the sector.  
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case termed ‘distributive governance’ (i.e. governance in this case is qualified by the 
use of an adjective to make reference to a new governing method or strategy), but no 
further elaboration on this aspect is presented. 
 
As time elapsed, the argumentations developed on ‘water governance’ –including 
those of the GWP´s– became more refined and more illustrative; better integrating 
the different elements considered by the socio-political governance debate and 
taking place in parallel in the realms of the political sciences (GWP, 2008, 2011).22   
In a more recent work on water governance, Edelenbos, Bressers and Scholten 
(2013) develop a clearer understanding of the socio-political governance notion, one 
closer to the meaning used in the political sciences debate, and one better equipped 
to support descriptive and analytical work: 
 
“Due to the complex nature of water systems, a water governance approach is 
needed in which different values, interests and uses of water that are 
interconnected so that water policy measures are developed and implemented 
with the support of different stakeholder groups. (…) This means that the solution 
can only be found beyond the boundaries of one layer and segment of 
government and even often beyond the boundaries of government as a whole.  It 
requires delicate ways of governing multi-actor processes, which we call water 
governance in this book.  As in the case with governance in general (Kickert, et 
al. 1997) and also in the case of water governance, there has been a general 
shift from an emphasis on State provision to private provision based on market 
principles, and more recently, a multi-stakeholder approach in water 
governance.” (Edelnbos, Bressers and Scholten, 2013:5) 
 
Accroding to Edelnbos, Bressers and Scholten (2013), enabling and governing multi-
stakeholder processes becomes then a central concern of water governance.  I 
agree with this perspective and share with other scholars the interest in studying 
MSPs in the water sector (Warner, 2007).  Later this chapter will address in a more 
detail a description of MSPs for water resources management to give a more through 
idea of their characteristics.  I will know refer to two of the main approaches to the 
study of the ‘governance phenomenon’, the society-centred and the State centric-
relational approaches, something that will help locate this PhD in the context of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Other relevant and comprehensive interventions on water governance that are worth 
reviewing for more information on the topic are:  Solanes, M and A. Jouralev (2008) Water 
Governance and Sustainability, Santiago de Chile, ECLAC; L. Miranda (ed.) (2011), Water 
Governance Key Approaches: A Literature Review, Amsterdam, University of Amsterdam; 
and UNDP (2013) Assessing Water Governance, New York, U.S.A., UNDP. Perhaps it is also 
relevant to mention that the water governance debate definitely evolved as social scientists 
started to work on it, supporting the initial efforts of water resources managers from the ‘hard 
sciences’, such as civil and water engineers.  
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scholarly research efforts on the subject matter and also help to demarcate the 
research focus.   
 
1.4. The Different Approaches to the Study of the Governance Phenomenon 
 
After several years of evolution of the ‘governance concourse’, it is possible to 
identify two distinct analytical approaches to the study of the governance 
phenomenon: the society-centred and the State centric-relational approaches.   Each 
of these approaches focuses in studying different aspects of the governance 
phenomenon, and thus has developed distinct descriptive and analytical tools to do 
so.  The first one focuses almost entirely in the study of policy networks, their 
emergence, functioning and the State’s responses to attempt to govern over them in 
the pursuit of the public interest.  The second one focuses more on the process of 
State adaptation, seeking to reassert the position and role of the State in the context 
of socio-political governance arrangements. 
 
1.4.1. The Society-centred Governance Approach 
 
The society-centred governance approach supports the notion that polities across 
policy sectors worldwide are now populated by a number of diverse social actors with 
diverse interests. These social actors have different capabilities to influence the 
governing process and are dispersed across what is perceived as an extremely 
dynamic, pluralist, horizontal and pluri-centric polity.  These social actors are also 
frequently grouped in the form of policy networks around the pursuit of their individual 
and collective interests throughout the policy process (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2004; 
Torfing et al., 2011; Peters et al., 2012).  Policy networks are conceived as open and 
changing socio-political entities, readjusting constantly in the process of socio-
political interaction.  Accordingly, the political and policy process in the context of 
policy networks is described as fluid, dynamic and interactive.    
 
In policy networks settings the State is perceived as no longer holding the 
predominant role throughout the governing process, because it does not have the 
necessary power and autonomy to pursue public policy goals. This interdependency 
has prompted the State to adapt by developing new governing strategies to steer 
over these policy networks in an attempt to organise collective action towards the 
pursuit of public policy goals and also to safeguard the public interest.  These new 
capabilities are referred to in the literature as “network management strategies for 
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the public sector” (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997) and more recently as meta-
governance network management capacities (Torfing and Triantafillou, 2011; Peters, 
2012).  
 
In scholarly terms the society centred approach to the study of socio-political 
governance offers great analytical prospect to the study of the civil society’s 
transformation and participation the governing process. It is also useful to study the 
changing relationships between the State and different types of social actors 
established with the emergence and evolution of policy networks, and to the way 
power and authority is exercised and distributed across participant actors.  More 
recently, several scholars have also focused their attention in the challenge that 
policy networks face in terms of democratic practice, developing interesting means to 
analyse for example what democratic decision making, political representation, 
accountability, transparency, and inclusive participation means in the context of 
policy networks (Lewis and Triantafillou, 2011, Meuleman, 2008; Koppenjan, Kars, 
and van der Voot, 2011). 
 
1.4.2. The State-centric and State-centric Relational Governance Approach 
 
The State-centric approach focuses on the study of an observable phenomenon in 
polities around the world, the manner that the State has changed and has 
transformed in response to a number of governing drawbacks and challenges, 
experienced mostly at the end of the 1990s (Pierre and Peters, 2000; Peters, 2000).  
Accordingly, ‘governance’ has been the State response in order to reassert and 
maintain its steering role and coordination capacities, and by developing new 
governing strategies, structures and processes aimed at sharing responsibilities, 
recognising interdependencies between social actors and harnessing societal 
resources through greater social participation/involvement and stakeholder 
cooperation in order to achieve greater collective action in the pursuit of public policy 
goals.   
 
The State-centric approach to the study of the governance phenomenon retains 
much of the ‘old institutionalist’ political science’s emphasis on the study of 
government institutions, and how they have sought to establish new governance 
arrangements, as well as on how these arrangements evolve through time (i.e. 
focusing on the traditional ‘institutionalist’ research interests, such as institutional 
design features, institutional change and development processes, and path-
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dependency phenomena).  It is relevant to comment that this PhD research shares 
the same research interests of the State-centric approach, because part of its main 
research focus is on the changing relationship between the Mexican State and civil 
society throughout the water resources management processes, and more 
particularly the role of the State in the establishment and institutional development of 
the MSPs for ground water management. The State-centric governance approach 
neglects the proposition made by the society-centred approach that an increasing 
number of policy decisions are taken by self-organising policy networks, as evidence 
has proven that State’s authority remains central to most governance strategies and 
contexts. Smith (2006) supports this criticism of the society-centred approach: 
 
“The problem with society-centred governance accounts of state reform and 
development is that they fall back on the simplistic assumptions of pluralism. 
They ignore the asymmetries of power that potentially exist even in network 
relations. Perhaps the main problem is the way in which governance assumes 
that the central state has lost power when there is a raft of empirical evidence to 
demonstrate the high level of resources and authority that remain within the 
central state.” (Smith, 2006:32) 
 
More recently some scholars have developed a corollary of the State-centric 
approach, the State centric-relational approach, and that offers some slight 
complementarities. One of the central tenets of the State centric-relational 
governance approach is that the governability of a polity should be considered an 
outcome of a more systemic type of capacity pertaining to the overall political system 
–and not only the State–; and made up of all manners of societal interactions 
between the State and social actors in the pursuit of private and public interests (Bell 
and Hindmoor, 2009).  In this view the State still plays a central role in governing, but 
one of its central task is to enable the necessary conditions to support all social 
actors to progressively and positively contribute to the governability of the polity.  Bell 
and Hindmoor (2009) comment on this: 
 
“Our approach is state-centred because we argue that governments rely upon 
hierarchical authority to implement their policies, and because even when 
governments choose to govern in alternative ways, the state remains the pivotal 
player in establishing and operating governance strategies and partnerships. 
We, thus, see governance and changes in governance arrangements as 
substantially driven by changes in state preferences and strategy. Our approach 
to governance is also relational because we emphasise the extent to which 
governments in establishing and operating governance strategies, develop 
strategic relationships or partnerships with a range of non-state actors. (…) Our 
state-centric relational approach emphasises the importance of the state and 
also the importance of state-society relations in governing. Our state-centric 
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relational approach thus absorbs the relational aspects of the society-centred 
approach, but from a state-centric perspective.” (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009:3) 
 
It seems important to comment that each of the governance approaches shed some 
light on different aspects of the ‘governance phenomenon’.  Scholars pertaining to 
each of the approaches have developed –and are currently developing– analytical 
frameworks to pursue timely and important research questions on the ‘governance 
phenomenon’.  Moreover, it is also important to mention that each approach offers 
particular advantages to pursue the analysis of specific research objectives in 
different policy sectors and contexts.  Ultimately, the choice of between approaches 
involves the careful understanding of the research focus at hand, and the potential 
that each approach offers for case study analysis.  In the context of the present PhD 
research, the approach pursued will be, as already mentioned, that of the State 
centric-relational approach to the study of socio-political governance, because the 
focus of this research is not the study of policy networks in the context of the 
Mexican water polity, but the study of the role of the State in the establishment and 
development of socio-political governance arrangements, represented by the MSPs 
for groundwater resources management. 
  
In the following section, I will address some basic aspects of institutional analysis, 
because, ultimately, one of this PhD interests is to study of the socio-political 
governance arrangements as a form of institutional innovation. It will also present 
some aspects regarding the ‘State’ and ‘power’ that will be useful to help understand 
their role in the context of socio-political governance arrangements.  Both notions are 
central concepts in the social sciences and at the centre of any elaboration on the 
socio-political governance phenomenon; despite the efforts made by some quarters 
to depoliticize the discourse on socio-political governance and remove any notion of 
conflict and social struggle out of it.  
 
1.5. Institutional Analysis, the State, and Power in the Context of the Socio-
Political Governance Phenomenon 
 
It seems important to remember that we should not be fooled into believing without 
hesitation that socio political governance is devoid of politics (i.e. consensus-building, 
political struggle and conflict), involving only positive participatory and cooperative 
relationships between the State and other stakeholders through different type of 
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socio-political governance institutional arrangements.23  Peters et al. (2012) reflects 
on this misconception:  
 
“”An even greater problem caused by the post-political vision of governance is 
that interactive forms of governance tend to be exempted from democratic 
demands.  Hence, if interactive governance arrangements are considered to be 
un-political and devoid of power, there is no reason for making a fuss about their 
democratic performance and scrutinizing their democratic quality. (Peters et al., 
2012:54) 
 
Socio-political governance is about collective decision-making in more or less 
formalised institutionalised settings in which multiple stakeholders –with different 
interests, strategies and resources– are continuously engaged in politics, and under 
the ‘shadow’ or ‘aegis’ the State.  Socio-political governance is also about the State 
sharing decision-making power with other stakeholders in civil society.  These 
important considerations have been highlighted by the more critical scholars studying 
the socio-political governance phenomenon, and today are becoming more central 
and widespread to the debate (Swyngedouw, 2005; Castro, 2007; Peters et al.; 
2012).  On this ‘neglected’ aspect of the socio-political governance phenomenon 
Peters et al. (2012) again provides a telling insight regarding the prevalent research 
interests: 
 
“As such interactive governance is often depicted as a pragmatic ‘problem 
solving’ process devoid of politics and power. Interactive governance is allegedly 
about “recognising the capacity to get things done” (Stoker, 1998: 24); not 
through the use of state authority, but through consensual deliberation and 
exchange among the relevant actors who are holding important information, 
knowledge, and other key resources.  Thus, interactive governance is seen as a 
depoliticized process of collaboration guided by common purpose and technical 
rationalities.” (Peters, et al., 2012: 50)  
 
Amongst this more critical vain of scholarly researchers, the emergence and 
consolidation of the socio-political governance phenomenon has triggered an 
important debate on its more realistic nature and characteristics, bringing the State, 
‘power’, social struggle and conflict back into the debate and highlighting the 
essentially political nature of socio-political governance and the normative 
implications inherent to any governing process with due care for the public interest, 
democracy and social equity. These scholars warn us regarding the systematic 
overlooking of the role of the State and power relations in the ‘depolitisation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 An interesting work that concurs with this view and elaborates insight on the pitfalls and 
limitations of social participation is: Cooke, B and U Kothari (2001), Participation, the New 
Tyranny?, London UK, Zed Editorial.  
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governance’, maintaining that the image of consensual multi-stakeholder processes 
does not stand in empirical research, and underlining the need to put politics, the 
State and power at the centre of study of the governance phenomenon.  E. Castro’s 
(2007) critical views on socio-political governance also emphasise the political nature 
of socio-political governance: 
 
“The core of ‘governance’ has to do with determining what ends and values 
should be chosen and the means by which those ends and values should be 
pursued (i.e. the direction of the social unit).  Governance, in this sense, is not a 
strategy, and is not an idealised scheme of interaction between also idealised 
actors.  Governance is always in this perspective, a political process involving 
the exercise of political power by political actors who seek to define the ends and 
values that must inform social development.  It also comprises the identification 
of means to pursue those ends and values, and the adoption of suitable 
arrangements for the exercise of authority and power in the process.” (Castro, 
2005: 106-10) 
 
So, in order to grasp the power-ridden character of socio-political governance, it is 
important to assess the role of the State in socio-political governance arrangements, 
to study how power is distributed in the context of socio-political governance 
arrangements and to unravel how they actually change or develop through time (i.e. 
their process of institutional change or development). This endeavour can only be 
undertaken by looking at particular case studies, a point highlighted by governance 
scholars. In the following sections of this chapter an attempt will be made to 
problematize the notion of institutions, the State and power and to elaborate on their 
impact in relation to the socio-political governance phenomenon.  This elaboration 
will support the extraction of some useful analytical concepts that may later be 
deployed for the case study analysis. 
 
1.5.1. Institutions and Institutional Analysis: The Historical Institutionalist 
Approach 
 
A central objective of this PhD is to develop a historical-institutional understanding of 
the Mexican State-transformation process and a more in-detail institutional analysis 
of one form of socio-political governance arrangement, the MSPs for groundwater 
management. Therefore, it is important to establish some form of analytical 
perspective on this endeavour and present some useful concepts that can be later 
deployed for analytical purposes. As such Historical Institutionalism (HI) is an 
approach to the study of politics and institutions that distinguishes itself from other 
approaches for its attention to real life empirical questions, its historical orientation 
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and its focus on understanding how institutions structure political behaviour and 
shape political outcomes (Hall, 1996; Peters, 2000; Steinmo, 1992; 2008).  HI seeks 
to study how institutional arrangements encourage or discourage political behaviour 
and strategic action on behalf of social actors in particular contexts.  According to HI 
and simply put, institutions –such as State bureaucracies, legislatures, partnerships 
and also social class, etc.– structure politics. HI is one of the three most common 
forms of institutional theory, the others being Rational Choice and Sociological 
Institutionalism (Hall, 1996, Peter, 2000). The most important difference between 
them relies on their conceptualisation of human agency motivations. 24 
 
In the case of Rational Choice Institutionalism, human beings are best described as 
individual rational actors who when confronted with decisions only think in terms of 
cost-benefit calculations affecting them (i.e. they are self-utility maximisers). Hence, 
institutions are important because they structure (i.e. create incentives and 
disincentives) for strategic behaviour (Ostrom, 1990, Hall, 1996, Peters, 2000). In 
contrast, in the case of Sociological Institutionalism, human beings are best 
described as social beings, that is as social actors that are not only self-interested, 
but are actually conditioned by habit and mores.  For Sociological Institutionalism 
institutions frame the way in which people perceive the world, think and then act. 
Social actors act more according to a ´logic of appropriateness’ that implies acting 
more in terms of responding to the question ‘what should I do’, instead of ‘how do I 
benefit more’ (March and Olsen, 1996; Peters, 2000).  Institutions then are 
considered more as the norms and mores that govern formally and informally 
everyday social interaction.   
 
According to institutional theorists, HI stands in the middle of both views, as they see 
social actors as being both ‘rule’ and ‘norm’ abiding beings, as well as self-interested 
rational actors. This conceptualisation has important implications for how the study of 
politics should be undertaken, because in order to truly develop an understanding of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 It is important to mention that by making this theoretical choice this PhD makes another 
theoretical demarcation and distances itself from the extensive and extremely interesting 
literature regarding to the study of the management of common pool resources –including 
aquifers– supported by the Rational Institutionalist perspective developed by the Bloomington 
School of Social Research and leaded by the Noble Prize Laureate E. Ostrom. This work is 
represented by Ostrom’s seminal work: Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons: The 
Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press; 
Dolsik, N and E Ostrom (2003) The Commons in the New Millennium: Challenges and 
Approaches, Massachusetts, USA, MIT Press; and Ostrom, E (2005), Understanding 
Institutional Diversity, Princeton, USA, Princeton University Press, amongst other important 
readings.  
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political decisions and outcomes, HI considers that is paramount to study the 
relationship between historical contexts, institutions, and individuals (Steinmo, 2014). 
S. Steinmo (2014) explains: 
 
“But we also know that institutions do not determine outcomes (nor do they 
determine the path of history).  This is not only because humans create and can 
change institutions, but also because human beings come to the institutions they 
inhabit with prior expectations and cognitive biases that affect how they will work 
within these institutions and adapt them to their local circumstances.  We know, 
for example, that you cannot simply plant as set of institutions on a population 
(whether mid-20th Japan or early 21st century Afghanistan) and expect to easily 
predict how these institutions will be interpreted, use and manipulated.  I believe 
that to understand the actual policy choice made in different countries, we must 
examine the interaction between history, political institutions, public policies and 
citizens.” (Steinmo, 2014: 1).  
 
HI’s research agenda then centres in understanding political life through unravelling 
the relationship between history, political, institutions and individuals (Pierson, 2004; 
Stenimo, 2014).  In this endeavour a very important and first element of its research 
is the study of ideas and their implementation through strategies.  For HI ideas and 
strategies play a central role in the process of institutional design, change and 
development (Peters, 2000).  So, secondly, another important item in the research 
agenda is the study of processes of institutional design, change and development 
(Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992; Pierson, 2004). HI analytical approaches 
seek to develop an understanding about the reasons behind the origin of particular 
institutional arrangements and how these reasons, as well as other factors later 
affect the process of institutional development. So they go on asking why, when and 
how do certain institutional arrangements are established in particular points in time 
and space.  In order to respond to this questions HI aims to explore the features of 
social contexts that give rise to particular institutional forms (i.e. policy challenges, 
policy ideas, and socio-political and economic context), and in retrospect, also study 
how these historical contexts have affected the pertaining institutional arrangement’s 
present institutional form and performance (Pierson, 2004). 
 
Central to developing responses about institutional form and development is HI’s 
interest is the notion of path-dependency. Path dependence refers to a dynamic 
process involving some form of “positive feedback” that determines that each step 
taken by a polity in a particular direction makes it more difficult to reverse a course of 
action (David, 2000; Peters, 2000). So the core of the path dependency concept 
refers to the idea that institutional history matters, once one direction is taken, it is 
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more or less enduring, and to modify it important efforts need to be applied. 
Accordingly, path dependence refers to developmental trajectories that are inherently 
difficult to reverse, as time passes by –and reinforcing mechanisms exert their 
influence–, so switching to another alternative becomes more difficult and probably 
also most costly (Pierson, 2004). Pierson (2004) explains: 
 
“Analysts are increasingly inclined to invoke the concept of path dependence, but 
clear definitions are rare. In practice, usage tends to fluctuate between a broader 
and narrower conception. William Swell for instance suggests that path-
dependence means that what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the 
possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point time.” 
(Pierson, 2004: 20).  
 
This means that path dependence refers to a dynamic process involving some form 
of “positive feedback” that determines that each step in a particular direction makes it 
more difficult to reverse a course of action (David, 2000; Peters, 2000). So the core 
of the path dependency concept refers to the idea that institutional history matters, 
once one direction is taken, it is more or less enduring, and to modify important 
efforts need to be applied. Accordingly, path dependence refers to developmental 
trajectories that are inherently difficult to reverse, as time passes by –and reinforcing 
mechanisms exert their influence–, so switching to another alternative becomes 
more difficult and probably also most costly (Pierson, 2004).  
  
Another important study focus is the analysis of timing and sequence.  HI highlights 
that in order to understand a pattern of institutional formation, change and 
development, it is necessary to unravel the timing and sequence of such processes.  
This research endeavour is pursued by then by looking at the characteristics of 
‘critical conjunctions’ (Peters, 2000; Pierson, 2004). It is then that by unravelling the 
interaction effects between distinct sequences of events that are joined together at 
particular points in time and space –and that have a strong influence in the definition 
and establishment of institutional arrangements and their process of institutional 
change and development– how analysts can gain knowledge into this processes. 
Still, HI emphasises one important distinction, when researching patterns of 
institutional formation, change and development, one should not only focus in 
‘precipitating causes’, but more so in ‘structural causes’ (Pierson, 2004).  
Accordingly, precipitating causes can produce certain institutional changes, but if 
structural causes do not provide for underlying support or attune with these 
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precipitating causes, it is possible the orientation of such institutional changes may 
not be sustained in time and space (Pierson, 2004).  
 
The above discussion on HI is brief, but attempts were made to recuperate some 
essential concepts that can later be harnessed to support the design of an analytical 
device that will enable this PhD to study the process of institutional formation, 
change and development of MSPs for groundwater management in the context of the 
Mexican water polity.  
 
1.5.2. Some Words on the State: The State as a Social Relation, State-projects 
and State-strategies  
 
The theoretical debate on the notion of the State is extremely extensive as it is 
interesting.  For reasons of space, no attempt in this chapter is made to engage 
thoroughly with this debate, except only to present a particular understanding of the 
State as a social phenomenon, and to support this PhD’s research on the process of 
State-transformation and role of the State in the establishment and development of 
socio-political governance arrangements.25  So perhaps a good starting point to 
provide some focused reflections on the conception of the State is by beginning with 
a particular definition and understanding of how it is possible to consider it in 
theoretical terms. This reflection basically draws its argumentation from the post-
Marxist view on the State developed initially by N. Poulantzas (1975, 1978) and then 
developed further by B. Jessop (1990, 2008) through his ‘Strategic Relational 
Approach’.26   
Both of these scholars initially present a simple functional description of the State 
apparatus defined as the distinct ensemble of institutions and organisations whose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  An interesting, comprehensive and straightforward reading on the State phenomenon is 
Hay, C, Lister, M. and D. Marsh (eds.) (2006), The State: Theories and Issues, Hampshire, 
UK. MacMillan Editorial. In this work several authors present different perspectives on the 
State phenomenon, from the very classical viewpoints –such as Pluralism and Elitism–, 
through green and feminist perspectives, to the more recent views on the State in the context 
of globalisation and governance. Other classic work that also provides insightful readings is 
Evans, P. B .(ed.)(1985), Bringing Back the State In, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University 
Press. From the perspective of environmental politics some of the work that helped to shape 
the orientation of this PhD and that served as background readings are: Barry, J. (1999), 
Rethinking Green Politics, London, UK, Sage Editorial; Barry, J. and R. Eckersley (2005), The 
Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty, Massachusetts, USA, MIT Press; and 
Barry, J. and R .Eckersley (2005), The State and the Global Ecological Crises, 
Massachusetts, USA, MIT Press. 
26 Please see: Poulantzas, N. (1975), Political Power and Social Classes, London, UK, Verso; 
Poulantzas, N (2014), State, Power, Socialism, London, UK, Verso; Jessop, B (1990), State 
Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place, Cambridge, UK, Polity Press; and Jessop, B. 
(2008), State Power, A Strategic-Relational Approach, Cambridge, UK, Polity Press. 
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socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on a 
given population in the name of the ‘common interests’ and also the ‘general will’ 
(Poulantzas, 1978; Jessop, 2008). 27   So far this functional conceptualisation is 
straightforward and seemingly clear, but both scholars go on further in their 
considerations regarding the State.  According to N. Poulantzas (1978) and B. 
Jessop (1990,2008) the State is not to be considered an entity, but a social relation 
(Jessop, 2008).  This conceptualisation requires some clarification.  
 
Both Poulantzas’s and Jessop’s notion of the ‘State’ as a social relation means 
considering the State as something that is not essentially fixed, nor as the neutral 
and autonomous coordinator of socio-political interests, nor the guarantor of the 
common interest per se.  Rather for them, the State is determined in its orientation, 
institutional form and capacities by the nature of the wider societal relations in which 
it is situated in, and especially by the balance of social forces in the polity.  
Poulanztas (1975) continues elaborating on these ideas and depicts the State not as 
a “monolithic bloc” or a simple sovereign legal body, instead he considers the State 
as being comprised by different ‘apparatuses, sections and levels’ that serve as 
‘power centres’ for different faction alliances in the ‘power bloc’. 28   He also considers 
these centres as points or nodes of resistance for different social actors in the polity.  
Thus, for him the State must be understood a “strategic field” formed through 
intersecting power networks that constitute a favourable or unfavourable terrain of 
political manoeuvre, not only for the hegemonic faction, but also by counter-
hegemonic forces. Furthermore, for him the capitalist State is the material 
condensation of the balance among class forces, insofar as the State actually helps 
to constitute that balance –rather then simply and straightforwardly reflecting it– and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This PhD research accepts this initial and basic functional definition of the State. Certainly 
in the water policy sector, the State should be at the centre of the pursuit of a more 
democratic, egalitarian and sustainable water resources management, of water supply and 
sanitation for all, and an inclusive and widespread water security; aspects that ideally should 
be part of ‘common interests’ and ‘general will’.   
28 Poulantzas explains the participation of several social classes and class fractions in the 
process of political domination through the exercise of State power by the concept of ‘power 
bloc.’ A power bloc is to be understood as the contradictory unity of dominant classes or 
fractions whose interests are antagonistic rather than monolithic.  A power bloc is always 
dominated by an hegemonic class or fraction that is capable to establish its own economic 
interest as the general common denominator of the overall power bloc and at the same time 
making itself the representative of the general common interest of such power bloc. It is then 
that from this privileged position within the power bloc, the hegemonic class reproduces its 
own privileged position within the relations of political domination and economic exploitation. 
(Polunantas, 1975). For an interesting compilation of Poulantzas political thinking please see: 
Martin, R. (2008), The Poluntzas Reader, London, U.K., Verso Editorial.  
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in the case of the capitalist state in favour of capitalist interests, so driven by the goal 
of securing material conditions to enable processes of capital accumulation.29  
 
The conception of the State as a social relation is insightful. From this conception it is 
possible to consider that through history polities around the world have somehow 
socially constructed their own particular State-forms that are somehow the product of 
the balance of social forces in the polity.  State. B. Jessop (2002) explains in the 
following extract: 
 
“”Following the prewar Italian communist, Antonio Gramsci, and the postwar 
Nickos Poulantzas, I consider the state as a social relation.  The former 
proposed an inclusive definition of the state in its integral senses as political 
society plus civil society (Gramsci 1971); the latter analysed state power as form-
determined condensation of the balance of political forces operating within and 
beyond the state (Poulantzas, 1978). Combining their ideas, one can define the 
state as an ensemble of socially embedded, socially regularised and strategically 
selective institutions, organizations and social forces and activities around (or at 
least actively involved in) making collectively binding decisions for an imagined 
political community. State power can be understood in turn as a power relation 
that is mediated in and through this institutional ensemble. It is not exercised by 
the state as such: the state is not a subject. Nor does it originate entirely within 
the state itself or from among the state’ personnel.  Instead it depends on the 
balance of forces within the wider society as well as those within the state 
apparatuses. (Jessop, 2002:6) 
 
As already mentioned, Poulantzas (1978) and Jessop (2008) consider that the State 
is not autonomous, but has a social basis. This social basis is to be understood as 
the specific configurations of social forces organised as political actors that support 
the basic structure of the State. This support is brought about by consensus and also 
conflict over specific policies as long as such conflict occurs within an agreed 
institutional framework and accepted ‘policy paradigm’ in use, and that establishes 
the parameters of public choice.  It should be noted that political support is not 
reducible simply to question of consensus –as mentioned above-, but depends on 
the specific modes of societal integration available in the respective Statehood 
formation and that channel, transform and prioritise demands and manage the flow of 
material concessions to these political actors; concessions that are necessary to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Capital accumulation can be, very succinctly, explained according to Marxist theory, as the 
operation whereby profits are reinvested in time and space, increasing the total quantity of 
capital. In order for capital accumulation to occur there are certain preconditions that have to 
be enabled –by the capitalist State– such as the rule of law, property rights, labour contract 
law, etc. For a more elaborate introduction to this concept, applied to environmental studies 
please see: Smith, N (1990), Uneven Development, Georgia, USA, University of Georgia 
Press. 
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maintain the ‘unstable’ equilibrium of compromise that underpins its support (Jessop, 
2008). An example of this is corporativism and clientelism.  
 
Jessop (2002) goes further in deploying concepts to unravel the idea of the State in 
what he considers a State-Relational approach. Under this approach any particular 
‘Statehood formation’ (e.g. the Developmental-Interventionist, the Welfare, Social-
Democrat, the Neo-liberal Statehood formations) will seek to consolidate a distinct 
State project, and in order to do so will deploy or implement a range of State-
strategies, which outcomes depend on the capacity of the State to stabilise them in 
the polity. These outcomes are always contingent on the social struggles that support 
or contest them.  Accordingly such State-projects are pursued through different 
State-strategies that seek to advance their consolidation. Together these 
considerations imply that from a Strategic-Relational approach, the State’s powers 
and capacities do not depend solely on the nature of the State as an autonomous 
institutional apparatus, but depends on forces that lie beyond it. 
 
Two other concepts from the State-relational approach require unpacking, because 
they are useful for analytical purposes. The first one, the concept of State project, 
refers to any initiative that aims to provide State institutions with some measure of 
functional unity, operation, coordination and organisational coherence. State projects 
can target the State itself as a distinct institutional ensemble within the existing 
broader social forces in a polity (Jessop, 2002, 2008; Collin, 2006). Political actors 
then seek to stabilise their selected State project and normalise preferred State-civil 
society relations. The second one, the notion of ‘State strategies’, refers to any 
initiative to mobilise State institutions in order to promote particular forms of socio-
economic and even environmental intervention. State-strategies focus on the 
articulation of the State and non-State institutions, attempting to regulate socio-
political and economic behaviour, the circuit of capital, and the balance of social 
forces in order to ensure the process and characteristics of capital accumulation, as 
well as other specific sectorial policy objectives. Specific State-strategies are part of 
a particular State project (e.g. liberalisation, deregulation, decentralisation, and 
socio-political governance). State-strategies can be consolidated and also contested.  
The above discussion on the State will help support the definition of the second 
moment of analysis, an aspect that will be dealt with in chapter 4.  I will know devote 
some efforts to developing some useful insight regarding the concept of power.  
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1.5.3. Power in the context of the Socio-political Governance Debate 
 
In order to address the issue of power in socio-political governance it is necessary to 
look briefly into some of the main conceptualisations on this phenomenon, bearing in 
mind that ‘power’ is one of the most broadly studied phenomena in the social 
sciences and it is not possible in this document to look profoundly at the different 
theories and notions about it. So, the ideas presented in this document about power 
are only to aide in describing how power may operate in the context of socio-political 
governance arrangements. 30   In the power and the governance studies literature it 
is possible to find three distinct approaches to the understanding of power: power in 
socio-political governance arrangements, power of socio-political governance 
arrangements, and power over socio-political governance arrangements. The 
following is a brief engagement with this debate. 
 
1.5.3.1. Power in Socio-political Governance Arrangements 
 
A good starting point for the analysis of power in socio-political governance 
arrangements is by looking at power relations as they are most often defined, that is 
‘power over’, referring to the attempt by one social actor to affect the ‘agency’ of 
another in order to secure a preferred outcome (Stewart, 2001; Lukes, 2005, Peters, 
2012).  This is clearly represented by S. Lukes’ first dimensions of power (i.e. –
direct– power is a successful attempt by A to make B to do something that he/she 
would not otherwise do), the second dimension (i.e. A exercises –indirect– power by 
regulating and controlling the political agenda in order to hide conflicts by supressing 
ideas, proposals, and decisions promoted by B), and, finally, a third dimension (i.e. A 
manifests its -–ideological– power over B by manipulating its subjective perception 
and interests over something in order to align it to its own).  More recently, post-
structuralist political scientists have complemented the three dimensions of power 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The literature studying power is really as extensive as it is interesting. It is not the object of 
this PhD to provide for an exhaustive elaboration on this important political concept, still I will 
use some notions to help support my argumentation and provide clearer bases for case study 
research.  In the literature on power there is a clear distinction between the notion of power 
over –a conception of power that focuses on domination– and power to –a conception of 
power that focuses on the capability of human agency to act, and more so to act in concert. 
For an interesting discussion on this forms of power please see: Stewart, A (2001), Theories 
of Power and Domination, London, UK, Sage Editorial. For an interesting discussion on the 
structural conditions that determine the distribution of power in society see:  Mann, M. (1993), 
The Sources of Social Power, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.  A more intricate 
post-structuralist and anti-essential approach to power is provided by: Dryberg, V (1997), The 
Circular Structure of Power, London, UK, Verso Editorial.  
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with one other perspective based on a discourse theoretical approach (Gordon, 
1980; Dryberg, 1997; Dean, 1999). Accordingly, power is also exercised through the 
development of institutionalised discourses that seek to shape the overall conditions 
of action of social actors, forming subject-identities, rationales, preferred types of 
socio-political relationships, concepts, etc.31 These four dimensions of power, hence, 
capture the different ways social actors exercise power over other actors. 
 
Scholars agree that in the context of socio-political governance arrangements the 
exercise of direct, indirect, ideological and discursive power is certainly present 
(Peters, et al. 2012).   The exercise of direct power in open conflicts about decisions 
happens as social actors seek to influence collective decisions in order to pursue 
their own interests. This is clear, however, strong use of direct power is more difficult 
to exercise because socio-political arrangements exist due to the voluntary 
participation of stakeholders who engage in the governing process with the hope of 
having an open channel of communication and democratic decision-making.  So, 
strong actors are –more or less– constrained to use direct power by the ‘exit’ power 
of other social actors, as well as the ‘shaming’ and the loss of trust that can be 
brought about my its use.32  
 
In the case of socio-political governance arrangements indirect power –that is aiming 
to control de agenda– and ideological power –aiming to influence other actors’ 
perception of their interests– seems to be a more relevant form of power to be 
encountered (Peters et al., 2012).  Lastly, social actors participating in socio-political 
governance arrangements may also be strongly influenced by the institutional 
discourses that define what is considered valid agency, knowledge, normative 
premises, and discourses throughout the governing process (Peters et.al. 2012). 
Hence, the discursive form of power also frames and structures social interaction in 
socio-political governance arrangements.   
 
There is another important aspect that requires devoting some attention too. What is 
then the source of power in socio-political governance arrangements? Again 
following the classic writers on power, the standard political science approach for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For an interesting application of these notion of power to the field of environmental politics 
please see: Hajer, M (1995), The Politics of Environmental Discourses, Oxford, UK, Oxford 
University Press; and Dryzek, J (2013), The Politics of the Earth, Environmental Discourses, 
Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.  
32 The point regarding the ‘power of exit’ is also highlighted by scholars studying democratic 
theory. Please see Warren, M (2001), Democracy and Associations, Princeton, USA, 
Princeton University Press.  
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identifying the source of power in socio-political governance arrangements is to look 
at the actors’ possession of resources and capabilities that, in turn, are determined 
by structural background conditions that generate economic and political inequalities, 
as well as cultural disparities (Poulantzas, 1975).  Still, in the context of socio-political 
governance arrangements, scholars are also turning to other forms of explanation to 
the sources of power, such as social networks analysis (Prell, 2011; Scott, 2012) and 
social power (Lukes, 1986; Haggard, 2002).  
 
Both conceptions of power are based on ‘relational’ determinants that stem from the 
structural position of a particular social actor in the wider network of actors.  This 
implies that the relational or ‘network power’ of a social actor is contingent to the 
number of links it has to the network; as these links will give him/her access to 
knowledge, resources, experience, trust, reciprocity, etc. Consequently, such 
relational positions may turn an actor into a powerful social actor –a broker– who can 
steer and control interaction, and thus shaping negotiations and decision-making 
processes.  This also resonates with the arguments advanced by social capital 
theorists (Putman, 2000; Halpern, 2005; Field, 2008).  
 
1.5.3.2. The Power of Socio-political Governance Arrangements or 
Countervailing Power 
 
Referring to the ‘power of socio-political governance’ implies accepting that socio-
political governance institutional forms can be unified political actors –with a specific 
and certain level of capacity and resources– to work jointly to address collective 
action problems and affect the polity they are part of, thus influencing also its path of 
socio-environmental change. As a unified political actor, a socio-political governance 
institutional form can define its relationship with the State, sometimes working 
alongside it, but also sometimes resisting its orientation and struggling against 
specific ‘State strategies’, something refer to also in the literature as ‘countervailing 
power’ (Fung, 2003). Countervailing power is a ‘manifestation of power’ that reduces, 
and perhaps neutralizes the power advantages of ‘powerful actors’ in the context of 
socio-political governance arrangements. Countervailing power is not so much an 
open and open adversarial form of power, but more a form of collaborative power 
that serves to resist in the context of social participation and stakeholder cooperation. 
Peters et al., (2012) explain this clearly: 
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“A such, the power of interactive (socio-political) governance involves both ‘a 
power to govern’ through the capacity of joint action and societal regulation and 
a ‘power over government’ through the capacity to affect governmental decisions 
and regulations.  Hence, when studying the power of interactive governance we 
are interested in the way that negotiated interaction in quasi markets, 
partnerships, networks and other influences the formulation and implementation 
of policy. In other words, we should be focusing on the particular attributes of 
interactive governance arenas that seem to condition its political impact and 
power.” (Peters et al., 2012: 59) 
 
The governance literature studying the ‘power of socio-political governance focuses 
its attention on the conditions that convey socio-political governance arrangements 
with a certain level of power (Kahler, 2009; Peters, 2012). A number of conditions 
appear in such studies, such as:  the level of institutional development of the socio-
political governance arrangement –that is its the level of consolidation in the polity, 
which implies in this case achieving a level of functionality to support the pursuit of 
objectives–, and the institutional design features –that convey them with the 
scalability and adaptability necessary to prosper and evolve.  In this case, scalability 
is to be understood as the ability of the socio-political governance institutional form to 
expand its membership at a relatively low cost without fundamentally changing the 
organisation (Kahler, 2009).  Its adaptability is defined as the capacity to transform its 
own institutional design features and incorporate the necessary characteristics to 
respond to shifting endogenous and exogenous pressures that affect its capacity for 
collective action and political influence (Kahler, 2009; Peters et al., 2012).  
 
The governance literature is also very much aware that the institutional development 
process of socio-political governance arrangements and their actual institutional 
design features are not the only conditions affecting their evolution and performance. 
It is also important to consider the fact that their power depends also on the 
characteristics of the political environment –the contextual background conditions– 
and the State form of the polities where socio-political governance arrangements are 
embedded in.  Peters et al., (2012) provide an opinion on this matter: 
 
“”As such, it seems clear the political systems with a strong tradition of 
participatory governance and corporatist involvement, a fragmented and 
devolved political system with many access points, and multiparty systems 
based on coalitions government will tend to enhance the impact of interactive 
forms of governance.  (…) Conversely, highly statistic, unitary and centralised 
political systems based on one party majority government will tend to mitigate the 
impact of interactive governance.  Bob Jessop refers to the effect that different 
state forms have on the formulation and realisation of particular governance 
strategies in terms of the ‘strategic selectivity of the State’. (Peters et al., 2012: 
62) 
	   71 
 
This situation impels governance analysts to develop the necessary tools to study 
also how these contextual background conditions impinge on socio-political 
governance institutional forms.  Amongst these contextual conditions, the literature 
emphasises that that the nature and characteristics of the State formation and the 
level of decentralisation/devolution and empowerment has critical influence, a point 
also shared by associative and deliberative democratic scholars (Torfing, Peters, 
Pierre and Sorensen, 2012). This situation urges to develop some understanding on 
the conception of the State, and as already highlighted.  
 
1.5.3.3 Power over Socio-political Governance Arrangements 
 
Socio-political governance arrangements are constantly shaped and regulated by the 
State. However, traditional hierarchical and command and control instruments are 
not the only –or the best mechanisms– to do so; this is because using such top-down 
instruments risks undermining the social participation/involvement and stakeholder 
cooperation of socio-political governance arrangements. This is why the State has 
sought to govern over socio-political governance arrangements in more subtle and 
indirect way through meta-governance strategies. 33 
 
A first ‘direct’ strategy is quite straightforward and refers to the opening/establishing 
or closing down socio-political governance arrangements. As such the State has the 
authority and the power to convene multiple actors whose participation is relevant to 
address a policy process and to establish a socio-political governance arrangement.  
It has also the authority to dismiss them and close them down, albeit it could be the 
case that not without political cost and social resistance (Peter et al., 2012).   
States can also exercise meta-governance capacities by regulating the access of 
different social actors to socio-political governance arrangements.  This is indeed a 
powerful meta-governance capacity, as deciding who can participate –when and 
how– and who is excluded is a very effective way to strengthen or weaken particular 
interests and voices in socio-political governance arrangements.  Still it is important 
to comment that as soon as a socio-political governance arrangement is established, 
the State can sometimes loose some control over who is included and excluded. In 
order to maintain some form of power over socio-political governance arrangements, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  Towards the end of this chapter a more thorough elaboration pertaining to the debate on 
meta-governance will be presented, but here I will explain some basic notions that are tied 
directly to notion of ‘power over of socio-political governance’.  
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another tactical manoeuvre is to compensate by a process of ‘selective 
empowerment or disempowerment’ of individual stakeholders (i.e. through veto 
power, capacity building, targeted financing, etc.) (Torfing and Triantafillou, 2011; 
Peters, 2012) 
 
Constructing the agency of social actors in socio-political governance arrangements 
is another way to exercise meta-governance capabilities.  In this case governments 
can define through different means such as the ex-ante definition of rules, 
regulations, and discourses that establish a framework for social action. Constructing 
the social agency implies then the creation of other incentives and disincentives for 
social action (e.g. the granting of financial and technical assistance). This is referred 
to by institutional theory as the development of a ‘logic or appropriateness’ that is the 
moulding of agency to abide to a preferred form of interaction (March and Olsen, 
1995; Peters, 1999).   
 
The assessment of socio-political governance arrangements is also another way to 
exercise meta-governing power.  It is then that by monitoring and evaluating the 
performance of the socio-political governance institutional form –in terms of the 
achievement of its objectives and the means to achieve them– can turn into a way to 
either reward or penalise it, and thus control their development in time.  Finally, the 
State can exercise a direct power by changing the overall institutional architecture of 
the socio-political governance arrangement (Fung and Wright, 2003; Peters, 2012). 
 
Reviewing succinctly the different faces of power in the context of socio-political 
governance may allow us to study how these may manifest in the context of 
empirical case studies.  Based in the above argumentation presented in the 
preceding sections of this chapter, I will now like to offer a functional definition of 
socio-political water governance.   
 
1.6. A Functional Definition of Socio-political Water Governance and Multi-
stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Resources Management 
 
I would like now to present a working definition of socio-political water governance 
that will be used to animate the ‘research spirit’ and the research hypothesis of this 
PhD research.  This definition borrows from the work of E. Swyngedouw (2005), 
Allen, Davila and Hoffman (2006) and E. Castro (2007), because these scholars 
make important efforts to emphasize the idea that socio-political governance, more 
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than a new political strategy –albeit it can start like this–, is a complex political 
process of which its outcome is uncertain and hinging on the array of existing socio-
political forces and power relations, thus highlighting the normative concerns 
regarding the role of the State, the form and distribution of power and democratic 
performance. Below then is a definition of socio-political water governance, one that 
seeks to highlight certain elements of the debate that are an integral element of the 
research questions orienting this PhD research and that somehow have supported 
the definition of the research hypothesis: 
 
“Socio-political water governance is a complex process through which different 
stakeholders with different perspectives, interests and capacities interact with 
each other through new institutional structures and policy processes (i.e. socio-
political governance arrangements), that they socially construct –shape, sustain 
and transform– in order to enable social participation/involvement and 
stakeholder cooperation and to address water resources management, water 
supply and sanitation and water security challenges. They do so by way of 
establishing, mobilising and exchanging an array of resources (i.e. discourses, 
rules-regulations, resources, and social agency) to pursue both individual and 
collective interests throughout the governing process. Socio-political governance 
arrangements are not devoid of politics and thus their outcomes are open-ended 
and uncertain.” 
 
As already mentioned, in the water policy sector there are many different types of 
socio-political water governance arrangements developed to address many different 
types of water resources management, water and sanitation services and water 
security challenges.  The case of MSPs for water resources management (MSPs) is 
one form of socio-political water governance arrangement that has been highlighted 
in the literature for its capacity to enable social participation/involvement and 
stakeholder cooperation in order to deal with complex, interdependent and 
crosscutting problems, including groundwater resources management Dourojanni, 
Jouravlev, and Chavez, 2002; Warner, 2007; Kemper, Blomquist and Dinar, 2010).  I 
will know devote some attention to develop some notions regarding MSPs for water 
resources management, and because, as already mentioned, MSPs for groundwater 
management in Mexico represent the case study under investigation.   	  
1.6.1. Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Resources Management 
 
In the water policy sector an illustrative example regarding the emergence of socio-
political governance arrangements is the one pertaining to the development of multi-
stakeholder platforms for water resources management at the river basin micro-
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basin, transboundary basin and aquifer levels (Jaspers, 2003; Crase, and Gandi, 
2009; Edelnbos, Bresser and Scholten, 2013).34  These MSPs have been created to 
precisely enable greater social participation/involvement and stakeholder cooperation 
to address water resources management challenges and water security concerns.  J. 
Warner (2007) illustrates this situation clearly in the following intervention: 
 
“Policy-makers, donors, NGO’s water managers –all are intrigued by the sound 
of multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) as new form of cooperation and 
participation in the face of (imagined or real) water conflict. MSPs appear as 
ensembles of cooperation and negotiation involving multiple sectors or actors 
within a watershed.  A widely accepted definition defines platforms as a decision-
making body (voluntary or statutory) comprising different stakeholders who 
perceive the same resources management problem, realise their 
interdependence for solving it, and come together to agree on action strategies 
for solving the problem.  It is like a roundtable, where people are gathered with 
very different perspective.  From a functionalist perspective, MSPs are perceived 
as problem-solving institutional innovations, to democratise water management, 
to manage conflict, event to make water management more efficient.” (Warner, 
2007: 1).  
 
MSPs are hailed for being helpful for addressing complex and interdependent water 
resources management challenges, because they are perceived as useful 
institutional innovations to support the necessary associative activity and public 
deliberation between different stakeholders to develop the sense of interdependence, 
the shared vision and objectives, as well as necessary collective action to address 
these challenges.  Like in other discussions on the virtues and benefits of socio-
political governance arrangements, MSPs are presented as ‘ideal type institutional 
arrangements’ imbued with a positive value connotation.  In this sense, MSPs are 
being considered as means to build an inclusive, effective, efficient and democratic 
water resources management processes  (Currie-Alder, 2007).  
 
The expectations on MSPs started high as institutions for water resources 
management, and also as vehicles for democratisation and empowerment (Figueres, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 An important part of the MSPs literature focuses on the prospect and challenges of river 
basin organisations and river basin councils.  Indeed it is possible to say that most of the 
scholars and practitioners studying MSPs have concentrated their attention in such 
institutional forms. This situation creates an interesting opportunity to contribute to the study 
of MSPs for groundwater resources management.  Relevant readings on the subject matter 
for the interested reader are: Dourojeanni, A., Jouravlelev, and G. Chavez (2002), Gestión del 
Agua a Nivel de Cuencas, Santiago de Chile, Chile, CEPAL.  Blomquist, W. Dinar, A and K. 
Kemper (2005), Comparison of Institutional Arrangements for River Basin Management in 
Eight Basins, Washington, USA. World Bank; Cotler, H. (ed.) (2004), La Gestión Integral de 
Cuencas, estudios y reflexiones para orientar la política ambiental, Ciudad de México, 
México, INECC:   
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Tortajada, and Rockstrom, 2003; UNESCO, 2006; Warner, 2007). Nonetheless, it 
possible to consider that MSPs face the same type of problems as other socio-
political governance arrangements, and currently these expectations are more tamed 
and realistic, and for reasons that will become clearer as we along in this document.  
I shall now turn to elaborate more on the nature and characterisitcs of MSPs in the 
water sector.  
 
1.6.1.1. Unpacking the Different Dimensions of MSPs 
 
• Some General Considerations 
 
A specific purpose of MSPs is to support the development of shared governing 
objectives and joint implementation of actions and initiatives that reflect individual 
stakeholders’ interests, and also collective goals. Consequently, MSPs need to 
balance shared objectives –intended to achieve such collective goals–, and also 
stakeholders’ objectives –as the pursuit of individual objectives motivates them also 
to participate in the MSP (Warner and Verhallen, 2007).  This is not an easy task that 
demands the design, enablement and management of associative and public 
deliberation processes capable of including all relevant stakeholders, manage 
consensus-building decision making processes and enables joint implementation 
processes; all central aspects of the MSPs spirit. 35 
 
MSPs are also considered helpful to unlock stalemate in decision-making and 
distrust amongst social actors –again precisely through a sustained process of 
associative activity and public deliberation. MSPs may also support greater 
transparency and accountability by exposing the different rights, roles, 
responsibilities and performance of stakeholders.  Very importantly, they are also 
considered mechanisms to support social learning and capacity building processes 
(i.e. including opportunities to gain skills, exchange knowledge and experience and 
share valuable information) (Watson, 2007). Finally, MSPs are considered to have 
not only an important managerial or administrative role, but also a political one as 
they, in principle, are designed to allow previously disenfranchised or marginalised 
stakeholders to gain empowerment throughout the governing process (Verhallen, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Indeed this consideration is an important factor that compelled me to use the associative 
and deliberative democratic theories to support the development of the analytical framework 
to study the democratic prospects and challenges of multi-stakeholder platforms for 
groundwater management in Mexico.  
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Warner and Santbergen, 2007).  In the next section a more in-detail description of 
MSPs is given.  
 
• Important Dimensions: Scale, Scope and Structure 
 
In order to understand MSPs in more detail, a standard initial approach developed by 
scholars is to start with a simple description on their scale, scope and structure 
(Currie-Alder, 2007). Accordingly, the ‘scale’ of an MSP refers to the spatial and 
temporal boundaries of the water resources management process it is established 
for, be it its expanse in time in space (i.e. a river basin, a micro-basin or aquifer and 
related ecosystems, etc.).  In the water sector the scale of the MSP is always 
challenged by the need to address complex problems with different 
interdependencies and trade-offs, and by greater understanding of socio-ecological 
processes (e.g. IWRM and conjunctive use) (GW-Mate, 2010; Knuppe and Pahl-
Wost, 2011; Wijnen, 2012).36   
 
The ‘scope’ of an MSP concerns the conceptual and institutional boundaries defining 
what is considered in the water resources management process; putting it simply, the 
main goals and objectives of the of the MSP (i.e. sustainable water resources 
management, water allocation and distribution, water conservation, groundwater 
management, democratisation, stakeholder participation, etc.). Scholars studying 
MSPs highlight the need to carefully study the scope of an MSP; because it is in the 
scope’s definition process where important prospects and challenges for sustainable 
water resources management may be found.  
 
Lastly, the ‘structure’ of the MSP concerns its actual institutional design features. The 
institutional design features define the relationship between the stakeholders and the 
water resources under management, the relationship between stakeholders in the 
MSP and the relationship between the MSP itself and the wider water polity. The 
‘structure’ also defines the type of authority and power of the MSP, the form of its 
decision-making process, the type of the policy mechanisms used to address 
governing challenges, the financial arrangements, the accountability and 
transparency safeguards, etc.  The MSP literature advices, that the ‘right’ fit between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Conjunctive use is often discussed in water resources management. It is a term used to 
describe a practice that consists in harmoniously combing the use of both surface water and 
groundwater resources in order to minimise the undesirable physical, environmental and 
socio economic effects of each solution and to optimise the water demand and supply 
balance.  
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the scale, scope and structure of the MSP is necessary for a successful sustainable 
water resources management.  
 
• Stakeholder Participation (Rights, Responsibilities and Roles) and the ‘Platform’ 
Concept 
 
There are other important institutional structure dimensions that need to be explained 
regarding the MSP, including what it is meant by ‘stakeholder participation’ and its 
nature as a ‘platform’ for water resources management. ‘Stakeholder participation 
processes’ in MSPs is considered a process through which a powerful stakeholder –
frequently a government institution– decides to share the governing responsibility 
with other interested stakeholders that participate throughout the governing process 
(Warner, 2007). This decision, as we have explained previously, is prompted by a 
change in the governing rationale that impels the State to establish an MSP as a new 
socio-political governance arrangement for water resources management.  
 
In the context of MSPs in the water sector, a ‘stakeholder’ is considered to be any 
individual or group who stands to loose or gain from the water resources 
management process, and thus, has some form of personal or group investment in 
the governing outcomes.  A vey important point to make is that the State plays an 
important –sometimes a leading– role in the MSPs.  Most of the stakeholders in the 
MSP are direct water users, but other stakeholders also participate, such as NGOs, 
research centres, international organisations, etc. In the case of the water users in 
many cases the ‘stake’ is actually a livelihood dependence on water resources; a 
situation that frequently impels them to participate. Frequently, this stake –or 
relationship between the social actor and water resources– is dynamic as it changes 
frequently through time (Milot and Lepage, 2010).   
 
In the MSP’s discourse, the concept of ‘platform’ evokes the idea of a ‘level playing 
field’.  The reality is that in MSPs not all stakeholders are equal in their interests, 
capacities and resources, for example, stakeholders can be powerful or weak, 
organised or disorganised, and active or passive.  These ‘agency’ characteristics are 
defined by multiple factors, including the different dimensions of power discussed in 
the previous section of this chapter. Thus, MSPs can also be studied and evaluated 
in terms of their stakeholder inclusion and empowerment, that is to say, which 
stakeholders are involved in an MSP, and what is the degree of influence they have 
in decision-making processes that affect them.  In this sense, although frequently the 
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case is that MSPs evaluations focus mostly on efficiency and effectiveness concerns, 
carrying out evaluation in procedural terms (i.e. democratic decision-making 
processes) and more substantive terms (i.e. social equity) is important.   
 
In an MSP stakeholders have rights, responsibilities and roles (Currie-Alder, 2007). 
In the context of MSPs a ‘right’ is considered to be an entitlement that each 
stakeholder posses, that defines its relationship with the pertaining water resource   –
such as a property right, a water user concession or exploitation right, etc.  There 
other rights that are defined by rules and regulations, and that are very much context 
specific. The ‘responsibilities’ describe how a stakeholder contributes to the water 
resources management process, including all the activities that they do to support 
the MSP and more generally the water resources management process.  Finally, a 
‘role’ is defined by the overall purpose or ‘identity’ that the stakeholder is entitled to 
do enact and perform.  A ‘role’ implies both the degree to which a stakeholder 
participates in the MSP and the relative influence he or she has in decision-making.  
These rights, responsibilities and roles are hence circumscribed and also contested 
throughout the socio-political water governance process.  So, rights, responsibilities 
and roles change over time (Milot and Lepage, 2010; Mollard and Berry, 2010).  
 
• Evaluation: Effectiveness, Equity, and Efficiency 
 
The MSPs literature purports also that MSPs can be evaluated according to an 
effectiveness, equity and efficiency criteria (Currie-Alder, 2007; Warner and 
Verhallen, 2006).  So, ‘effectiveness’ can be considered to be the extent to which an 
MSP achieves its objectives, including the extent it attains both the shared and the 
individual stakeholder objectives. Effectiveness needs also to consider the extent of 
social participation and coordination realised.  In terms of ‘equity’ in the context of 
MSPs, it should be considered as the degree of fairness in the distribution of cost 
and benefits amongst stakeholders involved in the MSP and throughout the 
governing process.  Lastly, ‘efficiency’ is the ration of management outcomes to the 
costs of achieving those outcomes.  For example, at times the ration of economic 
costs at the beginning of the MSP process is extremely high in relation to the 
outcomes, but in the long term this ration may become more positive (Warner, 2006).  
As I mentioned earlier, in order to develop a comprehensive evaluation criteria it is 
important to focus in procedural and substantive aspects.  
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This section presented some important notions regarding MSPs as one form of 
socio-political governance arrangement.  Accordingly, MSPs can be described in 
terms of their scale, scope and institutional structure.  They can also be assessed in 
terms of their efficiency, equity and effectiveness.  MSPs, like all other forms of 
socio-political governance arrangements, are not devoid politics, and thus they 
should also be assessed in terms of the role of the State in their institutional 
development, how power manifests through them and their democratic performance.  
The next section in this chapter elaborates on this important consideration.  
 
1.7. Democratic Prospects and Challenges of Socio-political Governance 
 
The relationship between socio-political governance and democracy is perceived by 
the more critical scholars of the ‘governance phenomenon’ to be full of tensions. For 
them the post-political view of socio-political governance is rather unfortunate, as it 
prevents us from grasping its truly political and power-ridden character (Swyngedou, 
2005; Allen, Davila and Hoffman, 2006; Castro, 2007; Peters et al., 2012). This 
perspective is also considered to be even biased towards a pragmatic 
accommodation on behalf of the State and behind the tendency to consider socio-
political governance arrangements devoid of conflicts and power-struggles, 
exempting them, hence, from thorough and systematic democratic scrutiny (Torfing 
and Triantafillou, 2011: Peters et al., 2012). Swyngedouw (2005) refers then to the 
contradictory nature of “governance beyond-the-state” (i.e. socio-political 
governance): 
 
“Our focus will be on the contradictory nature of governance beyond-the-state 
and, in particular, on the tension between the stated objectives of increasing 
democracy and citizen’s empowerment on the one hand and their often 
undemocratic and authoritarian character on the other.” (Syngedouw, 
2005:1993)  
 
As such these governance scholars have generated a different argument, as we 
have mentioned above. This argument is that socio-political governance 
arrangements seem to offer both the potential to support stronger democratic 
practice and the empowerment of previously disenfranchised groups, at that same 
time that they also can become sources of even greater political and social 
inequality. Much like democracy, socio-political governance in this sense is an 
uncertain and open-ended state, an outcome contingent to its own process of social 
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construction, as stated in the definition on socio-political water governance.37  In this 
sense, socio-political governance arrangements are perceived neither to be 
intrinsically democratic nor intrinsically undemocratic.  Peters et al., (2012) highlight 
this important tension in the following passage: 
 
“Over the last ten years, debates concerning the democratic implications of 
interactive forms of governance have been gaining more and more momentum 
(Sorensen and Torfing, 2007).  While governance researchers tend to agree that 
the surge of interactive governance arenas such as quasi-markets, partnerships 
and networks have implications for the role and functioning of democracy, there 
is less agreement about what these implications are (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007). 
Some argue that interactive forms of governance are democratically 
problematic, because they undermine political equality, and the transparency of 
governance processes that makes it possible for the public to control and hold 
political decision-makers to account (Hansen, 2007; Papadopolous, 2007; 
Bexell and Morth, 2010). Others claim that interactive forms of governance give 
a new life to a disenfranchised representative democracy because they provide 
new arenas fro empowered participation on the output side for the political 
system (Fung and Wright, 2003; warren, 2009).” (Peters, et al., 2012: 186) 
 
So, one immediate question to ask is: what are the conditions or factors that tilt 
socio-political governance arrangements towards one way or the other?  
Consequently, the complex relationship between socio-political governance and 
democracy has urged scholars to develop useful frameworks to study their 
democratic performance in a systematic way, turning also onto specific empirical 
case studies in an attempt to offer useful information for policy recommendations.  
Accordingly, one place to start in this endeavour is by stating in clear terms the 
tension between socio-political governance vis à vis democracy.  In the literature it is 
possible then to find four main positions about the relationship between governance 
processes and democracy (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007).   
 
1.7.1. Some Positions and Pathways to Assess the Democratic Performance of 
Socio-political Governance Arrangements 
 
There are various positions that explain the relationship between socio-political 
governance and democracy. The first one is an ‘incompatible position’, whereby 
governance is considered incompatible with liberal representative democracy, 
because the authority of the State is hollowed-out by governance contexts that, to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 L. Whitehead, an important scholar specialised in democratic theory, has the same opinion 
of democracy. For him democracy is an open-ended project, subject to a process of social 
construction, and full of continuous tensions that make for its quality and performance. Please 
see Whitehead, L. (2002), Democratization: Theory and Experience, Oxford, U.K., Oxford 
University Press.  
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make things worse, are frequently captured by powerful interests and so produce a 
range of democratic deficits.  The second one is a ‘complementary position’, whereby 
governance arrangements can be considered to co-exist with traditional liberal 
democratic practices; as they help to further democratic practice based on traditional 
forms of accountability.  The third is a ‘transition position’ that considers that 
governance arrangements offer greater flexibility and efficiency, and so they might 
gradually replace representative democracy as the dominant model of decision-
making and representation. Finally, an ‘instrumental position’, that perceives socio-
political governance arrangements as a means to provide for traditional government 
institutions to increase their democratic –or autocratic control– over increasing 
differentiated and complex polities.  From the above argumentation it is possible to 
see that the second and fourth positions could be said to consider socio-political 
governance arrangements and traditional democratic institutions as complementary, 
while position one and three may be considered as oppositional (Klijn and Skelcher, 
2007; Hans Klijn, 2011; Peters et al., 2012).   
 
These four positions manifest potential scenarios that need to be investigated 
through the thorough application of consistent frameworks over empirical case study 
investigations. Scholars in the field of governance studies are working towards the 
development of analytical frameworks or pathways to study the democratic 
performance of governance strategies and arrangements (Klijn and Scklecher, 2007; 
Torfing and Triantafillou, 2011; Klijn, 2011; Peters et al, 2012). There are doing so 
through the engagement with different notions of democratic theory and different 
theories of democracy in an attempt to identify the ways to assess their democratic 
performance (i.e. democratic effects). In this research quest the efforts have been 
oriented at defining some form of democratic criteria (e.g. through the development 
of a set ‘ideal type’ range of democratic conditions, democratic tensions, and a range 
of potential democratic effects) through which to assess the democratic performance 
of socio-political governance arrangements.  
 
An interesting example of scholarly efforts to develop some form of analytical 
pathways to support the analysis of socio-political governance institutional forms is 
the one presented recently by Torfing, Pierre, Peters and Sorensen (2012). The 
criterion used is based on the notion of ‘democratic anchorage’.  According to them 
the basic idea behind the notion of democratic anchorage depends on determining 
the degree to which a socio-political governance arrangement is anchored to a 
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number of relevant territorially or functionally demarcated political constituencies and 
set of rules for democratic interaction that render them democratic legitimacy.  As 
such in order for a socio-political governance arrangement to be assessed positively 
in terms of democratic performance it should be: democratically anchored to elected 
politicians –therefore, asking questions regarding to what extent democratically 
elected politicians steer socio-political governance arrangements and hold them 
accountable to official policy objectives and normative commitments–; democratically 
anchored to a membership basis of participating groups and organisations –that is to 
examine to what extent socio-political governance arrangements are inclusive and 
representative of all stakeholders–; democratically anchored to a territorially defined 
citizenry –that is to establish to what extent policy outputs and outcomes of 
governance contexts are transparent and accountable to affected citizens–; and 
finally, democratically anchored to democratic rules and norms –that is to determine 
to what extent democratic principles of inclusion, deliberation, representation, and 
democratic innovation are upheld by the socio-political governance arrangement.   
 
E. H. Klijn (2011) is another scholar that offers a framework to analyse the 
democratic performance of socio-political governance arrangement. He begins by 
distinguishing three basic sources of democratic legitimacy: accountability –referring 
to the existence of effective procedures and rules to hold officers accountable to an 
external authority and the citizenry–; voice –referring to the existence of effective 
procedures and rule that grant voice and influence to stakeholders in decision-
making-; and due deliberation –referring to notion that democracy is strong as long 
as the source of democratic legitimacy rests in public deliberation processes.  After 
establishing this initial ‘sources of legitimacy’ he suggests that to analyse the 
democratic performance of socio-political governance arrangements it is necessary 
to cross this criterion with another parameter represented by three types of 
democratic legitimacy (i.e. input, throughput and output democracy).  Accordingly, 
this framework helps to ask research questions such as for example: who is 
accountable for the process to come to decisions –accountability/input legitimacy –; 
how is feedback arranged in the process between process interactions and the 
actors that are accountable –accountability/throughput legitimacy –; and who is 
accountable for the final decision –accountability/output legitimacy?  With this, E.H. 
Klijn (2011) goes further the study of the democratic performance of socio-political 
governance institutional forms.  
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It is possible to consider from the previous efforts to build analytical pathways to 
study the democratic performance of socio-political governance arrangements, that 
researchers are making attempts to innovate with different tools at their disposal, and 
stemming from progress made in the field of democratic theory.  This innovation is 
based in the recognition that traditional tools or ways to analyse the democratic 
performance of, for example, government institutions or hierarchical governing 
arrangements are not really suitable for the analysis of the democratic performance 
of socio-political governance arrangements. Thus, it is necessary to innovate and this 
PhD makes an attempt to contribute to this process of scholarly research in this 
matter by engaging with the associative and deliberative democratic theories.  
 
1.7.2. Associative and Deliberative Democratic Theories: Two Theoretical 
Pathways to Study the Democratic Performance of Socio-political Governance 
Arrangements 
 
The present PhD research investigation represents an attempt to further the research 
on the democratic performance of socio-political governance arrangements and 
proposes that by engaging with the associative and deliberative theories of 
democracy a better understanding may be developed, and by way of establishing a 
range of potential democratic effects that will help to understand their prospects and 
challenges, and also the preconditions that seems to affect this performance. This 
assumption results from the consideration that socio-political governance 
arrangements deeply rely on the purposeful associative and deliberative activity of 
stakeholders in a polity, and both democratic theories are equipped to scrutinise 
these activities. 
 
Consequently, one moment of analysis of the heuristic-analytical device will be 
supporting the study of the democratic performance of socio-political governance 
arrangements and backed by the associative and deliberative democratic theories. 
This analytical device will then be deployed to study the democratic performance  
(i.e. the democratic effects) of MSPs for groundwater management in the Mexican 
water polity.  The next chapter will elaborate in detail on these considerations.  
 
1.8. The State’s Meta-governance Strategies and Capacities 
 
As already established, arguments about the rise of the ‘governance notion’ are 
closely connected to those of the process of State-transformation in the development 
of new strategies, structures and processes to address complex policy problems and 
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govern polities under a new governing context. More recently, after several year of 
evolution –tainted with some form of disenchantment or concern with the limited 
outcomes of socio-political governance arrangements–, the governance concourse is 
currently engaging more consistently with the study of the necessary State 
capabilities –strategies and capacities– to exercise a better governing role over 
socio-political governance arrangements, and in order to foster their governability. As 
such the aforementioned scholarly concerns are presently manifested and being 
addressed through the rise of the ‘meta-governance notion’. Pierre et al., (2012) 
comment on this: 
 
“However, interactive forms of governance do not emerge spontaneously but are 
often facilitated, initiated and even designed by public authorities. In addition, the 
interactive governance arrangements might fail to produce effective and 
legitimate ideas and solutions. Finally, elected governments must impose some 
kind of direction on the interactive policy processes in order to realise their overall 
objectives, enhance pluri-centric coordination and policy alignment and ensure 
democratic accountability. Hence, the attempts of governments at multiple levels 
to reap the fruits of governance call for reflexive and strategic meta-governance.” 
(Torfing, Peters, Pierre and Sorensen, 2012: 122) 
 
The concept of meta-governance is a relatively recent invention and its definition is 
still a work in progress. Consequently, scholars are currently making efforts to 
continue to establish a coherent meaning, to propose its analytical usefulness in the 
field of governance studies, and to deploy its analytical leverage in empirical 
research (Jessop 2004, 2007; Sorensen, Bell and Park, 2006; Meuleman, 2008; 
Hindmoor and Bell, 2009; Peters, 2010; Torfing and Triantafillou, 2011, and Peters et 
al. 2012). For example, Peters (2010) considers that scholarly efforts in the field of 
governance studies have done a reasonably good job in defining the ‘meta-
governance notion’, but the discussion on the instruments and mechanisms 
necessary to foster it is still very much an abstract, open and contested debate. 
Therefore, it seems important to further the understanding of what meta-governance 
could be, not only in theoretical terms, but also through real-life empirical situations. 
What follows is a simple elaboration on the development of the meta-governance 
notion. This elaboration will help later to design the fifth moment of analysis of the 
heuristic analytical device that will support the Mexican State water institution’s meta-
governance strategies assessment. 
 
Perhaps Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan (1997) were the first scholars to begin to 
address the need for the State to manage governance contexts; although in their 
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particular case their focus was on the elaboration of ‘State network management 
strategies’ to steer policy networks, and they did not use at that time the term meta-
governance. Still, their work on ‘network management’ is fully imbued with spirit of 
the ‘meta-governance notion’, and is worth including as part of meta-governance 
debate. Accordingly, network management, as a meta-governance strategy 
comprises the following actions: network activation (i.e. initiating interaction amongst 
relevant stakeholders to address a collective action problem), arranging interaction 
(i.e. providing the necessary formal and informal mechanisms to organise a positive 
and purposeful interaction amongst stakeholder), facilitating interaction (i.e. involves 
creating the conditions for the favourable development of strategic consensus and 
developing conflict resolution and brokering mechanisms) and network structuring 
(i.e. involves influencing policy environments to support networks, influencing the 
interrelationship between network members, influencing values, norms and 
perceptions, and mobilising new coalitions). 
 
Jessop (2002, 2004) was also one of the first scholars to begin to address governing 
failures over socio-political governance institutional forms, and to suggest that in light 
of the widespread use of governance strategies, there was a need to strengthen the 
role of the State in governing governance arrangements through meta-governance 
practices. For him the State is in the best position to exercise this role (Jessop, 
2004). As such, the concept of meta-governance can be best understood, at a 
strategic level, as the promotion of a shared vision oriented at governance 
arrangements so that the activities of different social actors may be promoted in a 
complementary manner.  Very importantly, for Jessop, meta-governance is also 
about shaping the contexts in which governance contexts are embedded, developing 
strategies for helping them further their objectives. Jessop (2004) considers that 
meta-governance should be aimed at: providing the ground rules for socio-political 
governance arrangements; ensuring the compatibility of different governing 
mechanisms, mainly by establishing a monopoly of organisational intelligence to 
shape cognitive expectations; becoming the last instance of conflict resolution when 
conflict arises between stakeholders; balancing power imbalances to secure 
democratic outcomes; developing the capacity for interactive and dynamic learning; 
building methods for coordinating actors, with different identities, interests and 
systems of meaning and that act according to different spatial-temporal horizons and 
domains; and establishing a common worldview to coordinate individual action.        
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Another systematic approach to the study of meta-governance is the one furthered 
by Meuleman (2008, 2011). Meuleman’s approach appears less theoretically 
oriented and more grounded than the ones deployed by Kooiman (2003) and Jessop 
(2004). For him meta-governance has been driven by the practical concern to design 
strategies to reconcile conflicts between the three distinctive modes of governance: 
hierarchies, markets and networks. Accordingly, meta-governance is an activity or 
practice positioned above the aforementioned modes of governance in an attempt to 
avoid the negative impacts of lack of coordination and to enable the potential 
synergies between them. Meuleman (2008, 2011) emphasises that the concept of 
meta-governance has been applied to contexts of network governance, considering 
meta-governance as an indirect form of top-down governing practice that is 
exercised by influencing self-governance and co-governance regimes through 
various forms of coordination such as framing, facilitation and negotiation. He then 
proposes the following definition for meta-governance: 
 
“Meta-governance is a means by which to produce some degree of coordinated 
governance, by designing and managing sound combinations of hierarchical, 
market and network governance, to achieve the best possible outcomes from the 
viewpoint of those responsible for the performance of public sector organisations: 
public managers as ‘meta-governors.” (Meuleman, 2008: 68) 
 
Meuleman goes on to develop several functions that should be fulfilled by the State 
as part of its meta-governance activities: providing and guaranteeing the 
constitutional legal framework for private self-regulation; providing the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’ to keep self-regulation and cooperation geared toward the general good; 
authorising participatory claims of private actors; taking part in providing a normative 
environment and therefore the legitimacy to goals of private actors; supporting the 
monitoring of self-regulation; and avoiding the negative externalities by linking the 
different sectorial self-regulation efforts with each other. 
 
According to Bell and Hindmoor (2009), under their State centric-relational approach, 
the “resilient State” is responding to the coordination and sovereignty challenges 
imposed by socio-political governance arrangements by developing meta-
governance measures. Consequently, they consider the notion of meta-governance 
to refer to the specific governing practices and procedures necessary to secure 
government influence and control over socio-political governance institutional forms. 
Accordingly, meta-governance is basically defined in terms of six central State 
functions: steering (i.e. involving the strategic management of processes, goal-
setting, coordination of actions and relationships between stakeholders and the 
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strategic selection of modes of governance to deploy in different settings), 
effectiveness (i.e. involves establishing evaluative criteria relevant to the goals and 
activities performed by socio-political governance institutional forms; resourcing (i.e. 
involves establishing the proper financial, technical, authority, information resources 
for socio-political governance arrangements to further their mandates and 
objectives); democracy (i.e. involves ensuring that democratic principles are upheld 
through broad participation, legitimate representation, and democratic decision 
making); accountability (i.e. involves establishing clear principles and lines of 
responsibility, responsiveness and control), and, finally, legitimacy (i.e. involves the 
establishment and upholding of certain normative criteria that lay the bases for such 
legitimacy like fairness, equity, effectiveness, etc. 
 
Lastly, for Peters (2010), the challenge of meta-governance is to ascertain the 
coordination and steering capacities of the state in ‘governance contexts’, but without 
depleting such contexts of their virtues as decentralised, devolved and participatory 
sites. Accordingly, he contemplates that meta-governance should respond to four 
major challenges: the enablement of effective, efficient and democratic decision-
making processes; the due care for a broad and inclusive participation, and 
legitimate representation; the development of effective coordination and steering 
capabilities; and the establishment of functional accountability mechanisms (Peters, 
2010).  
 
The above elaborations represent some of the most important discussions regarding 
the meta-governance notion.  Some of these ideas seem to be more straightforward 
and less abstract than others, and many authors concur on the nature and 
orientation of meta-governance. This presentation of the different meta-governance 
strategies will again serve to support the design of heuristic analytical device 
(chapter 4), to later identify and assess the Mexican State’s meta-governance 
strategies and capacities over the MSPs for groundwater management.   
 
1.9. End Comments to this Chapter: Summarising the Explanadum  
 
Socio-political governance studies seek to investigate the governance phenomenon, 
manifested as processes of State-transformation oriented at modifying the 
relationship between the State and society in order to enable greater democratic 
social participation/involvement and stakeholder cooperation throughout the 
governing process. There are three distinct governance approaches to study this 
phenomenon, the society centred, the State centric, and its corollary the State 
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centric-relational approach. The State centric-relational approach focuses on 
processes of State-transformation, the establishment and institutional development 
of socio-political governance arrangements, and the role of the State in the meta-
governance of such arrangements oriented at governing over them, and also at 
supporting their institutional development.  This doctoral research attempts a state-
centric-relational governance approach to the study of the Neo-liberal process of 
State-transformation in the Mexican water polity, and the establishment of socio-
political governance arrangements, the MSPs for groundwater resources 
management; COTAS.  
 
As such, the Mexican polity started an important and deeply rooted process of State-
transformation commencing in the mid 1980’s, and as part of a broader political 
process oriented at consolidating a new Neo-liberal Statehood formation, after many 
decades of existence of a Developmental-Interventionist Statehood one. In the 
context of the water polity, this process entailed the design of a new State-project 
and the implementation a number of State-strategies oriented at substantially 
modifying the relationship between the State and civil society in the pursuit of 
sustainable water resources management, water supply and sanitation, and water 
security.  What happened and how can this process be explained?    
 
A central Neoliberal State-strategy in the Mexican water polity was the establishment 
of socio-political governance arrangements, the MSPs for water resources 
management at the river basin, micro basin and aquifer level.  The MSPs for 
groundwater management, the COTAS, were established to enable greater social 
participation/involvement and stakeholder cooperation to address severe 
groundwater resources over-exploitation.  What has happened with these MSPs for 
groundwater management, have they contributed to address groundwater 
management challenges? Have they contributed to harnessing greater social 
participation and stakeholder involvement?  What has been the role of the State in 
their institutional development? 
 
The more critical governance scholars consider that there are two potential faces to 
the governance phenomenon, as socio-political governance arrangements can be 
sources of greater social participation/ involvement and stakeholder cooperation      –
being in this sense, potential sources of democratic renewal–, but they can also turn 
into institutional venues that only reproduce –and even amplify– socio-political 
relations of power, domination and exclusion.  Through the support of the theoretical 
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developments presented in the next chapter on associative and deliberative 
democratic theory, this doctoral research will also attempt to study the democratic 
performance of the MSPs for groundwater management in the Mexican water polity. 
Are they sources of democratisation of the local water polity or are they sources of 
democratic deficit?  
 
Again critical scholars have also highlighted that frequently the role of the State in the 
institutional development of socio-political governance arrangements has been 
hindering and limiting, and that power relations also affected them negatively.  This 
doctoral research is also interested in studying this situation, and will determine 
through the use of the theoretical power developed in this chapter, the role of the 
Mexican state in the establishment and institutional development of the MSPs for 
groundwater management.  Accordingly, it will also assess its meta-governing 
strategies and capacities in terms of the institutional development of the MSPs.  
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Chapter 2. The Associative and Deliberative Democratic Theories: A Pathway 
to Study the Democratic Performance of Socio-political Governance 
Arrangements: The First Moment of Analysis (Continuation) 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter will engage with the associative and deliberative democratic theories in 
order to support the design of the fourth moment of analysis of the heuristic-
theoretical device to be used for the study of socio-political governance 
arrangements.  The rationale behind this endeavour is that from both theories it is 
possible to extract some analytical elements or dimensions that may later be used to 
assess the democratic performance of socio-political governance arrangements (i.e. 
to establish the analytical orientation and research content of the fourth moment of 
analysis of the heuristic-analytical device).  Both democratic theories represent 
reformist political projects that seek to further the democratisation of contemporary 
liberal democratic polities by actively supporting and enhancing the associative and 
deliberative activity in society (Hirst, 1994; Dryzek, 2000).  According to both 
theories, a more robust, intense and regulated associative and deliberative activity in 
the context of formal and informal institutional venues would have a range of positive 
democratic effects (e.g. legislatures, State institutions, socio-political governance 
arrangements, voluntary organisations, etc.). These democratic effects besides 
themselves being a positive political outcome, in turn, benefit the pursuit of public 
policy goals and help address contemporary governing challenges (Fung, 2003; 
Smith, 2003). 38   More on these aspects will be developed in the next sections of this 
document.  
 
In order to fulfil the objective of designing this moment of analysis to assess the 
democratic performance of socio-political governance arrangements this chapter will 
identify a range of ‘potential democratic effects’ and by revisiting the associative and 
deliberative democratic theories.  These democratic effects somehow represent the 
associative and deliberative democratic scholars’ theoretical and normative hopes 
and aspirations, outcomes of this associative and deliberative activity taking place in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 For example, the linkages between associative and deliberative democratic practice and 
environmental protection have attracted the attention for some time now. The debate is 
extensive, but for some scholars there seems to be direct relationship between democracy 
and better environmental protection.  Some interesting readings on this topic are: Lafferty, W. 
and J. Meadowcroft (1996), Democracy and the Environment, Cheltenham, UK, Edard Elgar; 
Smith, G. (2003), Deliberative Democracy and the Environment, London, UK, Routledge; and, 
Backerstrand, K, Khan, K, Kronsell, A and E Lovbrand, (2010) Environmental Politics and 
Deliberative Democracy, Chelthenham, UK, Edward Elgar.  
	   91 
the context of diverse institutional venues –that in the case of this PhD are 
represented by a socio-political governance arrangement (i.e. the MSPs for 
groundwater management).  This range of potential democratic effects together 
represent a form of an ‘ideal type’ democratic polity, that is that they depict ‘how 
things should be’ from the standpoint of a normative and prescriptive democratic 
criteria. Accordingly, a well functioning democratic socio-political governance 
arrangement would be able to reproduce these democratic effects and by way of 
embedding into its institutional design a range of features oriented at safeguarding 
democratic principles and at producing democratic effects, a situation that brings 
immediately into focus the study of the interaction between the necessary 
institutional design features and enabling/hindering contextual-background 
conditions.39 
  
In this sense, it is also relevant to highlight that the term ‘potential’ is used 
purposefully, as democratic scholars are clear that the potential democratic effects of 
associative and deliberative activity are contingent to such institutional design 
features and contextual conditions (i.e. preconditions for associative and deliberative 
activities), and that mainly have to do with the capacity of such socio-political 
governance arrangements to face the democratic challenges and opportunities 
imposed by these contextual conditions.  In this sense, efforts will also be made to 
unravel what institutional design features and contextual background conditions 
seem to have a stronger and more direct bearing in the democratic performance of 
socio-political governance arrangements.  Also, scholars consider that the attainment 
of these democratic effects has in itself a positive feedback loop, as the attainment of 
these effects supports, through the passage of time, the furthering of democratisation 
processes. 40  Can these be the case of the MSPs for groundwater management? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The ‘’ideal type’ is a methodological tool used by sociologists and political scientists, and 
developed to a comprehensive level by Marx Weber. According to Weber and ideal type is a 
formalised model of how things are supposed to be from the standpoint of a normative or 
prescriptive criterion.  Consequently, ideal types serve for the following research objectives: 
to identify a research object, a social phenomenon that one wants to understand; to build a 
formal model of how things are supposed to work within the context of the phenomenon 
studied; to measure the difference between what happens and what should happen                 
–according to that normative or prescriptive criterion–; and to analyse the causal relation 
between the phenomenon studied and the suppose change in social reality.  On this please 
see: Collins, R. (1994), Four Sociological Traditions: Selected Readings, Oxford, U.K, Oxford 
University Press. 
40 L. Whitehead (2002), a leading scholar on democratisation processes, points out to the 
need for political systems to have positive feedback loops that enable a constant 
democratisation processes, as when and if democracy stands still undemocratic forces start 
to gain terrain. On this please see: Whitehead, L. (2002), Democratization: Theory and 
Experience, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press. 
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It is worth highlighting that in real case scenarios not all the potential democratic 
effects will be achieved ‘evenly’.  In certain cases some effects will be achieved to a 
greater level or extent than others.  Scholars consider that this situation seems to 
depend on the nature and orientation of the institutional setting in which associative 
and deliberative activity takes places, as some settings will have a stronger 
inclination, for example, to pursue developmental effects over say institutional and 
public sphere effects (Warren, 2001, Fung, 2003). So each institutional setting 
should be assessed in its own terms.  Still, this is not to say that comparative 
exercises cannot be pursued, as it may be possible to asses the attainment of 
democratic effects of homologues institutional settings, identifying the differentials in 
their attainment and the difference in the preconditions that have made the 
difference.  In this sense it is possible to assess what type of effect was more greatly 
achieved by the Laguna-Seca COTAS.   
 
To provide some form organisation in the presentation of these potential democratic 
effects of associative and deliberative activity, this chapter will engage in their 
characterisation. This characterisation will rely on the work produced by associative 
democratic scholars (Cohen and Rogers, 1995; Warren 2001, 2004; Fung and 
Wright 2003; Fung, 2009) and deliberative democratic scholars (Elster, 1998; 
Bohman, 2000, Backstrand, 2010; Dryzek, 2012).  The work produced by these 
scholars is perhaps amongst the most thorough and systematic on the subject 
matter. It is also important to acknowledge that the debate on the potential 
democratic effects of associative and deliberative activity is very comprehensive and 
rich, and the following presentation is only an attempt to simple portray the most 
salient features of this debate, to later enable the development of a heuristic-
analytical device for the study of the democratic performance of socio-political 
governance arrangements.41    
 
In an attempt to characterise the potential democratic effects of associative and 
deliberative activity, scholars have identified three main democratisation pathways 
through with the potential democratic effects may manifest.  These pathways are the 
potential developmental effects, public sphere effects and institutional effects 
(Warren, 2001).  Accordingly, developmental effects, in principle, may be attained by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 For a more philosophical engagement with this aspect please see: Ellen M. Immergut, ‘An 
Institutional Critique of Associative Democracy’, in J. Cohen and Rogers (eds.), Associations 
and Democracy (London, Versso, 1996), pp.193-200, and, Steiner, J (2012), Foundations of 
Deliberative Democracy, Empirical Research and Normative Implications, Cambridge, UK, 
Cambridge University Press.  
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the manner in which associative and deliberative activity contributes to forming, 
enhancing and supporting the development of certain citizens’ capacities. These 
capacities are mainly related to political education and other citizen skills that enable 
citizens to actively and fruitfully engage in governing processes, and more 
particularly in the context of socio-political governance arrangements where the State 
and other stakeholders participate together.  On this, it is possible to reflect that 
MSPs should be capable, in principle, of producing this form of developmental effects 
and so the research interest is to assess the ‘level’ in the attainment of such, as 
already mentioned.  
 
The public sphere effects refer to the manner in which associative and deliberative 
activity contributes to the enablement of deliberative arenas where democratic public 
deliberation on matters of common concern and policy relevance are discussed 
between stakeholders.  These deliberative arenas in the case of the socio-political 
governance arrangements should be oriented at enabling open dialogue between 
stakeholders, at enabling decision-making based on consensus-formation and at 
providing contexts for a transparent and legitimate alternative conflict resolution. It is 
important to emphasize that MSPs for water resources management have at their 
centre some form of deliberative arena that enables public deliberation processes 
between different water users, other stakeholders, and the State.  Consequently, 
efforts will be made to try to determine the attainment of public sphere effects and 
the quality of the deliberative arena in the context of the MSPs for groundwater 
management in Mexico, and more specifically the Laguna-Seca COTAS. 
 
Lastly, the institutional effects refer to the manner in which associative and 
deliberative activity contribute to the support of keener political representation, 
political equality, and social equity.  Very importantly, another institutional effect is to 
become alterative institutional settings for socio-political governance, that functionally 
support political representation, political equality and social equity. In this case, it is 
relevant then to make attempts to determine the institutional effects of MSPs for 
groundwater management, ultimately learning if they are functional vessels for socio-
political governance.  
 
Another important aspect of this debate is that associative and deliberative 
democratic scholars acknowledge that there are two other important aspects relative 
to the attainment of these democratic effects, the preconditions for associative and 
deliberative activity, including: the necessary o ‘ideal’ institutional design features to 
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support the pursuit of such democratic effects and the background contextual 
conditions that also have a bearing in the outcomes of such pursuit.  So when 
studying the democratic effects of associative and deliberative activity, it is also 
necessary to look at the interaction between institutional features and contextual 
conditions, thus indeed following a Historical Institutionalist approach. In this sense 
associative and deliberative democratic scholars highlight that in order to have 
positive democratic effects, there should be a functional match or fit between the 
characteristics of background contextual conditions and the institutional design 
features.  So for example, in contexts characterised by harsh political or social 
inequalities, the institutional design features should pay particular attention to 
address them; and so forth (Fung and Wright, 2003).  
 
The rest of this chapter is divided in four main sections.  The first section presents 
the main tenets of the associative democratic theory and its potential democratic 
effects.  It will also elaborate on some important preconditions that are necessary to 
enable socio-political governance arrangements to attain these effects. The second 
section will perform the same tasks for the deliberative democratic theory.  The last 
section presents some end comments to this chapter. 
 
2.2. Associative Democratic Theory 
 
2.2.1. Main Tenets of Associative Democracy 
 
Associative democracy is a democratic theory with a rich theoretical evolution that 
stretches back in time.  According to scholars the roots of associative democracy 
stem from a form of ‘associationalism’ developed in the 19th century with important 
influences from English advocates of industrial and social cooperation, English 
political pluralism and guild socialism, as well as some French and German ideas of 
corporatism (Taylor, 1982; Held, 1987; Keane, 1988; Matthew, 1989; Hirst, 1994). 
The first contemporary theoretical manifestations of associative democracy were 
developed in the second half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, asserting 
a strong criticism of the liberal democratic polities’ entrenched centralisation of State 
power, the growth of the bureaucratic phenomenon and administrative rationalism, 
and the deepening of the individualist culture. 42  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 It is worth commenting that some of the criticisms developed by the associative and 
deliberative democrats regarding the characteristics and workings of contemporary political 
systems attune well with those made by governance scholars. 
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Associative democratic theory supports a broad political reform seeking to 
complement the liberal representative democratic model of decision-making, political 
representation and political legitimacy by altering the locus of power in the political 
system from State institutions and markets to civil society –that is to different 
institutional venues where civil society has a substantive role in decision-making and 
political participation (Fung and Wright, 2003).  As a political project it seeks then 
greater decentralisation, subsidiarity, and devolution initiatives –at territorial and 
functional levels–, and by way of establishing different forms of institutions that open 
the governing process to the meaningful participation and empowerment of 
organised civil society (Hirst, 1994; Cohen and Rogers, 1995, Fung and Wright, 
2003).  Associative democrats give priority to individual freedom, but they also tend 
to emphasise the importance of ‘freedom of association’, as the individual citizen 
right to come together with other individuals to collectively express, promote, and 
pursue common interests throughout governing processes.  
 
Associative democrats use a broad and abstract definition of associative activity 
(Cohen and Rogers, 1995). Associative activity is considered to be any form of 
voluntary activity performed by citizens who become members of an informal or 
formal organisational or institutional setting –considered as an associative space–, 
that helps them to build ‘thick attachments’, based on a goal oriented, face-to-face 
and frequent interaction for the pursuit of shared purposes and the furthering of 
particular objectives –including governing objectives (Cohen and Rogers, 1995; 
Warren, 2001).  According to associative democrats, ‘associative spaces’ that bring 
different social actors together, distinguish themselves from hierarchies and markets 
–as two other governing modes– in that they gain their political legitimacy and 
authority from the inclusive participation of citizens and from decision-making 
processes that are firmly based on the establishment of decision-making 
mechanisms based on consensus-building and alternative conflict resolution 
mechanism –such as the case of MSPs (Fung and Wright, 2003).  Associative 
democrats ultimately consider that purposeful associative activity in the context of 
formal and informal institutional settings can become a source for building alternative 
socio-political governance processes.43   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The consideration regarding decision-making processes supported by public deliberation, 
consensus-building and alternative conflict resolution also impels to look into the workings of 
deliberative institutional designs and public deliberation processes that are at the heart of the 
deliberative democratic theory. Accordingly, an associative activity without a rich deliberative 
one may also harbour some potential democratic challenges. Interesting readings on the 
relationship between associative and deliberative democracy can be found in: Hirst, P. and V. 
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There are three central ideas to the associative democratic project. The first is that 
the State should actively support individuals in their pursuit or realisation of their 
citizenship rights for associative activity on matters concerning political life and 
governing processes (Cohen and Rogers, 1995, Warren, 2001). The second is that 
State should actively promote a rich and democratic associative activity by way of 
establishing institutional settings where this activity is promoted –like socio-political 
governance arrangements (Cohen and Rogers, 1995, Warren, 2001). Finally, that 
the State should also make efforts to ensure that the institutional settings where this 
associative activity takes place provide for accurate political representation, political 
equality, political legitimacy and social equity, thus actively steering these settings to 
pursue these democratic principles (Rogers and Cohen, 1995).  Hirst (2002) reflects 
on some of these aspects regarding the role of the State in support of associative 
activity: 
 
“Associationalists contend that there are in any complex and free society 
different versions of what the good life should be, and the task of the state is to 
help realise as many of these as possible, not to impose one of them. The state 
should perform its core functions of assuring public peace, adjudicating in 
clashes of norms and mobilising resources for public purposes. Unlike liberal 
doctrines that seek to limit the functions of the State and expand the scope of 
the market, associationalism seeks to expand the scope of democratic 
governance in civil society.” (Hirst, 2002: 409) 
 
The ideas mentioned above serve well to support the need to consider the role of the 
State in supporting the establishment and development of socio-political governance 
arrangements.  It is possible then to consider that in order for polities and socio-
political governance arrangements to uphold democratic principles it is necessary for 
the State to actively support the establishment of socio-political governance 
arrangements; to actually support the associative activity of citizens in socio-political 
governance arrangements; and to exercise meta-governing strategies to support 
their democratic performance.  In terms of the case study analysis, it could prove 
interesting then to study the meta-governing strategies and capacities of the Mexican 
State to support the associative activity in the context of the MSPs for groundwater 
management. 
  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bader, V. (ed)(2001) Associative Democracy, the Real Third Way, Abidngon, UK, Frank Cass 
Publishers. 
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2.2.2. Potential Democratic Effects of Associative Activity   
 
Advocates of associative democracy consider that a robust associative activity in a 
polity can make various sorts of substantial contributions to democracy, especially in 
contexts where the political system has failed to provide meaningful avenues for 
political representation and social participation, where the State has shown to have 
important limitations for addressing complex, interdependent and cross-cutting policy 
problems, and most importantly, where the unfettered market economy continues to 
produce increasing inequalities in the distribution of wealth and risk (Beck, 1986; 
1995).  On this, associative democrats assert that associative activity plays a central 
role in contemporary democratic polities by way of contributing to produce a range of 
democratic effects. Several scholars have made systematic efforts to study the 
potential democratic effects of associative activity, and so the debate is quite rich and 
extensive (Hirst, 1995; Immergut, 1995; Young, 1995; Warren, 2001, 2004), but for 
reasons of space, it will be summarised.  Warren (2001) comments on the role of 
associative activity in the next short intervention: 
 
“Any democratic system, but particularly one which politics has migrated beyond 
the state-centred venues, depends upon the multiple effects of associative 
activity –representation, public deliberation, a counterbalancing of powers, 
alternative forms of governance, the cultivation of political skills, and the 
formation of public opinion, just to name a few possibilities. Associative activity 
plays key roles at numerous points in what are new complex and multi-faceted 
political systems.” (Warren, 2001: 27) 
 
The following sections of this document elaborate on the different types of 
democratic effects of associative activity, including developmental, public sphere and 
institutional effects.  
 
2.2.2.1. Developmental Effects of Associative Activity 
 
Associative activity supports two main developmental effects: the development of 
more comprehensive and shared views through information generation and 
socialisation, and the development of critical citizen skills and other forms of political 
education.  These are explained below in more detail.  
• Development of more comprehensive and shared views through information 
generation and sharing 
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Associative activity supports the generation and socialisation of useful information 
throughout the governing process.  This is because stakeholders participating in 
purposeful associative activity are useful collectors, organisers and providers of 
relevant information that can be used for the diagnosis of policy challenges and for 
decision-making. It is generally the case, that stakeholders will usually have very 
valuable local knowledge, based on day-to-day experience and also historical facts 
and trends that usually escape the remit of technical experts, scientists and 
politicians.  This information can contribute, through a process of public deliberation, 
in the development of more comprehensive, accurate and shared stakeholders’ 
perspectives on relevant policy situations and trends that affect them. These aspects 
of information generation and socialisation may thus have also an important 
empowerment outcome (Cohen and Rogers, 1995, Warren, 2003, Smith, 2009).  
Cohen and Rogers (1995) reflect on this potential democratic effect: 
 
“Associative activity can provide information to policy makers on member 
preferences, the impact of proposed legislation or the implementation of existing 
law. As the State has become more involved in regulating society and extended 
the reach of its regulation to more diverse sites, technically complex areas and 
processes subject to rapid change, this information function has arguably 
become more important (…) Because of the proximity to those effects, groups 
(stakeholders) are often well positioned to provide such information. When they 
do (provide information), such groups contribute to satisfying the norm of popular 
sovereignty, because good information improves citizen deliberation, facilitates 
the enforcement of decisions and clarifies the appropriate objects of state policy.” 
(Cohen and Rogers, 1995:42-43) 
 
• Development of Critical Citizen Skills and other Forms Political Education 
 
An important aspect included as part of the potential developmental effects of 
associative activity is the consideration that it can foster some form of development 
of critical skills and political education. In the context of this debate, critical skills are 
deemed extremely important because they allow stakeholders a more reflective and 
comprehensive understanding of the situation they are embedded in, and of the 
different perspectives or options that exist to meliorate it.  Accordingly, it is through 
the interaction that stakeholders have in associative activity how they may learn –in 
more detail– about the different aspects surrounding such situation/problem they are 
embedded in, as well as on possible avenues to address it. By participating in 
associative activity stakeholders can be socialised into a ‘problem’ or ‘challenge’ and 
gain more knowledge about different aspects that previously had been unknown or 
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not considered (Warren, 2003; Smith, 2009).  On this Warren (2001) develops the 
following idea: 
 
“The opportunities to develop critical and cognitive skills are key to the possibility 
that participants in political processes will change their preferences in ways that 
are truer to their needs and are more likely to contribute to stable consensus, 
bargains, or coalitions because they know what they want. This possibility, 
however, is likely to occur only under rather specific conditions: what is needed is 
some degree of conflict under conditions that enable conflict to be resolved 
through associative and deliberative means.” (Warren, 2001: 75) 
 
Associative activity is also deemed to play an important part in other aspects of 
citizens’ political education. It is generally advocated by associative democratic 
scholars, that associative activity fosters the development of a range of citizen skills 
–like public speaking, self-presentation, negotiation, bargaining, and creative thinking 
(Hirst, 1994; 2002).  Imagine then a group of individuals that have to decide upon 
which course of action they need to take to further the objectives of the MSP for 
water resources management they participate in.  In order to arrive at such a 
decision, stakeholders are required to speak in public, present their ideas, negotiate 
and bargain over different interpretations of reality and viewpoints, and then value 
the merit of individual proposals to eventually arrive at the definition of a course of 
action. Accordingly, these interaction activities, if carried out regularly, may assist in 
the development of such citizen skills.44  
 
In perhaps more abstract terms associative democrats also consider that associative 
activity may conduce to the generation of civic virtues –such as respect, toleration, 
solidarity-unity, and cooperation (Warren, 2001, 2003). This is because associative 
activity may support the enablement of ‘deliberative arenas’ where inclusive and 
open deliberation takes place, and where in order to advance decision-making 
process stakeholders are required to be respectful and tolerant, to acknowledge 
interdependencies and to develop some form of collective purpose to enable 
cooperation between them. On these aspects Fung (2003) elaborates the following 
ideas: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  A number of scholars consider that citizenship dispositions can be cultivated by 
participating in associations. For example, green political theorists are very much interested in 
this virtuous relationship. On this topic interesting readings worth reviewing are: Doherty, B. 
and M. de Geus (eds.) (1996), Democracy and Green Political Thought: Sustainability, Rights 
and Citizenship, London, U.K, Routhledge Editorial; Dobson A. and D. Bell (2005), 
Environmental Citizenship, Massachusetts, USA, MIT Press; and Smith, G., ‘Green 
Citizenship and the Social Economy’ Environmental Politics, Vol, 14, No.2, (2005), pp. 273-
289. 
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“Of the hypothesized effects of association on democracy, the category that has 
received the most contemporary attention has concerned how associative activity 
affects the attitudes, skills, and behaviours of individuals in ways that benefit 
democracy. One version of this view focuses upon the attitudes and dispositions 
of citizens. In this view, associations inculcate civic virtues in their members. 
Such virtues include attention to the public good, habits of cooperation, toleration, 
respect for others, respect for the rule of law, willingness to participate in public 
life, self-confidence and efficacy (Warren, 2001.73). To the extent that individuals 
possess these values, democracy itself becomes more robust, fair, and effective 
in myriad of ways. ” (Fung, 2003: 520) 
 
2.2.2.2. Public Sphere Effects of Associative Activity 
 
Associative democratic scholars consider that associative activity may enable the 
creation of purposeful public spheres that enable stakeholders to communicate 
between each other, develop more comprehensive views and pursue joint decision-
making processes in deliberative arenas. 
 
• Creation of Public Spheres: Enabling Public Deliberation  
 
Associative activity may contribute to the creation of public spheres and deliberative 
arenas where citizens engage in public deliberation processes. This public 
deliberation processes are critical for sharing information, getting to know each other, 
developing a more comprehensive and shared perspective about a situation or 
governing challenge, support consensus-building and alternative conflict resolution, 
and, lastly, support the coordination and cooperation between stakeholders.  A more 
through elaboration on this type of democratic effect will be developed in the next 
section of this chapter on deliberative democratic theory, a theory that focuses 
precisely on enabling public deliberation processes.  
 
2.2.2.3. Institutional Effects of Associative Activity 
 
Associative democratic scholars consider that associative activity may harbour the 
following institutional democratic effects: keener political representation and greater 
political equality between stakeholders; political legitimacy in decision-making; 
stakeholder cooperation and cooperation throughout governing processes; and 
ultimately the enablement of alternative forms of governance (Cohen and Rogers, 
1995, Warren, 2001, 2003; Fung and Wright, 2003, Smith, 2006). The following 
sections provide a brief elaboration on these effects. 
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• Keener Political Representation and Greater Political Equality and Social Equity 
 
According to scholars, associative activity is considered to have the capacity to 
improve political representation within polities and to favour the attainment of the 
democratic principle of political equality. This happens because through associative 
activity stakeholders can actually voice their views, clarify interests and preferences, 
and very importantly, contest perspectives in the context of institutional settings that 
in principle have a bearing over governing processes. This situation, in turn, may 
contribute to the pursuit of greater political equality. On this Fung (2003) develops: 
 
“A fourth contribution of association to democratic governance is to improve ways 
in which interests are represented to lawmakers and translated into law and 
policy. Associative activity offer additional channels –beyond voting, lobbying and 
direct contact with public officials– for individuals to press their public concerns. 
Association can improve the quality of representation, and so the quality of 
democracy more broadly.” (Fung, 2003: 523) 
  
In terms of the furthering political equality in polities, associative activity in the 
context of institutional settings is also considered to be able to assist disadvantaged 
and marginalised individuals and groups to participate in political processes, and 
thus provide them with better chances to influence decision-making processes that 
affect them directly. In this sense, it is suggested by associative democrats that 
associative activity might contribute to achieve better conditions of political equality 
and social equity in polities characterised by inequalities or outright exclusion. The 
following extract by Cohen and Rogers (1996) supports this view: 
 
“Politics is materially conditioned and inequalities in material advantages of the 
sort definitive of capitalism translate directly to inequalities in political power. 
Groups can help remedy these inequalities by permitting individuals with lower 
per capita resources to pool those resources through organisation. In making the 
benefits of organisation available to those whose influence on policy is negligible 
without it, groups help to satisfy the norm of political equality. Similarly, groups 
can promote a more equitable distribution of advantage by correcting for 
imbalances in bargaining power that follow from unequal control of wealth. 
Groups can also represent interests not best organised through territorial politics 
based on majority rule. (…) Here, groups improve an imperfect system of interest 
representation by making it more fine-grained, attentive of preference intensities 
and representative of diverse views.” (Cohen and Rogers, 1996:43) 
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• Political Legitimacy  
 
Another important potential democratic effect of associative activity is political 
legitimacy. Accordingly, if associative activity is carried in such a way so as to enable 
inclusive political representation and provides for political equality in decision-making 
processes and social equity in policy outcomes, it also renders political legitimacy.  
Political legitimacy is of great concern, especially if the associative activity takes 
place in the context of an institutional setting that can turn into an alternative source 
of socio-political governance. On this Warren (2001) also comments in the following 
paragraph:   
 
“When political processes are legitimate, they stabilise political conflict in ways that 
keep democratic processes open and fluid without producing uncertainties so 
severe that they would undermine the system as a whole. So a second possibility is 
that democratic legitimacy is enhanced if associative activity enables citizens to 
have equal chances to influence outcomes, even, if they do not get their way. The 
opportunity to seek influence, even if it fails or is only partially effective, can 
nonetheless provide legitimacy for both processes and outcomes.” (Warren 2001: 
92) 
 
• Negotiated Coordination and Cooperation throughout Governing Processes  
 
Associative activity has the potential for enabling effective coordination and 
cooperation amongst stakeholders participating throughout the governing process, in 
certain cases even more so than State-hierarchies and markets. Accordingly, 
associative activity can support the pooling of resources and the synergies to engage 
in coordination and cooperation exercises. Similarly, it is through associative activity 
that politicians or civil servants may boost initiatives and achieve greater synergies 
and collective action in complex policy environments. Cooperation may be at 
different levels, from only gaining relevant information to supporting authentic joint 
decision-making and implementation processes. Accordingly, it is possible to 
consider that the greater the achievements in terms of the developmental, public 
sphere and institutional effects of an associative activity, the greater the possibilities 
for coordination and cooperation throughout the policy-making process.45  On this 
Warren (2001) develops the following ideas:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45  It is important to emphasise that the coordination and cooperation potential of an 
association depends greatly on the type of state-civil society relationships, a point that will be 
addressed later in this chapter when discussing the preconditions for associative activity.  
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“It is often assumed that associative activity can do better at resolving conflict 
than can formal political institutions. In part because of the scale and complexity 
of many problems today, and in part because of the pluralism of forces and 
interests that bear on most problems, collective decisions and actions require 
negotiated coordination among a multitude of groups, each with different 
resources and often with different interests, identities and values. Owing to these 
characteristic, many areas of policy have become difficult to manage and 
administer on the bureaucratic model favoured by the state, while market 
solutions cannot respond to political demands.” (Warren, 2001: 89) 
 
• Alternative Forms of Governance and Resistance 
 
Finally, associative activity in the context of formal institutional setting –such as 
socio-political governance arrangements– may support the development of 
alternative form of governance –other than hierarchies and markets (Warren, 2001, 
2003).  Accordingly, associative activity can help to formulate, implement and 
monitor policies and projects. Associative activity can also support the enablement of 
self-regulation. Warren (2001) elaborates on this situation: 
 
“The idea that associations can and often do serve as social infrastructure of 
subsidiarity is central to the emerging school of associative democrats, as well as 
others who have come to view associative activity as means of restoring the 
radical meaning of self-governance. Associations can provide alternative 
structures of governance, which can in turn provide more opportunities for 
participation and responsiveness. The possibilities are attractive because of the 
apparent limits to state-centred administration which, by its very nature, tends to 
be inflexible and sometimes arbitrary.” (Warren, 2001: 88) 
 
Resistance to domination and antidemocratic polities has long been thought a central 
contribution of associative activity.  This is because organised associative activity 
can potentially become a source of “countervailing power” (Galbraith, 1952; Fung, 
2003) against State-authority and other powerful interests. The idea behind this 
countervailing power is that associative activity can actually help to confront and 
equalise against colluded and entrenched political and economic interests. This is 
particularly important when considering the forms of power active in the context of 
socio-political governance arrangements, as elaborated in the previous chapter of 
this document (Warren, 2003).   After these elaboration on the potential democratic 
effects of associative activity, I know turn to elaborate on the enabling preconditions 
for such activity. 
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2.2.3. Preconditions for Associative Activity 
 
What follows then is an attempt to work out a simple characterisation of the 
preconditions for a robust and democratic associative activity, including the 
institutional design features to support associative activity and the background-
contextual conditions that affect associative activity.  
 
2.2.3.1. Institutional Design Features to Support Associative Activity 	  
The following section elaborates on some of the most important institutional design 
features that scholars consider supporting of democratic associative activity, 
including: provisions for broad stakeholder participation and internal and external 
democracy,   
 
• Broad Stakeholder Participation and Interest Pursuit: Balance between Inclusion 
and Requisite Exclusion  
 
Associative democrats recognise that one important condition for associative activity 
to be able to support democratic effects is for institutional design features to take 
care of being inclusive and representative of a wide variety of stakeholders and 
interests.  Accordingly, if there is broad stakeholder participation in the institutional 
setting with a concrete level of decision making powers and influence, and 
representing a diverse range of interests, it is also possible to conceive that there is 
also an acceptable level of political legitimacy (Fung and Wright, 2003; Smith, 2006).  
 
Still, the debate does not end there, as they are also concerns for balancing broad 
stakeholder and interest inclusion with functionality and efficiency criteria. This 
consideration is based in empirical evidence pointing out to situations when overly 
inclusive stakeholder participation and interest representation may complicate 
consensus-building processes and stall decision-making; compromising functionality 
and efficiency, perhaps also generating stalemate in governing processes. Immergut 
(1996) comments on some of these aspects: 
 
“These conditions, however, imply some limits on the inclusiveness of associative 
democracy –both in terms of the number and the range of groups that are 
included and in terms of the scope of the issues that such associations can 
consider. […] Moreover, even the representation of a wide variety of groups is 
problematic. Aside from the risks that more people you include, the harder it is to 
reach agreement, the inclusion of too many groups may overburden the 
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negotiations by widening the agenda to include conflicts that are extremely 
difficult to reconcile. […] Attention needs to be paid to the impact of political and 
institutional frameworks on these procedures for interest negotiation and to the 
difficulties of balancing democratic concerns for broad representation with 
pragmatic considerations about effective negotiation.” (Immergut, 1996:206) 
 
• Internal and External Democracy: Accountability, Responsiveness and 
Transparency  
 
Another important institutional condition affecting the democratic performance of 
associative activity has to do with internal and external democracy; that is with the 
capacity that an association has to be accountable and responsive to its members as 
well as to the authorities. For Bader (1996) the disjunction of an association’s 
leadership’s interests to that of its members and the State is perhaps one of the most 
difficult challenges of associative democracy. Accordingly, for example, an important 
aspect of internal democracy has to do with the centralisation of decision-making 
power in whatever leadership and representative structure exists, without taking due 
care for accountability, responsiveness, and transparency criteria.  
 
Another very important aspect related to the internal democracy of associative 
activity is related with transparency and the equal access to information on behalf of 
all participant-members. Consequently, an associative activity should take of 
establishing institutional design principles safeguarding transparency and access to 
information for all stakeholders. Associative activity also rests in a robust public 
sphere where the process of public deliberation also supports the pursuit of 
accountability, responsiveness and transparency; aspects that will be explored in 
more detail later in this chapter.  
 
The problem of external accountability is also paramount, especially if the associative 
activity involves some form of governing process. Therefore, associative democrats 
consider that it is necessary to cater also for external accountability mechanism, 
clear performance standards –in terms of its leadership and overall performance 
assessment–, and some form executive and legal oversight from part of the State 
(i.e. through meta-governance strategies).  
 
2.2.3.2. Relevant Background Contextual Conditions 
 
The viability of the democratic effects of associative activity relies deeply on the 
characteristics of particular contextual background conditions. Beyond the discussion 
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of the potential democratic effects of associative activity and the necessary 
institutional design features supporting such democratic effects, the debate on the 
contextual background conditions adds another source for important concern 
regarding the viability of associative activity to produce democratic effects. On this 
aspect Cohen and Rogers (1995) provide the following comment: 
 
“Groups are, again, importantly artifactual. Their incidence, character and 
patterns of interaction are not merely the result of the tendencies to association 
among citizens with like preferences; they reflect structural features of the 
political economy in which they form, from distribution of wealth and income to 
the locus of policy-making in different areas. And they reflect variations across 
the members of that society along such dimensions as income, information, and 
density of interaction. Existing political institutions and culture may crystallise 
around certain structural features and patterns of variation along these 
dimensions. But those features and variations are in no sense natural: they are 
themselves in part the product of opportunities and incentives that are induced by 
the structure of political institutions and the substance of political choices and so 
can be changed through public policy.” (Cohen and Rogers, 1995: 46-47) 
 
Cohen and Rogers intervention highlight a very important factor, the opportunities 
created by the State to support –or deter– associative activity.  For them, the State is 
plays a key role in enabling associative activity of the sort that really is able to 
provide for democratic effects and participate in socio-political governance 
processes.   
 
• Relationship with the State: Level and Orientation of State Involvement, 
Decentralisation/Devolution and Empowerment  
 
Associative democratic scholars highlight that the potential democratic effects of 
associative activity critically depend on the decentralisation and devolution 
relationships between the State and civil society. Very importantly, associative 
democrats stress that the extent of decentralisation/devolution and also 
empowerment measures pursued by the State in a polity is of paramount relevance 
to really transform the polity and create alternative venues for socio-political 
governance. Fung and Wright (2003) elaborate on this important point:  
 
“Since empowered associative governance targets problems and solicits 
participation localised in both issue and geographic space, its institutional reality 
requires the commensurate reorganisation of the State apparatus. It entails the 
administrative and political decentralisation/devolution of power to local action 
units –such as neighbourhood councils, personnel and individual workplaces, and 
delineated natural habitats– charged with devising and implementing solutions 
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and held accountable to performance criteria. The bodies in the reforms below are 
not merely advisory, but rather creatures of a transformed State endowed with 
substantial public authority.” (Fung and Wright, 2003: 20) 
 
Associative democrats consider that a very important background contextual 
condition affecting the attainment of democratic effects is the type of relationships 
between the State and civil society.  Accordingly, the premise is that a progressive 
Sate should be careful to foster a functional and democratic associative activity. In 
this sense, the State should seek to ensure that the efficiency and the potential 
democratic effects of association are safeguarded, through different steering, 
coordination and financial mechanisms –effectively through meta-governance 
strategies. So, in this case the level of State involvement in the support of associative 
activity is paramount to the achievement of the aforementioned potential democratic 
effects.  
 
• Political Equality and Social Equity 
 
Associative democrats place great importance on political equality and social equity 
as a fundamental condition for enabling associative activity to produce democratic 
effects. According to associative democrats, political equality does not only mean 
granting citizens a right to vote, but that all people should have broadly the same 
opportunity to meaningfully participate in politics and collective decision-making 
processes about issues that concern and affect them and their communities.  More 
specifically, for associative democratic scholars, political equality refers to the 
opportunity to participate in associative activity oriented at participating and 
influencing the governing process. Consequently, they highlight that in contexts 
lacking political equality, certain groups or individuals lack the individual capacities 
and opportunities, as well as the support from the State to participate in associative 
activity. On these aspects Cohen and Rogers (1995) develop the following ideas:  
 
“Finally, the strength and distribution of groups inevitably reflects such 
background conditions as the distribution of material resources, the proximity and 
density of interaction of membership with convergent interests and other familiar 
conditions of collective action, Underlying inequalities tend to translate into 
inequalities in group power. Systems of group representation vary in the degree 
of such background inequality, in the extent of translation into inequalities and, as 
a consequence, in policy outcomes.” (Cohen and Rogers: 1995 30) 
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Lastly, for associative democratic scholars, the social equity condition in the polity 
also has a bearing in the opportunity that people have in participating in associative 
spaces. Social equity implies fair access to livelihood, education, and resources; full 
participation in the political and cultural life of the community and self-determination 
in the meeting of fundamental needs.  This composite condition allows people to 
have the time, the disposition, the education and the material resources not only to 
participate actively in associative activity, but to also have influence over decision-
making processes.  Accordingly, it is important to understand how social inequality 
affects the process of associative activity.   
 
2.3. Deliberative Democratic Theory 
	  
2.3.1. Main Tenets of Deliberative Democracy 	  
Deliberative democracy represents another interesting development in democratic 
theory. It is proposed as a reformist and critical approach, disapproving of the 
entrenched, limiting and inadequate decision-making and interest-representation 
mechanisms of liberal democracy. Its genesis stems from leftist political thinking and 
its concern over finding ways to strengthen government’s efficiency and legitimacy 
through the enhancement of meaningful forms of citizen participation in political life 
(Barber, 1984; Bohman and Regh, 1999, Chappell, 2012).  In the late 1960s this sort 
of thinking started to question a number of key underlying assumptions of 
established theories of democracy, including elitism, pluralism and economic 
theories. Deliberative democratic scholars consider such theories to mostly 
understand politics in terms of conflict and competition between interest groups and 
elites, envisioning political actors only as rational actors and self-interested 
individuals left unchanged in their motivations and perspectives by the political 
process. This perspective, according to them, empties the notion of citizenship of 
part of its important meaning as an active, engaged and participatory political subject 
(i.e. citizens as individuals that may be influenced by being part of a broader political 
community, like historical institutionalism considers) (Weinstok and Kahane, 2010; 
Nabatchi, 2011).  Deliberative democrats consider these democratic theories to place 
too much decision-making power in the hands of politicians and technical experts, 
thought to be better equipped than citizens to make all forms of public decisions in 
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the name of the ‘public interest’.46  J. Bohaman and W. Regh (1997), two of the first 
and most active deliberative democratic scholars comment on these aspects:  
 
“These theorists (deliberative democratic theorists) question the key assumptions 
underlying the earlier economic and pluralist models: that politics should be 
understood mainly in terms of conflicting and competing interests, and thus in 
terms of bargaining than of public reason; that rational choice frameworks 
provide the sole model for rational decision-making; that legitimate government is 
minimalist, dedicated to the preservation of the negative liberty of atomic 
individuals; that democratic participation is reduced to voting and so on. In a 
more positive vain, deliberative democratic theorists took their cue from a variety 
of deliberative contexts and motifs: direct democracy, town-hall meetings and 
small organisations, workplace democracy, meditated forms of public reasoning 
among citizens, voluntary associations, and deliberative constitutional and 
judicial practices, regulating society as a whole, to name a few.” (Bohman and 
Regh, 1997: xii) 
 
Deliberative democracy is also concerned with the capabilities of citizens themselves 
to recognise and oppose oppressive forces effectively, through an active and 
informed interaction and communication processes. This critical aspect of 
deliberative democracy has been driven by one important institutional objective, the 
integration of the ideas regarding ‘communicative action’ and ‘instrumental rationality 
versus communicative rationality’.  Proponents of deliberative democracy thus 
defend a complex ideal of a polity, whose common life is governed by the public 
deliberation of its members.  On this J. Dryzek (2000) comments:  
 
“Communicative action is oriented to understanding between individuals rather 
than success in achieving predefined individual goals. Communicative rationality 
is found to the degree that communicative action is free from coercion, deception, 
self-deception, strategizing and manipulation. Both forms of reason have their 
proper place in human affairs. The central problem of modern society to 
Habermas is that instrumental rationality has invaded and conquered realms 
where it does not belong, leading to the through scientisation, bureaucratisation 
and commercialisation of social life and politics. Thus the full potential of 
communicative rationality has not been realised.” (Dryzek, 2000:22) 
 
Deliberative democracy has at its core the commitment that political decision making 
and social choice should be the outcome of collective-public deliberation conducted 
rationally and fairly amongst free and equal citizens, participating in different types of 
deliberative arenas –such as citizen juries, cooperative regimes, multi-stakeholder 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Risk management has become one of such areas where everything is left to the expert and 
politicians. For an interesting exposition on the value of associative and deliberative 
democratic theories in the context of the risk society please see: Wouter Achterber, 
‘Association and Deliberation in the Risk Society: Two Faces of Ecological Democracy’, 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol 4, Issue 1, (2001), pp. 
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platforms, and, more generally, the public sphere. Hence, deliberative democracy 
makes emphasis on the need to expand and strengthen citizen participation in such 
types of deliberative arenas (Saward, 2000; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Elstub, 
2008). As such, deliberative arenas are dynamic and evolving political sites, where 
authentic public deliberation may support –if the conditions are right– a number of 
democratic effects, including broadly speaking processes of democratic renewal and 
progressive socio-environmental change.47  J. Bohman (1996) elaborates on the 
drivers of the deliberative democratic theory: 
 
“Critics of current democratic institutions, ranging from communitarians to radical 
democrats, share a remarkably consistent set of themes. They argue that current 
arrangements undermine the most important principles of democracy: 
contemporary political practices are based on a politics of self-interest that 
produces social fragmentation, they permit an unequal distribution of social and 
economic power that persistently disadvantages the poor and the powerless, and 
they presuppose institutions that depend almost entirely upon merely 
aggregative, episodic, and inflexible forms of decision making and that leave 
deep structural problems of social and economic renewal unresolved. Out of all 
these diagnoses comes the same remedy: public deliberation.” (Bohman, 1996: 
1) 
 
It is relevant to highlight that deliberative democracy’s tenets are complementary with 
those of associative democracy and also socio-political governance, as they all 
support governing processes based on the participation and public deliberation of 
different stakeholders in deliberative arenas, similar to the ones enabled by socio-
political governance arrangements. Indeed this is the case of the MSPs for 
groundwater management. As already mentioned, an important research task of this 
PhD is to consider how this process of public deliberation is enabled by MSPs for 
groundwater management and if indeed this process has positive democratic effects. 
As in the case of the associative democratic theory, it is also possible to identify in the 
case of deliberative democracy a range of potential democratic effects brought about 
by these public deliberation processes. The following is a succinct elaboration on 
some of the most important potential democratic effects of public deliberation. Again, 
the debate on these effects is extremely broad –perhaps even more so than is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Deliberative democratic theory has had an important influence over green political theory. 
The notion that public deliberation in arenas aimed at producing and implementing 
environmental policy making will increase the democratic legitimacy and also the efficacy of 
such measures is a recurrent theme within cotemporary green political theorising. For an 
extended debate on this please see Walter Baber and Bartlett, Robert (2005), Deliberative 
Environmental Politics, Massachusetts, USA, MIT Press, 2005); Graham S (2003), 
Deliberative Democracy and the Environment, London, UK, Routledge; and Backstrand, K., 
Khan, J, Kronsell, J and E. Lovbrand (2010), Environmental Politics and Deliberative 
Democracy Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar 
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case for associative democracy, so what follows is a simple engagement aimed at 
identifying some of the most relevant democratic effects, to later use this theoretical 
engagement to support the development of a heuristic-analytical device for the 
analysis of the democratic performance of the MSPs for groundwater management. 
 
2.3.2. Potential Democratic Effects of Public Deliberation 
 
Deliberative democrats consider that public deliberation has a number of potential 
democratic effects. For the purpose of internal consistency in the general 
argumentation on the democratic effects of public deliberation, the next presentation 
will follow also the same form of characterisation used for the description of the 
potential democratic effects of associative activity, which is a presentation that 
includes the notion of developmental and institutional effects.48   
 
2.3.2.1. Developmental Effects 
 
• Limiting the Impact of Bounded Rationality  
 
Public deliberation is thought to help lessen the impact of ‘bounded rationality’ in 
decision-making processes by enabling the public consideration and reasoning over 
matters of common concern.  In this sense, public deliberation may assist citizens to 
widen limited, fallible and partial perspectives on specific issues and policy problems. 
These public deliberation processes may in turn enable the generation of 
complementary perspectives, or even totally new ways of considering situations and 
alternatives previously unknown to individual stakeholders. Fearon (1998) develops 
on this point: 
 
“For a great many in collective decisions a significant problem is not that people 
have private information about preferences or likely consequences, but rather 
that it is simply hard to figure out the best course of action because the problem 
is so complicated. […] To use Herbert Simon’s famous term, public discussion 
might then be a means for lessening the impact of bounded rationality, the fact 
that our imaginations and calculating abilities are limited and fallible. So faced 
with a complex problem, individuals might wish to pool their limited capabilities 
through public discussion and so increase the odds of making a good choice.” 
(Fearon, 1998:49) 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48  Of course in the case of the elaboration on the democratic effects of deliberative 
democracy there is no explicit mention to the public sphere effects, as all the aspects are 
related to this notion.  
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• Public Justification: Transparency and the Transformation of Interests 
 
Deliberative democrats also consider that the process of public deliberation 
encourages participants to become –or appear to become– ‘more reasonable’ and 
‘less self-interested’ by way of participating in the public formulation or public 
justification of their objectives and perspectives. Accordingly, stakeholders 
participating in public deliberation processes will be required to present their 
perspectives on situations in such a way as to show a more comprehensive 
consideration, rather than just their own and immediate concerns. Presentations on 
such should also be more reasonable, realistic, informed, and critical in order that 
other stakeholders may ‘take them on seriously’ and develop greater empathy 
towards an individual’s or group’s perspectives. Consequently, deliberative 
democrats consider that the process of public deliberation will support, on the one 
hand, the development of a more accountable and transparent public sphere, but 
also on the other hand, the transformation of interests and attitudes on behalf of 
stakeholder participants and towards the production of more collective perspectives 
and shared interests (Elster 199, Dryzek, 2012).  Fearon (1998) also shares his 
opinion on these aspects of public deliberation:  
 
“Thus, one advantage of public discussion would be that the participants might 
be disinclined to make or support purely self-interested proposals for fear of 
appearing selfish. Off course, nothing stops a person from offering high-minded, 
public-spirited arguments in discussion and then voting out of pure self-interest. 
However, if the discussion shapes the formulation of the alternatives for vote, 
then one may never get the option to vote for a baldly self-interested option. 
There is also the possibility that arguing publicly for a position would, by various 
psychological mechanisms, reshape one’s private desires.” (Fearon, 1998:54) 
 
This process of ‘transformation of interests’ is extremely important for deliberative 
democrats, because it is through this mechanism that individual positions may turn 
into collective ones that might reflect and include different interests and viewpoints, 
hence taming the pursuit of purely individualist and partial interests.  
 
• Development of Citizen Skills and Political Education 
 
Like in the case of associative democracy, for deliberative democrats public 
deliberation can also contribute to improving the ‘intellectual’ and political capacities 
of participants in deliberative arenas. This assumption is based on the consideration 
that stakeholders participating actively and constantly in public deliberation 
processes may increase certain skills –such as self-presentation, negotiation, and 
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dialogue. Citizens participating in public deliberation in order to advance policy 
objectives will gradually develop the necessary skills to present their opinions and to 
influence such processes (i.e. by learning by doing).  Deliberative democratic 
scholars consider that participants in public deliberation may also develop certain 
political capacities and civic virtues –such as respect, toleration, and solidarity– 
through a process of socialisation into the practice of public deliberation itself.  
Fearon (1998) offers his view on this consideration: 
 
“Certainly, having discussions rather than just making proposals and voting 
would tend to result in the development of certain skills and perhaps virtues in the 
participants. The following come to mind as possibilities: eloquence, rhetorical 
skills, empathy, courtesy, imagination and reasoning ability. And it seems 
plausible, as Mill’s argument implies that if people expect to engage in public 
discussion about what to do, they will be encouraged to invest more time and 
energy preparing themselves –gathering information, thinking about the problem 
and so on. […] Some work in political theory on deliberative democracy has 
stressed the related justifications that active participation in deliberation makes 
better citizens and perhaps better people and that broader public deliberation will 
increase people’s sense of shared community and shared fate.” (Fearon, 
1998:59-60) 
 
2.3.2.2. Institutional Effects  
 
• Greater Transparency and Accountability through Public Scrutiny  
 
Advocates of deliberative democracy concur that processes of public deliberation 
can help to reveal private or undisclosed information about individual interests or 
group preferences and objectives, thus contributing to the goals of transparency and 
accountability. For advocates of deliberative democracy, transparency and 
accountability are linked to the notion of publicity.  Imagine then an associative space 
where decision-making is taken through a process of public deliberation, if someone 
wishes to advance a specific proposal –in benefit of him or herself or one group 
only– or report on a specific policy outcome, this would have to pass the public 
scrutiny of the participant members, thus contributing to support the transparency 
and accountability of such process.  The case will be the same if the State presents a 
policy option or the result of policy implementation to a group of stakeholders in the 
deliberative arena, which will require the authorities to present information in a 
truthful and accurate manner so as to maintain credibility.  Fearon (1998) elaborates 
on this potential democratic effect of public deliberation: 
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“One reason is that discussion allows people to express diverse intensities of 
preference –that is, whether they have strong or indifferent feelings about 
particular choices (…) One reason for discussion is that it can facilitate relatively 
nuanced revelation of private information when it would be cumbersome to try to 
devise a voting mechanism that would allow for the same range and manner of 
expression. (…) For example, individual members of a group might private 
information about factors bearing on the probability of different outcomes of the 
different choices, or on the nature of these outcomes, and making a good 
decision for the group might require the revelation of such private information.” 
(Fearon, 1998:45-46) 
 
• Political Legitimacy through Participation in Public Deliberation 
 
Public deliberation is also assumed to help legitimise choices, through various 
mechanisms. The first one has to do with inclusion and participation. Accordingly, the 
participation of stakeholders in public deliberation processes aimed at the definition 
of policy choices will help, not only to gain legitimacy over such choices, but also will 
support enforcement and compliance towards them. The other means of political 
legitimacy is through the quality of public deliberation and the generation of collective 
agreement. On this, there are several conditions that public deliberation processes 
need to address to authentically contribute towards more legitimate outcomes. The 
general principle is that open consensus building and alternative conflict resolution in 
deliberative arenas bring about legitimacy. 49 Benhabib (1996) comments on this 
situation:  
 
“According to the deliberative model of democracy, it is a necessary condition for 
attaining legitimacy and rationality with regard to collective decision-making 
processes in a polity, that the institutions in this polity are so arranged that what 
is considered the common interest of all results from processes of collective 
deliberation conducted rationally and fairy among free and equal individuals.” 
(Benhabib, 1996: 69) 
 
2.3.3. Preconditions for Public Deliberation or Deliberative Activity 
 
Many are the factors impinging on the feasibility and success of deliberative 
democratic arenas, and scholars still contend on the relative importance of each 
factor.  Many are then the avenues of debate around the definition and explanation of 
the necessary preconditions for public deliberation.  The following characterisation 
will attempt to present only the most widely recognised and critical factors.  As in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 For deliberative democrats, legitimacy exists only if certain preconditions are met. A more 
thorough presentation of the necessary preconditions for public deliberation will be presented 
later in this chapter.  
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case of associative democracy, it is possible to approach such characterisation by 
looking at the institutional design features –what deliberative democrats refer to as 
an ‘ideal proceduralist approach’50–, and by looking at the contextual background 
conditions for public deliberation –what deliberative democrats refer to as the 
substantive conditions for public deliberation (Cohen, 1997; Bohman and Regh, 
1997). 
 
2.3.3.1 Institutional Design Features of Public Deliberation 
 
Deliberative democrats deploy the notion of ‘ideal proceduralism’, as an approach 
that seeks to capture the main features of an ideal deliberative institution in order to 
be able to measure an ideal type deliberative arena against real-life examples 
(Cohen, 1997; Bohman and Regh, 1997). Following this, deliberative democrats 
consider that public deliberation requires the following institutional features to be in 
place.  
 
• Decision Making through Reasoned Deliberation and the Force of the Better 
Argument  
 
Central to public deliberation is of course the need for institutional designs to allow 
for meaningful public deliberation and deliberative decision-making. Accordingly, on 
the one hand, public deliberation requires for the purposeful and careful construction 
of deliberative arenas where stakeholder can freely exercise their right of voice and 
express their ideas, perspectives and concerns without fear of mockery or reprisal. 
Most importantly, due care should be taken for asymmetries in power not to radically 
influence collective decisions, so as to encroach on the public deliberation process. 
On this, deliberative democrats rightly emphasise that public reasoning should back 
collective decisions, not power. On the other hand, the deliberative outputs produced 
from the public deliberation process should be respected, not only by participant 
members, but also by the respective State authorities. On this Cohen (1997) offers 
the following explanation: 
 
“Deliberation is reasoned in that parties to it are required to state their reasons for 
advancing proposals, supporting them, or criticising them. They give reasons with 
the expectation that those reasons (and not, for example, their power) will settle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The deliberative democratic scholars’ ideal proceduralist approach follows the same social 
research rational of the ‘ideal type approach’ explained earlier in this document; that is to look 
at the ideal institutional design features that is thought may bring about the desired 
democratic effect.  
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the fate of their proposal. In ideal deliberation, as Habermas, puts it, no force 
except that of the better argument is exercised. Reasons are offered with the aim 
of bringing others to accept the proposal, given their disparate ends and their 
commitment to settling the conditions of their polity through free deliberation 
among equals. Proposals may be rejected because they are not defended with 
acceptable reasons, even if they could be so defended. The deliberative 
conception emphasises that collective choices should be made in a deliberative 
way, and not only that those choices should have a desirable fit with the 
preferences of citizens” (Cohen, 1997: 74) 
 
• Broad and Inclusive Participation and Institutional Neutrality 
 
Deliberative democratic scholars assert that institutional designs should also 
correspond to conditions of ‘unrestrictive domain’ and ‘institutional neutrality’ in order 
to ensure political equality. Accordingly, ‘unrestrictive domain’ refers to the notion 
that deliberative arenas should not only include all the relevant and affected 
stakeholders to cater for the goal of political equality and legitimacy, but should also 
not impose any ex-ante filters on the substantive views of participants to be 
discussed in the deliberative arena (Parkinson, and Mansbridge, 2012). 51  Knight 
and Johnson (1997) explain these concepts: 
 
“First, unrestricted domain disallows any prior constraint on the content of 
preferences or interests that are proposed. (…) Deliberative democracy requires 
the most expansive possible conditions for entry to formal or official deliberative 
arenas. As noted earlier, such entry must be available both at agenda setting and 
final decision-making stages.” (Knight and Johnson, 1997:283) 
  
Deliberative democrats are also aware that there is a peril that deliberative arenas 
may exercise, through various forms, bias towards certain stakeholders and their 
preferred claims and choices. Consequently, they are concerned about the need for 
deliberative arenas to cater for ‘force of the better argument’. This means that 
procedures that govern deliberative arenas should aim to ensure that all claims and 
positions go through the critical public scrutiny, and that all proposals should then be 
defended through argumentation and counter-argumentation. Knight and Johnson 
(1997) help to explain the notion of institutional neutrality: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51  This debate is very intense and has no clear-cut response. How many different 
stakeholders should participate in deliberative arena is always a complex question, because 
empirical evidence tends to suggest that too many stakeholders and too much heterogeneity, 
generally speaking, produces stalemate if not conflict. Thus the attributes of a particular 
deliberative arena –in terms of stakeholder inclusion– is always a situation that has to be 
studied on a case-by-case basis.  
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“It is not sufficient to ensure expansive conditions of entry to deliberative arenas. 
It is also necessary to ensure that, once various participants and the competing 
positions that they endorse have gained admission to deliberative institutions, the 
internal workings of those institutions not accord differential advantage to either 
particular participants or to their favoured positions. […] This means that the 
procedures that govern the deliberative phase of democratic decision-making 
protect equality by ensuring that all claims and counterclaims are subject to 
critical public scrutiny and that, when challenged, any participant must defend her 
proposal or back her objections by reasons.” (Knight and Johnson, 1997: 287-
288) 
 
• Political Equality and the Common Good as Institutional Design Principles 
 
Deliberative democracy requires for deliberative arenas to uphold a complex ideal of 
political equality to enable public deliberation. This complex ideal has two main 
aspects: one procedural –relative to the institutional design features of a deliberative 
arena –and another substantive –relative to background contextual conditions. 
Accordingly, In terms of procedural equality institutional designs of deliberative 
institutions should cater for granting equal status to all participant stakeholders in a 
deliberative arena. Cohen (1997) develops on this notion:  
 
“Ideal deliberation should be aimed at a rational motivated consensus –to find 
reasons that are persuasive to all who are committed to acting on the results of a 
free and reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals. […] Beginning then 
from a formal ideal of deliberative democracy we arrive at an ideal of association 
that is regulated by deliberation aimed at the common good and that respects the 
autonomy of its members. And so, in seeking to embody the ideal deliberative 
procedure in institutions, we seek, inter alia to design institutions that focus 
debate on the common good, that shape the identity and interests of citizens in a 
way that contributes to an attachment to the common good and that provides the 
favourable conditions for the exercise of deliberative powers that are required by 
autonomy.” (Cohen, 1997:75) 
 
In relation to the substantive political equality the institution should acknowledge that 
power relationships in the polity affect the opportunity and the capacity for 
stakeholder to engage meaningfully and freely in public deliberation processes.  
Thus the State should address substantive inequalities –or structural inequalities– 
that affect the polity. Cohen (1997) also develops the following consideration:  
 
“In ideal deliberation, parties are both formally and substantively equal. They are 
formally equal in that the rules regulating the procedure do not single out 
individuals. Everyone with deliberative capacities has equal standing at each 
stage of the deliberative process. Each can put issues on the agenda, propose 
solutions and offer reasons in support of or in criticism of proposals. And each 
has equal voice in the decision. The participants are substantively equal in that 
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the existing distribution of power and resources does not shape their chances to 
contribute to deliberation.”(Cohen, 1997:74) 
 
2.3.3.1 Background Contextual Conditions for Public Deliberation 
 
It is widely accepted that deliberative democracy requires a number of socio-political 
background conditions to enable a democratic, goal-oriented and successful public 
deliberation process. The following is a succinct elaboration on some of the most 
salient contextual conditions referred to in literature.  
 
• Relationship with the State: Devolution and Coordinated Decentralisation 
 
Deliberative democrats consider that governing challenges cannot be addressed 
solely by the central State and, therefore, they are strong supporters of devolution 
and decentralisation processes, that is of the transferring of the governing 
responsibility from central government to subnational authorities and socio-political 
governance arrangements.  Very importantly, deliberative democrats looking to 
support this devolution and coordinated decentralisation highlight, that these 
processes should be accompanied by the necessary authority, capabilities and 
resources to be able for these local authorities and socio-political governance 
arrangements to function effectively and efficiently. On this point, Fung and Wright 
(2001) comment: 
 
“Since deliberative institutions target problems and solicits participation localised 
in both issue and geographic space, its institutional reality requires the 
commensurate reorganisation of the State apparatus. It entails the administrative 
and political devolution and decentralisation of power to local action units –such 
as neighbourhood councils, personnel individual workplaces, and delineated 
ecosystem habitats- charged with devising and implementing solutions and held 
accountable to performance criteria.” (Fung and Wright, 2001:21) 
 
Deliberative democratic scholars are also concerned about the need to establish 
formal channels of communication, resource distribution and responsibility between 
State authorities and decentralised institutions, in such a way as to embed such 
deliberative arenas in the governing structures and establish clear coordination and 
even oversight mechanisms, a point also highlighted by governance scholars 
studying meta-governance strategies. Fung and Wright (2001) also develop on this 
important aspect:  
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“Deliberative democracy suggests new forms of coordinated decentralisation. 
Driven by the pragmatic imperative to find solutions that work, these new model 
rejects both democratic centralism and strict decentralisation as unworkable. The 
rigidity of the former leads it too often to disrespect local circumstances and 
intelligence and as a result it has hard time learning from experience. 
Uncoordinated decentralisation, on the other hand, isolates citizens and groups 
into very small units, surely a foolhardy measure for those who do not know how 
to solve a problem but suspect others, somewhere else, do.” (Fung and Wright, 
2001:22-23) 
 
• Substantive Political Equality: Equal Opportunity to Influence and Capability-
Equality 
 
This item has been briefly addressed above, but deserves to be further elaborated. 
Deliberative democrats have given important consideration to the issue of political 
equality.  It is possible to identify then two main aspects of political equality: equal 
opportunity to influence –as the capacity that an individual has to influence decision-
making processes through public deliberation– and capability-equality –as the actual 
capacity that an individual has to participate broadly in processes of public 
deliberation on issues that affect them. Knight and Johnson (1998) develop on the 
notion of equal opportunity to influence:  
 
“Deliberative democracy requires a particular, relatively complex sort of political 
equality. Given our stress on the uncertainty of outcomes produced by 
democratic arrangements, such arrangements obviously cannot require equality 
of outcomes. Democracy then requires some version of equality of opportunity. 
More specifically, democratic deliberation requires equal opportunity to political 
influence.” (Knight and Johnson, 1998: 281)  
 
Deliberative democrats draw from the work of Amartya Sen (1992, 1999). Following 
Sen’s work on development planning and social policy, Bohman (1998) seeks to 
approach the problem of equality through a ‘Sen-like’ definition of political equality, 
as equality for effective social freedom or ‘capability equality’. Bohamn (1998) 
explains: 
 
“Employing public reason in dialogue with others clearly requires highly 
developed capacities and skills related to cognition and communication. It may 
well be that some citizens develop particular interest in public life generally or in 
particular issues, acquiring special abilities and even expert knowledge. But if 
deliberative politics is to remain democratic, it cannot simply favour those who 
are most educated, who have access to special information, who posses the 
greatest resources and privileged positions, its procedures ought to not invariably 
favour the reasons of advantaged persons or groups. Capability equality 
therefore underwrites a fundamental feature of deliberative theories of 
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democracy by developing an account of the minimal level of public functioning 
necessary for the deliberative equality of citizens.” (Bohman, 1998:325-326) 
 
Bohman’s conception of political equality is then primarily concerned with the polities 
taking care of supporting the capacities relevant to participation in deliberative 
arenas.  He then argues in favour of what he calls ‘effective freedom’, the capacity of 
an individual to live the life of his or her choosing, a situation only enabled by an 
individual’s rights and abilities to participate actively and meaningfully in political 
activities that shape, precisely, his or her life. This consideration is clearly related 
then to a number of complex contextual conditions or factors –that are also 
interdependent– and that characterise a polity, including such elements as: the level 
of respect for political and social rights; the form and distribution of wealth and 
resources; the level of educational attainment of social sectors; and the support that 
the State has for all actors to participate in deliberative arenas, amongst many other 
relevant factors.  I am aware that describing in full the nature and interplay between 
these complex factors is out of the reach of this PhD, but still a modest attempt will 
be made to apply some of this notions in the actual study of the background 
contextual conditions affecting the democratic performance of the MSPs for 
groundwater management. 52 
 
The above description of the associative and deliberative democratic theories 
presented succinct elaborations on the main tenets of such theories, their potential 
democratic effects, and the enabling preconditions that generally may affect the 
materialisation of such effects.  What follows is an effort to harness the reflection 
presented above in order to support the design of a heuristic-analytical device to 
study the democratic performance of socio-political governance arrangements, the 
MSPs for groundwater management in Mexico.  
 
2.4. End Comments to this Chapter: Clarifying the Explandum 
 
The associative and deliberative democratic theories offer an interesting perspective 
regarding democratisation processes and more broadly, socio-political change. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 If the reader is interested in pursuing this line of investigation interesting readings are: Sen, 
D. (1999), Development as Freedom, New York, USA, Anchor Books; Kaufman, A. (ed.) 
(2007), Capabilities Equality: Basic Issues and Problems, Abingdon, UK., Routledge, Also an 
interesting perspective that ponders about the issues related with democracy and equality is 
the theorisation on ‘difference democracy’ and inclusion and democracy. On this topic, 
interesting work has been produced by I. M. Young and S. Banhabib.  Please see: Benhabib, 
S (1996), Democracy and Difference, Oxford, UK, OUP, and Marion, Y. (2002), Inclusion and 
Democracy, Oxford, UK., OUP.  
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associative democratic theory sustains that a robust and active associative activity is 
a cornerstone of democratic polities, because it enhances the opportunities and 
capacities of citizens to proactively organise in different associative spaces               
in order to participate in politics and governing processes more directly and 
influentially. The deliberative democratic theory purports that public deliberation is at 
the core of democratic renewal and the deepening of democratisation. Both theories 
offer interesting insights into the mechanisms behind democratisation processes. 
 
The associative and deliberative democratic theories offer a range of potential 
democratic effects that may be researched and studied in the context of actual socio-
political governance arrangements, including the MSPs for water resources 
management. Both theories also offer an understanding on the preconditions 
affecting the attainment of democratic effects, including the institutional design 
features and contextual background conditions. Consequently, from these 
elaborations it is possible to retrieve analytical power to study socio-political 
governance arrangements’ potential democratic effects. In the context of this PhD 
research, this analytical leverage will be deployed to study the potential democratic 
effects of the MSPs for groundwater management in Mexico.  
 
It is important to emphasise that in order to support an accurate study of the potential 
democratic effects of associative and deliberative activity, as well as on the 
preconditions that affect the attainment of these, an intense fieldwork is necessary.  
This is because some of the effects can only be truly studied by actually participating 
in the deliberative arenas whilst public deliberation processes take place.  This 
situation represents a challenge in terms of the actual empirical research of real life 
deliberative arenas. Another important aspect to consider is that some potential 
democratic effects are indeed difficult to measure accurately, as most of them have 
mostly a qualitative and intricate dimension. Still, it is possible to consider that by 
attempting to study the developmental, public sphere and institutional effects of 
associative and deliberative activity, it seems feasible to be able to establish an 
overall –maybe general– democratic performance assessment of socio-political 
governance arrangements, as well as to present arguments regarding to as how their 
institutional design features and background contextual conditions affect such 
performance.   
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Chapter 3: A Heuristic-Analytical Device to Study Processes of State-
transformation and Socio-political Governance Arrangements 
 
This chapter presents the heuristic-analytical device to study the Neo-liberal State-
transformation process and the implementation of different State-strategies, including 
the establishment of socio-political governance arrangements –the MSPs for 
groundwater management–, their prospects and challenges –including their 
democratic performance– and the role of the State in their institutional development –
including the State’s meta-governing strategies and capacities.  It is a heuristic 
device because its architecture has been partially influenced by experience-based 
knowledge.  It is also analytical, because its architecture derives also from the 
theoretical developments presented in chapter 2 and 3. (i.e. governance and meta-
governance studies, historical institutionalism, State and power theory and 
democratic theory). This device presents six distinct analytical moments.  Each of 
these moments helps to develop an understanding about different aspects 
concerning the research problem.  Each moment can be considered a stepping-
stone for the next, that is to say there is a sequence in the application of the 
analytical moments, as the description and the analysis provided by each of them 
supports the description and analysis provided by the next.  Together they gradually 
support the development of a more comprehensive perspective and understanding of 
the research problem or explanandum. The sequence of the moments of analysis is 
depicted in the following diagram: 
 
Figure-2: Heuristic-Analytical Device to Study Socio-political Governance Arrangements 
Moments of Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i. Theoretical Engagement and Explandum 
	  
ii. Historical and Contextual 
 Institutional Analysis 
	  
iii. Socio-political Governance 
Arrangements Institutional Design 
Analysis 
iv. Democratic Performance Assessment 
v. Meta-governance Capacity 
Assessment 
 
vi. The Role of the State in Socio-
political Governance 
Arrangements 
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(i) Theoretical Engagement and Explanandum: The State-transformation 
Process, the Governance Phenomenon, the Democratic Performance of Socio-
political Governance Arrangements and the Meta-governance Strategies 
 
The first moment of analysis corresponds to the theoretical engagement that 
ultimately supports the identification and definition of a research problem or 
explanadum. So through the theoretical engagement with the relevant governance 
studies’ literature it was possible to revisit the debate and develop a research 
problem, that in this case is the prospect of studying the Neo-liberal State-
transformation process and the implementation of State-strategies –to modify the 
relationship between the State and civil society throughout the governing process 
and in order to enable greater democratic social participation and stakeholder 
involvement– and their drawbacks and contradictions. Also, with the support of the 
literature on water governance and IWRM it was possible to identify one important 
form of socio-political water governance arrangement –the MSPs for IWRM.  So 
another decision was made, to study, in more detail, the establishment and 
institutional development of MSPs for groundwater management in the Mexican 
water polity –as a central Neo-liberal State-strategy–, their prospects and challenges.  
This way of conceptualising the research problem was assisted through the support 
of HI and its orientation towards the study of the relationship between history, ideas, 
political institutions, policy processes and social struggles, as well as by some 
elements of State and power theory. These theoretical engagements ultimately 
support the analytical orientation and power of the second and third moments of 
analysis.  
 
The literature on governance studies, as already mentioned, also highlights the need 
to study the democratic performance of socio-political governance, and so another 
aspect of the research problem was established, the prospect of studying the MSPs’ 
democratic performance.  A central contention of this PhD is that the associative and 
deliberative democratic theories can support the democratic performance 
assessment of socio-political governance arrangements. Thus, through the 
theoretical engagement with these democratic theories some analytical power was 
drawn and with the objective to support the development of the fourth moment of 
analysis.  Similarly, with a more recent engagement with the governance studies’ 
literature it was possible to establish another important aspect of the research 
problem, the prospect of studying the State’s meta-governance strategies and 
capacities. Again, from this engagement it was possible to support the development 
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of the fifth moment of analysis.  Finally, through the sequential and ‘cumulative’ 
insight retrieved from the deployment of the first, second, third, fourth and fifth 
moments of analysis, a final sixth moment of analysis attempts to draw some form of 
conclusion regarding the role of the Mexican State in the establishment and 
institutional development of the MSPs..  
 
(ii) Historical and Contextual Institutional Analysis: Description of the 
Historical Context and the Overall Process of Neo-liberal State-transformation 
and the Implementation of State-strategies 
 
This second moment of analysis has the objective of studying the process of 
Neoliberal State-transformation in the Mexican water polity and the implementation of 
a range of State-strategies, their drawbacks and contradictions. It is then that through 
the perspective of HI this moment of analysis seeks to describe and study the main 
ideas, political institutions, policy processes, and social struggles involved in the 
implementation of such State-strategies.  This moment of analysis devotes efforts to 
establish the general contextual-historical conditions that gave rise to the 
establishment of the MSPs for IWRM in the Mexican water polity, preparing the 
ground for the subsequent deployment of the third moment of analysis.  This moment 
of analysis seeks to address the following research questions: 
 
• What important contextual-historical factors serve as background conditions 
to the phenomenon of Neo-liberal State-transformation and the 
implementation of State strategies? 
 
• What were the main drivers of the process of Neo-liberal State-
transformation and the main State-strategies? 
 
• What were the main ideas, political institutions, policy processes and social 
struggles involved in the implementation of the Neo-liberal State-strategies in 
the Mexican water polity?  
 
• What are the main outcomes of the implementation of such State strategies: 
drawbacks and contradictions?  
 
• What drivers led to the establishment of MSPs for IWRM in the Mexican 
water polity? 
 
 
 
 
	   125 
(iii) Socio-political Governance Arrangement’s Institutional Analysis: MSPs 
Institutional Formation and Development Process, and Institutional Design-
Features Analysis  
 
This moment of analysis focuses in the description and study of the establishment of 
MSPs for groundwater management in the Mexican water polity, and their 
institutional development process. So initial efforts are devoted to the description of 
the institutional history leading to the establishment of these MSPs, looking at some 
of the ‘critical junctures’ that gave rise to these form of socio-political governance 
arrangements in the Mexican water polity and also at some path-dependencies that 
seem to have affected this process. Secondly, it devotes attempts to develop an 
assessment of the MSPs’ institutional design features.  In order do to do so it 
elaborates on different institutional design dimensions of the MSPs’, such as: scope, 
scale and institutional structure, as well as on the form of stakeholder involvement 
(i.e. the rights, roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders); and more generally its 
effectiveness, efficiency and equity, although this last aspect is analysed more 
thoroughly during the fourth moment of analysis.  
 
Other important aspects of the institutional analysis are relevant, such as the way 
power relationships are played out, including power in the MSPs, power of the MSPs, 
and power over the MSPs, although this last dimension of power is explored in more 
detail during the fifth moment of analysis. Also as part of the study of the MSPs’ 
institutional change and development process, other issues are also addresses such 
as situations of institutional adaptation and redesign –looking again at critical 
junctures, and issues of timing and sequence– and at the role individual agency in 
this process, and as form of countervailing power. Issues of path-dependency are 
also address, so questions asked are aimed at responding how the process of initial 
institutional formation has affected the process of institutional development.  Some 
important research questions addressed by this moment of analysis are:  
 
• What drivers lead to the establishment of the MSPs for groundwater 
management in the Mexican water polity? 
 
• What are the institutional design features of the MSP for groundwater 
management? What are the scope, scale and institutional structure features 
of the MSPs for groundwater management? 
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• What are the characteristics of stakeholder involvement? What are the right, 
roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders in the context of the MSPs for 
groundwater management?  
 
• What is the nature and characteristics of the stakeholder relationships and 
the relationship between the MSPs and the State? What is the level of 
decentralisation/devolution and financial autonomy? What type of decision-
making powers do the MSPs have over the groundwater challenges they 
face? 
 
• How do the different dimensions of power play out in the context of the MSPs 
for groundwater management (i.e. power in, power of and power over)? 
 
• How have the MSPs for groundwater management evolved through time and 
what factors –including what critical junctures– have affected their process of 
institutional change and development –adaptation and redesign?  
 
 
An important comment to make is that when engaging with the case study, at times it 
refers to the overall national level process of establishment of the MSPs, the process 
of establishment and development of the MSPs in the State of Guanajuato –a 
paradoxical case study–, and also about the more specific case of the Laguna-seca 
COTAS.  When appropriate I will inform the reader of these shifts. 
 
(iv) The Socio-political Governance Arrangement’s Democratic Performance 
Assessment: The MSPs Democratic Performance 
 
This moment of analysis will support the assessment of the democratic performance 
of socio-political governance arrangements, by way of establishing the different 
dimensions of the different potential democratic effects: including the developmental, 
public sphere and institutional effects.  This moment of analysis will also support the 
study of the necessary preconditions that enable associative and deliberative activity 
in the context of socio-political governance arrangements: the institutional design 
features and contextual conditions. It is important to establish that these dimensions 
are mostly qualitative and not quantitative, a situation that posses some research 
challenges, as will be explained later in the methodological chapter of this document. 
The moment of analysis will be deployed to study the democratic performance of the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS.  
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• The Potential Democratic Effects  
 
In terms of the ‘developmental effects’ of the Laguna-Seca COTAS, there are several 
dimensions and research questions that need to be assessed, including: 
 
• Development of more comprehensive and shared views through information 
generation and sharing 
 
• Does the Laguna-Seca COTAS generates relevant information and then 
shares it between stakeholders?   
 
• Does this information support the understanding of the governing challenges 
and policy issues faced by the Laguna-Seca COTAS and water users? 
 
• Does the information generated by the Laguna-Seca COTAs support the 
communication of members’ preferences and perspectives? 
 
• Development of Critical Citizen Skills and other Forms Political Education 
 
• Have stakeholder participants developed some form of discernible critical 
skills that support their participation in the Laguna-Seca COTAS? 
 
• Do stakeholder participants feel that they have gained some form of political 
education?  Do they consider that by participating in the deliberative arena of 
the Laguna-Seca COTAS they have learned to speak in public, present 
issues, and negotiate amongst themselves and with State institutions? 
 
• Do they feel that their participation in the Laguna-Seca COTAS has made 
them and others more tolerant, respectful and prone to cooperation? 
 
• After participating in the deliberative arena do stakeholders seem more aware 
on the interdependent and cross cutting nature of the governing challenges 
they face? 
 
• Has there been any noticeable change in the attitude and behaviour of 
stakeholders when addressing matters that require consensus-formation or 
conflict resolution? 
 
• Limiting the Impact of Bounded Rationality  
 
• Has the participation of citizens in the Laguna-Seca COTAS helped them to 
expand their vision about the challenges faced? Have they come to develop 
more complementary and alternative perspectives? 
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• Public Justification and the Transformation of Interests 
 
• Has the need for public justification generated by the deliberative arena 
shaped the way in which stakeholders present their views, interests and 
initiatives?  
 
• Have stakeholders participating in the public deliberation process modified 
their initial view and interests? Are stakeholders’ interests now more 
comprehensive and emphatic after exchanging perspectives in the 
deliberative arena? 
 
In terms of the ‘public sphere’ effects of the Laguna-Seca COTAS, the following 
dimensions and research questions need to be assessed:   
 
• Creation of a Functional Public Spheres: Enabling Public Deliberation  
 
• Has the Laguna-Seca COTAS developed a functional deliberative arena? 
 
• Does the deliberative arena of the Laguna-Seca COTAS contribute to the 
sharing of information and stakeholder perspectives and interests? 
 
• Does the deliberative arena support the transformation of individual 
stakeholder’s perspectives and interests? Does it support consensus-building 
and alternative conflict resolution? 
 
• Does the deliberative arena support greater coordination between 
stakeholders? 
 
In terms of the ‘institutional effects’ of the Laguna-Seca COTAS, the following 
dimensions and research questions need to be assessed:   
 
• Keener Political Representation and Greater Political Equality  
 
• Have different stakeholder participants increased their access to decision-
making processes? 
 
• Have different stakeholders gained greater opportunity to express their 
perspectives and concerns? 
 
• Has the Laguna-Seca COTAS supported the contestation of controversial 
views?  
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• Has the participation of marginalised stakeholders in the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS helped them to gain access to decision-making processes and other 
forms of support   –material, technical and other? 
 
• Do all relevant stakeholders participate in the Laguna-Seca COTAS?  Are all 
the relevant interests represented in the MSPs? 
 
• Political Legitimacy  
 
• Is the Laguna-Seca COTAS considered legitimate in the polity?  Does it 
provide for stakeholder representation and political equality? 
 
• Do the actions of the Laguna-Seca COTAS render it political legitimacy in the 
eyes of stakeholder participants and other external stakeholders in the polity? 
 
• What other sources and factors convey political legitimacy to the Laguna-
Seca COTAS, if at all? 
 
• Greater Transparency and Accountability through Public Scrutiny  
 
• Has greater transparency and accountability been attained through the 
sharing of information and the dialogue structured in the deliberative arena of 
the Laguna-Seca COTAS? 
 
• Are important decisions, evaluation and monitoring considerations discussed 
in the deliberative arena of the Laguna-Seca COTAS?  
 
• Political Legitimacy through Participation in Public Deliberation 
 
• Have decisions been taken through public deliberation processes? 
 
• Have conflicts been discussed in the deliberative arena and resolved through 
public deliberation processes? 
 
• Has this form of political legitimacy helped to secure enforcement? 
 
• Coordination throughout the Governing Processes  
 
• Has the Laguna-Seca COTAS facilitated any form of coordination and 
cooperation between relevant stakeholders and to address governing 
challenges? 
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• Have resources from different institutions, organisation and other 
stakeholders been pooled to achieve synergies and develop projects and 
initiatives in benefit of the governing process, and as a result of negotiations 
and consensus-building?  
 
• Alternative Forms of Governance and Resistance 
 
• Is the Laguna-Seca COTAS a source of governance? 
 
• How does the Laguna-Seca COTAS contribute to the governing process? 
 
• Does the Laguna-Seca COTAS provide for countervailing power? 
 
 
• The Preconditions that affect the Democratic Performance of the MSPs 
 
i. Institutional Design Features 
 
In term of the institutional design features, the most important factors to consider 
when assessing the institutional design features of the MSPs are the following. 
 
• Broad Stakeholder Participation and Interest Pursuit: Balance between Inclusion 
and Requisite Exclusion  
 
• Does the socio-political governance arraignment’s institutional features cater 
for broad stakeholder involvement? 
 
• Does the Laguna-Seca COTAS cater for the balance between inclusion and 
requisite inclusion? 
 
• Does the Laguna-Seca COTAS’s institutional features supports the 
participation of marginalised and disenfranchised stakeholders? 
 
• Do powerful groups also participate in the Laguna-Seca COTAS? 
 
• Is the Laguna-Seca COTAS ‘neutral’ in terms of reflecting the interests of all 
stakeholders or are there any  ‘biases’ or ‘hidden agendas’? 
 
• Internal and External Accountability, Responsiveness and Transparency  
 
• Does the Laguna-Seca COTAS have mechanisms that allows for 
accountability, responsiveness and transparency? 
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• Do the Laguna-Seca COTAS’s leadership are accountable to the 
stakeholders their represent? What institutional mechanisms allow for 
accountability, responsiveness and transparency? 
 
• Is the Laguna-Seca COTAS accountable to the State institutions? What 
accountability and transparency mechanisms exist for this purpose? 
 
• Decision Making through Reasoned Deliberation and the Force of the Better 
Argument  
 
• Does the Laguna-Seca COTAS allow for meaningful, frequent and effective 
public deliberation processes? 
 
• Does the Laguna-Seca COTAS support the necessary public deliberation 
processes? 
 
• Do State institutions and other stakeholders respect the decisions taken 
through public deliberation? 
 
• Political Equality and the Common Good as Institutional Design Principles 
 
• Do the institutional design features of the Laguna-Seca COTAS support the 
pursuit of political equality and the common good? 
 
• Do the institutional design features of the Laguna-Seca COTAS support the 
more marginalised, poor and disenfranchised stakeholders and grant them 
equal access to decision making process and other institutional benefits? 
 
ii. Contextual Background Conditions 
 
In term of the contextual background conditions the most important factors are the 
following: 
 
• Relationship with the State: Level and Orientation of State Involvement, 
Coordinated Decentralisation, Devolution, and Empowerment 
 
• What are the characteristics of the decentralisation process?  
 
• What is the level of political authority and financial autonomy that the State 
has allocated to the Laguna-Seca COTAs? 
 
• What is the level of State commitment and support towards the 
decentralisation, autonomy and empowerment of the Laguna-Seca COTAS? 
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• What mechanisms exist between the State and the socio-political governance 
arrangement to coordinate and cooperate? 
 
• What other forms of State support exist towards the Laguna-Seca COTAS?  
 
• Substantive Political Equality and Social Equity 
 
• What opportunities and capabilities do different stakeholders have to 
participate in the Laguna-Seca COTAS? 
 
• How does structural social inequalities affect the opportunity of poor and 
marginalised stakeholders to participate in the Laguna-Seca COTAS? 
 
• How do structural social inequalities affect the performance of the Laguna-
Seca COTAS? 
 
(v) Meta-governance Capacity Assessment 
 
This moment of analysis seeks to identify and study the State’s meta-governance 
strategies and capacities in the Mexican water polity.  In the case of the definition of 
this moment analysis the analytical leverage harnessed derives mostly from Bell and 
Hindmor’s State centric-relational approach to the study of meta-governance 
strategies and capacities, but also some other relevant elements will be extracted 
from the different theoretical developments already presented by the other scholars 
in chapter 1, and in order to complement (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).  In this case, I 
will disregard the meta-governance strategies developed by Kickert, Klijn and 
Koppenjan, because these mostly meta-governance strategies for policy networks, 
and this PhD is not focusing on this type of poly-centric ensembles.  
 
Therefore, efforts under this moment of analysis will seek to identify a group of ‘ideal 
type’ meta-governing strategies and capacities in the Mexican State water 
institutions.  According to Bell and Hindmoor (2009), the most relevant meta-
governance strategies are: steering, effectiveness pursuit, resourcing, democracy, 
accountability and democracy. So important research questions would be:  
 
• What are the Mexican State’s steering capacities? How does the Mexican 
State steers and coordinates stakeholders participating in the MSPs for 
groundwater management? 
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• What conditions the Mexican State provides for facilitating and enabling 
stakeholder participation, interaction, and cooperation in the context of the 
MSPs for groundwater management? 
 
• How does the State support the institutional development of the MSPs? Is 
there policy consistency on this matter? How does the Mexican State 
resource the MSPs –financially, technically, through information and capacity 
building? 
 
• What types of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are implemented by 
the State to monitor the activities and capacities of the MSPs for groundwater 
management? 
 
• How does the Mexican State support the MSPs in upholding democratic 
principles, including broad and inclusive participation, legitimate 
representation, accountability and democratic decision-making? 
 
• Is there a consistent policy to support the development of the socio-political 
governance arrangement? 
 
(vi) The Role of the State in Socio-political Governance: State Strategies, 
Projects and Strategic Selectivity  
 
This moment of analysis builds on the theoretical reflections made on the nature and 
characteristics of the State according to Poulantzas’ post-Marxist interpretations and 
Jesoop’s strategic relational approach. This moment of analysis is somehow based 
in the information and reflections made during the preceding moments of analysis.  
The objective of this moment is to offer a general overview of the role of the State in 
the establishment and development of the MPSs and broadly water resources 
management.  In order to carry out this endeavour a number of important State-
theory notions help to structure relevant research questions.  
 
Some important research questions can be organised in the next manner:  
 
• What does the process of institutional development of the MSPs tells about 
the nature and form of the Mexican State?  
 
• What is the role of the State in the institutional development of the MSPs and 
more broadly water resources management?  
 
• What underlying factors or forces seem to affect the orientation and role of 
the State in this matter.  
 
 
	   134 
Chapter 4: Methodological Chapter  
	  
4.1.Introduction 
 
This chapter elaborates on the research methodology, the research methods and 
other important considerations involved in the research process. It starts with the 
presentation of the qualitative case study research strategy, the strategy selected for 
this PhD. This section presents the different implications of conducting this type of 
research strategy and the different stages that usually comprise it. Each stage is later 
addressed individually and highlighting relevant aspects. Following, I devote some 
attention to important ethical and biases considerations that deserve also some 
clarification on my side.  At the end of the chapter I offer some reflections on the 
research paradigm that animated the overall doctoral research process, Critical 
Realism, and devoting some efforts to clarify some epistemological and ontological 
implications.  
 
4.2. Qualitative Case Study Research Strategy 
 
The research strategy selected for this PhD is that of a qualitative case study. This 
strategy was chosen, because the doctoral research faced the challenge to study a 
particular phenomenon in time and place, this is to say a contextualised 
phenomenon that had to be studied in a particular setting –in this case the Mexican 
water polity. The research interest was to study what, why and how processes 
happened during the Neo-liberal State-transformation and the establishment and 
institutional development of MSPs for groundwater management, and what have 
been the impacts.  In order to be able to approach the phenomenon under study it 
was necessary to develop some theoretical understanding about it, and to be able to 
develop a set of research questions and establish a more concrete research 
problem.  
 
Selecting undertaking a qualitative case study research carries some important 
considerations and conditions that have to be addressed.  In this section I will 
address some of important aspects of this. I will begin with the definition of what a 
qualitative case study research entails. According to scholars (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2005; Yin, 2009) the essence of the case study research strategy is that of being an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a social phenomenon in-depth and within a real-life 
context. So, ultimately a case study contributes to our knowledge of socio-political 
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phenomena by explaining a ‘set of situations and decisions’ –why they were taken, 
when, by who, and how. For a qualitative case study research, contextual conditions 
are very important to the phenomenon under study, and so they need to be 
acknowledged and explicated. This situation creates some important research 
challenges, as frequently it becomes necessary to rely on multiple sources of 
evidence that later need to converge to be interpreted. Another important condition is 
that the qualitative research strategy builds on a previous engagement with theory 
and in order to build theoretical propositions and/or a research hypothesis that is 
later tested through empirical research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005 Creswell, 2009). 
This theoretical propositions and research hypothesis guide the research process. A 
qualitative case study research strategy generally follows the next research pathway: 
 
• engagement with theoretical bodies, the identification and development of a 
research subject and research problem, and the development of an analytical 
framework to investigate the phenomenon under study;  
• definition of research questions, theoretical propositions, and a research 
hypothesis; 
• definition of a case study design and the research sample;  
• definition and implementation of the fieldwork and the research methods; 
• analysis and interpretation of the findings of the case study; 
• establishment of validity and reliability considerations, and the development 
of generalisations; 
• contribution to theory building; and 
• development of policy recommendations (not necessarily, but possible).  
 
The qualitative case study research strategy has to address a number of challenges, 
including: a commitment to investigative rigour and extensive fieldwork; challenges of 
validity (internal and external); challenges of generalisation; and challenges of 
reliability (Yin, 2009, Creswell, 2009).  The qualitative case study research demands 
from the research a commitment to investigative rigour, a decision that implies 
‘sticking‘ to a research pathway that supports an appropriate engagement with 
theory, the definition of a research subject, the design of an appropriate research 
methodology and a selection of research methods, that supports the validity and 
reliability of the research, and that allows for the development of generalisations.  
The qualitative case study research also demands of an extensive and well-planned 
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data collection process in order to be able to gather enough information and build 
insight into the social phenomenon under study.  
 
Regarding to challenge of constructing validity there are two important dimensions to 
this: internal and external validity. Some central aspects in the construction of 
internal validity are to establish a prior specification of the significant events under 
study, as well as to establish the causal relationship whereby certain conditions lead 
to specific effects. This situation requires the use of theory, the specification of 
concepts and some form of definition or identification of ‘measures of change’ that 
can be also specified.  The concepts are then ‘operationalized’ through the research 
process –and the theoretical suppositions and hypothesis– to then find and organise 
the evidence of the phenomenon under study (Yin, 2009). With the interplay between 
theory and empirical research, inferences are then developed. If the research 
process offers validity and reliability, some form of generalisation may also be 
procured. This is an important challenge as critics typically state that single case 
studies offer a poor basis for generalising, and so the only way to offer generalisation 
is to test the findings by replicating them through other case study samples (Yin, 
2009). If this form of generalisation is not available the researcher needs to indicate –
where appropriate– if there are facts and insights that point towards the ‘possibility’ of 
generalisation.  In a way the researcher should be able to point out some ‘pathways 
for generalisation’ out of a single case study sample, and that if pursued may lead 
the actual construction of amore robust external validity.  
 
Finally, reliability intends to establish that if another researcher followed the same 
investigative route –the same research strategy and methodology– than the first 
earlier or original researcher, he/she will arrive at the same findings and conclusions. 
This demands of the earlier or original researcher to be thorough throughout the 
research process and clearly elaborate a description of his research pathway.  In this 
chapter I will address the challenges of undertaking a qualitative case study 
research.  
 
4.2.1. The Research Pathway 
 
4.2.1.1.The engagement with theoretical bodies, the identification and 
development of a research subject and research problem, the definition of 
research questions and the research hypothesis, and the development of an 
analytical framework 
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• The Theoretical Engagement and the Identification of Research Subject and 
Problem 
 
In the case of my doctoral research I engaged with several theoretical bodies that 
supported me in the identification of a research subject and subsequently the 
definition of a research problem; the development of theoretical propositions, a 
research hypothesis; and the development of an analytical framework. Accordingly, 
the engagement with the ‘governance studies’ literature allowed me to establish the 
possibility and relevance to pursue a scholarly research on the process of Neo-liberal 
State-transformation, and the establishment of socio-political governance 
arrangements, as one form of Neoliberal State-strategy.  It led me to problematize 
the need to scrutinise the role of the State and power in the context of such socio-
political governance arrangements, as both elements are deemed critical in defining 
their institutional development and their general performance. It also prompted me to 
consider the need to assess the performance of socio-political governance 
arrangements, including also their democratic performance –as frequently they are 
sources of democratic deficits and at times also of democratic renewal.  Finally, the 
engagement with the governance studies literature also helped to identify the debate 
on meta-governance, and thus to consider the possibility of assessing also the State 
meta-governance strategies and capacities present in the case study.  
 
The engagement with the associative and deliberative democratic theories helped 
me to establish that both democratic theories –because of their progressive tenets 
regarding the organisation of socio-political relations in the context of institutional 
settings– are a useful basis to support the definition of a range of ideal type potential 
democratic effects that may be attained by socio-political governance arrangements, 
and also the preconditions that affect such attainment. Furthermore, the engagement 
with both theories helped also to support the consideration made that democratic 
reforms in line with supporting associative and deliberative democratic practice are 
required to support the institutional development of socio-political governance 
arrangements.  
 
The literature on water governance and MSPs also supported the definition of the 
research subject and problem. In reality this literature helped to ‘materialise’ or 
‘actualise’ the theoretical background on the ‘governance phenomenon’ through the 
identification of a tangible research subject and problem.  This action, in turn, helped 
to identify the concrete case study: the Mexican water polity, the process of State-
	   138 
transformation –of the CONAGUA– and the establishment and implementation of the 
MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS. 
 
Finally, the engagement with Historical Institutionalism plays throughout the thesis at 
the background and underpins the definition of the research approach and strategy.  
Ultimately, the doctoral research follows a Historical Institutionalist approach that is 
interested in the role of ideologies, policy ideas, institutions, socio-political forces and 
social conflict in definition of governing process and political behaviour, as well a 
policy outcomes.  
 
Together, this theoretical edifice supports the design of a heuristic-analytical device 
capable of addressing the study of the process of Neo-liberal State-transformation, 
the implementation of Neo-liberal State-strategies, more specifically represented by 
the establishment of MSPs for groundwater resources management –their prospects 
and challenges, including their democratic performance–, and the role of the State in 
this process.  There is an important aspect to address related to the compatibility of 
theories in this edifice. In my opinion Historical Institutionalism is compatible with 
both the governance studies literature and the associative and deliberative 
democratic theories. This is because more than anything else, Historical 
Institutionalism rather than being a theory is an comprehensive approach to the study 
of politics (Steinmo, 2008), that seeks to investigate real world empirical questions 
about how institutions structure and shape political behaviour and outcomes.  In this 
particular case what this doctoral research sought to investigate was the process of 
Neo-liberal State-transformation and the rise of emerging institutional forms for 
enabling socio-political governance processes.  
 
I also consider that there is compatibility with the associative and democratic 
theories, because ultimately these theories are also concerned with the study of how 
institutions actually enable associative and deliberative activity, a form of activity that 
is central to the well functioning of socio-political governance arrangements. So 
Historical Institutionalism provides the background orientation and approach, the 
governance studies theorisation provides the research subject and structures the 
research problem, and the democratic theories provide a pathway to assess the 
democratic performance of socio-political governance arrangements. Finally, the 
theorisation of the State used in this PhD is backed by a post-Marxist and Strategic-
relational interpretation to the phenomenon of the State. To my mind, this definition 
only reflects a personal predilection, and does not seem to have computability 
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problems with the theoretical edifice. In principle, it is possible to consider that I could 
have used any other rival interpretation of the State to deploy the study of the role of 
the State in socio-political governance.  The relevance of using the post-Marxist and 
Strategic-Relational approach is that they help to highlight a number of situations –
socio-political struggles and structural material-economic conditions– that have a 
strong bearing in the outcomes. This is also part of a selected research interest.  
 
4.2.1.2 Definition of the Research Subject and the Research Sample 
 
The research subject of this PhD is the process of Neoliberal State-transformation in 
the Mexican water polity, its main State-strategies and its consequences –its 
drawbacks and contradictions.  This process entailed the implementation of various 
State-strategies since the mid-1980 –when the first Neo-liberal reforms began to take 
place in the country as whole– and until the present date, when the consequences 
are still being felt.  These reforms sought to transform the orientation, role and 
structures of the State to then modify also the relationship of the State and society 
throughout the water resources management process. One of those State-strategies 
–that represents a central element of the research subject– was the establishment of 
MSPs for groundwater resources management, COTAS, as new form of socio-
political governance arrangement allegedly oriented at enabling greater social 
participation/involvement and stakeholder cooperation in an attempt to face severe 
and growing groundwater over-exploitation problems.   
 
Some important facts deserve to be explicated, because they determined also the 
definition of the research subject and ultimately the case study design. In the case of 
the Mexican water polity, there were two attempts to establish and develop MSPs for 
groundwater resources management, the first one represented by the CONAGUA’s 
COTAS –established across the country’s territory– and the second one by the State 
of Guanajuato COTAS –14 COTAS to cover the aquifers in state. Both attempts are 
embedded in the overall State strategy to establish and develop the MSPs, but each 
of these attempts is different in several dimensions, that make them somewhat 
contrasting (in a way each attempt represents a different research sample).  Efforts 
were made to make some form of comparison between them, highlighting some 
important contextual and institutional design differences.  It is relevant to emphasize 
that I chose the State of Guanajuato COTAS, because they represented a 
‘paradoxical’ case where serious attempts were being made initially (at the end of the 
1990s and beginning of the 2000s) by the local State to enable them as authentic 
MSPs for groundwater resources management (i.e. politically and legally 
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autonomous institutions, with executive powers, financially independent, participatory 
and inclusive).  This situation marked a stark contrast with the CONAGUA COTAS 
that were only considered as consultative bodies –and present an important number 
of drawbacks and contradictions– with very little influence in the groundwater 
management process. 
 
Furthermore, another decision was made in the definition of the case study research 
design.  In order to study in more detail the democratic performance of the COTAS, I 
chose a particular COTAS in the State of Guanajuato, the Laguna-Seca COTAS (out 
of 14 other COTAS established in the State of Guanajuato).  This selection was not 
random, but responded to the need to find a COTAS that showed some form of 
positive outputs. In reality the Laguna-Seca COTAS is an embedded sample within 
the overall sample of the State of Guanajuato COTAS. So after interviews with 
scholars and also civil servants, they suggested that the Laguna-Seca COTAS could 
prove a telling and interesting research sample to evaluate in terms of its democratic 
performance.53 The Laguna-Seca COTAS was the first one to be established in the 
State of Guanajuato and apparently efforts were made during its establishment 
process to carry out an inclusive convening process. Also in the opinion of scholars 
and civil servants at the CEAG and the CONAGUA State Office in Guanajauto, the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS benefited from a very active Technical Management Team, 
and so it was generally recognised as a ‘good’ example of a ‘well-functioning’ 
COTAS.  
 
One last important consideration to make regarding the definition of the research 
subject and sample is the one concerning the study of the State meta-governance 
strategies and capacities.  In this case I also engaged in the study of the incipient 
meta-governance strategies and capacities of both the CONAGUA –at a central 
level– and the CONAGUA State Office in the State of Guanajuato. Again this 
decision was made because both cases are also contrasting.  In the case of the 
CONAGUA there are only very vague ideas about how to govern over the COTAS, 
and in the case of the State of Guanajuato there is an ambitious strategy to put the 
COTAS at the centre of groundwater management processes and, hence, strongly 
support their role and their institutional development.  
  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 I am thankful to Dr Boris Marañon and Mr Jose Alfredo Galindo for pointing out the Laguna-
Seca COTAS as potential case study. 
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Figure-3. Basic Type of Design for Case Studies 
In the case of this doctoral research the design concurs with  
an embedded-multiple units of analysis approach 
 
Source: Yin (2009), Kindle Location 1168 
 
 
4.2.1.3. The Definition of the Research Questions and Research Hypothesis 
 
• The Main Research Questions  
 
An important aspect that deserves to be highlighted is that the research questions 
follow the sequence of the moments of analysis of the heuristic analytical device 
presented in the previous chapter. This sequencing attempts to approach the 
research problem by layers and to gradually build a more comprehensive 
understanding about it.  
 
The Main Research Questions: 
 
• What have been the main characteristics of the Neo-liberal State-
transformation process in the Mexican water polity?  What were the main 
State-strategies implemented and what did they achieve? What have been 
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the main drawbacks and contradictions in the implementation of these State 
strategies? 
 
• What is the institutional history of groundwater management in the Mexican 
water polity? What are the institutional design features of the MSPs for 
groundwater management, COTAS? What are the prospects and challenges 
of these MSPs for groundwater management at a national level and also in 
the State of Guanajuato? 
 
• What has been the democratic performance of the Laguna-Seca COTAS? 
What kind of democratic effects has it attained, and what preconditions has 
affected this process? Are the COTAS as source of democratisation in the 
context of the Mexican water polity? 
 
• What are the main meta-governance strategies capacities of the Mexican 
State over the MSPs for groundwater Management, the COTAS? 
 
• What has been the role of the State in the establishment and institutional 
development of the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS? What 
does this role tell us about the nature and characteristics of the Statehood 
Formation in Mexican water polity? 
 
• The Research Hypothesis 
 
The Mexican State went through a complex Neo-liberal transformation process that 
entailed the implementation of series of State-strategiesthat sought to transform the 
water polity. Overall, these strategies show important drawbacks and contradictions 
that ultimately have created serious governing problems and path dependencies       
–deliberate and inadvertent. In the case of the establishment of MSPs for 
groundwater resources management (COTAS) –like in the case of the other State-
strategies–, the role of the State in their institutional development has been mostly 
contradictory, at best inconsistent.  In the case of groundwater management, the 
Mexican State appears mostly concerned with enabling economic development and 
the process of capital accumulation, at the expense of a more sustainable, 
participatory and democratic groundwater management, and thus there has been a 
contradictory interest in enabling the institutional development of the COTAS.  
Consequently, the COTASs’ performance –including their democratic performance– 
has been meagre and peripheral in terms of addressing groundwater management 
challenges. Still, it is possible to recognise some prospects, especially through the 
‘countervailing power’ that has been generated at the centre of the COTAS, and also 
through the recent implementation of some apparently more enabling meta-
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governance strategies implemented by more ‘progressive’ cadres of the 
CONAGUA’s State Office in Guanajuato. This confirms the assumption that the 
MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS, are not devoid of politics; they remain 
open-ended and uncertain institutions with outcomes that seem contingent to the 
array of social forces that socially construct them. 
 
4.2.1.4. The Fieldwork and the Definition and Implementation of the Research 
Methods 
 
• Fieldwork Stages 
 
The PhD took 15 years in the making, starting in 1998 and finishing in 2014.  This 
situation created some challenges and also some opportunities in terms of the 
fieldwork.  This section describes what happened during this long period of time, and 
in order to present a more organised narrative I will divide the fieldwork in three 
different stages: stage 1, phase 1 (initial exploratory fieldwork, during 2001 to 2002), 
stage 1, phase 2 (second fieldwork engagement, during 2002- 2003), an interruption 
stage (2004-2011), stage 2 (third fieldwork engagement, during summer 2011 to 
winter 2012), and stage 3 (corrections to the PhD thesis, 2013 to 2014). The 
following is a description of each of these stages.  
 
Stage-1, Phase 1: Initial Local Literature Review and Exploratory Fieldwork (2001-
2002) (full involvement with the PhD) 
 
The first exploratory stage started in mid-2001 and lasted for approximately 6 
months. This period represented the start of long-term engagement with the fieldwork 
and was mostly devoted to assessing the feasibility of carrying out the case study 
analysis in Mexico and establishing an incipient network of contacts. I proceeded first 
by attempting a local literature review to identify relevant scholarly research and 
specialised literature on the subject matter. At that time I found that most of the 
literature was devoted to the study of MSPs at the river basin level, and in reality I 
was not able to find any relevant literature on the COTAS.  Following this first step I 
established contact with two distinguished scholars in the water sector, Dr Blanca 
Jimenez and Dr María Luisa Torregorasa. Both of them encouraged me to continue 
my doctoral research and confirmed me that undertaking a doctoral research on the 
subject on the process of State-transformation and the establishment of MSPs would 
be a timely, if not complex endeavour.  They strongly advised me to gradually find a 
way to approach the CONAGUA –at the highest level possible to gain access to 
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timely and relevant information, but most importantly to harness support for my 
doctoral research. Otherwise access to information would have been extremely 
difficult. 
 
My next step was to find a way to approach the CONAGUA –at a central level.  The 
CONAGUA is a complex, huge and also hermetic institution, so finding the right entry 
point took some time.  Eventually, I found a way in through the then Deputy-Director 
of Planning and Programming, Mr Cesar Herrera, who became interested in my 
research subject and channelled me to the right people in the relevant areas of the 
CONAGUA. The second point of contact at the CONAGUA was with the then 
General Manager of the River Basin Councils and Auxiliary Bodies, part of the 
Deputy-Direction of Rural Programmes and Social Participation, and the office in 
charge of the establishment and institutional development of the MSPs for water 
resources management in Mexico, including the river basin councils, micro-basin 
commissions and groundwater management committees, the COTAS.  Mr Guillermo 
Chavez also found my doctoral research interesting and allowed me to undertake 
several informal interviews with him and his staff at the Office.54  After a round of 
interviews with civil servants at the CONAGUA and also some WMO Consultants    –
that were part of the MASAS Programme–, it became clear that I had the possibility 
to undertake a case study analysis on the three different types of MSPs for water 
resources management currently being established by the CONAGUA. I had to then 
take a decision that had to be driven by my scholarly research interests, but also by 
practical and financial considerations.  In the end I chose to study the MSPs for 
groundwater resources management, COTAS, and for three reasons.  The first one 
the COTAS’s scale –at the level of aquifer – makes it easier to manage for a doctoral 
research fieldwork, as opposed to the river basin councils that cover a more 
extensive geographical area –large river basins–, and that would require travelling to 
different riparian states.  The second, the institutional development of river basins in 
Mexico had been studied –and was being studied– by a various consultants and 
scholars, but that was not so much the case for the COTAS; hence leaving some 
room for innovation in the latter case. The third reason, is that the research on the 
COTAS seemed to be more financially manageable, an important consideration to 
make.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 The interviews with Mr Guillermo Chávez were definitive in the definition of the research 
subject.  At that time I also had the opportunity to meet Mr Axel Dourojanni and Dr Luis 
Garcia, to senior consultants experts in the field of MSPs for water resources management.  
The interviews with them were also very influential in the selection of the COTAS as an 
element of my research subject.  
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My interaction with the River Basin Councils and Auxiliary Bodies Office at the 
CONAGUA led me to discuss the possibility to choose the Queretaro Valley COTAS 
as the research sample for my case study.  This COTAS was part of an important 
World Bank, OMM and CONAGUA groundwater management programme –the 
MASAS Programme– and was receiving a lot of support for its institutional 
development.  So I proceeded to interview the then Programme Manager –at that 
time–, Dr Venancio Trueba, who confirmed the information that I had about the 
Queretaro Valley COTAS, and also offered his support. He then channelled me to 
the responsible CONAGUA officer in the State of Querétaro.  I continued to pursue 
this possibility and so I travelled to the City of Querétaro (3.5 hours from Mexico City) 
to meet with some local stakeholders.  A third important round of interviews started 
with the CONAGUA State Office in Queretaro, who at that time was playing the role 
of Technical Secretary of the Querétaro Valley COTAS.  I had interviews with the 
State-level Director at that time, Mr Sergio Loustanou, who was also supportive of 
my doctoral research, and then with relevant staff members that were more closely 
involved with the management of the Queretaro Valley COTAS, Ms Lourdes Villegas, 
and Mr Ramon Gamez. With their support I had access to relevant information and I 
had also the opportunity to meet with some members of the Governing Board of the 
Queretaro Valley COTAS, at that time its President Alfonso Cobo and Treasury Mr 
Jose Antonio Urquiza. From this round of interviews I considered that there were 
some enabling conditions to undertake the case study in Querétaro, and so I initially 
chose the Querétaro Valley COTAS as my research sample.  
 
Stage-1, Phase 2: Fieldwork in Querétaro (2002-2003) (partial involvement with the 
PhD) 
 
The second phase of the fieldwork is marked by an invitation at the end of 2002, on 
behalf of Mr Guillermo Chávez, to become part of the staff of the River Basin 
Councils and Auxiliary Bodies Office of the CONAGUA, as coordinator of advisors for 
the Office. This position entailed coordinating a number of international and national 
technical advisors to support the institutional development of the RBCs and its 
auxiliary bodies. My scholarship was ending and decisions had to made.  It seems 
important to highlight that this professional opportunity facilitated a deeper 
understanding of the political, legal and institutional aspects involved in the process 
of State-transformation and the establishment and institutional development of the 
COTAS. It was also possible to travel around the country and participate in a number 
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of river basin council meetings and also to some of the COTAS meetings in the 
different states. 
 
During phase 2 I continued going to the State of Queretaro to participate in the 
different meetings –the deliberative arenas– organised by the Querétaro Valley 
COTAS.  I had the opportunity then to study the functioning of these deliberative 
arenas, to visit some of the local ejidos, and the mid-size and large landowners 
members of the COTAS. I was gradually building the case study of the Querétaro 
Valley COTAS and the research work seemed promising. 
 
Interruption State (2004-2011) 
 
Then my professional life took a turn and I had to change jobs.  This time I was 
invited to work for the Deputy Director of Planning and Programming at the 
CONAGUA.  This situation had a very significant influence in the definition of the 
orientation and content of the PHD, as from that job position I was able to understand 
in a more complete way the role of the State in water resources management and 
also the process of State-transformation that the CONAGUA was experiencing at 
that time. I had also the opportunity to participate in the organisation of the IV World 
Water Forum, a situation that enabled me the opportunity to organise a high-level 
panel on Democracy and Empowerment in the Water Sector, and chaired by Julia 
Carabias, and reported by Adriana Allen.  With the end of the government 
administration in 2006, as it is customary in Mexico, I had to leave the CONAGUA.  
Fortunately, I was invited to work at UN-Habitat (from 2007-2013) working in the 
design and development of the Water and Sanitation for Cities Programme in Latin 
America.  This position entailed constant and intense travelling to many different 
places in the world, a situation that complicated also any form of serious engagement 
with the PhD project. From this position I continued to work in the area of pro-poor 
water governance and other interesting themes. This experience also served me to 
gain some perspective of the water resources situation in Mexico, and of the role of 
the State in water resources management. It was in 2011 when through the 
encouragement of my family and friends, I decided to re-engage with the PhD 
project, this time perhaps with a better understanding of the research subject, and a 
clearer idea of the research problem.  This decision was not easy, because I had to 
continue working, and then also to carry out my doctoral research. 
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Phase 2: Re-engagement with the PhD project (2011-2012) 
 
This represents a final and determinant stage in the PhD’s fieldwork. During this 
stage a number of activities had to be undertaken. First, it was necessary to carry out 
a comprehensive updating of the literature review and to assess the viability and 
relevance of the case study of the Querétaro Valley COTAS. These important steps 
produced some important findings and adjustments.  I came across new concepts 
that helped me to address the research problem in a more comprehensive manner. 
Most importantly, my feeling is that I also approached the phenomenon under study 
with 10 years of involvement in the water sector and experience working both as a 
civil servant and also as UN officer, a situation that I think contributed for the best. 
Another obvious and determinant situation was that 10 years had also elapsed in 
terms of the institutional development of the MSPs for groundwater resources 
management, and so there was simply more history to study and report about from 
the perspective of a doctoral research.   
 
Very relevantly, when I reengaged with the fieldwork in Queretaro, I encountered that 
the Queretaro Valley has ceased to exist, because of reasons that I explained in the 
introduction.  I was then required to find a new case study sample.  At that time the 
CONAGUA had already established several COTAS across the country, but in the 
opinion of both civil servants and scholars the most relevant experience was that of 
the COTAS in the State of Guanajuato.  This is because the CEAG was attempting to 
develop a model that attempted to really innovate and build institutions for socio-
political governance.  The next was to corroborate this information and embark then 
in a second fieldwork.  
 
After some new interviews with civil servants at the CONAGUA and also with 
scholars I assessed then the possibility to study the State of Guanajuato COTAS.55 
So I initiated a new local literature review, only to find that at that time it was possible 
to find some new and interesting literature on the subject matter of the COTAS, their 
institutional development and their drawbacks.  This situation helped to confirm that it 
was relevant and also feasible to study the State of Guanajuato COTAS.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 I am grateful to Mr Ricardo Sandoval and Mr Jorge Montoya in Guanajuato for their interest 
and support in my doctoral research. As already mentioned Mr Boris Marañon and Diana 
Lopez, two of the very few scholars in Mexico studying the COTAS, also supported my 
decisions in this crucial moment of the PhD.  
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The next step in this stage represented an intensive fieldwork in the State of 
Guanajuato to carry out secondary and primary data collection. It is important to 
emphasise that I benefited from the support of the CONAGUA –at both federal and 
state level–, the CEAG, the CEH and the COTAS. At that time, it was extremely 
important to concentrate on the fieldwork efforts, because of financial and time 
constraints, and therefore a selection of a relevant sample had to be undertaken, 
leading to the selection of the Laguna-Seca COTAS. I wish to highlight also that I 
benefitted from the support granted by the different members of the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS, including its President, Manuel Gerardo Garcia, and the members of the 
Technical Management Team –most importantly Ms Lilia Esqueda and Ms Gretel 
Aguilar. 
 
Furthermore, this stage of the fieldwork benefited immensely from the organisation of 
the VIII National COTAS Meeting in the Context of Expo-Agua Guanajuato (from of 
August 29th to 31st, 2011, a water convention organised by the State of Guanajuato 
and where the COTAS also have their annual national meeting. This represented a 
great opportunity to carry out semi-structured and unstructured interviews with many 
of the COTAS’ members, the CEH’s members and civil servants. For my doctoral 
research it was extremely important to organise a focus group, because I need to 
confirm some of my considerations regarding the prospects and challenges of the 
COTAS, and the focus group would allow this. The focus group centred in attaining 
the opinion that the groundwater users had about groundwater management 
problems and about the COTASs’ role –present and future– in groundwater 
resources management.  With these fieldwork finished, I then embarked in the writing 
of the PhD thesis that had to be handed in October of 2012.  
 
Phase 3: Corrections to the PhD Thesis (2013 to 2014) 
 
This last phase in the PhD process entailed addressing the commentaries made by 
my supervisors, Dr Adriana Allen and Dr Vanesa Castan-Broto; as well as those by 
my examiners, Dr. Estaban Castro and Dr.John Twigg, during my viva examination in 
March 2013. A minor fieldwork was organised to the Laguna-Seca COTAS to access 
information on some last relevant details that helped to address some drawbacks of 
the original thesis.  
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• On the Research Methods: Secondary Data Collection / Documental Review 
 
The documental review consisted of an engagement with documents from mainly 
four different sources: 
 
Federal Government. This included official publications from the government 
agencies in charge of water resources management, including: CONAGUA 
SEMARNAT and the INE. The main documents reviewed were the sectorial 
development plans and statistics report (e.g. the National Water Programmes, 
National Environmental Programmes, the National Water Statistics Reports 2012, 
and the Water Agenda 2030), and other specialised technical reports. In Mexico 
there is also an important historic archive managed by the CONAGUA that stores 
several important documents related to the history of water resources management. 
Other important sources of information were the 1994, and 2004 versions of the 
National Water Law.  
 
State-level Government. This included again official publications from the 
CONAGUA’s State Office in Guanajuato (e.g. the State-level Water Programme) and 
the Guanajuato State Water Commission (CEAG) (e.g. Strategic Organisational 
Plan, and other technical documents). Other important documents reviewed were the 
Laguna-Seca Groundwater Management Plans, and the SIMSA Strategic Plan. 
Other sources of information were gathered through official power-point 
presentations.  
 
International Organisations. This included different official documents produced by 
World Bank and the WMO; especially the technical reports produced by the GW-
Mate Programme –the special groundwater management programme at the World 
Bank–, and the documents produced under the MASAS Programme. Other important 
publications reviewed are the ones produced by the ECLAC’s Natural Resources 
Management Group, that focus on MSPs for water resources management.   
 
The Guanajuato COTAS. This includes material such as technical reports, their 
constitutive act as a civil association, their agreement of cooperation between the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS and the CEAG, their a Annual Work Programmes, the 
groundwater management plans, progress reports, power-point presentations and 
other official communications. 
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Academic Publications. This includes specialised books on the subject matter and 
peer-reviewed papers. Interesting material was also found in doctoral thesis from 
students at the FLACSO and at Wageningen University. It is important to comment 
that there are not many publications on the socio-political aspects of the 
institutionalisation of the COTAS in Mexico, something that represented some 
challenges. In Mexico there are basically two specialised academic libraries, the 
library at the Colegio de Mexico (COLMEX), and the Facultad Latinoaméricana de 
Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO). Both libraries are of restricted access and require 
special permission to access. It is not possible to remove the books from their 
premises as an outside researcher, a situation that also created some hinderances. 
 
All the documental review material is cited in the bibliography at the end of this 
document.  
 
• On the Research Methods: Primary Data Collection / Unstructured and Semi-
structured Interviews 
 
A number of interviews were carried out and by stages. Some of them were 
undertaken informally (i.e. through unstructured interviews), taking advantage of for 
example waiting periods before official meetings commenced, long drives to get to 
meeting places, in visits to the groundwater well sites, or at coffee breaks, etc. Some 
of these unstructured interviews were very important, especially with the social sector 
–the small-scale agriculturalists and the ejidatarios–, because it is easier to have a 
friendly conversation with them informally and in a small group of people, than to 
sustain individual interviews. Generally speaking, in the Mexican water polity 
stakeholders are distrustful of outsiders. This is important, because as Patton (2002) 
comments, the task of the qualitative researcher is to provide a situation within which 
people can respond accurately and freely about their points of view and their 
experience, without fear of reprisal or mockery. A number of semi-structured 
interviews were also undertaken with different groups, and mainly with different civil 
servants at CONAGUA, and also former civil servants.  
 
The first stage of interviews was oriented at understanding the context of my 
research and assessing the feasibility of undertaking the doctoral research in Mexico.  
I initially approached a ‘friend’ that had a comprehensive overview of the water and 
natural resources situation in Mexico and that could provide with the necessary 
contacts to continue, Dr Juan Carlos Belaustiguigoitia, former Under-Secretary of 
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State for the Environment. This initial interview helped to ascertain that it could be 
possible to carry out a research on the subject matter I intended.  He then provided 
me with a high-level contact to approach the CONAGUA, Mr César Herrera Toledo, 
then Deputy-Director of Planning and Programming of the CONAGUA, as already 
described. In parallel I also approached two scholars in Mexico that also supported 
my intentions, Dr Blanca Jiménez and Dr Maria Luisa Torregrosa.  Through Mr 
Herrera, I met Mr Guillermo Chávez, Manager for River Basin Councils and Auxiliary 
Bodies, the office in charge of the institutional development of the MSPs.  This first 
round of interviews was determinant.  
 
After this first round of interviews I subsequently engaged in undertaking interviews 
with different types of stakeholder, including government officials, members of the 
COTAS, officials from the World Bank, independent consultants and academics.  
Throughout this document, I make efforts indicate the sources of information that 
have contributed positively in the argumentation presented by me in this document.  
Where relevant and appropriate in terms of ‘ethical and confidentiality 
considerations’, I maintained the sources vague. I wish to highlight that in most of the 
cases people preferred not to be taped, a situation that is ‘normal’ in the case of the 
Mexican water polity, people are generally distrustful and also have concerns over 
the use of information.  In annex-D I present the listing of key interviewees and 
informants. 
 
• On the Research Methods: Primary Data Collection / Direct Observation (field trips 
to the Laguna-Seca Aquifer Area)  
 
The process of direct observation mainly consisted of field visits to different 
groundwater wells and their surrounding areas pertaining to several aquifers’ 
regions, including mostly the Queretaro Valley COTAS and the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS. These visits were very informative about some of the main problems 
regarding groundwater governance. First, wells are extremely scattered across the 
aquifer’s territory, making it extremely difficult for the State to exercise enforcement 
over groundwater abstraction. A lot of the wells do not have properly functioning 
water meters, a situation that also deters an effective measurement of water 
abstraction and, consequently of enforcement. It is also important to mention that 
wells are situated in private property or ejidos, and at times owners are not willing to 
allow government inspectors to enter their property. There have been cases when 
inspectors have been threatened with the use of violence if they were to trespass to 
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check metering devices. Another telling situation regarding groundwater use is the 
dramatic change in land-use, as a lot of private property previously used for 
agriculture is now being used or being sold for industrial parks and urban 
development –the Parque Industrial Opción, in the Municipality of San Luis de la 
Paz, in the Laguna-Seca Area is an important case of this form of land conversation 
(Municipality of San Luis de la Paz, 2012).  Other agricultural lands remain idle        –
ranches and parcels have been abandoned, because the owners do not have the 
financial resources to extract groundwater that is too deep now due to important 
over-exploitation.  Furthermore, a it is also possible to notice the presence of agro-
industrial firms that have managed to consolidate the transfer of groundwater 
concessions rights in their favour, a phenomenon that actually represents a form of 
land and water grabbing.  
 
• On the Research Methods: Primary Data Collection / Participant-Observation in 
COTAS meetings 
 
Participant observation was an important element in the process of primary data 
collection, because the study of deliberative arenas demands it. So it was necessary 
to attend a number of COTAS meetings to be able to assess the process of public 
deliberation and the creation of the public sphere. On this is relevant to highlight, that 
the COTAS do not meet very frequently –except perhaps when engaged in the 
production of the groundwater management plans–, a situation that creates some 
barriers for their assessment. This situation entailed to ‘always be ready’ to attend 
the COTAS meetings when scheduled.  My scholarly experience in the deliberative 
arenas mainly consists of my attendance to those arenas convened by the Querétaro 
Valley COTAS and the Laguna-Seca COTAS. 
 
I wish to highlight that during some of the COTAS meetings, I was invited to 
participate pro-actively and give my opinion on issues and concerns. On other 
occasions, it was best to maintain some distance from the on-going discussions, 
especially when the COTAS members were engaging in severe criticisms regarding 
government actions –for example with the issue regarding matters concerning the 
allocation of funds.  Attending the COTAS meetings was very productive, because it 
was possible to have conversations –unstructured interviews– with groundwater 
users –principally small-scale ejido farmers– who sometimes are a bit reluctant to 
engage in more thorough semi-structured interviews, as already mentioned. So 
coffee breaks were extremely useful periods to gather their opinions on situations.  
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• On the Research Methods: Primary Data Collection / Organisation of a Focus 
Group 
 
According to Morgan (1998), focus groups are basically group interviews, relying on 
the dynamic interaction of selected participants and based on a topic supplied by the 
researcher, who takes the role of moderator. Focus groups are also particularly 
useful to retrieve a considerable amount of information in a short period of time. They 
are useful for engaging in collective explorations about a phenomenon and to 
retrieve general appreciations on a subject matter. That is to say, they generate a 
venue for interpersonal communication between participants that helps to clarify 
group perspectives on issues and concerns. They are also particularly useful to help 
fine-tune semi-structured interviews as well as to triangulate information (Kitzinger, 
1995). They also support the validation of information and sometimes also the 
prospect of generalisation.  
 
I sought the organisation of a focus group August 29th, 2012 in the context of the 
Annual COTAS meeting in ExpoAgua, Guanajuato. It is pertinent to mention that the 
focus group was a jointly organised with the CEAG and the CONAGUA State Office 
in Guanajuato, so I did not have full control over the design of the dynamic or the 
moderation. Consequently, I had to share the design of the objectives of the focus 
group and the content of questions to be engaged during the session.  In the table 
below, I present the focus group questionnaire; the questions in bold are the ones 
that were generated by me. The participants of the focus group were members of the 
14 COTAS of Guanajuato, including Presidents and Technical Managers. No 
members of government were invited, only members of the COTAS and in order to 
create a more free and relaxed deliberative arena. The moderation of the focus 
group was shared by with me another individual.  Although sharing the focus group 
with other entities was not ideal, it still represented a great opportunity to engage with 
a group of people that share the same type of problems and in order to retrieve 
general information on the groundwater users’ perceptions of the COTAS institutional 
development process, their prospects and challenges. Where appropriate in the 
relevant chapters of the thesis, I highlight where the argumentation presented is 
supported by the insights and the information that I gained from the focus group.    
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Table 1: Focus Group Questionnaire 
Regarding the purpose of the COTAS 
 What does the COTAS do, that it should keep doing? 
 What does the COTAS need to stop doing? 
 What activities does the COTAS need to begin to do? 
 What factors affect the performance of the COTAS? 
Regarding the members and clients of the COTAS 
 Who should be the beneficiaries of the COTAS? 
 Who should not be the beneficiaries of the COTAS? 
 What services and functions should the COTAS be providing to the 
government? 
Regarding the faculties and roles of the COTAS 
 What faculties and resources should the COTAS have? 
 What kind of support should the COTAS receive from government? 
 What kind of changes would strengthen the COTAS? 
Regarding strategic alliances 
11 What type of alliances should the COTAS develop? 
12 How can the COTAS achieve organisational sustainability? 
 
4.2.1.5. The Analysis and Interpretation of Findings of the Case Study 
 
The analysis and interpretation of findings of the case study are anchored in the 
heuristic-analytical device that derives its investigative power from theoretical 
sources that, in turn, support theoretical propositions that orient it in is search for 
explanans.  The architecture behind this device seeks to support a sequence of 
moments of analysis that orient their analytical power towards different aspects and 
layers of the phenomenon under study in an attempt to gradually develop a more 
profound and complete understanding about it. I highlight that by embedding in its 
architecture a sequential application of different moments of analysis it is possible 
then to study different interrelated aspects and layers of the phenomenon. This 
probing capability allows either to confirm or to disprove what has been learned in 
each of the previous moments, helping to support the construction of internal validity 
–a point that I will address later in this chapter.  
 
So the first moment of analysis (i.e. the theoretical engagement and explanandum) 
provides theoretical founded propositions about what needs to be investigated. 
Eventually, these theoretical propositions assisted in the design of a research 
hypothesis.  Both the theoretical propositions and the research hypothesis guide the 
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search of an explanans.  The second moment of analysis (i.e. historical-contextual 
institutional analysis) provides a general approach to the phenomenon under study, 
indicating the general orientation and pattern of the research subject and problem. In 
this case this orientation and pattern refers to the general and widespread 
characteristics of the process of Neo-liberal State-transformation in the Mexican 
water polity and the implementation of a number of State-strategies that sought to 
modify the relationship between the State and civil society, highlighting their 
drawbacks and contradictions.  
 
The next step in the sequence is the application of the third moment of analysis (i.e. 
socio-political governance arrangement’s institutional analysis).  This moment of 
analysis provides a more in-detail and penetrating investigation regarding one 
selected and particular aspect of the research subject and problem. In this case, this 
refers to one Neo-liberal State Strategy identified during the second moment of 
analysis –and one of several others– and that was also already pre-established as a 
central research concern previously during the first moment of analysis.  This State-
strategy is represented by the establishment and implementation of the MSPs for 
groundwater resources management; an emerging form of institutional innovation for 
socio-political groundwater governance. During this third moment analysis the MSPs 
for groundwater management are analysed through the support of a standard and 
ad-hoc institutional analysis framework provided by the specialised literature on 
water governance and water resources management (i.e. the scale, scope, 
institutional structure, stakeholder involvement, efficiency, efficacy and equity).  
Furthermore, this moment of analysis also devotes attention to develop a greater 
insight of the research subject and problem by establishing a simple comparison 
between to research samples that distinguish themselves for manifesting different 
empirical characteristics –the CONAGUA COTAS and the State of Guanajuato 
COTAS.  This moment of analysis hence enables to probe into yet another ‘layer’ of 
knowledge and builds a more comprehensive insight regarding the orientation and 
pattern of the research subject and problem. 
 
Turning onto the fourth moment of analysis (i.e. socio-political governance 
arrangement’s democratic performance assessment) the operation centres again in 
probing deeper into the research subject and problem, this time by assessing the 
democratic performance of one embedded research sample of the State of 
Guanajuato COTAS, the Laguna-Seca COTAS. The operation of this moment of 
analysis is also supported by the theoretical propositions established during the first 
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moment of analysis –through the use of the democratic and associative democratic 
theory analytical power– and provides again a more in-detail investigation of the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS, this time in terms of the assessment of a range of potential 
democratic effects achieved by the Laguna-Seca COTAS, and also the identification 
of a number of preconditions that seem to affect this achievement. The insights 
produced by the application of this moment of analysis are wide-ranging and also 
interweaved with those produced by the other moments.  
 
After the immersion into the MSPs’ institutional development process provided by the 
third and fourth moments of analysis, the next moment of analysis shifts its focus 
back specifically to the role of State.  The fifth moment of analysis (i.e. the State 
meta-governance strategies and capacities assessment) examines the range of 
State meta-governance strategies and capacities that the Mexican State has over the 
MSPs for groundwater management, again establishing a comparison between the 
CONAGUA’s –central office– strategies and capacities and that of the CONAGUA’s 
State Office in Guanajuato. The insights resulting from the application of this moment 
of analysis serve to corroborate the findings about the role of the State that have 
been problematized during the first moment of analysis and have been surfacing 
during the implementation of the previous moments of analysis –second, third, and 
fourth. 
 
Finally, with the theoretical background that supported the development of the 
explanadum, and the information and insights gathered from the application of the 
different moments of analysis, it was possible to devote efforts to apply the last 
moment of analysis (i.e. the assessment of the role of the State in the institutional 
development of the MSPs for groundwater resources management), and where 
some inferences are made regarding the role of the State in the establishment of 
MSPs for water resources management, and more broadly water resources 
management.   With this last action the sequence in the analysis and interpretation of 
the case study is completed.   
 
4.2.1.6. The Validity and Reliability of the Case Study Research, and the 
Development of Generalisations 	  
There are several aspects of the validity of the case study research strategy that 
should be addressed.  In this case I have sought to address validity concerns 
through the following pathways.  Initially one way to support the validity of the 
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research is through an accurate definition of concepts that are later subject of 
investigation –operationalization and ‘measurement’.  So, throughout the thesis I 
have made efforts to define the main concepts that are subject of investigation and 
that are used to describe and assess the phenomenon under study, for example 
State-transformation, State-strategies, the State and power concepts, the different 
institutional dimensions of the MSPs for groundwater resources management, the 
potential democratic effects and preconditions for associative and deliberative 
activity, and the meta-governance strategies and capacities.  All of these concepts 
are presented at early stages of the thesis in the theoretical chapters –when the 
exaplandum is presented. Later throughout the empirical chapters these concepts 
are then operationalized to describe the different aspects of the phenomenon under 
study. I realise that throughout the thesis other concepts gradually appear to support 
building the argumentation, and some of them are left more loosely undefined, 
leaving open the ground for the reader’s interpretation.  Still, attempting to secure the 
meaning of all the ‘secondary’ concepts seems an extremely complicated task to 
achieve.  It is my hope that reader somehow is oriented on the definition of such 
concepts by the nature of the context they are embedded in (i.e. by the orientation of 
the argumentation itself). Still these secondary concepts remain mostly at the 
background of the argumentation.  
 
The second pathway that seeks to convey internal validity is through a strategy 
termed ‘pattern matching’, that involves comparing the empirical based pattern (i.e. 
the findings’ pattern) with the predicted one, and through the use of some pre-
established theoretical suppositions and a research hypothesis (Yin, 2009).  In this 
case, again in the theoretical chapters a number of theoretical suppositions and the 
research hypothesis were established to help oriented the research endeavour.  This 
action supports then focusing the attention of certain ‘useful’ situations and 
information –and disregard other ‘non-useful’– in the development of argumentations.  
Even more so, it is possible to consider that one of the central concerns of the 
heuristic-analytical device is to help focus the attention over certain aspects of the 
phenomenon under study throughout the research process by establishing different 
moments of analysis –themselves grounded by theoretical developments– and that 
cover specific aspects or dimensions of phenomenon. It is then that through the 
implementation of the full-sequence of each of the moments of analysis how a more 
comprehensive view of such phenomenon is developed. As mentioned before in the 
preceding section the ‘layering’ architecture of the heuristic-analytical device seeks 
not only to offer a specific explanation of a particular aspect of the phenomenon 
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under study, but to actually probe deeper into the overall phenomenon and thus 
inherently helping to validate the findings.  
 
Although the case study research is not truly a comparative exercise, part of the 
research subject and problem inherently implied the need to establish a comparison 
between two research samples, the CONAGUA COTAS and the State of Guanajuato 
COTAS.  This comparison not only served to highlight the differences between both 
‘initiatives’ regarding their path of institutional development, but also helped to 
validate the argumentative interpretation based in the theoretical propositions 
orienting the investigation.  One last source of internal validity is the use of different 
data sources that support the development of argumentations to respond to the 
different research questions. In previous sections of this chapter I develop a 
description of the fieldwork and data collection sources.  It is then that through the 
above pathways it was possible to arrive at the production of an evidence-based 
argumentation (i.e. an inference) about the phenomenon under study.56 
 
Regarding the reliability of the research strategy –that is of demonstrating that the 
operations performed during the research process could, in principle, be replicated, 
and if so replicated could produce the same findings– efforts were made throughout 
the thesis to clearly establish the explanndum and then the research pathway used 
to develop the explanans.  In my opinion the presence of the heuristic-analytical 
device also supports a clear understanding of the research operations made to 
address the research questions and support the development of the descriptive and 
explanatory narratives.  In the preceding section of this chapter I explicated in detail 
the research process and established the sources of data and information. 
Throughout the empirical chapters efforts were made also to establish the sources of 
data and information that were harnessed to develop the argumentations presented 
in each of the sections.  
 
As mentioned above case studies pose challenges in terms of generalisation, both 
statistical generalisations –producing inferences about other research samples with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56  One aspect is relevant to mention, because it helped the PhD research processes 
benefited from the organisation of the VIII National COTAS Meeting in State of Guanajuato 
last August.  During this Meeting, I was able to interview and have also informal 
conversations with a great variety of stakeholders.  As such this situation helped to verify the 
tendencies and opinions.  Also, as already mentioned, during this Meeting, it was possible to 
co-organise a focus group, a situation that also help to ascertain tendencies and identify 
different opinions.  
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the evidence generated from the one– and analytical generalisations –confirming, 
complementing or rebuking theoretical propositions from the evidence generated 
from the case study.  In this particular situation it is complicated to provide an in-
detail and fully evidenced-based statistical generalisation (i.e. for example in terms of 
the attainment of democratic effects of the Laguna-Seca COTAS), but it is possible to 
indicate that there is high probability that the rest of the COTAS are experiencing the 
same types of prospects and challenges than the COTAS in the State of Guanajuato.  
In the case of analytical generalisation I believe that it is possible to consider that the 
evidence generated from this doctoral research confirms a number of theoretical 
propositions. These generalisations will be presented at the Overall End Comments 
Chapter –chapter 8.   
	  
4.3.Ethical and Other General Considerations 
 
Ultimately, case study research is about the experience of people in relation to the 
phenomenon under study, that itself is the setting –or has been the setting– of their 
own everyday environments.  Accordingly, when carrying out case study research it 
is necessary to maintain high standards of integrity, responsibility and accountability 
to the research’s participants and to what is reported about the social phenomenon 
they are part of. Researchers should be aware of any potential ethical difficulties or 
dilemmas arising from their work, especially in relation to three problems: the 
researcher/participant relationship, the interpretation of data and the research design 
itself.   
 
In terms of the researcher/participant relationship the researcher should be aware of 
any potential problems or conflicts that may arise by the use and disclosure of 
potential damaging or strategic information provided by different informants.  This 
was very much the situation of my case study research.  The Mexican water polity is 
a ‘highly politicised environment’ where all forms of power relationships manifest 
between stakeholders.  The role of the State is extremely contradictory and ‘harsh’ 
and thus, generally speaking, stakeholders take extra care of being prudent about 
the considerations and opinions they share openly, as well as about the information 
that they are readily available to reveal. Definitely the State casts a shadow that is 
perceived and managed differentially by different stakeholders, as there is the 
perception that people may experience reprimands or consequences. Also the nature 
of the research subject and the research problem is contentious, a situation that had 
an impact in terms of primary data collection. This situation definitely complicated the 
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research process and demanded from my side to follow a standard protocol of 
engagement with all of the potential informants/participants. This protocol is based in 
three ethical principles: autonomy, opportunity and justice (Golafshani, 2003). 
 
Autonomy establishes that all informants/participants have the right to be informed 
about the research study, have the right to freely decide whether they participate or 
not in the study, and have also the right to withdraw at any time without any form of 
penalty. During my research I abided to this important principle and in all cases I 
disclosed the nature of my interests during interviews, informal meetings, and of 
course the focus group.  I was confronted with different reactions, but in most cases, 
for example, interviewees/participants did not approve of the use of tape recorders 
and preferred having the interviews with me only taking notes. Also the interviewees 
accepted to be referred to in the actual thesis document –and as part of other 
sources of information and insight–, but preferred not be quoted.   
 
‘Opportunity’ considers that need for the researcher to exercise a criteria of 
inclusiveness, that is for all affected stakeholders to have the ‘right of voice’ if so 
desired.  This situation prompts the researcher to take extra care in enabling the 
opportunity for all stakeholders to participate, and for their opinions to be truly and 
accurately reflected in the PhD thesis or any other written piece that uses information 
shared by them. This in principle seems ‘easy’, but at times may also be 
complicated. For example, during my fieldwork it was relatively easy to approach 
certain individuals –like for example the COTAS’s Governing Board Members or 
high-level civil servants at CONAGUA–, but this is not so much the case with small-
landholders, ejidatarios and mid-level ranking officers at CONAGUA. In their case, 
more extensive assurance needed to be given to entice people to participate, and 
also demanded specific outreach efforts, like travelling to their workplaces, offices 
and outposts.  Accordingly, efforts are also made in the thesis to accurately reflect 
the situations, opinions and insights of the stakeholders, and particularly also that of 
the interviewees/participants.  
 
In terms of justice, this principle refers to equal share and fairness.  This entails 
avoiding any form of exploitation or abuse of the interviewees/participants during the 
research process. This principle is operationalized during the research process by 
recognising the vulnerability and the risk that each participant is taking and that may 
be derived or generated from their actual participation in the research process. For 
example, in the case of my research I was adamant to respect the wishes of the 
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groundwater users that participated in the focus group that no government authority 
should be present during the session, and in order for them to express their ‘true’ 
opinions and feelings about the situation regarding the groundwater problems faced 
by them, and about the challenges and prospects of the COTAS in the State of 
Guanajuato.  I took also care of assessing the vulnerability of civil servants at 
CONAGUA and of basically removing any risk for reprisal for them. 
 
The interpretation of data is also subject to the principle of opportunity, that is that 
due care needs to be made not only in reflecting a true account of the facts and 
opinions, but also of reflecting the situation and opinions of the marginal and 
vulnerable stakeholders.  Again efforts were made to abide to this principle and 
devote attention to description of situations and conflicts that affect marginal and 
vulnerable groups.  A great part of this effort is included by the application of the 
fourth moment of analysis, and also the sixth.  
 
There is also one other important consideration to make, the issue of bias. This 
consideration manifests in a significant way in the case of my research, and because 
of my closeness and level of involvement to the research subject and problem. On 
this, I have to say that is possible that the focus of the PhD research was influenced 
by years working as civil servant in the CONAGUA.  As a civil servant I gained inside 
understanding of the role and might of the State and its capacity to influence socio-
environmental transformation.  I also came to understand some of its more important 
and damaging drawbacks and contradictions.  Indeed, this situation is what prompted 
me to scrutinise the role of the State in the Mexican water polity.  This intention only 
harbours a sincere interest in developing a scholarly understanding about the social 
phenomenon under study, but if I am truthful I was –and I am– also interested in 
finding ways to further the process of State-transformation in ways to make it more 
supportive of meaningful of greater social participation/involvement, stakeholder 
cooperation, democratic practice and environmental sustainability. That is to say that 
I am also interested in deriving policy recommendations from this doctoral research.  
 
Another comment seems pertinent also, this time from my professional position as a 
consultant for the CONAGUA. I am currently participating in a ‘task force’ to design 
and implement a new set of reforms in the Mexican water polity. We have been 
asked to explore ways to strengthen Mexico’ water security and also groundwater 
management.  Therefore, the insights and the knowledge that I have gained are 
being extremely useful for this endeavour.  I have hopes that I will be able to convey 
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–as a member of this task force– some relevant policy recommendations that can 
strengthen the role of the COTAS in groundwater management, and also that can 
help support the democratisation of the Mexican water polity.  
 
Lastly, UCL encourages PhD students to be aware of any ethical and professional 
issues involved in carrying out social research and coursing a post-graduate degree. 
In this sense UCL encourages PhD students to ascribe to a form of ‘code of ethics’ 
that although not intended to be prescriptive, seeks to raise awareness and develop 
the student’s criteria to conduct social research.  UCL encourages their research 
students to also acknowledge important considerations regarding plagiarism and 
research misconduct. Clear information on the UCL Graduate Research Degree’s 
Code of Practice can be found at:  
http://www.grad.ucl.ac.uk/codes/CoP_Research_12.pdf 
 
4.4. A Word on the Research Inquiry Paradigm: Critical Realism  
  
The research inquiry paradigm adopted to carry out social research investigations 
contains important assumptions about the way in which we view the world, what is 
the form and nature of reality and what can be found out about it –the ontology–, and 
also the way in which we approach its knowledge, that is the relationship between 
the knower and what can be known –the epistemology. Both ontology and 
epistemology are related, that is to say, once the ontology is defined, the 
epistemology follows. The selection of a research inquiry paradigm will, in turn, 
support the definition of the research strategy and the research methods used by a 
social researcher (Guba and Lincoln, 2005). In this case the research paradigm 
supporting the current PhD research investigation is that of critical realism, as 
opposed to for example positivism/empiricism or interpretivism. As such, critical 
realism represents an alternative to traditional positivistic and interpretivist 
approaches to the social sciences (Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson and Norrie, 
1998).  
 
Briefly, positivism is oriented at studying an ‘observable reality’ that is independent 
from the researcher and driven by immutable laws and mechanisms. This reality is 
considered independent, as it is neither affected by the researcher nor affects him or 
her throughout the research process. Accordingly, after observing such reality, the 
researcher produces credible law-like generalisations that may be similar to those 
produced by natural or physical scientists. A positivist research strategy will first 
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establish a base-line theory and develop a hypothesis to corroborate, disprove, or 
qualify that theory. This process will lead to the development/complementation of 
theory, and then to further theoretical elaborations, through the continuation of this 
research cycle. A positivist will be strictly concerned with ‘facts’ that are captured 
through a ‘value-free’ stance that allows for an ‘objective’ interpretation of such 
reality. This situation will allow values and biases not to influence research 
outcomes. A positivist will use a highly structured methodology in order to facilitate 
replication and the emphasis is mostly placed on quantitative data collection (Guba 
and Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln, Lynham and Guba, 2011).  
 
Interpretivism, on the other hand, considers that it is impossible for the social 
researcher to grasp an observable reality independently from him or her; hence, 
social reality is grasped through symbolic meanings. Interpretivists argue that social 
reality is simply too complex to be able to be reduced into law-like generalisations. 
Interpretivism is very much concerned with understanding the social world through 
the knowledge and the understanding that social actors have of its symbolic 
meanings, so in this sense, the researcher must adopt an empathic position with 
his/hers research subjects. For interpretivism, because reality is so complex and 
unravels in so many different ways, making generalisations is not so much of a 
concern due to unfeasibility (Guba and Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln, Lynham and Guba, 
2011).  
 
Critical realism claims that it is not possible to establish a comprehensive 
understanding of social phenomena, and that knowledge, regardless of any form of 
theoretical and methodological thoroughness, is fallible. So in this sense, all social-
scientific accounts of reality are only partial accounts of a particular phenomenon that 
researchers choose to highlight for various purposes. These accounts are only 
partial, because this reality is in constant flux. In short, reality is assumed to exist, but 
to be only imperfectly comprehended, because of flawed mechanisms to apprehend 
it and due to the fundamentally intractable nature of phenomena. Critical realists 
consider, as a basic tenet, that reality exists, and that it is possible to conceptualise 
and to make theories to attempt to describe it. In fact, we apprehend reality through 
these theories and concepts, in turn describing the natural order, the events and 
discourses of the social world (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen and Karlsson, 1997; 
Lincoln and Guba, 2003).  
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Most importantly, critical realism supports the view that we can only understand and 
transform the world if we identify the underlying structures behind social events and 
discourses, but that these structures in themselves are not necessarily obvious or 
spontaneously apparent. Critical realists consider that there are three layers or 
domains of reality –a very important difference from positivist/empiricist and 
interpretive approaches: the empirical (i.e. the level of experiences), the actual (i.e. 
the level of events) and the real (i.e. the level of the underlying mechanisms). This 
doctoral research seeks to address these three layer or domains. Wuisman (2005) 
explains some aspects of the critical realist ontology:  
 
“The critical realist ontology implies that social reality is neither equal nor 
explainable exclusively in terms of the empirical. Instead scientific explanation 
of social phenomena necessitates a search in the underlying layers of reality 
for specific mechanisms that generate the particular events taking place and 
which, in turn, to a greater or smaller extent, may be experienced through our 
senses.” (Wuisman, 2005:368-369) 
 
Accordingly, at the domain of the empirical we can make observation of 
‘experiences’, meaning visible observations of social phenomena. These 
experiences, in turn, constitute part of the events, which we can identify at the 
domain of the actual, and that are in turn the outcome of the mechanisms operating 
at the domain of the real. Each of these levels has the capacity to change the 
researcher’s understanding of what is being studied, so critical realists argue for a 
social research capable of undertaking such multi-level studies (Danermark, 
Ekstrom, Jakobsen and Karlsson, 1997). 
 
Epistemologically speaking, the aim of critical realism is to explain the relationship 
between experiences, events and mechanisms and to focus more precisely on such 
mechanisms. Accordingly the critical realist perspective emphasises questions on 
how and why a particular phenomenon came into being, got its specific character, 
unravelled in such a way, and produced such outcomes, within a particular time and 
space. The emphasis of critical realism is on the explanation of the constitution of 
empirical phenomenon and not really to give predictions. For critical realism theory 
plays a paramount role in the manner in which reality is approached to later be 
analysed and understood. As such the understanding of reality is theory-laden and 
concept-dependent, as the theories and concepts that a researchers use determines 
the type of research outputs produced (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen and 
Karlsson, 1997).  
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At this point, it is important to refer to the modes of inference generally used in social 
research: deductive and inductive. A deductive approach works from the more 
general to the specific, which is why it is sometimes called a ‘top-down’ approach. 
Accordingly, a deductive mode of inference seeks to approach a research problem 
through the use of theory connected to the description and explanation of that 
problem. With the use of theory, the social researcher will then develop a suitable 
analytical framework to be later deployed to guide the empirical observations, and 
orientated at testing predetermined hypothesis. Indeed an important part of the 
deductive mode of inference is the design of a workable hypothesis to be later tested 
through empirical observation. This process will eventually lead to the confirmation, 
rebuttal or qualification of the hypothesis, with the implied consequences on the 
theoretical development (Patton, 2002).  
 
An inductive approach moves from specific observations to broader generalisations 
and even theories. This approach is also referred to as a ‘bottom-up’ approach, 
which hence begins with the careful and in-depth observations of particular 
phenomenon, before later attempting to detect some form of pattern and regularities. 
The social researcher will then work towards establishing a tentative hypothesis that 
should be explored –by going backwards or top-down again– to finally develop some 
form of general conclusion or theory. Inductive approaches are criticised as not being 
able to produce valid scientific knowledge, because there is simply no amount of 
sensory observations that can be established that will suffice to draw valid universal 
conclusions about a social reality. It is important to mention that frequently critical 
realist social researchers will combine both approaches. That is to say they work first 
under the principles of a deductive approach, but through the engagement with the 
empirical research, it is possible to also benefit from implementing an inductive 
approach. This, in principle, could help fine-tune the theoretical and analytical 
framework, the research questions and the hypothesis; adjusting in a positive way 
the research approach (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen and Karlsson, 1997, 
Wuisman, 2005).  In the case of this PhD, this is partially a reason why the analytical 
device is a heuristic-analytical device.  
 
For critical realists there is a third mode of inference that is termed “retroduction” 
(Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen and Karlsson, 2002). Retroduction is aimed at going 
“behind” empirical and observable events in an attempt to capture the underlying 
structures and mechanisms that produce them. Accordingly, knowledge about social 
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reality can only be attained –and only partially, as already stated–, if the researcher 
aims to capture the “transfactual conditions” for the events and phenomena under 
study, that is to get at the generative drivers or mechanisms of influence.  
Retroduction is about advancing from one thing (the empirical observation of events) 
and arriving at something different (a conceptualisation of transfactual conditions). It 
is by gaining an understanding of these transfactual conditions that the social 
researcher can approach attempts to generalisation. It is important to mention that 
critical realists do not consider each mode of inference to be totally exclusionary of 
each other; on the contrary a researcher may go through them in the course of the 
different research moments in an attempt to gain more precision and relevance.  
Indeed one objective of this PhD is to gain insight about the transfactual conditions 
affecting the role and orientation of the Mexican state in the establishment and 
institutional development of the MSPs for groundwater management.  
 
Still, regarding the feasibility of how to make generalisations, critical realism 
questions the capacity of social research to be able to produce trustworthy 
generalisations regarding empirical phenomenon. This is mainly because the world is 
constantly changing, and causalities or drivers of social change are in constant flux. 
Notwithstanding, if generalisations are attempted, the researcher should be careful of 
taking into account the domain of the deep structures of reality. Consequently, social 
research attempting generalisations should not be limited at the description and 
analysis of ‘empirical facts’, instead it should attempt to identify and gain knowledge 
about such structures, as the constituent and dynamic mechanisms of history 
(Steinmetz, 1994; Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen and Karlsson, 2002). 
 
Critical realism also holds a specific position regarding the agency-structure debate. 
According to this debate, society manifests through two broad and interrelated 
phenomena: agency (i.e. that is people acting) and structure (i.e. social structures 
structuring people’s agency). This debate offers three main positions. The first one, 
termed the ‘social fact paradigm’ where all influence moves from structure to agents 
in a rather deterministic way –thus the object of social research focuses on those 
structures–; the ‘agency paradigm’ where agents are seen to act following their own 
objectives and goals according to their interpretations and beliefs –thus the object of 
study are perceptions and intentional behaviour– and lastly the ‘integrative 
paradigms’ that seek to join agency and structure through some form of relationship; 
of which Giddens’ “structuration theory” is the most renowned (Giddens, 1984). 
Briefly, for Giddens, structures do not exist separately and independently from 
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agents, both are the medium and the outcome of social action through a recursive 
process; and most importantly they can only be conceptualised in relation to each 
other. Actors through a process of “reflexivity” consciously seek to alter such 
structures in the path of social change (Giddens, 1984; Danermark, Ekstrom, 
Jakobsen and Karlsson, 2002), at the same that those structures influence their 
social agency.  
 
Critical realism offers a different approach to this debate; something labelled 
analytical dualism (Archer, 1995). Analytical dualism recognises the interdependence 
of structure and agency, but each work in a different timescale, so at any given 
moment an existing structure will definitely constrain the agency of a social actor, 
whose interactions will eventually reproduce or transform such initial structure. So 
while structure and agency are independent, it is possible to unpick them analytically 
for research purposes and by doing so to clearly investigate how structural factors 
shape subsequent actions. Consequently it will be possible to give accounts on how 
structure and agency phenomena interlink over time. Accordingly social process are 
constituted through an endless process of interactions, something called the 
morphogenetic sequence (Archer, 1995).  
 
Lastly, critical realism is emphatic about the influence that the researcher’s values 
play in social research. This is because they consider that the researcher’s values 
are always present throughout social research. So at all times, the researcher will 
demonstrate his or her values. For example by choosing one topic or theory, rather 
than another, suggests that a researcher thinks that such topic is more important 
than another, or that theory is more useful. Thus, for critical realism, our research 
approach, strategy, and methods are a reflection of our values (Danermark, Ekstrom, 
Jakobsen and Karlsson, 2002; Guba and Lincoln, 2005). 
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Chapter 5: The Neoliberal State-transformation Process: State Projects and 
State-strategiesin the Mexican Water Polity: The Second Moment of Analysis 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter is about the long-haul State-building and more recent Neoliberal State-
transformation processes in the context of the Mexican water polity. This historical 
process produced three distinct Statehood formations, including in chronological 
order: the Nation- and State-Building, the Developmental-Interventionist, and the 
Neoliberal Statehood formations, the last of these being a central concern of this 
PhD. Each of these Statehood formations has attempted to establish and stabilise 
different State projects through the design and implementation of a range of State 
strategies. All of the aforementioned Statehood formations respond to particular 
water resources management challenges through the implementation of particular 
State-strategies oriented at organising socio-political processes towards the pursuit 
of specific ends.  So, political ideologies, policy ideas, political forces and socio-
political struggles have influenced the establishment and stabilisation of each of the 
Statehood formations.  
 
In the context of this PhD document, it is not possible to develop an in-detail 
description of the Nation- and State-building Formation and the Developmental-
Interventionist State Formations, but still it is relevant to present some brief notions of 
each, because they have somehow exerted influence over the definition and 
development of the Neoliberal Statehood formation (i.e. they have produced some 
path dependencies). Afterwards, I will then provide a description of the Neoliberal 
Statehood formation in the water polity, its State-project, and strategies. I will devote 
particular attention in developing a succinct understanding of some of the most 
important Neoliberal Statehood State-strategies, to later focus in a more in-detail 
description and analysis of the establishment of socio-political water governance 
arrangements, represented in the context of the Mexican water polity by the MSPs 
for water resources management at the river basin, micro-basin and aquifer level. 
The elaboration on such State-strategies will provide some historical and contextual 
understanding regarding the Neoliberal Statehood formation and its attempt to 
implement a deep transformation in the relationships between the State and society 
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throughout water resources management. 57  Overall, in this chapter I will reflect on 
how the Neo-liberal Statehood Project implemented a widespread set of State-
strategies in an extremely ‘orthodox manner’ without really carefully pondering about 
the ‘contextual conditions’ in the Mexican water polity and also without any 
consideration about the need to develop a ‘transition process or strategy’ that would 
have created more enabling conditions for such strategies to stabilise and produce 
more positive outcomes.  The drawbacks in the implementation of some of these 
State-strategies have proven them highly contradictory; a situation that leaves room 
to more radical questionings regarding to the Neoliberal ideology’s assumptions.  
 
 At a general level, several scholars and practitioners conclude that the Mexican 
water polity is currently experiencing a ‘governability’ crisis as a result of the 
Neoliberal State strategies, that requires again a systemic change to address a 
series of mounting water resources management, water supply and sanitation and 
water security challenges. Whether the Mexican water polity can achieve this 
systemic change or not is an open question, but there are very strong path-
dependencies that seem to be difficult to break and that doing so would require, in 
my opinion, broader socio-political and economic changes that are not clearly 
foreseen in the near horizon. I concur with other scholars such Aboites, Cifuentes, 
Jiménez and Torregorsa (2008) that the role of the State in this process has been 
critical and remains critical in the future.58  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The reader will notice that these Statehood formations and State projects are not exclusive 
to the water polity, in reality they are pervasive to the wider country polity, and so they are 
reflection of national level phenomena. Still certain sectorial polities may manifest to a lesser 
or greater extent the influence of this national level Statehood formations.  I consider that the 
water polity is very much the case of a ‘great level of influence’, as I will describe later in this 
chapter.  This is to say that in the case of the Neoliberal Statehood formation the neoliberal 
policy ideas and strategies were implemented in a very ‘orthodox’ manner with highly 
consequential impacts in the Mexican water polity.  In an interview with Dr Dr Maria Luisa 
Torregrosa, the first a water historian and the second an environmental sociologist 
specialised in the Mexican water policy sector, they both confirmed this opinion, and 
encouraged me to continue with the orientation of this doctoral research. I am grateful for this 
encouragement.  An interesting contribution to the debate on the implementation of Neoliberal 
reforms in the Mexican water polity is the following:  Aboites, L (2009) La decadencia del 
agua de la nación: estudio sobre la desigualdad social y cambio politico en México en la 
segunda mitad del siglo XX, México D.F, México, Colegio de México. 
58 In interviews with former senior level civil servants in the CONAGUA at the level of General 
Directors, Deputy Directors and General Managers that were in charge of the design and 
implementation of some of the Neo-liberal State-strategiesin retrospect they consider that 
indeed the implementation of the Neo-liberal State-strategies–although they do sometimes do 
not refer to them as such– produced important drawbacks and contradictions. For most of 
them there are three central aspects that negatively affected the implementation of a more 
carefully thought and incremental reform process: the influence of the World Bank in terms of 
conditional lending, the influence –the “pressure”– of the President’s Office that determined in 
many ways the orientation and pacing of the reforms also, and the veto-power of the 
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This chapter is divided in four broad sections.  The first section presents a brief 
description of the Nation- and Sate-building Statehood formation in the Mexican 
water polity. The second section presents also a brief description of the 
Developmental-Interventionist Statehood formation in the Mexican water polity.  The 
third section presents a more in-detail description and analysis of the Neo-liberal 
Statehood formation in the water polity, elaborating succinctly on the general 
characteristics and impact of the Neo-liberal ideology in Mexico –in a first sub-section 
–to later concentrate in describing and commenting on several Neo-liberal State 
strategies, including amongst them: the establishment of a specialised apex-
institution for water resources management; the territorial administrative re-
organisation of the water polity; the creation of a national water planning and 
programming process; the decentralisation of WS & S services; the opening to 
private sector involvement; the transfer of irrigation districts to water users; the 
creation of a property rights system and water markets; and the establishment of 
MSPs for water resources management –the river basin councils and its auxiliary 
bodies. I will devote greater attention to this last Neoliberal State strategy, as it is one 
central element of the research subject. Finally, some end comments will presented 
in a final section of this chapter.  
 
5.2. The Nation- and State-building Statehood Formation in the Mexican Water 
Polity: A General Overview (period: the end of the 19th Century to the Agrarian 
Reform in 1915) 
 
The Nation- and State-building Statehood Formation in the Mexican water sector at 
the beginning of the 19th century responded to a State-project principally oriented at 
gradually positioning the central-State at the centre of authority in terms of the control 
over water use across all the country’s territory (Aboites, 1998). It is important to 
mention that water was at that time managed locally by local authorities, landowners, 
religious and local communities. Central to this State-project were two State-
strategies: the push for the centralisation and federalisation of State-power in matters 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Secretary of the Treasury and Public Credit (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 
SHCP), who ultimately took critical decisions about the amount of resources to be used and 
when to be used in the implementation of each of the State-strategies. It is important to 
establish two important facts. The first one is that ‘presidentialism’ in Mexico is deeply rooted; 
that is the concentration of immense amounts of power in the President and the Presidential 
Office. The second one is that a central aspect of Neo-liberalism as State project was to also 
concentrate greats amounts of power in the SHCP, and the careful appointment of ‘Neo-
liberal technocrats’ that had studied in American Universities, such a Chicago University, 
Yale, and Stanford, and that were amenable to Neo-liberalism.  
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concerning water resources management and water supply and sanitation (Aboites, 
1998, Suárez, 1998). These strategies sought to recede the power of local 
authorities, large landowners and stockbreeders over water use, as well as to 
disentail religious privileges over land and water resources; all in favour of the central 
and federal State and with a view of organising society in favour of the creation of a 
‘polity of equals’ and a ‘strong’ federal State (Aboites, 1998, Suárez, 1998).  
 
A number of important State-strategies were designed and implemented during this 
period of Mexican history and to respond to the requirements of the Nation and Sate-
building Statehood formation project. The first one was the design and enactment of 
the necessary legal frameworks to incipiently develop and expand –in the territory– 
the normative bases of the central State’s authority, and to build the necessary State-
apparatus to apply the rule of law (Romero, 2005). The first laws dealing with water 
use were enacted in different points in time, mainly seeking to gradually ascertain 
that water resources were to be considered public property, and thus establishing the 
conditions and ‘parameters’ for private use.  A second important State strategy was 
aimed at chartering the territory to characterise scientifically its water resources, as 
well as to identify the main and the largest water users (Sánchez Rodríguez, 2009).  
This, in turn, helped to make strategic decisions regarding the establishment of 
federal-regional offices to deal with incipient water use conflicts, and to foster also 
some incipient federal control over water resources management across the territory.  
Overall, the central concern was to begin to expand the reach of the central-State in 
matters concerning water resources management across the whole of Mexico’s 
territory (Sanchez Rodríguez, 2009).  
 
Interestingly, this centralisation and federalisation pursuit was marked by important 
political struggles between liberal and conservative ideologies, the first seeking to 
forge a range of political and social rights over water use and for the individual 
citizen, the second to maintain a range of inherited privileges and economic stations 
for the aristocracy and the politically powerful classes.  Eventually, the modest 
progress made in the creation of the liberal political ideal of a ‘polity of equals’, a long 
period of dictatorship –el Porfiriato–, and the stagnant socio-economic conditions of a 
great majority of peasant populations across the country led to the Mexican 
Revolution in 1910 (González y Gonzalez, 2011).  It is worth mentioning an important 
form of institutional development resulting from this period of political turmoil and 
social struggle, a form of political conquest in favour of the individual citizens vis à vis 
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the State power: the Constitutional Rights Trial (el jucio de amparo). 59   The 
Constitutional Right Trial is a legal figure that has accompanied Mexico’s political 
history and that is still a robust legal resource for water users –and more generally 
Mexican citizens– against the vagaries and the abuse of authority of the Mexican 
State. When water users are affected in their constitutional rights to use water 
resources to sustain their livelihoods –and if other conditions apply– they use this 
institutional-legal resource to defend themselves from the State. On this Birrichaga 
(2009) elaborates:  
 
“In Mexico, with the objective of safeguarding the individual interests from any 
inappropriate or abusive government action, an innovative and progressive legal 
figure was created in 1861: the constitutional rights trial (juicio de amparo). Since 
1861, the constitutional rights trial was conceived as an open political trial that 
gives way to an interpretation of the law, something that allows any citizen that 
considers his/her human and civil guarantees transgressed by the State to ask a 
federal judge for a constitutional rights trial.  (...) Since then the constitutional 
human rights supports citizens queries with the State with regards to the use and 
expropriation of water rights.” (Birrichaga, 2009:47) (Translation: mine) 
 
After the Revolution, the central State-strategy was oriented at peace keeping and 
Nation-building, that is, at the pacification of territories through land redistribution and 
the water resources that came with it. Through the passage of time the Nation- and 
State-building Statehood formation gradually consolidated and stabilised the 
centralisation and federalisation of State-power, making the central State the final 
guarantor of water resources and the official conflict resolution instance across the 
territory (Molina Enriquez, 1978; Garciadiego, 2004; Castañeda, 2005).  Another 
important form of institutional innovation worth mentioning as part of the Nation- and 
State-building Statehood formation is the creation of the Ejido, one form of common-
property land-holding that supports productive activities by local peasant and 
indigenous communities and protects them against external pressures to sell or 
abandon their land (at least until the Neoliberal Statehood formation when the legal 
parameters of the Ejido changed). This form of institutional innovation supported the 
disintegration of large inherited landholdings (latifundios) and served as a land 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 In an interview with this scholar, his consideration is that the ‘juicio de amparo’ probably is 
the most important legal instrument that has served Mexican citizens to face the ‘abuse’ of 
the State’s authority and power.  Actually, he pointed out the ‘juicio de amparo’ has been a 
central recourse for workers and peasants in their social struggle against Neoliberal labour, 
social security, land tenure, education and water reforms.  An interesting, brief yet 
comprehensive presentation of the Juicio de Amparo and its impacts in safeguarding citizens’ 
guarantees and the rule of law is: González Cosio, A (1994), El Juicio de Ampáro, México 
City, Mexico, Porrúa Editorial.  
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redistribution mechanism to support local communities in their modernisation 
process, and with the aim of creating a modern capitalist small-sized holding 
agricultural class. The 1917 Constitution and several other sectorial laws and by-laws 
norm over the institutional design structure and the operations of the Ejidos. 
 
Overall, the centralisation and federalisation State-strategies responded to the need 
to gradually build the Mexican Nation, a federal State-authority and an incipient 
State-apparatus. Generally speaking, it is possible to consider that these goals were 
somewhat and gradually achieved. During the next Statehood formation both 
strategies were also pursued, but with greater ‘might’ and strength, and so in this 
sense, the centralisation and federalisation of the Mexican water polity will become 
one of its central or ‘structural’ characteristics.  The following section on the 
Developmental-Interventionist Statehood formation will explain this trend in more 
detail.  
 
5.3. The Developmental-Interventionist Statehood Formation in the Mexican 
Water Sector: A General Overview (From the 1915 to 1975) 
 
The Developmental-Interventionist Statehood formation phase includes from the 
Agrarian Reform in Mexico (1915-1934) and up to Mexican modernity –the period 
called Stabilising Development (Desarrollo Estabilizador) (mid 1970s) (Cosio 
Villegas, 1995; Lorenzo Meyer, 1995)60.  This Statehood formation sought as a 
central State-strategy to continue with the centralisation and federalisation process.  
It also actively pursued a process of landownership and water redistribution in order 
to enable socio-economic development, as one of the main concerns was to tackle 
massive rural poverty (Molina Enriquez, 1978; Blanquel, 2011).  A fundamental step 
in the consolidation of the Developmental-Interventionist Statehood formation was 
the creation in 1926 of the National Irrigation Commission (Comisión Nacional de 
Irrigacion, CNI).  The CNI had a number of important responsibilities, including: the 
development of water supply infrastructure –mainly the perforation of wells– to better 
the health and sanitary conditions of the population. In order to support this 
endeavour the CNI established federal water boards that developed medium sized 
and large WS & S systems across the country’s territory, and also made efforts to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Interesting readings about this historical period in Mexico are: Ortiz Mena, A. (1998), El 
Desarrollo Estabilizador: reflexiones sobre una época, México D.F. Mexico, Fondo de Cultura 
Ecónomica; Veron, R (1977), El Dilema del Desarrollo en México, México D.F., México, 
Editorial Diana, and Bértola, L and J A Ocampo (2013), El Desarrollo Económico de América 
Latina desde la Independencia, México DF, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica.  
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coordinate with local-municipal water boards in order to develop smaller scale local 
systems (Sandré, 2005).  
 
The CNI was also entrusted with supporting irrigated agriculture aimed at enabling 
local production and consumption, and mostly by providing irrigation infrastructure to 
the old and newly created Ejidos, and Irrigation Districts, Irrigation Units and 
Technical Rainfed Districts –other important forms of institutional innovation of this 
Statehood formation.61  With these actions the State began to gradually expand its 
geographical spread, technical capability and political influence over the rural and 
peasant populations. Lets us remember that at time that Mexico’s population was 
mostly rural and represented an important political force to keep appeased. 
Additionally, other policy instruments began to be used such as subsidies, tax 
exemptions and government soft lending –through the Ejidal Bank (Banco Ejidal), 
and with the State-strategy of creating an agriculturalist middle class that could work 
under the most appropriate organisational, technical, financial and even political 
conditions. As already mentioned, this peasant middle class, ideally, would 
eventually become the basis of a socially progressive and productive agricultural 
sector in Mexico.  It is important to establish also that this form of State-led 
development support began to engender a very particular type of relationship 
between the Mexican State and civil society: Mexican clientelism and corporatism. 
These two forms of socio-political relationships gradually became an integral part of 
Mexico socio-political history and political culture. It is worth mentioning that 
clientelism and corporatism are still very much present in Mexico, even so in the 
context of the Mexican water polity, affecting the rational allocation of scarce financial 
resources, the distribution of scarce water resources, and ultimately the overall 
democratic performance of the water polity (Kloster and de Alba, 2007). 62 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 More comments will be made later regarding the Irrigation Districts, because they represent 
an interesting form of institutional innovation where greater participation and cooperation 
between stakeholders is sought to achieve more productive agricultural practices.  
62 Clientelism is a type of socio-political relationship where the exchange of goods and 
services provided by the State involve an implicit or explicit quid-pro-quo. Throughout 
Mexican history the State has established this form of asymmetric relationship with groups in 
civil society that eventually provides ‘sympathisers’ with certain benefits, against political and 
electoral support.  The ultimate exchange being votes, that in turn ensures the reproduction of 
the political and economic system. Corporatism or corporativism refers to the socio-political 
organisation of society by major interest groups or corporate groups such as labour, 
business, agricultural, industrial, and the like.  Also through history, the Mexican state has 
fostered corporatism as preferred form of socio-political relationship, because it facilitates the 
design and implementation of public policies and the pursuit of State strategies. An interesting 
reading on the subject matter is: Hernandez E. (2006), “El Clientelismo en México: Los Usos 
del Políticos de la Pobreza”, in Espacios Públicos, febrero, vol. 9, no. 17, Universidad 
Autónoma de México, pp. 118-140.  An interesting interview with Dr.Karina Kloster confirmed 
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Approaching the 1950s there is a slight change in the State-strategies of the 
Developmental-Interventionist Statehood formation. Mexico was modernising 
(urbanising and industrialising extremely fast), and thus, it was necessary to address 
other important water resources challenges.  Water resources management started 
to focus on taking water to urban and industrial centres, as well as to large-scale 
irrigated agriculture districts. Developing and managing more complex WS & S 
systems was also another central priority. Very relevantly, the State devoted 
important amounts of resources to the construction of dams and the development of 
hydropower generation (Oribe, 1970).63  
 
The Secretary of Hydrologic Resources (Secretaría de Recursos Hidráulicos, SRH) 
was created in 1947.  At that time in history and according to scholars, the SRH was 
probably one of the most politically influential, financially endowed, and technical 
capable institutions in the field of water resources management in world (Aboites, 
Birrichaga and Garay, 2010).  The SRH was influenced by several important policy 
ideas that were in vogue at time, such as the notion of ‘multi-purpose water projects’ 
and ‘river basin regional development planning’.  Innovative institutional designs like 
the River Basin Commissions in the United States –most predominately the 
Tennessee Valley Authority– that aimed to harness basin level water resources for 
regional development had a important influence in Mexico. Several River Basin 
Regional Commissions were established and with great amounts of political power 
and financial resources at their disposal. 64  These River Commissions transformed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the relevance of clientelism and corporativsm in the water sector.  Dr. Karina Kloster has 
studied this phenomenon in detail, and focusing in the access to WS & S services in cities. 
Please see:  Kloster, K and F de Alba (2007) “El agua en la ciudad de México y el factor de 
fragmentación política” in Perfiles Latinoamericanos, num. 29, January-June 2007, pp. 137-
159. 
63 Building damns and reservoirs has been central to the achievement of water security since 
centuries back. An interesting contribution linking water security and economic development 
is Grey, D and C Sadoff (2007) Sink or Swim: Water Security for Growth and Development, in 
Water Policy, Vol 9 No 6 pp 545–571.   
64  Perhaps the most important example of this form of institutional innovation was the 
Papalopan River Basin Commission.  An interesting historical narrative of its institutional 
development process is provided by Poleman, T (1974), The Papaloapan Project: Agricultural 
Development in the Mexican Tropic, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press. Also see 
CONAGUA (2009), Semblanza Historica del Agua, Mexico DF, Mexico, CONAGUA. During 
President de la Madrid’s term (1982-1998), the first Neo-liberal regimes in Mexico, as part of 
the State retrenchment and financial austerity, the River Basin Regional Commissions were 
terminated. This policy measure was justified as part of the efforts to strengthen federalism 
and re-orient the developmental role of the State, allowing from now on the market forces to 
determine the allocation of financial resources in the territory and the ‘future’ of regions and 
territories. Scholars comment that with this situation, Mexico’ ‘golden age’ of regional 
development planning was lost.  In an interview with Dr Enrique Aguilar Amilpa, a seasoned 
civil servant that has played an important role in the development of the institutional 
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the landscape, the ecosystems and local socio-economic and cultural systems in a 
very dramatic ways.  Aboites, Birrichaga and Garay (2010), three of the most reputed 
water historians in Mexico, comment on the role of the SRH in the Mexican water 
polity:  
 
“With this range of functions and faculties, the Secretary of Water Resources 
acquired ample and direct scope of intervention over water resources 
management, and also had financial resources commensurable to its mandate 
and the objectives at its disposal. In this respect, it is important to highlight that 
for its operations, the SRH handled 10% of the federal budget. According to the 
opinion of its former directors, there was no institution in the world at that time 
that invested that level of financial resources. The impressive budgetary and 
investment capacity of the SRH responded to the growing centralisation of State 
power and weakening of the state and municipal levels’ treasury. The economic 
boom, also known as the ‘Mexican miracle’ between the 1940s and the 1970s, 
supported this favourable budgetary situation, which in turn furthered the support 
for industrialisation and the instauration of the Mexican import substitution 
development model.” (Aboites, Birrichaga and Garay, 2010:41-42) (Translation: 
mine) 
 
 
Relevantly, in term of groundwater management, the 1956 by-Law on Matters 
Concerning Groundwater was created, defining the SRH as the institution in charge 
of establishing groundwater abstraction prohibition zones to control groundwater 
abstraction (zonas de veda).  The SRH’s Groundwater Directorate was created in 
1966, and with the mandate to develop a national inventory of wells and establish 
regulations to use and protect groundwater resources (Arreguin, 1998). During the 
next two decades the SRH gradually expanded the breath of the State in matters 
concerning water resources management, water supply and sanitation and 
groundwater management across the country’s territory.   
 
During the final years of the Presidency of Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) the first 
National Water Plan (1975 NWP) (Plan Nacional Hídrico, 1975) was produced.  This 
document was very influential and defined water policy making for the next 15 years.  
In it is possible to identify different policy ideas that are worth highlighting.  At that 
time the 1975 NWP clearer reflected the orientation and identity of the 
Developmental-Interventionist Statehood formation, as it visibly stipulated the need 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
arrangements in the Mexican water polity, he shared an interesting insight on what happened 
with the river basin commissions. He commented that actually it was the State Governors of 
the states where river commissions existed who asked President de la Madrid to dissolve 
them, because they were competing with their political power and executive control over 
water resources.  
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to continue with an ambitious State-led infrastructure construction programme of 
critical water resources management & development infrastructure, such as damns 
and reservoirs, hydro-agricultural and irrigation infrastructure, and WS & S systems 
across the country. The role of the central State was clearly ‘to invest’ in modernising 
the water polity. The Plan also began to highlight the need for the creation of a 
specialised-apex institution for water resources management, the need to care for 
the environment, the need for a more integral management of water resources, the 
need to decentralise WS & S systems, the need to create an official water users’ 
interest representation system, and the need to create a robust financial system for 
water resources management and development. Very importantly, the 1975 NWP 
already alerts of the perils of groundwater management over-exploitation (Arreguin 
and Lopez, 2008), a trend that still continues and that represents one of the main 
water security challenges of the Mexican water polity. 65 
 
Under the Presidency of Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) and after the country had 
experienced important economic crises, other ideas began emerge, such as the 
need for greater rationalisation in the administration of financial resources, a need to 
reconsider the amounts of resources allocated to irrigated agriculture and a re-
orientation in priorities regarding water resources management to better support 
urbanisation and industrialisation processes.  Consequently, the SRH was abolished 
in 1976, in response to a number of concerns, including amongst the most important: 
a clear rural-agricultural bias that was no longer a priority in terms of water resources 
management, and also internal disputes between water and agricultural engineers.  
The SRH was effectively turned it into a mere Deputy Secretary of a new apex 
institution, the Secretary of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (Secretaría de 
Agricultura y Recursos Hidráulicos, SARH). Mexico’s development path and 
development model were changing fast.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 A special task force, leaded by Dr Fernando Gonzalez Villareal, produced the 1975 
National Water Plan. In an interview with him an interesting comment was made.  Actually a 
partnership between the Government of Mexico, the World Bank and the UNDP was 
established to create this task force.  From then on the influence of the World Bank in the 
definition of the State-strategiesin the Mexican water polity starts, only to gradually increase 
during the heyday of Neoliberalism in Mexico. Dr Villareal later became the first General 
Director of CONAGUA (the CNA at time), remains being a highly influential individual in the 
definition of the strategic orientations of the CONAGUA, and has also been a short-term 
consultant of the World Bank.   
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Figure-4. Rural-Urban Population growth in Mexico 
 
Source: CONAGUA, 2012 
 
According scholars (Aboites, 2004, Torregrosa, Paré, Kloster, and Vera, 2010) this 
new institutional configuration in reality manifests an important tension between 
sectorial professionals –agricultural and water engineers–, and that was won by the 
later, and to clearly make the Mexican water polity distinguish between agricultural 
development and water resources management. Accordingly, modern water 
resources management will help address the new challenges, and the State will 
transform and re-orient its attention and resources to deal with rapid urbanisation and 
industrialisation trends, and to build and modernise communication infrastructure. 
This strategic reorientation actually meant an important transformation of the State in 
terms of water resources management –and with a clearer urban bias.  
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As the period of the Desarrollo Estabilizador or the ‘Mexican Miracle’ begins to 
dwindle, mainly because of the global economic crisis in 1974-1976, the 
Developmental-Interventionist Statehood formation shows signs of weakening.  A 
massive public deficit forced the State to decrease government spending across all 
policy sectors, including water resources management and development. With this 
situation, the end of the strong Developmental-Interventionist Statehood formation 
started to loom. 66  When other external drivers started to exert important pressures –
such as the rise of Neo-liberalism–, the process of State-transformation to a new 
Neo-liberal Statehood formation began, and that will have dramatic effects over the 
country, including the water polity. 67 
 
5.4.The Process of State-transformation: The Rise and Consolidation of the 
Neoliberal Statehood Formation in the Mexican Water Sector 
 
5.4.1.The Neoliberal Statehood Formation in Mexico: A General Overview 
 
The Developmental-Interventionist Statehood formation began to weaken in the mid 
of the 1970s. As the capitalist golden age went into a crisis –at a global scale– the 
sustained growth that underpinned the Mexican State’s developmental and 
interventionist capabilities began to flounder, affecting also the rate of Mexico’s 
socio-economic development (Edwards, 1995, Hirshman, 1997). Putting it succinctly, 
this negative situation, alongside the rise of the Neo-liberal ideology –that had an 
important level of influence in Mexico–, triggered a gradual, but comprehensive 
process of Neo-liberal State-transformation. This State-transformation was 
characterised by a radically new State-project and the implementation of a number of 
State-strategies including, amongst the most relevant: a comprehensive State 
retrenchment and public spending curtailment measures –in fact austerity 
programmes–; the redefinition of the role of the State in governing –from an 
interventionist-developmental role to an enabling, regulatory and coordinating role–; 
important decentralisation and devolutionary reforms –to state and municipal levels, 
as well as to civil society–, the liberalisation and deregulation of the economy; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 In the case of the water policy sector these assertion needs to be qualified, because the 
CONAGUA’s budget has mostly steadily increased, allowing it to still support important 
investments in the water sector; an aspect that I will commented later on. 
67  Interesting readings on this determinant historical period are: Dornbusch, R and S. 
Edwards (eds) (1992), Macroeconomía del Populismo en América Latina, Mexico DF, 
Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica; Cárdenas E (1996), La Política Económica en México 
1950-1994, Mexico DF, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica; and Mancera M (2009), “Crisis 
Económicas en México: 1976-2008, in Este País, Enero, Vol. 2014, p.p. 21-30. 
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important privatisation initiatives; and a general redefinition of the relationship 
between the State and civil society –through the transition from government to 
governance (Babb, 2004, Harvey, 2005; Santiso, 2010). 
 
Some of the most relevant reasons behind this process of State-transformation 
highlighted by political economy scholars are very briefly described in the following 
paragraphs (Santiso, 2005, Gonzalez, 2008; Bertola and Ocampo, 2013). The 
massive public debt accumulated by the State during the 1970s, and resulting from 
the efforts of the Mexican State to promote the oil industry –that was booming at the 
time– and expensive State-led development processes, eventually turned into a 
severe State’s budgetary crisis, that when paired with the global economic crises 
turned the Mexican State practically insolvent (Salazar, 2004).  Initially, this State’s 
budgetary crisis impelled the State to pursue a gradual, but persistent austerity 
programme oriented at the curtailment of public expenditure across all policy sectors, 
and with very negative impacts over basic services provision and the general welfare 
and opportunities of the population (Rivera, 1986). Eventually, this overall situation 
gradually led to the well-documented implementation of a comprehensive package of 
Neo-liberal policies, promoted by the Washington consensus, and in the case of 
Mexico led by the World Bank.  As such, the economic crises of 1976, 1982, 1986, 
and 1994 and the Neo-liberal influence set then the tone for a series of austerity 
measures, Structural Adjustment Programmes and conditional lending operations 
implemented by the Mexican State since the 1980s, giving way to a bold process of 
political, institutional and economic reforms with a profound impact in the 
development path of Mexico (Edwards, 1995; Santiso, 2006; Bertola and Ocampo, 
2013) 
 
Simultaneously, as the State gradually lost its spending capacities, a noticeable 
weakening in the State’s hegemony over different sectors of the population –and 
previously developed by the dominant political party in office for 70 years, the PRI, 
through corporatist and clientelist relations across the country– began to debilitate. 
Increasingly, social demands across the country continued to be unmet by the State, 
producing an important legitimacy crisis that eventually opened up to the possibility 
for the country’s democratisation process (Stepan and Lintz, 1996, Gonzalez, 2008). 
When the developmental-interventionist presence of the State diminished, the 
political control over important organised social groups started to weaken.  Also, 
state Governors, when confronted with less support from the central State, began to 
loose the ‘centralist discipline’, and became more political active and contentious, 
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rallying a broad social support for ‘systemic political change (i.e. in the form of the 
New Federalism and a broad push for a democratic transition form 70 years of one-
party rule).  This was the case of Mr Vicente Fox, the Governor of the State of 
Guanajuato, that contended for presidential elections in 2000.  Several years later, 
Mexico’s democratisation process peaked with the beginning of the enduring 
Mexican democratic transition that manifested electorally with the National Action 
Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) taking office in 2000 and until 2012.  The PAN, 
a right wing and technocratic party, continued to broadly support the Neo-liberal 
Statehood project for next 12 years. 68 
 
It is not possible in the context of this document to refer extensively to the impacts of 
the Neoliberal Statehood project in Mexico, but only to say a few synthetic 
comments, that help to depict a general trend and prepare the ground for a more in-
detail review of the Neoliberal Statehood strategies in the water sector. Throughout 
Mexico’s history, income distribution has been mostly regressive, but throughout the 
Neoliberal Statehood formation, income distribution has been increasingly 
regressive.  J. R. Jiménez (1995) reviewing the income distribution situation in 
Mexico in 1995 –after approximately 10 years of Neoliberalism– calculated that 60% 
of the income generated in the country during the last decade was absorbed by 10% 
of the Mexican population, and conversely 10% of the income generated was 
received by 60% of the Mexican population.  The 1995 edition of the Forbes 
magazine highlighted the curious and recent presence of 24 Mexicans in the list of 
the top 350 millionaires in the world; one of them more recently becoming the richest 
man on earth.  
 
In terms of the job market, the severe Neo-liberal austerity and contractionary 
measures implement produced a virtual vertical plumb of the job market, and so 
studies suggest that from 1983 to 1995, the job market only generated 1.9 million of 
formal labour posts.  During the same years, the Mexican Centre for Economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Mexico democratic transition and economic liberalisation go hand in hand, a phenomenon 
termed “dual transition”, where economic reforms actually reinforce political reforms and vice-
versa.  For an interesting reading on this perspective please see: Gonzalez, F. (2008), Dual 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Insitutionalised Regimes in Chile and Mexico, 1970-2000, 
Baltmore, USA, John Hopkings University Press. In an interview with Dr Gonzalez focusing in 
the process of Neo-liberal reform in Mexico, he talked about an interesting quality of the 
Mexican polity system that expands into the water polity, a strong type of ‘institutionalised 
authoritarian rule’ that penetrates across all policy sectors and that on one side manages to 
support the implementation of hierarchical and centralist State-strategies, that may not result 
in effective policy outcomes, but that it is carried in a disciplined manner, and deters the 
implementation of other types of governing strategies based on enabling socio-political 
governance arrangements that are build on social participation and stakeholder cooperation.  
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Analysis and Forecasting (Centro de Análisis y Proyecciones Económicas de 
México) (1995) estimated that almost 12.5 million joined the informal economy.  A 
similar study by Banamex (Banco Nacional de Mexico, Banamex) (1995) concluded 
that only 1 in 10 labour posts had been generated by the formal labour market.  
 
In the same year a government poverty index study underlined that 40% of the 
Mexican population lived in poverty and extreme poverty conditions, of which rural 
populations represented 70%. In the rural sector the percentage of child 
undernourishment (from 1 to 4 years of age) increased from being of 7.7 (1979) to 
15.1 in 1989.  In terms of the per capita social spending, it declined 6% in real terms 
from 1984 to 1995. In terms of per capita health spending, it felt from 3.9 (1979) to 
3.3 (1995).  Meanwhile, Mexico external debt commitments –that had (and have) to 
be regularly met– turned from US$84,800 (1985) to US$165,755 (1997), something 
that implies a 95.4% increase in the period. In more general terms, the predicted 
economic growth did not really consolidate, as the GDP only increased 1.7% in 
annual terms from 1983 to 1997. Agricultural production only grew in 1% in the same 
period and the massive migration of Mexican peasants to the United States 
commenced. I will now turn to the characteristics of the Neoliberal Statehood 
Formation in the Mexican water polity.  
 
5.4.2. The Neoliberal Statehood Formation and the Mexican Water Polity: A 
More Detailed Overview 
 
This next section will take the reader through the convoluted process of Neo-liberal 
State-transformation in the Mexican water polity, involving the implementation of a 
range of State-strategies attempting to stabilise the Neoliberal Statehood project in 
Mexico. The Neo-liberal Statehood project in the water sector sought to gradually 
and deeply transform the role and structure of the State, as well as different types of 
socio-political relationships, including:  the intergovernmental relationships (i.e. the 
relationships between the central State, and the state- and local-level authorities), 
the relationship between the State and civil society –including the private sector and 
other social actors (i.e. water users and other stakeholders), and the relationship 
between the State and international organisations (e.g. the World Bank, the IADB 
and the IFC).  An important rationale –or justification– behind this Neoliberal State 
project was the central consideration regarding the need to redefine the role and size 
of the State in the process of water resources management, and thus also the 
inherent need to redefine the role of civil society and the market forces in such 
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process. This process is convoluted, as mentioned above, for many reasons, most 
importantly amongst them the difficulties in establishing and stabilising this State 
project, and the number of drawbacks and contradictions its strategies manifests.  
 
Some of the most important and consequential State-strategies were the deployment 
of the IWRM paradigm, and in attempt to influence discourse and policy; the creation 
of an water apex-authority and new National Water Plan process, the 
decentralisation/devolution of WS & S service provision to the local level; the 
opening-up of to private sector involvement in WS & S service provision; the 
decentralisation/devolution of irrigated districts to water user associations; the 
establishment of a complex property rights system, and the establishment of MSPs 
for water resources management (at the river-basin, micro-basin and aquifer level).  
Since their inception in the Mexican water polity each of these State-strategieshave 
‘struggled’ to stabilise, a situation that has generated important policy drawbacks that 
I will attempt to succinctly describe during the next sections of this chapter.  These 
drawbacks somehow manifests outright contradictions in the nature of the Neoliberal 
Statehood project in the Mexican water polity.69  The following sections elaborate 
briefly on the aforementioned State-strategies to help recreate the historical-
institutional context and to support the argumentation of the thesis. More detail we 
devoted to describe the State-strategy related to the establishment of the MSPs for 
water resources management, a central concern of this doctoral research.70 
 
5.4.2.1. The Establishment and Re-organisation of CONAGUA’s Institutional 
Arrangements and the National Water Planning Process 
 
In this section I will describe and comment the following central State-strategies: the 
consolidation of a specialised apex-authority and the territorial-administrative 
reorganisation of the water polity; the development of new National Water 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 In informal interviews with the current Deputy Director of Planning, Mr Emiliano Rodriguez, 
a senior external consultant of the CONAGUA, Jose Eduadro Mestre, and the General 
Manager for Water Policy, Dr. Judith Dominguez, it is interesting to acknowledge that actually 
the present CONAGUA’s administration is considering implementing a range of ‘policy 
reversals’ to address the drawbacks caused by the Neoliberal State-strategies. Some of 
these policy reversals if managed to materialise may represent an interesting opportunity for 
progressive reforms.  Still the three of them highlighted that unfortunately the Mexican water 
polity presents a number of very strong path-dependencies that would require an enormous 
‘political will’ and social consensus to break. One idea is even to foster a new form of ‘socio-
political pact’ for sustainable water resources management. More on this idea of a social pact 
will be developed in the final chapter of the thesis.  
70 It is important to establish that the exposition of the State-strategies does not obey a strict 
chronological order, so I go back and forth in a span of time of approximately 15 years. Still, I 
make efforts to support the reader in locating himself/herself in through this historical process.  
	   184 
Programme process; and the enactment of the 1992 National Water Law (1992 
NWL).71 
 
• The Consolidation of an Apex-Authority in the Water Sector, the Influence of 
IWRM as a policy paradigm, and the Territorial Administrative Re-organisation of the 
Water Polity  
 
Possibly one most consequential actions in terms of water resources management 
during President Carlos Salinas’ term (1988-1994, the second Neo-liberal regime in 
Mexico) was the consolidation of authority in the water sector through the 
establishment in 1989 of the National Water Commission (Comisión Nacional del 
Agua, CNA –with that acronym at that time, and with a current acronym of 
CONAGUA) (Torregrosa, et al, 2010).  The establishment of the CNA was greatly 
influenced by a group of civil engineers and water resources planners –the 
“hydrocracy” using J. Wester’s (2013) term. This influential hydrocracy participated 
together in the 1975 National Water Plan Commission (Comisión del Plan Nacional 
Hidraúlico). 72   The CNA became the apex-government entity entrusted with water 
resources management & development throughout the country, and with the very 
ambitious task of transforming the water polity through the implementation of a broad 
range of Neo-liberal reforms.  Initially, the CNA was under the remit of the SARH. 
Very importantly, during President Salinas’ term in 1992 a new National Water Law 
(1992 NWL)(Ley de Aguas Nacionales de 1992) was issued, establishing a new 
range of water policy principles avowed by international organisations and lending 
institutions –including the World Bank and the IADB– and comprised some 
fundamental paradigms and ideas, indicating the transformation that needed to be 
undertaken.  
 
During President Ernesto Zedillo’s term (1994-2000), the CNA in 1994 was shifted to 
become a de-concentrated government body under the recently created Secretary of 
the Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries (Secretaría de Medio Ambiente, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 I am grateful for the important orientation I received to develop the arguments in section 
from Mr Fernado Gonzalez, former General Director of CONAGUA, Mr César Herrera, former 
Deputy Director of Planning and Programming of CONAGUA; Mr. Juan Carlos Valencia, 
former Manager for Planning and Programming of CONAGUA, and Mr. Eduardo Mestre, 
senior consultant, amongst other experts. 
72 This hydrocracy was comprised of very important and influential individuals in the public 
administration, as they had ‘connections’ within State-apparatus, but also with the most 
important engineering and construction companies, consultancies, the academy, and very 
relevantly with water professionals at the World Bank and the IADB. In reality, they 
represented an important ‘advocacy coalition” with tremendous influence over the water 
polity.  
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Recursos Naturales y Pesca, SEMARNAP). 73  The official discourse manifested that 
this action corresponded to an attempt to break the agricultural orientation of the 
CNA and embed the water sector in the institutional arrangements entrusted with the 
task of environmental protection and sustainable development planning, again 
following the IWRM paradigm.  Scholars like Jimenez (1997) consider that this move 
was highly rhetorical being that the CNA absorbs an overall 70% of the budget 
allocated to the SEMARNAT, the political figure of the General Director of CNA, 
against that of the Secretary of SEMARNAT, clearly carries greater political clout, 
and the CONAGUA hardly can be considered a ‘green’ institution.  
 
Immediately after this important shift in the high-politics of the water polity, CNA 
embarked on an ambitious process of administrative territorial re-organisation and 
de-concentration process that lasted from 1995-1998, and that implied the 
regrouping of the country’s territory in new Hydrological Administrative Regions 
(HARs) (Regiones Hidrológico-Administrativas). This re-organisation produced 13 
HARs, each HAR had its own office. Some years later 26 River Basin Councils 
(RBCs) were established as MSPs for water resources management, one in each 
HAR (and some HARs had more than one RBC due their size).  According to 
Carabias and Landa (2005), this new regionalisation of the HARs and its RBCs 
obeyed mostly to pragmatic political and institutional considerations, rather than truly 
to water resources management criteria; a situation that later created important 
drawbacks in the attempts to manage water ‘at a river basin level’.74 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  President Salinas’ government succeeded in controlling inflation, seemingly achieving a 
certain degree of economic and financial stability, but when President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-
2000) took office, instead of going through the expected continuation of Salinas’ macro-
economic policies, Mexico was hurled into the worst crisis in history: known as “el tequilazo”. 
This crisis was fundamentally instigated by alarmingly low amounts of foreign reserves and a 
high degree of vulnerability brought about by the withdrawal of foreign investment within a 
short period of time and treasury bonds guaranteed in dollars, destroying overnight the 
country’s macro-economic stability and threatening Mexico’s economic future over the short 
and medium haul (Rodriguez, 1999:98). Consequently, President Zedillo’s term started with 
the country facing great financial challenges, a situation that had a clear impact over policy 
sectors, including the water polity, and mainly through the impact of austerity measures and 
State retrenchment (Aboites, Birrichaga and Garay, 2010).  
74 In an interview with Dr Julia Carabias, former Secretary of State for the Environment and 
Natural Resources, one important comment made is that actually some political forces were 
pushing for the establishment of a ‘super-Secretary’ that could manage natural resources and 
water together, and with the idea of more forcefully integrating the a a sustainable 
development agenda with water resources management. Unfortunately, the battle was lost in 
favour of the creation of water institution with a strong vocation towards building 
infrastructure.  
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• The Modern National Water Planning Processes 
 
In 1995 the Deputy Director General’s Office for Planning and Programming of the 
CNA embarked in the development of state and regional water resources and 
institutional diagnoses, applied to each of the states and the 13 HARs. These offices 
had as one of their central tasks the integration of more reliable hydrological and 
socio-economic information for decision-making.  Later, with this information each 
CONAGUA’s State Office, the HAR’s Offices, andthe CNA embarked in the 
production of the first State and Regional Water Programmes (Programas 
Hidraúlicos Estatales y Regionales). These programmes were the first regional 
programming and planning instruments, orienting strategic actions, institutional 
development, capital investments and other capacity-building initiatives in the 
country. To support this purpose, each of the HARs was provided with a Deputy 
Planning Department in charge of coordinating the production of these documents, 
which took into consideration a number of priority objectives and strategic pathways 
to achieve the sustainable management of water resources.  
 
The Programmes included the preparation of water availability scenarios and water 
demand predictions by region and with projections to the year 2020. These 
Programmes were integrated by incorporating information, concerns and proposals 
put forward during participatory planning workshops organised in coordination with 
the RBCs. This participatory exercise was the first of its kind in the Mexican water 
polity and was carried out in coordination with the RBCs, where a process of 
discussion between stakeholders took place. Later with this information the CNA 
produced in 2000 (with the outset of a new administration, under President Vicente 
Fox 2000-2006) the new National Water Programme 2000-2006 that also followed a 
‘participatory approach’. 
 
• The 2004 National Water Law and the new National Water Programme 2001-2006 
 
In 2000 Vicente Fox Quesada became president of Mexico, putting an end to one-
party rule of the PRI and giving way to the much-expected democratic transition. The 
new 2000-2006 National Water Programme establishes that water is “strategic 
resource and a matter of national security”, that the basic unit for water resources 
management is the river basin, that water resources management should be 
integrated and that decisions should be taken with the participation of stakeholders 
(CONAGUA; 2001: 83-84). Regarding IWRM the plan clary stipulates a shift in the 
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paradigm from a supply driven approach towards a water demand management 
approach: 
 
“It is necessary to modify the current approach oriented at satisfying the demand 
of water resources by increasing water availability through hydraulic massive 
infrastructure, to another one based on water demand management strategies, 
using water more efficiently, recuperating water losses, and implementing water 
re-use.  It is necessary to consolidate the integral management of surface and 
groundwater resources, in quantity and quality, and all its uses and management 
at the level of river basin.  It is also necessary to plan, develop and manage 
water resources and adopt the necessary criteria to harmonise the national 
objectives of efficiency and equity in the use of water resources and for the 
welfare of all the Mexicans.”  (CNA, 2001: 87-88) 
 
 
Under the new 2004 NWL, the CONAGUA was maintained as a de-concentrated 
institution of the SEMARNAT, but with a wider representation of other policy sectors 
in its Technical Committee, its highest decision making body, and in order to support 
greater inter-institutional coordination. 75  Very importantly, in terms of the territorial 
administrative re-organisation, the 2004 NWL established that the CONAGUA’s 
HAR’s Offices would turn into 13 River Basin Organisations (RBOs), as technically 
autonomous, administrative and legal decision-making units ascribed to the Director 
General of the CONAGUA. These RBOs would be also financially dependent on 
CONAGUA.  Every RBO had at the centre of its decision-making an RBCs.76  The 
RBOs main tasks are to coordinate the implementation of national level water policy 
and to administer water resources according to the rule of law and national water 
policy principles. Regardless of the official discourse and a relative autonomy over 
certain decisions, the financial and political dependency of the RBOs is absolute, 
making them institutions that are very much subject to the centralisation ethos of the  
Mexican water polity (Meza, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 The CNA changed its acronym to CONAGUA in this term. 
76 The 13 HARs are: I Baja California Peninsula, II Northwest, III Northern Pacific, IV Balsas, 
V Southern Pacific, VI Rio Bravo, VII Central Basins of the North, VIII Lerma-Santiago-Pacific, 
IX Northern Gulf, X Central Gulf, XI Southern Border, XII Yucatan Peninsula, XIII Waters of 
the Valley of Mexico. 
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Figure-5: HARs in the Mexican water polity  
Water Stress, GDP and Population Ratios 
Source: CONAGUA, 2012 
 
• Commentary on Drawbacks and Contradictions 
 
There are several important drawbacks and contradictions in the institutional 
arrangements and planning process of the CONAGUA. A central concern has to do 
with the limited decentralisation of the RBOs. The ‘theory’ behind establishing RBOs 
is to support the implementation of decentralisation processes and the subsidiarity 
principle; which implies that water resources management decisions should be taken 
and implemented at the river basin level and by local stakeholders.  In the case of 
the Mexican water polity, what we find is more a de-concentration move, rather than 
a decentralisation process.  As such, presently, the RBOs are mere representations 
of the central State, depending politically and financially from the CONAGUA. 
Despite several political forces have pushed for greater decentralisation, the 
centralisation of the Mexican Water polity, so strongly entrenched during the 
Developmental-Interventionist Statehood formation has generated an important path-
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dependency that is difficult to reverse. The weakness of the RBOs also derives from 
the weakness of their own RBCs.  The RBCs suffer from a number of institutional 
design problems that prevent them from being authentic MSPs for water resources 
management, including a lack of authentic stakeholder participation, an aspect I will 
review in more detail later in this chapter.  	  
 
Also the present CONAGUA’s territorial institutional arrangements give ‘de facto’ 
more political clout to CONAGUA’s State-level Offices, as they are closer to the State 
Governors, and so together both authorities frequently by-pass the RBOs in 
important decisions that affect the river basin. The perception amongst civil servants 
and practitioners is that State-Directors are “definitely” more powerful than RBO’s 
Directors. 77  This situation manifests yet another important path-dependency related 
to the federalisation of authority in the Mexican water polity. During years of the 
Developmental-Interventionist State-hood formation great efforts were undertaken to 
develop a State apparatus in each of the 31 states, and so decades later these 
institutional arrangements are difficult to change in order to follow the river-basin 
level planning rationale.78  
 
In fact the administrative re-organisation in HARs and RBOs is not really operational 
and effective, making the implementation of IWRM highly problematic also. In my 
opinion the problem lies also in the political culture the Mexican political system, 
where State Governors and other Federal Institutions are not really prepared to work 
at the river basin level, nor ready to accept water resources management as a 
crosscutting and transboundary policy priority.  In order for IWRM to really work and 
support a more sustainable development path for Mexico, the HAR’s and the RBOs 
should be at the centre of development planning processes, and other State 
institutions –of other policy sectors– should attempt to do their planning and 
management processes through the HARs.  This political culture or ‘silo effect’ also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 In informal conversations with several civil servants at the Deputy-Direction for Planning 
from the CONAGUA and also with RBOs directors, they mostly concur that water resources 
and management processes respond more to the State level, rather than more authentically 
to the river basin level.    
78 I wish to highlight that presently CONAGUA is having discussions whether to abolish the 
State level offices or not. This action will correspond to a decision either to further support the 
decentralisation of water resources management to the RBOs or to support more the re-
centralisation, in which case the State-level Offices are more useful. Indeed it has been 
extremely surprising to acknowledge that in Mexico there is an on-gong debate whether to 
decentralised or re-centralise, a situation that is creating grave concerns amongst more 
critical and progressive forces.  	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generates an important path-dependency that disables inter-institutional coordination 
and the development of MSPs for water resources management and development 
planning.  
 
Another important drawback has to do with the National Water Planning process. 
The participatory planning process is hurried and lacks the appropriate procedural 
design features to convey it with the necessary principles and safeguards to be a 
truly inclusive and influential participatory process.  Because of this reason, the 
National Water Programmes are interesting documents, but that are not necessarily 
truly legitimate and only represent the government’s vision.  Consequentially, most of 
the times, the Programmes are not really planning instruments as they do not really 
enable collective action, nor represent an authentic instrument to support socio-
political governance process.  In words of high-level civil servant participating in the 
planning process: “The National Water Programmes remain ‘discursive’ documents 
to be put on the shelf after their official presentation”. Scholars like Vera (2005) that 
have studied the national water planning process, have concluded that this 
participatory process attempted by CNA are weak and showed important limitations.  
According to him, what generally happened during the participatory planning 
workshops was that they were mostly attended by government officials and with very 
scant participation of the actual water users and other stakeholders. 	  
 
 
5.4.2.2. Decentralisation and Municipalisation of Water and Sanitation Services 
 
Previous to 1983 water supply and sanitation services (WS & S services) were 
operated by Federal Water Boards and under the jurisdiction of the SRH, this 
situation was a result of the consolidation of the centralisation and federalisation 
State-strategies pursued by the Developmental-Interventionist Statehood formation.  
By 1973, the SRH operated over 1300 WS & S systems across the country’s territory 
and was entrusted with the responsibility of investing in WS & S infrastructure 
development and maintenance throughout all regions (Pineda and Salazar, 2008).  
By 1976, a new Secretary of Human Settlements and Public Works (Secretaría de 
Asentamientos Humanos y Obras Públicas, SAHOP) was established to address the 
increasing and complex challenges of a rapidly urbanising country, and was 
entrusted with the task of basic services provision, including WS & S.  The SRH 
remained entrusted with water resources management and all mayor hydraulic 
infrastructure construction, such as dams, reservoirs and irrigation infrastructure 
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(Gonzalez Reynoso, 2005).79  The decentralisation of responsibilities for water and 
sanitation service provision in Mexico took place in two stages and following to 
slightly different strategic rationales.  Generally speaking, scholars and researchers 
of this phenomenon refer to them as the decentralisation and municipalisation stages 
(Rodriguz, 2004). 80 
 
• The Decentralisation Stage  
 
In 1980 by a Presidential Decree of President Jose Lopez Portillo, the SAHOP was 
instructed to devolve the responsibility of WS & S services to the state-level 
governments and to local authorities, and with this move, this first decentralisation 
strategy started; and notwithstanding the resistance of state-level and local 
authorities who felt that they did not have the means nor the capacities to accept this 
important responsibility.  Accordingly, the responsibility for WS & S services was to 
be allocated to newly to be created and specialised water and sanitation utilities 
(organismos operadores de agua y saneamiento, OO).  Furthermore, this decree 
restricted the central State from any form of direct intervention in the management of 
WS & S utilities; established general policy orientations regarding their 
responsibilities and financial autonomy; and established financial incentives for state-
level and municipal investments in the WS & S systems through a scheme of federal 
reimbursements against direct local investments.  
 
Under the aegis of this Decree a total of 1,161 water and sanitation systems were 
devolved to state-level and local authorities. At the state-level the initial and general 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  In the water sector –and more specifically in the water and sanitation sub-sector– it is 
important to establish the since 1917, water supply and sanitation services were provided by 
local authorities.  As the WS & S challenges became larger with rapid urbanisation and 
industrialisation processes, the central State had to intervene –as has been the case 
throughout history– to support the local authorities in this strategic task. In 1948, urban water 
and sanitation service provision systems began to be managed centrally under the SRH, until 
those responsibilities were placed in the Ministry for Human Settlements and Public Works 
(SAHOP), and then in 1983 in the Ministry of Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE). 
When the SEDUE was established (1982), it became evident that the highly centralised 
model had created some important problems due to this highly centralised form of managing 
water and sanitation services in cities across the territory. This situation, apart from the 
Neoliberal ideas regarding decentralisation, prompted the devolution of water and sanitation 
services to State and local authorities.  
80 The arguments presented under this section benefited from the orientation and comments 
provided by Mr. Roberto Olivares, Executive Director of the National Association of Water and 
Sanitation Utilities in Mexico; Emiliano Rodriguez, Deputy Director of Planning of CONAGUA, 
and former Director of the Querétaro State Water Commission (CEA), Mr Ricardo Sandoval, 
former Director of the Guanajuato State Water Commission (CEAG), amongst other experts.  	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reaction was to ‘dodge’ the responsibility for WS & S service provision and so states 
pushed hard for local authorities to take on the responsibility.81  Only in very rare 
cases, the state-level governments decided to establish state-level water 
commissions entrusted with the responsibility of providing WS & S services 
throughout the state’s territories. 82  The result was not surprising. The performance 
of the water and sanitation utilities across the territory was highly uneven and in most 
of the cases extremely poor.  According to Briceño (2004) in 1983 only 100 
municipalities –out of 2,200– had the capacity to sustain water and sanitation utilities 
in an autonomous manner without the intervention of the central State. These 
municipalities were the ones serving state capitals and some of the large cities 
across the country.  It was ‘common knowledge’ that for most municipalities water 
and sanitation utilities represented a financial burden and that the room for 
improvement was extremely narrow under the conditions imposed by the 1980 
Presidential Decree.  
 
• The Municipalisation Stage  
 
In 1983 under the context of the new presidential regime of President Miguel de la 
Madrid –the first full-fledge neoliberal regime in Mexico– important legal reforms 
were undertaken to further decentralise the WS & S to the municipal level. This 
action corresponds to the municipalisation stage and with the aim to clearly establish 
–notwithstanding the clear drawbacks– the municipal level as the favoured level for 
the organisation of WS & S systems. President de la Madrid pursued a general 
decentralisation and municipalisation process throughout the State apparatus with an 
encompassing legal reform of Article 115 of the Constitution, ‘aimed’ at strengthening 
the municipal treasury, supporting municipal autonomy and clarifying 
intergovernmental relations –seeking to establish the role of the central (Neo-liberal) 
State as policy designer, coordinator and regulator (Edwards, 1995, Olivares, 2008).  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 This situation highlights Polutanzas’s consideration that the State is not an homogenous 
entity, but that is actually can be better described as “a strategic field” comprised of different 
nodes that respond and react to actions and initiatives of different nodes. In this case the 
central State sought to impose a decentralising strategy that was not readily accepted by 
State-level and local governments that felt not only unprepared, but also were accustomed to 
things being resolved at a central level.  
82 It is relevant to mention that for many scholars and practitioners the most efficient spatial-
territorial level of organisation for water supply and sanitation utilities is the State-level water 
and for a number of political, technical, organisational and financial reasons.   
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• A Further Municipalisation Push and the Corporatisation  
 
With the arrival of President Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) –the most influential and 
consequential Neoliberal in the history of Mexico– the National Water Commission 
(CNA) was created in 1989. This strategic-selectivity, as mentioned before, had a 
number of important objectives. One of these objectives was to implement in the WS 
& S the New Public Management Reforms (NPM reforms) –such as corporatisation 
of water and sanitation utilities–, and to open the sector to private sector 
involvement.  In terms of the new corporatisation reforms the following policy 
measures were recommended and implemented throughout a large number of water 
and sanitation utilities across the country: the strengthening of the organisational and 
financial autonomy of the water utilities, the establishment of executive directors 
nominated by representative and ‘democratic’ governing boards –with representation 
of interests groups and citizens, and entrusted with the oversight of the utility’s 
performance–, and the financial sustainability of the entity through full cost-recovery 
and the adjustment of realistic tariff settings.  The CNA encouraged state-level 
governments to consolidate the decentralisation process, the full financial autonomy 
of municipal water and sanitation utilities –effectively decoupling them from state-
level financial support–, the establishment of a controversial ‘service suspension or 
reduction’ clause in service contracts, the stipulation of clear tariffs for different 
services and customers, the commitment to allocate the revenue from tariffs back to 
the respective water and sanitation utilities, and the provision for soft-State credits for 
those debtors willing to cover their debts for WS & S services, including State 
institutions. 83 
 
By 2006 the policy reforms implemented by the CONAGUA, under the support of the 
World Bank and the IADB, achieved meagre results in terms of three crucial aspects, 
embedding the corporatisation ethos in utilities –specially in matters concerning 
organisational autonomy (that is the decoupling of utilities from discretionary political 
decision-making on behalf of Municipal Presidents), achieving the financial autonomy 
of the utility through cost-recovery (because there is a strong culture of ‘no-payment’ 
across the territory and tariffs do not cover the cost of operations), and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83  To support these measures the Conagua entered into important ‘conditional lending 
operations with the World Bank and the IADB, and designed and implemented the National 
Programme for Drinking Water and Sanitation (Agua Potable, Alcantarillado y Saneamiento 
en Zonas Urbanas, APAZU). The technical loan entered into with the World Bank and the 
IADB amounted US$300 million and US$200 million, respectively.  In 1994 the APAZU was 
replenished with another World Bank Loan of US$350 million. 
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establishment of ‘service suspension or reduction’ clause (because it is a highly 
political cost-full measure).  Alcantara and Palma (1996) confirm that in 2006 only 17 
of the 31 states had really committed to the reform and promulgated the 
corresponding legal reforms to support this transition.  From then on, it is possible to 
see a very heterogeneous modernisation process of water supply and sanitation 
utilities. In some instances it is possible to find some examples of ‘world class’ 
utilities in some important cities of the country –and most of them following a mixed 
ownership structure, with some form of private sector involvement through 
performance based contracting and BOT schemes, but also with strong State 
involvement.  There are some other utilities with a mediocre performance –according 
to international benchmarking standards– and a great number of utilities in small and 
mid-size settlements that are practically struggling every day to provide services to 
their respective populations. The recent financial crisis has negatively affected even 
more this already critical scenario.  The poor are at the greatest loss.  
 
In 2007, during President Felipe Calderon’s term yet another technical loan, the 
Programme for Meliorating the Performance of Water and Sanitation Utilities 
(Programa de Mejoramiento de Eficiencias de Organismos Operadores, PATME) 
was organised with the support of the World Bank and this time to address the critical 
situation suffered by the majority of WS & S utilities in the country. In this case the 
loan contract surmounts to US$100 million.  The loan has the objective of improving 
several aspects in the operation of water and sanitation utilities, including technical, 
managerial, governance and legal aspects, amongst other critical areas.  
 
• Commentary on the Drawbacks and Contradictions 
 
The water and sanitation services decentralisation and municipalisation process has 
been highly criticised by scholars and professionals (Barkin et al., 2006; Sandoval, 
2006, Aboites, Cifuentes, Jimenez and Torregrosa, 2008). This process took place 
without any preparation and with little support for states and municipalities. Also no 
clear guidelines or policy principles were initially clearly established, creating a 
complete confusion and disarray amongst municipalities. Another important critique 
of this situation was that although responsibilities were transferred, other policies 
contravened these decentralisation trends. Furthermore, no immediate technical 
support or capacity-building assistance was granted to the municipalities, a situation 
that only generated a sharp decline in the quality of water and sanitation service 
provision and gave rise to the long-standing process of financial and performance 
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crises of water and sanitation utilities across the country. Pineda and Salazar (2008) 
describe the general situation:  
 
“ In retrospective we can consider that the municipalisation of WS & S reform 
of President de la Madrid was overly ambitious and ample, and its objectives 
vague and rhetoric.  In particular the case of WS & S, the objectives were also 
paradoxical, because the appeared to convey new responsibilities at the 
municipal level, but without providing the necessary resources for this 
institutions to adapt and thus make the process more viable. The 
municipalisation of WS & S was an utter failure, from the point of view of the 
objectives foreseen and the congruency and pertinence of its content, 
presupposing a local capacity that every one knew was not existent.  In the 
end, in the place were the WS & S were municipalised, perhaps due to the 
financial crises of the State, the services tended to deteriorate and become 
even more inefficient.” (Pineda and Santos, 2008: 62; Translation: Mine)  
 
After two decades of State-transformation in the WS & S sector, in 2012 water supply 
and sanitation coverage in the country surmounted to 92% and 90%, respectively. 
Despite this apparent success, almost 9 million Mexicans do not have access to safe 
drinking water, and almost 11 million to sanitation.  These numbers also hide an 
important urban bias, because in reality, the rural water supply and sanitation 
coverage is of 80% and 70%, respectively, a very low coverage for a country such as 
Mexico. Also, these numbers hide the fact that the coverage in poor peri-urban areas 
of most medium and emerging cities does not really increase year by year, and so 
the progress reported in the optimistic percentages only reflects the cumulative 
increase in water supply and sanitation services in formal and new urbanisations.  It 
is possible to say, that in Mexico there is a strong bias against the poorest 
populations inhabiting informal peri-urban areas of difficult access in hillsides and 
ravines.  Also, the current (2012) non-accounted for water average in the country 
represents between 30-50% of produced water, a very high percentage indeed, 
specially in certain areas with grave water stress.  Although drinking water supply is 
officially chlorinated, the quality of drinking water is not reliable, forcing every 
household in the country to boil or filter water for daily consumption.  Very 
dramatically, water treatment services –that are also mostly the responsibility of 
municipal water and sanitation utilities– surmounts only to 47%, which means that 
served water represents an important source of pollution and an important factor of 
health and environmental risk. As is the case elsewhere, the poor are the more 
vulnerable to this risk.  
 
	   196 
Most importantly, no regulatory entity was created, and so CONAGUA plays the role 
of policy designer, implementing agency, and monitoring and evaluation, an 
important contradiction, according to international best-practice. Centralised decision 
making in the water supply and sanitation sector is highly discretionary, and there is 
no clear system for the allocation of financial support to WS & S utilities. Everybody 
seems to pretend that financial self-sufficiency is something that is achievable, when 
it is clearly not for the great majority of WS & S utilities.  Tariffs are not really 
functional mechanisms for cost-recovery, because they are extremely political, and 
so the sector remains in an important impasse that requires a new generation of 
reforms.  
 
5.4.2.3. Private Sector Involvement in the Mexican WS & S Sector  
 
Private participation in the provision of water supply and sanitation services in 
Mexico starts at the end of the 1989s, during the mandate of President Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari, and as part of the comprehensive Neoliberal Statehood strategies 
implemented in the water sector in Mexico. The rationale behind it was to reduce 
public expenditure in the provision of WS & S services and also to bring the financial 
and technical capacities of the private sector.  Private sector participation in Mexico 
has had different forms of involvement in maters concerning WS & S services, but 
more so in the form of partial and total management contracts and ‘Build Operate 
and Transfer’ schemes (BOTs) for the construction of municipal water treatment 
plants. 84 
 
In terms of the integral management of WS & S systems there are to date 3 relevant 
cases of private sector involvement, of which two are total concessions (the cities of 
Aguascalientes and Cancun) and one is a partial service contract (Mexico City). In 
each of this cases, the private company has in its charge the integral management of 
the system, including fee recollection, infrastructure rehabilitation and maintenance, 
and infrastructure expansion.  The private companies also have the responsibility to 
increase the overall performance efficiency of the WS & S systems. In all cases the 
contracts have stipulated partnerships between Mexican and foreign specialised 
companies. In respect to private sector involvement in the partial management of 
systems through service contracts the most relevant cases are the Federal District 
and Puebla.  The first one picked a service provision model with a gradual level of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 This section also benefited from the orientation and comments made in interviews with Mr. 
Emiliano Rodríguez, and also with Mr Hugo Contreras former Commercial Director for Bal-
Ondeo, amongst other experts.  
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involvement in stages and with the responsibility shared between 4 private 
enterprises selected through an international bidding competition. In the case of 
Puebla, a service provision contract was chosen and only includes actions related to 
the commercial services such as billing, metering and fee-collection.  
 
In most of the cases the private sector was brought in under already challenging 
situations regarding WS & S service provision.  Local authorities, influenced by the 
‘paradigm in vogue’ considered that by bringing private sector involvement it would 
be easier to access the much warranted financial resources and technical expertise 
required to improve the service provision.  In all cases this assumption was 
misleading, and in all the cases contracts had to re-negotiated several times, and the 
State had to intervene with ‘financial bail-outs’ to keep the services running and to 
avoid longer conflicts with the service providers.  After more than two decades of the 
pursuit of private sector involvement in WS & S services, it is clear that the impetus 
for this alternative declined.  Only in terms of water treatment services, the idea 
persists, but this is not the case for complete service delivery (i.e. water production 
and distribution).  
 
• Commentary on the Drawbacks and Contradictions 
 
Generally speaking it is considered that private sector involvement did not truly bring 
in the necessary financial resources required to better the services as expected, and 
thus the perceived advantages of private sector involvement did not really 
materialise.  Overall the contracts entered into in Mexico only proved beneficial in the 
commercial areas, and not that much in term of infrastructure expansion and 
expensive maintenance services.  Another explanation for the dwindling pursuit of 
private sector involvement is alt the international trends in the sector.  Globally, for 
some time now, private sector involvement in the WS & S sector in Latin America 
has declined considerably. But scholars point out to more systemic problems, that 
affect not only private sector involvement, but the general performance of WS & S 
utilities in the country.  The absence of a specific and comprehensive WS & S policy 
is definitely one of the most pressing hindering factors. It is odd, but it is true that the 
CONAGUA has not produced clear policy guidelines for the sector, and thus policy 
measures, programmes and subsidies do not provide certainty regarding the future 
of WS & S sector in the country.  
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Furthermore, in Mexico the normative and institutional framework does not generate 
the right incentives.  Generally speaking there is no clarity between rights and 
obligations of the WS & S utilities, nor of the water users.  I wish to recall, that in 
Mexico there is no overall national regulatory agency, a situation that as already 
mentioned is extremely paradoxical. Also the lack of official benchmarking does not 
allow for peer and social pressure to support change.  Finally, the incompatibility of 
time horizons between the local authority’s administrative terms (3 years only) and 
the long term planning horizon required by the WS & S utilities creates important 
long-term planning and coordination problems.  The CONAGUA –again following a 
centralist ethos– does not allow for the establishment of local or state level 
regulations systems, and so the only way to regulate the behaviour of the private 
sector is through contracts, not competition, not economic regulation.  This situation 
is highly ineffective, not to say contradictory.  Establishing in the contract all premises 
for future contingencies is impossible and so contracts tend to fail as regulatory 
instruments, the result has in most cases ended in long re-negotiations, and 
ultimately in government bail outs, ultimately socialising the costs of governance 
failures. 
 
5.4.2.4. The Decentralisation of Irrigated Agriculture: The Transference of 
Irrigation Districts. 
 
During, President de la Madrid’s term (1982-1988), the water resources planners at 
the SRH started to favour a number of existing ‘international’ ideas regarding 
agricultural water management, such as water user participation, water pricing, 
subsidies’ curtailments, and other institutional reforms. 85  These ideas, plus the 
financial crises pushed some initial experiments with the Irrigation Districts 
decentralisation process in the Mexican water polity. Scholars such as Rap and 
Wester (2013) studying this process in detail consider that these experiments were 
mostly “trial and error”, but helped to lay up the ground for the subsequent national 
level irrigation transference during president Carlos Salinas’s term. Rap and Wester 
(2013) comment:  
“The re-emergence of the transfer policy idea in the 1980’s was closely 
intertwined with three concerns that have historically characterised the 
Mexican hydraulic bureaucracy’s identity, namely bureaucratic autonomy, 
control over financial resources and control over the irrigation districts. 
Gonzalez Villareal and his technocratic planning group represented a wider 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 The content of this section benefited from interviews with Dr Luis Rendón, Manager for 
Irrigation Districts at CONAGUA, and Dr María Luisa Torregrosa, scholar-expert in the subject 
matter, amongst other experts.  
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national ‘advocacy coalition’ of senior bureaucratic groups, political party 
actors, water related academy, producer organisations and professional 
organisations, consultancy and construction companies, with its broadly shared 
claim for a sole water authority with bureaucratic and financial autonomy.  But 
it also partially shaped an emerging international policy network to globally 
promote the transfer of irrigation systems to water user associations” (Rap and 
Wester, 2013:  515) 
 
In the early 1990s, the Mexican government pioneered the transfer of irrigation 
districts to newly created local water user associations, drawing a lot of attention 
from the international water sector.  As part of the Neo-liberal reforms during 
President Carlos Salinas administration (1989-1994), some 2.5 million ha of 
government irrigation districts (out of more or les 3.4 million) were transferred to 
water user associations (WUAs) (CNA, 1999).86  The speed in which this process 
took place surprised the international water community. Consequently, Mexico’s 
Irrigation Management Transfer programme (IMT Programme) was considered a 
success in water policy circles around the world, and the Mexican model became a 
reference and showcase for promoting this form of State-transformation in the water 
sector (Gorriz et al, 1995; Johnson, 1997).  The IMT Programme effectively and 
gradually reduced the direct role of the State in irrigation management, a situation 
that with the passage of time created a number of important drawbacks in the 
performance of the irrigation districts –and mainly because there were no governing 
provisions to support them in an integral manner.87 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 It is important to establish that in 1988 Salinas de Goratri assumed the presidency of 
Mexico after a strongly contested election and widespread electoral fraud allegations. There 
were numerous indications that the elections were rigged in favour of him and his political 
party Institutional Revolutionary (Partido Revolucionario Institucional), the dominant party, 
governing Mexico under one-party rule form more than 70 years. Because of this situation 
Salinas had to take initially only incremental steps in the State-transformation process and the 
liberalisation of the economy, under his famous slogan of ‘social liberalism’. Ultimately, this 
strategy was oriented at regaining political support and control amongst rural groups and 
peasant population. Accordingly, the irrigation transfer process was central in this State-
strategy.   
87  In the IMT Programme the role of the development banks was again critical and 
preponderant, especially in this case the World Bank.  The World Bank 1988 and 1899 sent 
eight high level missions to Mexico with the task of developing a new loan to support the IMT 
Programme. Extensive discussions were held with the CNA concerning the content, timing, 
politics and challenges, from which a central issue was the emphasis made on the need to 
eliminate subsides to the irrigation systems and that the irrigation districts had to be 
productive, self-reliant –in organisational terms– and self-sufficient –in financial terms.  In 
December 1991, a US$400 million loan was approved by the World Bank to finance Mexico’s 
IMT Programme (The Modernisation of Irrigation Districts Policy Loan). This loan supported 
the gradual transfer and modernisation process, targeting 21 irrigation districts. 
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Figure 6: Irrigation Districts in Mexico 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONAGUA, 2012 
 
A gradual transfer path was chosen, and so initially only 21 districts were ready be 
‘modernised’ and ‘decentralised between 1990-1994.  These districts were carefully 
selected on the basis of an assessment made by the CNA regarding the willingness 
of the users to accept the transfer (CNA; 1991a; World Bank, 1991). Most of them 
were large, commercially oriented districts located in the north of Mexico, with few 
infrastructure problems and good productivity ratIo. Several actions were then 
designed to secure the CNA’s control over the irrigation districts. Central to these 
was the constitution of WUAs as civil associations as limited liability organisations, 
and to be entrusted with the management, operation and maintenance of irrigation 
infrastructure in their pertaining irrigation districts.  With this move the CNA ensured 
that irrigation districts would fall under its control –and not under the control of the 
agriculture bureaucracy represented by SAGARPA (Espinas de Leen, 1994; Vargas 
2008).  
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In 1992 with the new national water law, the IMT programme was given a further 
boost. The CNA concentrated efforts to accelerate the transfer in the north of the 
country, and thus with by the end of 1992 the process was completed. In 1993 the 
transfer policy was consolidated and some 725 ha were transferred.  In 1994 the 
transfer again slowed down because the end of President Salinas term was finishing, 
a period in Mexican politics when the State-apparatus concentrates mostly on the 
presidential succession. Currently, the area with infrastructure that allows irrigation is 
approximately 6.5 million hectares, of which 3.5 million correspond to 85 IDs, and the 
remaining 3.0 million hectares to more than 39,000 IUs.  
 
• Commentary on the Drawbacks and Contradictions 
 
The assumption regarding the financial self-sufficiency of the irrigation districts was 
mostly misleading, as a great number of them require constant State support to 
cover for operation and maintenance costs. As result of a lack of financial resources 
the irrigation districts’ water distribution infrastructure has deteriorated considerably, 
a situation that not only affects agricultural production, but water use efficiency.  As 
already mentioned a great number of this irrigation districts are located in regions 
with severe water stress, so water use efficiency is central to a sustainable water 
resource strategy. There are also some important problems in their internal 
organisation, as although the districts are more or less comprised by homogenous 
water users, the reality is that frequently important conflict arise between water users 
members and over the use of water resources and other infrastructure management 
problems.  
 
5.4.2.5. The Water Rights Property Registry (Registro de Propiedad de 
Derechos de Agua, REPDA) and the Rise of Economic Instruments 
 
The presence of important water scarcity and pollution problems, the rising number 
of social conflicts amongst different water users, and the Neoliberal ideas regarding 
the benefits of property rights in water resources management prompted the 
CONAGUA to design and implement a water rights system in the country, the 
REPDA. This system includes water abstraction –water concessions– and 
wastewater discharge permits.  The 1992 LAN established the legal basis for the 
water rights systems in Mexico and signalled the start of a complex integration of 
water users into the federal REPDA. This process took more than three years and a 
massive socialisation and communication campaign to mobilise water users across 
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the country to inscribe in the Registry.88  Regarding the CONAGUAs role in the 
REPDA, the 1992 LAN defines important responsibilities: the granting, modifying and 
cancelling of water concessions; the granting, modifying and cancelling of 
wastewater disposal rights, the operating of the Water Rights Public Registry; the 
monitoring water abstraction, wastewater disposal and user compliance; detecting 
illegal users; determining sanctions; monitoring payments, conciliating and arbitrating 
against disputes; and updating the database.89  
 
• The Regularisation Process 
 
When the 1992 NWL was issued the process of water users ‘regularisation’ began, 
that is the integration or inscription of all the country’s water users into the Water 
Rights Public Registry, and providing a 4 year ‘grace period’ for a water users to be 
registered. During the following two years the process was extremely slow, the 
CONAGUA simply lacked the capacity to manage the regularisation process in an 
orderly and systemic fashion. By 1995 it was clear that the CONAGUA would not 
reach the regularisation target and the water users would be automatically breaching 
the law, so another measure had to be taken, one with great consequential impacts 
for the future of the Mexican water polity.  By Presidential Decree (October, 1995) all 
water users who came forward and register at the REDA will be granted a 10-year 
concession title, without any further prove except some simple administrative 
paperwork proving the use of water for productive purposes. The rationale was that 
in a 10 year period, the CONAGUA would gain greater knowledge of water 
availability and use and that in due time will gradually correct the concession 
allocation process.  Users were given several incentives to comply, such as the 
partial and full pardoning of unpaid charges and sanctions.  
  
The results were overwhelming, as the amount of users claiming water rights was 
simply ‘astronomical’ and again the CONAGUA was overwhelmed.  A second 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 It is relevant to establish that before1521 the relationship between Mexico’s inhabitants and 
water resources was mediated by pre-Hispanic religious and social norms. Since that date 
and the Independence (1821) water basically belonged to the Spanish crown that then 
delegated its rights to the Spanish conquistadores and the various religious brotherhoods 
established in Mexico.  The 1870 Civil Code established that the use of water owned by the 
State required a formal concession from a qualified authority.  Later, in the 1917 Constitution 
the State became the sole holder and manager of water resources and municipal authorities 
responsible for the provision of WS & S services (Art. 25, 27, 31 and 115 of the 1917 
Constitution). 
89 The argumentation presented in this section benefited from the interviews with Dr Hector 
Garduño, former Manager for the REPDA at CONAGUA, and Mr Cesar Herrera, former 
Deputy Director at CONAGUA; amongst other experts.  
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Presidential Decree (December, 1996) attempted to even simply the process, this 
time CONAGUA will only condition the entitlement provision to the ‘word’ given (i.e. 
the declaration under oath) by the respective water user regarding the effective 
abstraction volume used. By the end of 1997 almost 200,000 users applied for 
concession title, and by the end of 2000 almost 320,000 had inscribed in the Water 
Rights Public Registry.  
 
• Collection of Water Charges and Polluter Charges 
 
The collection of water charges is one of the main economic instruments used by the 
CONAGUA. It was introduced with the two main purposes: to increase water use 
efficiency –by promoting a gradual shift in water use towards higher value uses and 
deter water pollution–, and to provide funds for water resources management and 
development.  Since their inception, collection for water charges has gradually 
represented an important source of economic resources for the CONAGUA, albeit 
there is a great number of water users that do not pay the official levies.  With this 
consequential action the Neoliberal impetus to establish the economic value of water 
and its commodification started. In terms of the polluter pays principle, it allowed the 
CONAGUA to shift to society the responsibility to compensate society for any 
polluting activity. The idea behind this principle is that any ‘rationale actor’ (in this 
case any industry) will be deterred to pollute by the sheer cost of the tax imposed for 
this activity, and thus this situation creates incentives for end-of-pipe pollution control 
systems and water recycling.  
 
• Water Banks and Water Markets 
 
Before the 1992 LAN was enacted, water users made temporary transactions in the 
context of irrigated districts, but the 1992 LAN clearly established the official 
provision for enabling water markets.  Accordingly water users are free to trade their 
rights within irrigation districts, within river basins, and within aquifers without State 
intervention.  Water users can also transfer their water rights when only the user 
changes or within special provision zones, specially designated by the General 
Director of the CONAGUA.  All other transactions are subject to approval by the 
CONAGUA in order to protect the environment and third parties.  More recently, with 
the aim of making the transfer of rights more efficient and transparent, water banks 
have been created in each of the 13 Hydrological-Administrative Regions (HARs). 
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• Commentary on the Drawbacks and Contradictions 
 
Notwithstanding these important efforts, many scholars consider that the REPDA 
manifests important drawbacks. Scholars and practitioners concur that the REPDA 
does not really represent the total universe of surface and groundwater users, its 
information is dated and the process of regularisation of water users is incomplete 
(Aboites, Cifuentes, Jimenez and Torregrosa, 2008). This process has been 
complicated due to the manner in which the regularisation process was implemented. 
In reality allowing water users to manifest –in good will– the amount of water being 
used for productive activities created a ‘massive’ over-concession of surface and 
groundwater resources that is currently threating the viability of water security across 
the nations territory.  
 
Law enforcement is also an important challenge faced by the REPDA, as monitoring 
water abstraction and discharges is extremely complicated and costly.  The way that 
CONAGUA is attempting to address this issue is by implementing random samplings 
and visits to water users, as well as applying severe fines to those not complying. 
Sadly, there is also an important and widespread corruption, and the CONAGUA is 
also attempting to address this situation through various measures. H Garduño 
(2006), the manager of this process at that time, explains some main issues 
regarding the REPDA90:  
 
“The current challenge is how to make water rights a true water resources 
management tool.  The answer is a fine-tuned balance of economic incentives, 
stakeholder participation and law enforcement.  This approach can be 
illustrated by the case of Guanajuato State, where 17,000 wells abstracting 
(mainly for grain production) twice as much water as the natural recharge, 
causing a yearly drawdown of two meters, severe land subsidence and water 
quality deterioration. The government of the state has taken the lead by 
supporting the establishment of aquifer management organisations.  
Groundwater users have responded very positively and have participated in 
many actions such as making sure that the user information in the Water 
Rights Public Register is reliable.  They have also shown their willingness to 
reduce abstraction in order to restore the aquifer. “ (Garduño, 2006: 106-107)  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 In an interview with Dr Garduño he pointed out a telling fact.  In reality the plan to continue 
with a more structured regularisation of water users was well thought, but when the financial 
resources were requested to the SHCP to undertake this endeavour, these were refused on 
account of austerity measures, in fact cancelling the opportunity to continue with the process.  
This marked a critical contradiction in the efforts made to establish a functional property rights 
systems in the Mexican water polity. 
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5.4.2.6. The Establishment of MSPs for Water Resources Management: River 
Basin Committees and Auxiliary Bodies  
 
• Some Elements of Institutional History of the RBCs and its Auxiliaries Bodies: 
The MPS for Water Resources Management in the Mexican Water Polity. 
 
An integral yet complex component of the Neoliberal Statehood strategy in the 
Mexican water polity was the development of the necessary socio-political 
governance arrangements to support the implementation of the IWRM paradigm, that 
demands, amongst other things, the enablement of social participation/involvement 
and stakeholder cooperation.  So in Mexico, the 1992 NWL stipulated that greater 
social participation and stakeholder cooperation will be pursued amongst other 
means, through the establishment of River Basin Councils (RBCs) (Consejos de 
Cuenca), and their auxiliary bodies –the River Basin Commissions (Comisiones de 
Cuenca) and the Groundwater Management Technical Committees (Comítes 
Técnicos de Aguas Subterráneas) (Duorojeanni, Jouravlev, and Chávez, 2008).   
Still, the 1992 NWL was rather ambiguous about the structure and function of the 
RBCs and its auxiliary bodies, and provides little orientation about how these new 
forms of socio-political governance arrangements would actually work in the context 
of the Mexican water polity. 91  This is to say, that although RBCs existed in the 1992 
NWL, there was no clear plan to support their institutional development, nor a clear 
idea about their institutional design and procedures. 92  
 
Due to the inoperative nature of the premises of the 1992 NWL, in 1997 some 
modifications were made NWL By-Laws.  These modifications in fact changed some 
important aspects regarding the institutional design of the RBCs and in order to make 
them more functional and balanced in terms of political representation, effectively 
taking some initial steps to address important concerns regarding the lack of water 
users’ political representation in the RBCs and the balance of power between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 The 1992NWL considered as part of the RBCs organisational structure that the General 
Director of the CONAGUA and the State-Governors (of the riparian States part of the river 
basin) will be the actual government representatives during the respective RBC meetings.  
This situation made the operation of the RBCs very unrealistic, as it became very difficult to 
organise constant meetings with the presence of such high-ranking officers that usually have 
very complex and busy agendas.  
92 In an interview with Dr Duorojeanni and Mr Chavez, the first a senior expert in matters 
concerning IWRM, and the second the former Manager of the River Basin Councils 
Management Office of the CONAGUA, they commented that in reality this ambiguity showed 
the ‘indecision’ even ‘reluctance’ at the highest level of government regarding to the role of 
the RBCs in the Mexican water polity. According to them, several political forces were 
strongly against the establishment decentralised RBCs. 
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government and water users representatives (Chavez, 2002).  By 1997 only 2 RBCs 
had been established, the Lerma-Chapala RBC and the Valley of Mexico RBC.  
These RBCs were established because these river basins presented grave water 
resources management challenges, including grave pollution problems and also an 
increasing competition between water users that demand new institutional designs to 
foster multi-stakeholder dialogue, consensus building and cooperation.  
 
A central element of the 1995-2000 National Water Programme was to actively 
establish and develop 25 River Basin Councils, as MSPs for water resources 
management.  The effort began to take more form in 1997 through the establishment 
of a ‘special purpose’ unit within the CONAGUA, the River Basin Councils’ 
Management Office, entrusted with the task of ‘quickly establishing’ RBCs and the 
auxiliary bodies across the country.  This Office designed a 4-staged institutional 
establishment and development strategy to gradually conform RBCs and their 
auxiliary bodies across the different administrative regions of the country.  This 
strategy was comprised by an enabling, installation, consolidation, and operation 
stages.  Below I will comment briefly on them.  
 
The Enabling Stage consisted basically of the promotion and socialisation amongst 
state and local level authorities, water users, professional associations, universities 
and research centres and other stakeholders of the IWRM principles and the 
rationale behind establishing RBCs and auxiliaries bodies in Mexico. This first stage 
entailed enabling a complex convening and social participation process oriented at 
characterising the most important stakeholders in each river basin and at the 
integration of ‘RBCs promoter groups’.  These groups had the responsibility to gather 
stakeholder support for the RBCs idea. The stage culminated with the integration of 
state-level, sub-regional, and regional Water User Committees that will in turn 
conform the Water User Assembly of the respective river basin. This Assembly will 
then appoint their representatives –one for each water user group recognised in the 
1992 NWL– to have a seat at the RBCs.  This stage lasted for about two years.  
 
The Installation Stage commenced once the water user representatives had been 
elected by the Water User Assembly of the respective river basin.  This second stage 
had as main objectives to legally establish the RBCs, taking care of involving the 
most relevant stakeholders in the basins, and of establishing some initial priorities to 
be addressed by the newly conformed RBCs.  The installation stage also entailed the 
conformation of Follow-up and Monitoring Groups –one for each RBC– entrusted 
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with gathering and validating relevant information for decision-making, and 
implementing the decisions taken by the RBCs.  This stage on average lasted 3 to 4 
months for each RBCs.  
 
Figure 7: River Basin Councils in Mexico 
 
CONAGUA, 2012 
 
 
The third stage was the Consolidation Stage. This staged involved different 
piecemeal institutional development efforts to strengthen the RBCs and auxiliary 
bodies.  Several types of activities were carried out, including capacity-building 
workshops, consensus-building meetings, and the integration of participatory 
diagnostics regarding local water resources management challenges, amongst other 
activities.  As part of the consolidation efforts it was stipulated that the RBCs Follow-
up and Monitoring Groups should, in principle, meet 4 times a year initially (1999) 
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and then once every month (2000).  Another important element of the strategy was to 
support the creation of stable, fluid and ‘democratic’ channels of representation 
between the User Water Assemblies and the River Basin Councils.  This stage was 
considered to require approximately 5 years of duration. 
 
Finally, the Development and Operation Stage considered the future implementation 
of some ideas regarding as to how the RBCs could look like in the future, and that 
included for example: a vision of RBCs financially and organisationally autonomous, 
politically legitimate and representative, democratic and inclusive, and with a clear 
and consensual-based work-plan for the future. Also a number of important 
considerations were made regarding the challenge of better integrating the other 
auxiliary bodies into decision-making process (i.e. effectively attempting to address a 
multi-level governance and conjunctive use problems related to integrating decisions 
at the river basin, sub-basin and aquifer level).  
 
So towards the end of President Zedillo’s administration (1997-2000) there was great 
confidence, at least within the Conagua’s cadres, of the growing importance of the 
RBCs and their auxiliary bodies in the Mexican water polity. On this Guillermo 
Chavez, Coordinator of the RBC Management Office, commented at that time:  
 
“The process of creation and development of the RBCs, approved by the 
Technical Council of the CNA, has been gradually and progressively 
consolidating in recent years, to become one of the most robust pillars of the 
structural change that drives the Mexican water polity. The organisation of RBCs 
recognises four territorial levels (the river basin, the sub-basin the micro-basin 
and the aquifer) in order to articulate all the users’ interests recognised by the 
1992 NWL as well as those corresponding to non-governmental organisations 
and the three government levels (federal, state, and municipal). Their legal and 
regulatory bases, their operation and functioning rules, as well as the social 
backing of their state-level, sub-regional and regional user committees and their 
representative assemblies, constitute an ample and stable organisational 
structure that qualifies them to be at the centre of a modern water resources 
management process.” (Chavez, 2000:86-87) (Translation: mine) 
 
In 2004 the 1994 NWL was modified and, amongst other important reforms, water 
resources management at the level of river basin was strengthened, especially 
through the creation of 13 River Basin Organisations (RBOs).  As already mentioned 
in the previous sections the RBOs were de-concentrated units of the CONAGUA and 
mainly served as administrative, technical, and legal outpost of CONAGUA’s central 
office.  The 2004 NWL ratifies the figure of the RBCs and also strengthens them as 
mechanisms for water governance. The 2004 NWL opens up social participation in 
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the RBCs to other stakeholders –such as NGOs, universities and other stakeholders. 
It also establishes that the representations ratios in the RBCs should correspond at 
least to 50% of civil society representatives against government representatives.   
 
 
Figure 8: The River Basin Councils’ Stakeholder Relationships 
CONAGUA, 2000 
 
 
From then on the institutional development of the RBC and its auxiliaries bodies has 
taken place under the legal framework provided by the 2004 NWL and under the 
structure of the institutional arrangements established by the CONAGUA.  By 
December 2010, there were 26 RBCs, 30 River Basin Commissions, 29 River Basin 
Committees, 81 COTAS and 36 Clean Beach Committees (Conagua, 2011). After 
describing some elements of the institutional development history of the RBC, I will 
now turn to describe in more detail there institutional objectives and institutional 
design features.  
 
• Institutional Mission and Objectives of the RBCs 
 
The main mission of the RBCs is to support the implementation of IWRM at the river 
basin level and with the ultimate goal to contribute to social development without 
detriment to the integrity of the hydrological cycle or the natural ecosystems that 
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support it (Conagua, 2000, p: 6). Accordingly, the institutional scale of these MSPs is 
the river basin level. In order to fulfil their mission, the 2004 NWL established that the 
main institutional scope of the RBCs is comprised by the following aspects:  
 
• Know and disseminate the strategic guidelines of the national and regional water 
policy; and propose complementarities that reflect the river basin’s short, medium and 
long-term reality (Art 16: section I). 
 
• Promote the participation and coordination of state- and local level authorities in the 
RBCs deliberative arenas, as well as that of water users and other stakeholders 
interested in the design, approval, follow-up, up-date and evaluation of the water 
programming process of the respective river basin (Art 16: section II). 
 
• Promote the integration of different task forces or work commissions to analyse, and 
propose solutions and recommendations related to matters concerning water 
resources management, the development of hydraulic infrastructure, the rational use 
of water resources and the preservation of its quality (Art 16: section III). 
 
• Support the generation of agreements with the CONAGUA regarding water allocation 
priorities and the range of policy instruments to be applied, and under the legal 
framework provided by the NWL and its By-Laws; as well as regarding the definition 
of emergency policy mechanisms in case of emergencies and contingencies such as 
floods, water scarcity, waster over-exploitation, water pollution or depletion (Art 16: 
section IV). 
 
• Support the necessary due-processes to achieve the ‘pooling’ of technical, financial, 
material, technological and organisational resources required to execute any of the 
projects considered under the river basin’s programming (Art 16: section V) 
 
• Participate in the development of financial studies developed by the CONAGUA and 
with the object of determining the amounts of the water user contributions aimed at 
supporting the execution of programmes in their benefit and that of the river basin 
(Art 16: section VI) 
 
• Participate or intervene in other cases as deemed appropriate by the Conagua and 
established under the NWL and its By-Laws (Art 16: section VII) 
 
• The CONAGUA, once the River Basin is established, will adjust its functioning to 
provide for its due functioning according to the faculties established for the River 
Basin Councils in the NWL and By-Laws (Art 16: section VIII) 
 
 
 
• Institutional Design Features of the RBCs 
 
The RBCs institutional design structure comprises several entities that support its 
objectives, including the Water Users Assembly, the President, the Government 
Vocals, the Water Users’ Representatives, Other Stakeholders’ Representatives, The 
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Technical Secretary, the Follow-up and Monitoring Group, and the Specialised 
Groups and the Auxiliary Bodies –the River Basin Commissions and the COTAS. In 
the following pages I give a brief explanation of these different entities.  
 
• Water Users Assembly: The Water User Assembly represents the social basis of the 
respective RBC.  In reality it is not an entity, but more so of the political meeting place 
where all the water user groups in the river basin ‘meet’ for mainly two purposes: to 
select their representatives to their respective RBC and to discuss all the ‘water 
resources management’ matters submitted for discussion by their respective RBC.  
So, in this sense, the Water User Assembly is also a deliberative arena. The first 
meeting of the Assembly is used to select the first Water User Groups 
representatives to seat in the RBC. The Assembly can only be convened by a Water 
User Group representative or the Technical Secretary of the Follow-up and 
Monitoring Group. In theory the Water User Assembly of the RBC should be the 
ultimate decision-making entity in the RBC’s institutional set-up.  
 
• President: The General Director of the CONAGUA will act as President of each of the 
RBCs and will have ‘vote cast’ rights in case of ‘draws’ in matters concerning 
decision-making. The President will have as his main responsibility to propose the 
criteria for the design and implementation of the water programming instruments for 
the river basin; and to nominate the RBC’s Technical Secretary. 
 
• Government Vocals: The Government Vocals are represented by the State-
Governors whose states are included in the RBCs. They have right to voice and vote. 
Their main responsibility is to represent the State government, to agree on the 
programmes and initiatives to be implemented in the basin, and support the water 
resources management decisions taken by the RBC. 
 
• Water User Groups’ Representatives: Each water user group –recognised by the 
NWL- will have a pertaining Water User Group Representative, including agricultural, 
industrial, water and sanitation utilities, public-urban and social users groups. They 
have right to voice and vote.  The water user representatives are entrusted with the 
important task of accurately and legitimately representing their constituencies.  They 
are elected for a period of 3 years and may be re-elected once.  They are also 
responsible of socialising and communicating to their constituencies the decisions 
taken by the RBC. They have the right to convene –when necessary– the Water 
Users Assembly. They may form part of the Follow-up and Monitoring Group.  They 
should actively seek the involvement of their constituencies in the RBC. 
 
• Other Stakeholders’ Representatives: Other relevant stakeholders can participate in 
the RBC in the form of invitees and representatives of local authorities, non-
governmental organisations, the academy and research centres and other 
professional associations can participate in the RBCs.  They are considered to be 
trustful actors that will contribute to the initiatives determined by the RBC. They have 
right to voice, but not to vote.  
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• Technical Secretary: The Technical Secretary is a government official of the 
CONAGUA, chosen by the General Director, and with the task of providing the 
necessary information and analysis for decision making, support the general 
operation and management of the RBCs, provide logistical organisation for the RBCs 
meetings, provide monitoring and evaluation information, integrate the water 
resources management initiatives’ portfolio; and amongst other functions. The 
technical secretary also functions as the coordination of the Follow up and Monitoring 
Group. They have right to voice, but not to vote.  
 
• Follow up and Monitoring Group: This Group is responsible for providing follow up 
and monitoring to the actions and initiatives determined by the RBC.  This group is 
responsible then of gathering all the necessary information and analyse it to promote 
an informed and accurate decision-making process.  Any member of the Government 
Vocals and the Water Users Representatives Group can participate in this Group.  
This Group can actually considered the motor behind the RBC, as it takes care of 
providing all the relevant information for decision- making.  
 
• Specialised Groups: The RBC can conform any Specialised Group to perform any 
task that deems appropriate 
 
• The Water Information & Consultation Centre: This Centre will provide information 
services regarding relevant water resources management issues and as well as 
information regarding relevant matters pertaining to the river basin.  The idea behind 
this Centre is that all water users could attend to gain access to relevant information 
to prepare them for a more informed and active participation in the decision making 
process.  
 
• River Basin Commissions and Groundwater Management Committees (The Auxiliary 
Bodies):  These entities are also MSPs.  The River Basin Commissions have a 
similar structure to the RBCs and also a similar mandate, but the scale is smaller –at 
the level of micro-basins.  Similarly, the COTAS are MSPs at the level of aquifer.  The 
Presidents of the Auxiliary Bodies can participate in the RBC sessions, but do not 
have voting rights.  
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Figure 9: Institutional Design Features of the River Basin Councils 
CONAGUA, 2000 
 
The River Basin Commissions and the Groundwater Management Committees 
(COTAS) are also MSPs, and as the above diagram shows they are embedded in 
the institutional structure of the RBCs.  The idea behind this is that these Auxiliary 
Bodies should have representation at the RBCs and to foster greater integration 
between territorial units in decision-making.  The River Basin Commissions’ scale is 
the micro-basins.  The COTAS scale is the aquifer. The institutional design principles 
of the River Basin Commissions and the COTAS somewhat resembles that of the 
RBCs, but with some differences.  	  
• Commentary on the Drawbacks and Contradictions 
 
The legal recognition of the RBCs in the 1992 NWL generated great expectations 
regarding the implementation of the IWRM paradigm in Mexico, the implementation 
of decentralisation policies and the opening-up to greater social participation and 
stakeholder cooperation.  Still through the passage time it became evident that these 
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expectations needed to be tamed, as the role of the RBCs remains very modest.  
This situation rests primarily in that the RBCs in reality are only considered as 
consultative entities and do not have any executive powers.  The accords arrived in 
its deliberative arenas are not legally binding and so the relevant authorities have 
ultimately the final decision whether they implement the accords, to what extent they 
implemented them and when.  
 
The later version of the law, the 2004 NW, does not grant any form of legal 
personality or statue to the RBCs.  In this sense, they cannot exercise any act of 
legal authority (i.e. like the allocation of water concessions or the authorisation of 
actions).  They are also not autonomous administratively, financially and technically, 
as they depend for any of these matters from the central office of the CONAGUA or 
their pertaining RBO. It this sense it is important to emphasise that they are 
institutional spaces to entice dialogue, consensus building and cooperation.  For 
example, once the RBCs arrive to any decision, it then has to request to their 
pertaining RBO to implement –or channel the petition to the respective authority– the 
selected projects and initiatives. RBCs cannot by themselves execute any of the 
agreed measures or initiatives –as they do not have a judicial statue–, so they have 
to request via an agreement of cooperation with the State their execution. On the 
main drawbacks of the RBCs, G Chavez (2008) comments:  
 
“Notwithstanding the progress made so far, the establishment of the RBCs 
through which the State and civil society cooperate is not yet a finished project, 
and in their actual form they manifest a number of weaknesses and drawbacks 
that are necessary to address in order to achieve their consolidation. Very 
importantly, there is a great need to convey them with greater authority, 
management autonomy, sufficient financial and material resources to sustain 
their organisation and activities.” (Chave, 2008, 34) (Translation: Mine) 
 
Another important drawback that generates great concern is the issue of political 
representation and democratic performance.  Scholars and practitioners alike are 
aware that there are important problems of lack of accurate political representation   
–and thus political equality and legitimacy– in the RBCs. There are other important 
democratic deficits such as capture and bias, as identified in the governance 
literature dealing with the democratic assessment of socio-political governance 
arrangements. On these aspects, A Dourojeanni (2000) comments: 
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“The democratisation and effective stakeholder participation that are involved 
in water resources management should be a central concern of the RBCs. It 
should not be allowed for certain ‘powerful’ groups to take decisions for the 
rest, and for them to create a false system of political representation and social 
participation. All stakeholders should be informed about what is going to be 
discussed in the deliberative meetings, and efforts should be made by the 
State to facilitate the attendance of all water users, even if it is necessary to 
cover their travel expenses. The lack of readily available information should 
also be address by the production of concise and telling brochures that can 
highlight the most important concerns in a neutral and informative manner.” 
(Dourojeanni, 2000: 193) (Translation: Mine) 
 
5.5. End Comments to this Chapter 
 
This chapter has identified and described three distinct types of Statehood 
formations throughout an important period of the history of the Mexican water polity. 
The socio-political forces behind these formations sought to stabilise in their 
respective time a particular State project –a vision about the role of the State and 
society in water resources management, water supply and sanitation and, also water 
security. Through different State-strategies these Statehood formations sought to 
define and articulate different types of socio-political and economic relations between 
the State and society, and also between society and water resources.  Throughout 
this historical-institutional overview, this chapter also attests to the importance of 
water resources in socio-economic development processes, a situation that puts it at 
a centre of politics, State rule and management, and socio-political conflict. 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I described the main highlights of the Nation- and 
State-building Statehood formation, when the rationale of the central State was to 
seek to establish an overall federal authority acting in the public interest over a 
‘public’ resource and at a national level.  The objective was to build a cohesive 
Nation and the authority of the central State over an extremely important natural 
resource, and by pursuing a strong centralisation and federalisation strategy. 
Through this strategy important efforts were made to recede the power of local 
oligarchies and disentail religious privileges over water use. The result was the 
creation of an incipient legal framework, an emergent State-apparatus and a 
relatively weak State authority. Still the institutional basis of the State was created for 
the next Statehood formation to continue, and water became a public resource under 
that tutelage of the central State.  
During the Developmental-Interventionist Statehood formation, the central State 
managed to continue with this process in a more powerful and perhaps consistent 
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manner, developing an extensive network of strategic water infrastructure across the 
country, and building a complex legal framework and institutional array that 
supported the enlargement of the central-State both in terms of scope, as well as in 
its extension. At the same time and very importantly, the State gradually conveyed 
water resources with a central socio-political and economic role, as water became a 
‘fully politicised natural resource’ (Bryant and Bailey, 1997).  As such water 
resources were not only a driver of socio-economic development and a source of 
political conflict, but also an instrument of power and political patronage by putting at 
the centre of clientelist and corporatist socio-political relations. Throughout this 
period of time, Mexico was transformed dramatically by population growth, socio-
economic development, and a massive rural-urban migration. As time passed by, 
and as a result of the development path ensued, water resources management 
problems began to become more ‘complex’ and ‘crosscutting’ challenges that could 
not solely be addressed by ‘civil engineers’ through infrastructure construction, but 
required a completely different strategy. The use of centralist, hierarchical-normative 
and top-down State-strategies also began to show clear signs of limitations and 
drawbacks. Then a critical juncture emerged. 
 
At the same time the ‘global’ economic conditions changed, the State, purportedly, 
had to transform its orientation, its role and capacities in the governing of polities. For 
no longer the State could continue with such a strong and interventionist role, as it 
did not have the means nor the resources to continue with these orientation and 
roles.  Consequently, the State had to share responsibilities with other stakeholders, 
including other State levels, society and international development institutions, and in 
order to maintain the necessary contextual conditions in their polities to enable socio-
economic development.  That was the mainstream interpretation to the State-crisis. 
The prevalent socio-political forces in this moment of ‘crisis’ managed to create a 
new idea for a Statehood formation, with a completely different State-project and a 
completely different array of State strategies: the Neo-liberal Statehood formation.  
 
Mexico followed the trend and undertook a profound process of Neo-liberal State-
transformation in a fairly ‘orthodox manner’ since the mid-1980s.  In the water polity 
the Neoliberal Statehood formation implemented a number of State-strategies that 
sought to transform the relationship of the State with other ‘stakeholders’ in water 
resources management, water supply and sanitation provision, and more broadly the 
pursuit of water security. For a number of years Mexico was at the ‘vanguard’ in the 
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implementation of these Neo-liberal ‘policy reforms’ aimed at ‘structural change’.  
‘Everything’ was tried: the creation of an apex authority, the appropriation of the 
IWRM discourse, the territorial re-organisation of the water polity to conform to river 
basin management, the design of national ‘participatory’ planning process’, the 
decentralisation of WS & S services, the opening to private sector involvement, the 
transfer of irrigation districts, the creation of a property rights system and water 
markets, and the establishment of MSPs for water resources management.  The 
people in charge of this process all refer to this period as an “exciting and 
challenging time”. 93 
 
But something went wrong, and important drawbacks and contradictions gradually 
emerged. The implementation of IWRM has mostly been rhetoric, except maybe at 
the level of micro-basins where we can find examples of other State institutions and 
stakeholders –rather than CONAGUA– designing and implementing more integral 
and comprehensive water and natural resources management processes with the 
participation of local stakeholders. Today, the CONAGUA is an apex institution, but it 
is hardly an enabling, regulatory, and steering one. Its budget has steadily increased 
in the last decades and according to a senior civil servant approximately 90% of it 
still goes to infrastructure construction, and the rest to institutional development and 
capacity building. The evolution of CONAGUA’s personnel rooster is also telling. the 
institution has gradually been dismantled –this is line with the State retrenchment 
Neoliberal policies–; this is to say it has been steadily loosing personnel, whilst at the 
same highly qualified personnel has not been required –allegedly what a regulatory, 
enabling, steering entity would require. It is possible then to consider that CONAGUA 
still is, by all means, a ‘development and interventionist institution’. It derives its 
institutional reach and political power, more than anything else, from its capital 
investment capabilities, and not its steering, coordination, and meta-governing 
strategies and capacities, as the Neo-liberal theory prescribes. 
Figure 10: Evolution of CONAGUA’s Budget, Annual Time Series 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 In the course of this doctoral research I had the opportunity to interview various members 
of this Mexican ‘hydrocracy’, all of them civil engineers by training with very robust knowledge 
on technical aspects related to water resources management.  It was interesting to hear from 
some of them that indeed they felt that they were being confronted with problems that they 
had not been trained to address per-se, as their work now demanded to know more about 
socio-political processes, policy-making, inter-institutional coordination, institutional design, 
social conflict, etc.  
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CONAGUA, 2012 
Figure 11: Evolution in CONAGUAs Staff Rooster 
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More so, the territorial administrative re-organisation of the water polity and the 
establishment of the RBOs represented only an administrative reform with very little 
decentralisation and subsidiarity content and showing only meagre capacities for 
water resources planning and management at the river basin level.  It is difficult to 
understand the reasons behind the creation of RBOs, if later no decision-making, 
executive powers and financial autonomy were decentralised to them.  As already 
mentioned, the result has been a duplication of functions and a constant ‘turf battle’ 
between the RBOs and the CONAGUA State Offices in the different States. The 
State Offices are closer to the General Director of CONAGUA, are closer to all the 
state governors and mostly have greater budgets than the RBOs, a situation that 
further weakens them.  So the question is, was it not the plan to implement IWRM at 
the river basin level, and thus the impetus to establish and develop the RBOs?  I am 
not saying that decentralisation is an easy decision to make, but the present 
ambivalence regarding the territorial-administrative re-organisation of the water polity 
is not tenable.  On some of these aspects V Guerrero, a former high civil servant in 
CONAGUA and critical writer, commented:  
 
“The lack of an integral vision in water resources management in Mexico, the 
individual and isolated work of the different stakeholders in the water polity, the 
deficient coordination between the different government tiers (federal, state 
and local), the great centralism and concentration of authority, the scarce or 
null social participation from water users and other stakeholders, as well as the 
grave depletion of Nature, are all drivers that are causing the absence of a 
sustainable development path, that is generating a tremendous water security 
risk for the present and future generations.” (Guerrero, 2004:31)  
 
The National Water Planning process was allegedly created to enable, every six 
years, the democratic participation of civil society in the definition of the central 
orientations and strategies that will guide water policy making for the government 
administration in turn.  Despite what it is established by the 1997 NWL and the 2004 
NWL, the process does not really enable a truly democratic and participatory 
process, as mostly who really participate in it are CONAGUA’s civil servants, civil 
servants from other government institutions and organised interest groups carefully 
selected, as Vera (2008) describes. Again this process is always carried out against 
the pressures of deadlines and so it is always rushed through, leaving aside the goal 
of truly enabling a democratic and participatory planning process.  Consequently, the 
National Water Programme does not really become a planning instrument, and the 
opportunity to truly engage society in an awareness-raising and social learning 
process inherent to this type of exercises is forgone.  The democratic and 
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participatory National Water Planning process remains a rhetoric, unduly legitimising 
and tokenistic exercise.  
 
The WS & S sector is also full of grave challenges as a result of the drawbacks and 
contradictions of the Neoliberal State-stragegies. The decentralisation of WS & S 
utilities created an extremely complex scenario of low performing water utilities that 
are not financially self-sustaining, and still require the constant support from the 
central State. When talking to experts in the field, according to them it was clear to all 
that the municipalities were ill-prepared to receive the responsibilities of providing 
WS & S services to the country’s population. Local water and sanitation utilities did 
not count with the necessary infrastructure assets, resources and personnel to carry 
out this role.  More so, the legal framework to support their activities was also 
extremely weak and required important changes. So the drawbacks of the WS & S 
sector are not surprising to anyone.  On the contrary, ‘everybody’ asks why this 
process was not carried out in a more planned and incremental fashion?  In Mexico 
cost-recovery is mostly a myth, except for very few exceptions. To complicate 
matters more, central government support is tied to ‘matching funds’, so only the 
prosperous utilities are able to participate from them, a situation the condemns most 
of the small and mid-size water utilities to remain in a critical condition. This problem 
has created an extremely difficult situation for the urban poor inhabiting peri-urban 
areas and also for the rural populations, as simply water utilities do not have the 
financial resources or the technical expertise to address the particularities of the 
challenges that bringing WS & S services to these areas represent.   
 
In the case of private sector involvement in the WS & S sector, the drawbacks are 
also clear and reflect more or less the global tendency regarding the Neoliberal 
mislead expectations regarding the role of the private sector in WS & S provision: 
that the private sector was going to come in and readily provide the necessary 
financial resources and technical knowledge to address the grave WS & S 
challenges faced by local water polities. Several problems tamed down these 
expectations. In Mexico local authorities had little experience in negotiating the 
contracts with the private sector, and so they had to be constantly re-negotiated, a 
situation that ultimately led to the central State needing to ‘bail out’ the schemes       
–when they ran into trouble– and by using public resources. The private sector 
involvement is mostly in the commercial areas where some improvements were 
made by focusing in cost-recovery, a situation that implied tariff reforms that were not 
easily accepted by ‘consumers’.  Furthermore, being that interventions were in these 
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commercial areas, very little new financial resources were brought in by the private 
sector –an important assumption that drove local authorities to seek private sector 
involvement in the first place, but that again did not consolidate.  Ultimately, the role 
of the private sector in WS & S did not really ‘solve’ the challenges, and remains 
fairly stagnant, except for BOT schemes for water treatment plants and a few new 
‘special projects’ that are ring-fenced by the State, protecting private actors by 
transferring most of the financial risk to the State –ultimately privatising the gains and 
socialising the risks and the costs. 
 
The case of the decentralisation or transference of irrigated districts is relatively more 
successful. The process effectively managed to gradually reduce the direct role of 
the State in irrigation management –which was the main goal–, and again, the speed 
in which this process was undertaken commands the attention of policy makers 
around the world. The Irrigation Districts and Irrigation Units are fairly operational, 
maybe because water users are relatively more homogenous and more or less share 
the same goals. Still, again the assumptions regarding financial autonomy or self-
reliance were overtly optimistic. Today most of the districts and units cannot keep-up 
with the necessary maintenance investments and so irrigation infrastructure has 
significantly deteriorated. To complicate matters an important percentage of these 
irrigation districts and units depend on over-exploited aquifers. The lack of 
coordination between CONAGUA and SAGARPA hinders the opportunities of 
technological and commercialisation support, with a direct impact to water 
productivity and economic efficiency.  Together these situations are turning also into 
a grave food security challenge for the country. 
 
An extremely controversial Neoliberal State strategy has been the establishment of 
the REPDA (i.e. property rights) and the enablement of water concessions rights 
transfers (i.e. water markets). Again the implementation of this strategy was rushed 
through, and eventually policy makers opted for the highly controversial measure that 
led to a massive over-concession of water resources across the country. The 
assumption that later in time it would be possible to revert this situation by adjusting-
down the concessions has been proven wrong. The end result is that water users 
have legal water concessions granted by the State, and that are driving 
unsustainable water resources management across the country. This is highly 
contradictory, as precisely the establishment of these types of systems should be 
geared at the control of over-exploitation and the sustainable management of water 
resources. Besides this complex situation, the REPDA remains a very weak system 
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that is not only dated (i.e. the concessions registered do not really reflect the current 
water volume that is in use), but is also a very difficult system to enforce, a situation 
that paired with important corruption allegations renders the system highly inefficient 
as a water management tool.  
 
Finally, the establishment of MSPs for water resources management was also a 
State strategy that created great expectations, but remains caught in an impasse or 
plateau.  Presently, there are 26 RBCs created, 32 river basin commissions and 85 
COTAS (Conagua, 2013) allegedly created to enable social participation/ 
involvement, stakeholder cooperation and democratic decision-making throughout 
water resources planning and management processes. In the three cases, ultimately 
the MSPs are only consultative bodies without any form of decision-making authority, 
executive powers and financial autonomy. These MSPs do play a role in enabling 
dialogue regarding water resources planning and management, consensus building 
and conflict resolution, but still remain only consultative and financially dependent 
auxiliary bodies. They also show important weakness in terms of political 
representation and legitimacy, as they are frequently captured by powerful interests 
and remain exclusionary of certain social groups, thus serving mostly to reproduce 
socio-political relations of power and domination.  A more in-detail analysis of the 
MSPs for groundwater management in the next chapter will show more pervasive 
challenges.  
 
The above interpretation of the situation depicts a governing crisis derived from a 
number of drawbacks and contradictions resulting from the implementation of a 
complex repertoire of Neo-liberal State strategies. In the next chapter I devote efforts 
to study the establishment and institutional development of the MSPs for 
groundwater management, COTAS, one form of socio-political governance 
arrangements in the Mexican water polity.  These MSPs for groundwater resources 
management were allegedly established to play a central role in enabling greater 
social participation/involvement, stakeholder cooperation and a democratic 
groundwater governance.  This attempt will seek to unravel with more precision what 
has happened, highlight the prospects and challenges of these MSPs, and also 
elaborate on the role of the State in the establishment and institutional development. 
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Chapter 6: Groundwater Management and the Establishment of MSPs for Water 
Resources Management, COTAS, in the Mexican Water Polity: The Third and 
Fourth Moments of Analysis 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter represents the implementation of the third and fourth moments of 
analysis (iii. Socio-political Governance Arrangement’s Institutional Analysis and the 
Socio-political Governance Arrangement’s Democratic Performance Analysis).  In the 
first section of the chapter there is a brief narrative of the historical context and the 
general institutional development of groundwater management in the Mexican water 
polity, attempting to highlight the most important challenges faced, some policy 
ideas, and institutional responses; and leading to the establishment of MSPs for 
groundwater management. As this description will show, the first ‘generation’ of 
State-strategiesimplemented mostly during the period of the Developmental-
Interventionist Statehood formation followed a centralist, hierarchical and 
administrative rationale that proved extremely ineffective and inefficient.  This 
problematic situation, alongside the impact of the Neoliberal ideas influencing the 
Mexican water polity, prompted the implementation of broad ‘decentralisation’ and 
‘participatory’ State-strategiesthat included the establishment of the MSPs for 
groundwater management, COTAS, in the middle of the 1990s. The COTAS were 
created as new forms of socio-political water governance arrangements, MSPs for 
groundwater management, with the objective of enabling greater social 
participation/involvement and stakeholder cooperation throughout the groundwater 
governance process. This chapter will show that this process again manifests a 
number of drawbacks and contradictions. The role of the State in this process and 
outcome has been central, as the reader will see.94  
 
In the second section of this chapter, I undertake the institutional analysis of the 
CONAGUA COTAS, addressing different important dimensions considered by the 
MSPs literature, including: institutional scale, scope and structure; as well as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 The historical-institutional narrative of the institutional development of groundwater 
management in Mexico benefited from secondary data collection –as indicated throughout the 
chapter in the referencing–, and also of interviews and informal conversations with three 
scholars that specialise in this subject matter: Dr Judith Dominguez, a legal-institutional 
expert with thorough knowledge on the evolution of the legal-institutional aspects of 
groundwater resources management; Dr Boris Marañon, one of the few scholars that have 
researched the institutional and socio-political aspects behind the establishment of the 
COTAS in Mexico, and Dr Oscar Escolero a hydro-geologists interested also in the 
institutional and socio-political aspects behind groundwater resources over-exploitation. I 
extend my appreciation to them.  
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stakeholder involvement (i.e. the rights, responsibilities and roles of stakeholders). At 
the end of this section a commentary is made regarding their effectiveness, efficiency 
and equity (i.e. drawbacks and contradictions). Some comments will also be made 
regarding to how power relationships are played out in the context of the MSPs 
COTAS. 95 
 
In the Mexican water polity the case of the establishment and institutional 
development of the COTAS in the state of Guanajuato is considered paradoxical, 
because it attempted to follow a different route than the one considered by the 
CONAGUA, and to truly establish decentralised, executive and autonomous MSPs 
for groundwater management. 96  This process initiated with great prospects due to a 
’critical conjuncture’ that I will refer to below. Still, evidence shows that although 
initially the process represented some interesting prospects, ultimately its 
progressive dynamism withered away because of important challenges and path-
dependencies.  So, in a third section of this chapter I present a short narrative of the 
case of the State of Guanajuato COTAS, highlighting the aspects that made it a 
paradoxical case, and unfortunately also a contradictory one.  Some insights 
regarding the role of the State –both of the central and the local State– are featured, 
confirming the post-Marxist and State-relational views on the nature of the State as a 
‘strategic field’ comprised of different power centres, serving different power blocs.97  
 
Following this narrative the chapter develops the fourth moment of analysis through 
the democratic performance assessment of the Laguna-Seca COTAS in the state of 
Guanajuato. This particular COTAS also represents a paradoxical case, because it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 The argumentations developed in this section benefited from secondary data collection     –
mainly the 2004N NWL and government policy documents– and informal and semi-structured 
interviews with civil servants in different areas of the CONAGUA and at different points of 
time, including Mr Guillermo Chavez, former Manager of the River Basin Management Office 
of the CONAUA, Mr Jose Alfredo Galindo, Deputy Manager of the Santiago Lerma Chapala 
Basin of the Basin Management Office, Dr Guillermo Chavez Guillen, Manager of the 
Technical Deputy Direction of the CONAGUA, Dr. Fernando Trueba, former Manager of the 
MASAS Programme, Dr. Sergio Vargas, former member of the Social Participation Unit of the 
IMTA, and Dr Stephen Foster and Dr Hector Garduño, members of GW-MATE Prorgramme 
at the World Bank. Some of the argumentations presented also benefited from informal 
interaction with groundwater users members of the COTAS in several venues across the 
country and at different points in time. I extend my appreciation to all them.  
96 From now on in this document I will distinguish the CONAGUA COTAS from the State of 
Guanajuato COTAS, by referring to them like this.  
97 The content of this section is based in secondary data collection –as indicated throughout 
the chapter in the referencing– and from interviews with Mr Ricardo Sandoval, former-Director 
of the CAEG, Mr Jorge Montoya, former Social Participation Manager of the CEAG, and Mr 
Jorge Avelleyra, Manager of Social Participation of the CONAGUA State Office in 
Guanajuato, and several Guanajuato COTAS Presidents and Technical Managers during a 
focus group co-organised with the CONAGUA State Office in Guanajuato.  
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was the first one established in the state of Guanajuato, and through a process that 
attempted to follow a bottom-up and inclusive approach. So using the analytical 
power established in the heuristic-analytical device, another section of this chapter is 
devoted to determine the developmental, public sphere and institutional effects of the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS, describing also some of the most important preconditions that 
seem to have affected their attainment.  Again some general insights are offered, 
some of these highlighting the role of ‘individual agency’ and countervailing power in 
the process of institutional development. 98 
 
Finally, a last section of this chapter presents some ‘end comments’ regarding the 
most relevant insights found from the implementation of the third and fourth moments 
of analysis.  
 
 
6.2. Groundwater Management in the Mexican Water Polity: Elements of the 
Historical Background and the Institutional Development Process 
 
Mexico’s rapidly growing agricultural expansion, industrialisation and urbanisation 
throughout the 1940’s onwards –during the period of the Desarrollo Estabilizador– 
led to an increasing demand for water resources nationwide, which was met by the 
use of both surface and groundwater resources, placing them under sever over- 
exploitation pressures.  Whilst in the case of surface water, regulation was explicitly 
considered in the 1917 Mexican Constitution –and through a series of laws and 
regulations that somehow incipiently protected and managed it since then–, the 
same however did not happen for groundwater, leaving the door open for its 
uncontrolled exploitation by whosoever basically had the financial resources to drill 
wells and had access to pumping technology and electricity.  During this long period 
of time groundwater water users considered it an ‘open access resource’ (un 
recusrso de libre alumbramiento) (Dominguez and Carillo Rivera, 2007).  In time, this 
situation –paired with the rise of modern deep drilling technology– created a severe 
groundwater over-exploitation crisis that demanded a State response.  From 1945 
onwards, and as result of the growing awareness regarding the far-reaching 
consequences of groundwater over-exploitation, the SRH –responsible at that time 
for water resources management– imposed a series of ‘groundwater exploitation 
prohibition zones’ (zonas de veda) across the country and over aquifers deemed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The arguments presented in this section are based on interviews with the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS Technical Management Team, its Board of Governors and some of its membership.  
The findings are also product of a limited participant observation during the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS deliberative meetings.   
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be at risk of over-exploitation and in regions with severe water stress.99  In 1947 a 
new specialised entity within the SRH, the Groundwater Management Office, was 
created, with the task of ensuring the enforcement of these prohibition zones, and 
also of developing a systemic geo-hydrological inventory of groundwater resources in 
the country, an instrument that will serve to manage them in the future.  
 
Figure 12: Water Stress in the HARs 
 
CONAGUA, 2012 
 
Later, in 1948 and 1949 other groundwater laws were approved whereby certain 
‘groundwater abstraction ceilings’ (limitaciones de extracción) were fixed according 
to the estimated groundwater availability of the aquifers. Also more groundwater 
exploitation prohibition zones were declared, and a ‘groundwater exploitation permit-
authorisation process’ (permiso de abstracción) was established. This last 
administrative measure ‘forced’ all potential groundwater users to request an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 The ‘groundwater exploitation prohibition zones’ establish a partial or total ban                   –
depending on the seriousness of the situation– of groundwater abstraction.  Mostly, the way 
this legal instrument works is that only the water users that already have groundwater 
exploitation concessions in the respective aquifer may continue to exploit it, but no ‘new’ 
concessions may be granted or only under a very strict imposition of abstraction caps.  
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abstraction permit before using groundwater resources for any purpose.  In 1948, a 
new Groundwater Management By-Law clearly established the validity and legality of 
the aforementioned regulatory and administrative instruments, and also presented 
the concept of ‘secure abstraction yield’ (tasa de abstracción segura), which basically 
established a groundwater abstraction rate deemed ‘safe’ in relation to estimated 
groundwater availability and replenishment ratios, and calculated for some important 
and over-drafted aquifers in the country.  In 1956 yet another Groundwater 
Management By-Law was enacted in substitution to the 1948 one, this time 
stipulating different types of prohibition zones declarations: fixed, flexible, and 
controlled zones. During the 1950’s approximately 50 prohibition zones declarations 
were enacted across different areas of the country, but mostly in the semi-arid and 
arid regions of the central highlands –el Bajio region, including the States of 
Queretaro and Guanajuato– and the north and north eastern regions also 
(Dominguez and Carillo Rivera, 2007).  
 
Figure 13: Groundwater Abstraction Prohibition Zones (present time) 
 
 
 
CONAGUA, 2012 
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Irrigated agriculture is the most important consumer of groundwater resources. In 
1951 the SRH reported the existence of 55 Irrigation Districts in Mexico, with an 
overall productive surface of 1.1 million ha and plans to expand to another 1.9 
million.  This number was reached in the 1970’s, and today remains approximately at 
3.5 million ha across 85 Irrigation Districts. It is relevant to mention that this ‘irrigated 
agriculture surfaces’ are located mostly in semi-arid and arid regions in the north of 
the country, where water stress was already a problem. Irrigation Units are also 
important groundwater consumers. They represent close to 3 million ha of irrigated 
agriculture, half of these again are also situated in semi-arid and arid regions. 
Together they sum 6.5 million ha, making Mexico the sixth country in the world in 
terms of irrigated agriculture surface. The importance of groundwater resides in that 
estimates establish that it sustains the irrigated agriculture of about 2 million ha (a 
third of the total number) (Moreno, Marañon, and López, 2010). 
 
Another important policy instrument started to be implemented in the 1960s, the 
‘aquifers extraction by-laws (reglamento de extracción).  After an exploitation 
prohibition zone was established over an aquifer what followed –at least theoretically 
or in terms of due legal process– was the enactment of the aquifers’ extraction by-
laws.  This policy instrument clearly stipulated the ‘secure abstraction yield’ for the 
aquifer and thus the overall amount of groundwater to be extracted by all the 
groundwater users on a yearly bases.  Initially, the SRH (and after 1976 the SARH) 
implemented the aquifers extraction by-laws in a top-down and centralised manner, 
the first cases being several aquifers in the State of Coahuila and the State of Baja 
California (north eastern territories) and in the Comarca Lagunera (at el Bajio region).  
In reality there was no form of social participation, no stakeholder cooperation and no 
consensus-building process. The new by-laws were made public through an official 
‘public gathering’ in a government office and through newspapers and other 
communication media.  Also the by-laws were not accompanied by a groundwater 
management plan or by any financial resources to implement water efficiency and 
water productivity measures. The CONAGUA ‘naively’ hoped for groundwater users 
to ‘automatically’ self-organise in order to comply with what was stipulated in the by-
laws. Not surprising, these by-laws were mostly unsuccessful in stabilising the 
aquifers, as groundwater users continued with the over-abstraction trends 
regardless. 100  They remained ‘death letter’ and so the protocol in the implementation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 The groundwater management best practice considers that it is best to first design the 
aquifers groundwater management plan, clearly establishing: the situation of the aquifer, 
different trade-offs scenarios, groundwater policy measures, the financial costs, and the 
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of this instrument had to be changed, but as I will explain later it remains an 
extremely complex instrument with little applicability (Marañon and Lopez, 2008).  
 
During the 1960’s the situation continued to deteriorate for a number of important 
reasons. First, water users began to exploit important legal loopholes. Briefly 
described, the problem is that the prohibition zones declarations in all the aquifers 
only considered banning groundwater abstraction in the areas where the 
‘groundwater abatement/depression cones’ (conos de abatamiento) were found, not 
banning exploitation across the rest of the aquifers surface; a situation that ultimately 
implied continuing to over-exploit the aquifers. 101   Second, new pumping 
technologies were more readily and cheaply available, as well as electricity. 
Consequently, the phenomenon of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ was generally 
amplified, especially in the already over-exploited aquifers, as groundwater users 
continued to over-exploit them, because “every body else was doing it’, and 
“everybody wanted to maximise their yield in the shortest period of time”.  Third, the 
State also started to use another legal instrument, the ‘prohibition amnesties’ 
(amnístias de prohibición) that granted exclusive groundwater exploitation permits to 
the agricultural sector –the Ejidos and also private landowners. This decision was 
justified in terms of socio-economic development priorities in rural areas, but in reality 
represented an attempt to maintain and foster clientelist relations and also to allow 
powerful large landholders to continue using groundwater, and in detriment of the 
sustainable and democratic management of aquifers (Dominguez and Carillo Rivera, 
2007;Marañon, 2010).   
 
Years later the 1972 National Water Law (1972 NWL) declared in an explicit and 
uncontested way that groundwater was property of the Nation and that groundwater 
abstraction control and management was a matter of public interest, and exclusive 
remit of the central State.  More specifically the 1972 NWL specified that the SRH 
had the responsibility of establishing and enforcing prohibition zone declarations 
wherever deemed necessary, and of regulating all aspects pertaining to abstraction 
permits authorisations, and pumping technology characteristics. This Law also 
established that under conditions of severe groundwater over-exploitation and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
implementation schedule. It is only after all of this is established through an intensive 
consensus-building process, when the lawyers and experts come in to draft the aquifers by-
laws.  
101 An abatement/depression cone is a zone were the water table is lower and to deeper 
levels than the average static water level in any respective aquifer, sometimes representing 
important differences of approximately 20 to 25 meters. Abatement cones form around areas 
of intensive groundwater abstractions where many wells constantly exploit the resource.  
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scarcity, the use of groundwater for WS & S services is a priority and over the rest of 
the other water uses (prelación de usos).  This LAW effectively integrates all the 
relevant institutions, laws and by-laws, and administrative processes in one 
comprehensive legal body.  Still, the general orientation of the 1972 NWL followed a 
centralist, hierarchical and top-down rationale.  For B Marañon and D Lopez (2009) 
two of the few scholars researching this phenomenon in Mexico, the problem had a 
very clear driver: groundwater management through history has been subject of a 
political and economic rationale that self-defeats any of the legal and regulatory 
efforts.  They comment on this situation:  
 
“Historically, the management of groundwater resources has been 
characterised for being centralised, ambiguous, and inefficient.  In reality, the 
State never really tried to regulate groundwater extraction, even less to try to 
contain the increasing groundwater over-exploitation processes that have been 
registered since the 1940’s in the arid and semi-arid regions of the country.  
The central concern of the State has been more socio-political and economic: 
the search for political legitimacy in the countryside, promoting agricultural 
growth, and industrialisation.  In this context, groundwater became only a 
factor of production and capital accumulation, without any other consideration, 
and without any form of regulatory barriers.” (Marañon and López, 2009: 79, 
Translation: Mine) 
 
By 1975, when the 1975 National Water Plan appeared, the groundwater resources 
situation was already extremely serious, 32 very important aquifers supplying water 
to important urban settlements and also agricultural regions started to show overdraft 
signs (CONAGUA, 1975).  It was again clear that the centralist-regulatory approach 
was not controlling groundwater over-exploitation, especially in regions with high 
levels of economic development.  Initiating the 1980’s, the process of producing 
aquifers extraction by-laws began to be supported by some form of incipient social 
participation through the organisation of groundwater users. The SARH –in charge 
then of water resources– made efforts to develop ‘water groups’ (grupos de agua), 
with the purpose of generating consensus regarding the content of the aquifers 
extraction by-laws.  The first water group was established in the Comarca Lagunera 
region, followed by the Santo Domingo region (in Baja California).  These water 
groups initially were extremely fragile, their roles were kept ambiguous, and they did 
not have any collective organisational and financial resources to implement actions. 
In reality only two by-laws were produced, one for the Santo Domingo Aquifer and 
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another one for the Costa de Hermosillo aquifer.102  Still, somehow they represent 
the antecedent of the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS (Marañon and 
Lopez, 2008).   
 
By the 1990s, Mexico’s population was already predominately urban. Under this 
situation groundwater over-exploitation to support WS & S services increased 
substantially, as groundwater provides approximately 70% of the water used for WS 
& S services in cities (that concentrate about 60 million inhabitants), and also 
industry in a very high percentage, as individual industries and industrial parks 
usually rely on groundwater for industrial processes, through important ‘deep wells 
concessions’, even in water stressed regions. Starting the decade of the 2000s, O. 
Escolero (2006), a prominent Mexican hydro-geologist, began to warn about the 
process of ‘water rights transfers’ –and mostly through an informal water rights 
market– from small agricultural producers –the ejidatarios and small landholders– to 
the largest water users –mainly agro-industries that produce for domestic and 
international markets, and also to growing urban centres.103  He also warned about 
the dramatic localisation of groundwater over-exploitation in certain areas of the 
country:  
 
“A document elaborated by CONAGUA’s technical area responsible for the 
management of groundwater resources, described the decline in the quantity 
and quality of groundwater, the existence of high risk regions and the critical 
aspects, as well as the lack of sufficient technical and scientific knowledge on 
this matter. The diagnostic was appalling, of 32 overexploited aquifers 
identified in 1975, this number increased to 104 in 2006, this is to say, that in 
three decades the number increased threefold.  More so, the relevance of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102  It is relevant to comment that in both cases the groundwater users represent an 
homogeneous group of water users that produce similar products and that have financial 
resources to support groundwater management activities on their own, including the 
production of hydro-geological studies. In this case, the majority of groundwater users share 
the same interests and have the capacity to self-organise to manage the aquifer.  This is not 
the case for most of the aquifers in the country. These insights derive from an interview with 
the Technical Manager of the Santo Domingo COTAS during the Annual National COTAS 
Meeting in the State of Guanajuato in 2011.  
103 Unfortunately, this phenomenon of illegal water markets is expanding in several water 
scarce regions of the country. Ejidatarios and small landholders when confronted with 
lowering groundwater tables simply cannot pay for the drilling necessary to get to the 
groundwater, nor the more expensive pumping technologies.  This situation together with lack 
of a consistent State support for agricultural production and commercialisation renders small-
scale agriculture an unviable activity for them. So they sell or ‘lease’ illegally their water rights, 
most of the times at a fraction of their value. What this process really entails is an upward 
redistribution of wealth and a process of ‘accumulation by dispossession.’ Please see: 
Harvey, D. (2005) The New Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession, Oxford, UK, Oxford 
University Press. In conversations with some of the Ejidatarios of the State of Guanajuato 
COTAS they all confirm that this phenomenon is happening and some even are even part of 
it.  
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100 aquifers is that they represent approximately 20% of the 653 aquifers in 
the country, and that they provide close to 80% of the overall groundwater 
extracted.” (Escolero, 2010: 80) 
 
Figure 14: Localisation of Over-exploited Aquifers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONAGUA, 2012 
 
In the 1990s when a deep process of Neoliberal Statehood transformation continued 
to consolidate, a number of State-strategies were being implemented to transform 
the Mexican water polity, and as already described in detail in the previous chapter.  
Along those measures, some of the most important in terms of groundwater 
management were the establishment of the REPDA, the Efficient Energy and Water 
Use Programme (Programa de Uso Eficiente del Agua y de la Energía; PUEAEE), 
the implementation of MASAS programmes –all of these programs were supported 
by the WB–, and the establishment of the MSPs for groundwater management. I will 
now turn to briefly describe these strategies, to then continue with a more in-detail 
narrative of the establishment and institutional development process of the MSPs for 
groundwater management.  
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• The Establishment of the REPDA 
 
Already some comments were made in the previous chapter regarding the 
establishment of the REPDA, but one important aspect deserves to be recalled, 
because of its extremely negative consequences over the sustainable management 
of groundwater.  In order to establish the REPDA, the CONAGUA convened all water 
users to declare the amount of surface and groundwater resources that they were 
using for productive purposes.  The CONAGUA accepted this as a ‘good faith’ 
declaration and granted water concessions accordingly, and in exchange for water 
users to register in the REPDA and be subject of a future down-size regularisation.  
The idea was that the CONAGUA would then gradually approach each water user, 
assess the real amount of water used by them, and later negotiate an adjustment in 
the water concessions according to the real availability and use. This process did not 
happen, of course, as implementing it would have been extremely cost-full, would 
have demanded an ‘army’ of inspectors, would have required a lot of time, and would 
have demanded the implementation of extremely well thought anti-corruption 
measures. The present situation is that there is a ‘massive’ over-concession of both 
surface and groundwater resources.  This State-strategy in fact created an incredible 
strong path-dependency that is now extremely difficult to revert.  The following table 
describes this reality in approximate numbers. As the reader can see the most 
important groundwater user by far is agriculture. 104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 This situation is extremely contradictory as the contribution of agriculture to Mexico’s GDP 
has been during last 5 years of an average 3.5%.  Please see: 
www.datos.bancomudial.org/indicador/NV.AGR.TOTL. In my opinion what is happening 
reflects a terrible lack of coordination between two very important policy sectors: the water 
and the agricultural sectors. It also reflects a very dramatic lack of food security. Furthermore, 
it is difficult to understand why scarce groundwater resources are being devoted to such ‘low 
value’ economic activities, specially if these activities are no longer really being performed by 
small scale landholders and ejidatarios –a situation that could obey to social development 
and poverty alleviation considerations.  So then immediate questions rise: why agriculture 
represents such a low level of contribution to the GDP? Who in the agricultural sector is 
benefiting from the use of groundwater resources? Who holds the groundwater water 
concessions titles in the agriculture sector? Evidence is difficult to find, and because it is not 
easily shared by the relevant authorities. But the general opinion is, that during the last 
decades big agro-industries are consolidating the groundwater water concession titles, in 
detriment not only of sustainable groundwater management, but also of environmental justice.  
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Table 2: Groundwater Concession Titles and Abstraction Volumes 
REPDA, 2009 
Groundwater Use Water Concession 
Titles 
Water Abstraction 
Volume M3/year 
Percentage 
Agriculture 114,674 17,600,606,197 60.6969 
Agro-Industry 56 5,102,257 0.0176 
Domestic 14,322 26,753,182 0.0923 
Aquaculture 153 18,485,610 0,0637 
Services 4,731 660,773,846 2.2787 
Industry 4,490 1,442,063,692 4.9731 
Livestock 20,411 124,611,218 0.4297 
Urban-Public 54,402 6,952,349,814 23.9756 
Multiple 30,722 2,165,639,302 7.4684 
Energy 1 778,857 0,0027 
Commerce 3 106,280 0.0004 
Others 4 281,416 0.0001 
Total 243,969 28,997,551,671 100 
Note: This table was taken from Moreno, J; Marañon, B and D Lopez (2010), “Los acuíferos 
sobre explotados: origen, crisis y gestión social, en Jimenez, B, Torregrosa, M L and L 
Aboites (2010) El Agua en Mexico, Cauces y Encauces, México, DF, Mexico, CIESAS. 
 
 
Very relevantly, the establishment of the REPDA also allowed the enablement of 
water markets and water transfers.  This situation paired with another important and 
consequential Neo-liberal reform (during President Salinas de Gortari’s term 1998-
1994), the Constitutional Reform of Article 27, that allowed the Ejidatarios to ‘partner 
with private capital’ and to concede (enajenar) their land rights to the private sector to 
use their agricultural land for productive purposes, enabled also an important ‘land 
and water grabbing’ processes by large domestic and international agro-industries.  
 
• The PUAEE Programme 
 
In Mexico there is a perverse electricity subsidy, the tariff 09, that encourages 
tremendous groundwater spillage. The estimated annual subsidy for agricultural 
groundwater pumping is approximately of US$900 million/year (Centro Mario Molina, 
2012). There is widespread international and national consensus of the negative 
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effects of this form of subsidy (OECD, 2003; WB, 2005; UNESCO, 2008, CIDE-
SAGARPA, 2004, Carabias and Landa, 2006), but despite several attempts to 
remove it, there has been widespread opposition from the agricultural sector, and so 
because of the social and political risks involved in pursuing changes on this matter, 
the situation remains the same. Accordingly, other attempts have been tried to 
control groundwater over-exploitation through the water-energy nexus. The Efficient 
Energy and Water Use Programme (Programa de Uso Eficiente del Agua y de la 
Energía; PUEAEE), established in 1990, sought to control groundwater over-
exploitation through water and energy efficiency measures. The objective of this 
Programme was to encourage savings in both water and energy by the technological 
modernisation of pumping equipment, and thus the savings in electricity.  In 
exchange for government investments –of 50% / 50%– for pumping equipment 
updating, groundwater users would commit to reduce withdrawing water in an 
amount proportional to the saving made from using this new equipment.  
Unfortunately, this technical approach also failed, as reports (World Bank, 2004) 
estimate that agriculturalists instead of actually saving the water, they use the new 
equipment to expand their agricultural frontier.  Due to this reason the PUEAEE was 
terminated in 2012. 
 
• The MASAS Programme 
 
The MASAS Programme sought the objective of ‘stabilising’ a group of important 
aquifers that served as pilot projects to test a number of policy assumptions 
regarding groundwater management practices. Accordingly, five aquifers were 
selected to participate: the Valle of Aguascalientes, the San-Juan del Rio Querétaro, 
the Bajio-Guanajuato Corridor, and the San Luis Potosi and Costa de Hermosillo 
aquifers.  The MASAS programme implemented a number of activities, including the 
hydro-geological characterisations of the aquifers, and several forms of modelling 
studies to establish their extraction and replenishment rates under different economic 
development scenarios; the establishment of MSPs, the CONAGUA COTAS; the 
development of the aquifers’ groundwater management plans –in consensus with the 
groundwater users–, and that included the design of a number of ‘technological 
modernisation’, water productivity, and water rights transfers strategies; and finally 
the development of the aquifers’ abstraction by-laws.  In all cases the final step of 
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actually designing and enacting the aquifers’ by-laws was not actually achieved.105  
Moreno, Marañon and Lopez (2010) comment on the implementation of the MASAS 
programme:  
 
“The MASAS Programme had the objective of stabilising the Valley of 
Aguascalientes, San Juan del Rio-Querétaro, el corridor del Bajio-Guanajuato, 
San Luis Potosi, and the Costa de Hermosillo aquifers. In the Final Report all 
the institutions involved comment that the Programme had been successful, 
although in reality it did not really achieve to reduce the over-exploitation rate, 
but at least contributed in stopping its increase. Furthermore, the Report clearly 
establishes that in the opinion of the experts, groundwater over-exploitation is 
determined by a perverse electricity subsidy, the 09 electricity tariff, that 
basically encourages the pumping and use of groundwater uses to non-
competitive and profitable water uses, that basically ‘costs’ the Mexican society 
an enormous amount of economic resources and contributes to generating 
greater water scarcity. So, the sustainability of groundwater resources depends 
in a radical change in the subsidies policy in agriculture. It also accepts that 
due to the complexity and the sheer size of groundwater over-exploitation in 
Mexico, the solution to this problems is not foreseeable in the near future.” 
(Moreno, Marañon and Lopez, 2010: 93) 
 
Presently, the groundwater management situation depicts the following scenario. Up 
to 63% of national consumptive water use comes from surface water and 37% from 
groundwater.  Agriculture is the main groundwater user across the country (60%), 
followed by domestic-public use (24%), and then industrial use (5%).  Groundwater 
abstraction is estimated at 29,000 Mm3, 20% more than in 1994.  Groundwater use 
is concentrated up to 71% in semi-arid and arid regions of the country (CONAGUA, 
2010).  The number of over-exploited aquifers surmounts to 106 (2013), out of 653. 
This situation by all means represents a grave water security concern.  As described 
in the previous sections of this chapter, the centralist, regulatory and technical-
administrative State-strategies implemented throughout history and more recently 
under the aegis of the World Bank have failed to address the grave groundwater 
management challenge faced by the Mexican water polity. An estimate by the Centro 
Mario Molina (2008) considers that almost 25% of the irrigated agriculturalists are 
illegal groundwater users. I know will turn to describe another important State-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 The Querétaro Valley COTAS, that was initially the research sample of my doctoral 
research no longer functions, despite having produce a number of technical documents, and 
having been part of an expensive and extremely visible World Bank Programme under the 
support of the GW-Mate, the specialised groundwater management policy advice unit of the 
World Bank. In conversations with the former Technical Secretary of the Querétaro Valley 
COTAS, Mr. Ramon Gamez, the main reasons behind its withering-away were the difficulties 
in actually producing an Aquifer By-Law and the construction of a massive aqueduct that 
‘guarantees’ water security for the region for the next 100 hundred years, a policy decision 
that somehow create the wrong incentives for water demand management strategies.  
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strategy used to address this situation: the establishment of MSPs for groundwater 
management, the COTAS.  
 
Figure 15: Localisation of illegal Groundwater Use 
 
Source: Centro Mario Molina, 2013 
 
6.2. The Establishment of the MSPs for Groundwater Management, COTAS, in 
the Mexican Water Polity 
 
In an attempt to address a complex and interdependent groundwater over-
exploitation problem, the CONAGUA started establishing in the mid 1990s a new 
kind of socio-political governance arrangement, the Groundwater Management 
Technical Committees or COTAS.  These MSPs for groundwater management were, 
in principle, created as part of the Neoliberal Statehood strategy to enable greater 
social participation/involvement and stakeholder cooperation to support a more 
sustainable, effective and democratic groundwater management. Several drivers 
impelled this response. First, the government’s growing recognition of the alarming 
increase in the number of aquifers being over-exploited and manifesting lowering 
water tables, a decrease in the quality of groundwater, increasing electricity costs, 
and a growing number of conflicts between groundwater users.  Second, the very 
limited State’s capacity –financially, institutionally and technically– to undertake the 
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necessary, expensive, and complex geo-hydrologic studies needed to establish the 
scientific bases for groundwater management, a situation that demanded other 
solutions based on consensus-building and alternative conflict resolution.  Third, the 
presence of a more ‘enabling’ environment that supported –at the level of discourse 
at least’ the implementation of ‘decentralisation’ and ‘participatory’ processes.  
Fourth, the lessons learned from the experience of the Valley of Santo Domingo, 
where groundwater users organised as working groups to discuss their problems and 
later address them through collective action.  
 
It is important to mention that at time, the 1992 NWL and the 1994 By-Laws were still 
very ambiguous regarding to the role of social participation and stakeholder 
cooperation in the management of groundwater resources, and in reality this legal 
instruments only made very general comments in reference to the COTAS. The only 
legal anchorage was a very vague mention to the existence of some form of ‘auxiliary 
bodies’ to support the State in groundwater resources management (Marañon, 
2000). It was not until some years later with the enactment of the 2004 NWL that the 
COTAS’s objectives and institutional design structure was more clearly defined.     
 
6.2.1. MSPs for Groundwater Management, COTAS: Institutional Analysis 
 
The institutional analysis of the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS, 
presented in this section will be supported by the analytical elements offered by the 
MSPs’ literature presented in chapter 2 of this document and supporting the 
analytical power of the third moment of analysis.  Accordingly, the institutional 
analysis of the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS, will address the 
following institutional dimensions: scale, scope, institutional structure, stakeholder 
involvement (rights, responsibilities and roles) and the effectiveness, efficiency and 
equity. 
 
• The Scale of MSPs for Groundwater Management, COTAS 
 
The scale of the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS, centres at the level of 
the aquifer. This is to say that the management unit is the aquifer. Aquifers can cover 
extremely huge surfaces of land, a situation that certainly complicates the 
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management process.106  As already mentioned, there are 653 aquifers identified in 
the country of which 106 are currently identified as being over-exploited (Conagua, 
2014). Presently, there are 76 COTAS established in the country, principally over the 
most severely over drafted aquifers. Albeit this definition of the COTAS’s scale 
seems quite straightforward, there are some important technical and institutional 
issues that seem important to highlight. 
 
First, identifying the physical limits and establishing the size of an aquifer, as well as 
characterising its behaviour (extraction rate, recharge or replenishment rate, 
connectivity flows with other aquifers, water quality, dynamic and static water levels, 
etc.) is a complex processes that requires the development of comprehensive and 
expensive hydro-geological studies. Without these studies it is extremely difficult to 
really understand the over-exploitation challenges faced by the aquifer, and 
subsequently proceed to design the groundwater management plans and the 
aquifer’s abstraction by-laws. Not many actors (e.g. research centres, universities, 
private firms, etc.) have the necessary knowledge and technological devices to 
support this type of analysis.  
 
Secondly, groundwater users of a respective aquifer withdraw groundwater water 
through ‘wells’ that are either legally registered –through water concession titles that 
establish the exact location of the well, the amount of water that the user is allowed 
to extract per year, and the type of pumping technology to be used– or that are illegal 
or clandestine. Wells are mostly situated in private property or in Ejido-land, a 
situation that makes enforcement very difficult.  Inspection processes require due 
administrative and legal preparation, are expensive to undertake, and usually take a 
long time. Ultimately, at the centre of groundwater management is the control of 
groundwater abstraction at the wells, a situation that frequently implies a reduction in 
the amounts prescribed in the concession titles, something that usually confronts 
resistance from groundwater users. Consequently, the management of groundwater 
is extremely difficult to achieve through centralised and hierarchical strategies, and 
thus require a different governing approach. 107 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 This situation has prompted several experts to suggest that it would be better to establish 
smaller groundwater management units. Please see: Moreno, J L; Marañon, B and D Lopez 
(2010) “Los acuíferos sobreexplotados, origen, crisis y gestión social” en Jimenez, B, 
Torregorsa, M and L Aboites (2010), El Agua en México: Cauces y Encauces, México DF, 
Mexico, CIESAS. 
107  Personnel at the CONAGUA State Office in Guanajuato tell ‘stories’ about how 
groundwater users receive them with ‘machetes’ in hand when they want to inspect their 
wells. So this situation also complicates enforcement considerably.  
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Third, groundwater resources are ‘common pool resources’ a situation that creates 
important groundwater management challenges, frequently referred to as the 
‘tragedy of the commons’. The central management issue in terms of the tragedy of 
the commons is how to best limit the use of natural resources so as to ensure their 
long-term, democratic and equitable socio-economic and environmental viability 
(Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 2006). Accordingly, advocates of 
centralised government regulatory approaches consider that the State should be at 
the centre of this process. Supporters of market forces consider that markets are the 
best equipped to this. However, evidence shows that neither the State or the market 
have uniformly successfully prevented the depletion of common pool resources, and 
so other pathways have been sought, including community-based approaches, and, 
more recently the design and implementation of socio-political governance 
arrangements (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, Gardner, Walker, 2006).  
 
Common pool resources share three primordial characteristics: substractibility or 
rivalness, are exposed to the free rider dilemma, and uncertainty. Substractibility 
refers to the notion that as one person/user ‘harvests’ or ‘uses’ from or deposits in 
the resource base, that person/user diminishes the ability of others to the same.  It is 
this characteristic that may lead to the overuse or congestion, and eventual depletion 
of the resource (Ostrom, 1990; Dolsak and Olstrom, 2003). The second shared 
characteristic relates to the cost of excluding potential beneficiaries or users from 
having access to the resource base.  Common pool resources –as well as public 
goods– have the problem that potential beneficiaries may face the individual 
temptation to become a ‘free rider’. This means that they will seek gains or benefits 
without contributing to the activities and the costs of providing, maintaining and 
regulating the resource involved (Dolsak and Ostrom, 2003). This dimension of the 
problem is also termed non-exclusivity.  There is one last aspect that is important to 
consider, which is uncertainty. Evidence has shown that most common-pool 
resources exhibit a high level of uncertainty in their behaviour, because in the end, 
they are complex resources and also because socio-economic interactions with such 
resources are also complex (Dolsak, 2003).  
 
These common pool resources management problems –substractability, the free 
rider situation, and uncertainty– require then institutional designs capable of 
addressing them.  In theory MSPs offer this management potential, but only if certain 
conditions apply, as will be discussed later in this chapter.  
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• The Scope of the MSPs for Groundwater Management, COTAS 
  
The scope of the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS, is established across 
several official documents, including amongst the most salient: the 2004 NWL, the 
Organisation and Operation Rules of the RBCs and Auxiliary Bodies (CONAGUA; 
2000), and the Basic Documents of the River Basins Councils and Auxiliary Bodies 
(CONAGUA, 2010). The scope of the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS, 
can be organised according to the following 5 dimensions: planning, studies and 
information gathering; promotion, socialisation and social participation; management, 
coordination, and consensus-building/conflict-resolution; finance and economic 
evaluation; and accountability, monitoring and evaluation.  
 
Planning, Studies and Information Generation:  
 
• Propose public policy guidelines for the management of the aquifers. 
 
• Participate in any groundwater management planning process with the objective of 
formulating the groundwater management plans in line with broader national water 
resources planning objectives. 
 
• Provide support and advice regarding the execution of programmes and actions to 
meliorate the groundwater management and develop relevant water infrastructure to 
support the sustainable management of the aquifer. 
 
• Provide opinions regarding to the main problems and strategic actions required to 
achieve the sustainable management of the aquifer.  
 
• Participate in the analysis and evaluation of any technical studies on the aquifers’ 
groundwater availability and behaviour, groundwater use, sustainable groundwater 
management, quality concerns; and provide criteria to select the most relevant 
actions deemed necessary. 
 
• Establish relevant task forces to support the analysis of problems and the design of 
policy measures and initiatives. 
 
• Support in the generation of information to be included in the National Information 
System. 
 
• Retrieve from the groundwater users any opinions and information that may be useful 
for the sustainable management of the aquifer.  
 
Promotion, Socialisation and Social Participation: 
  
• Support the knowledge and socialisation of the national water policy guidelines and 
the legal frameworks amongst groundwater users. 
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• Support the socialisation and acknowledgment of the groundwater policy guidelines, 
programmes and actions to be implemented by the CONAGUA in the aquifers. 
 
• Support the knowledge and socialisation amongst stakeholders of the ‘groundwater 
availability studies and determinations’ and promote the stabilisation of the aquifer.  
 
• Promote the democratic participation and involvement of all relevant stakeholders in 
the National Water Plan development process.  
 
• Promote the participation and involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the 
groundwater resources planning and policy/programme implementation process, 
including the development and implementation of the groundwater management plan 
and the aquifers’ by-laws. 
 
• Participate in any actions that may contribute to the betterment of the water quality 
and conservation of the aquifer. 
 
• Promote the development of a ‘water culture’ that acknowledges that water is a 
scarce and vital resource, that it has an economic, social and environmental value, 
and that supports the implementation of IWRM. 
 
• Design and promote water education and awareness raising programmes.  
 
• Participate in the monitoring and evaluation of policy, programmes and initiatives 
implemented in the aquifers, including the groundwater management plans and the 
aquifers by-laws.  
 
Management, Coordination and Consensus-building/Conflict-resolution 
 
• Support the implementation of IWRM. 
 
• Cooperate with the CONAGUA in the implementation of the NWL and its By-Laws. 
 
• Support the RBCs and the RBOs in their functions and coordinate with them any 
policies, programmes and actions that may be required for the sustainable 
management of the aquifers.  
 
• Support the involvement and coordination with relevant central, state and local 
authorities in any relevant planning and implementation process of programmes and 
actions to address the sustainable management of aquifers.  
 
• Support the CONAGUA in the enforcement of the law and by-laws related to the 
sustainable management of aquifers and through social participation/involvement and 
stakeholder cooperation.  
 
• Support the implementation of the ‘groundwater extraction prohibition zones’. 
 
• Contribute in the development of any necessary water infrastructure to support the 
sustainable management of the aquifer.  
 
• Legitimately represent, through its Executive Board, all the groundwater users of the 
aquifers in the context of the RBCs. 
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• Receive and channel suggestions, official applications (for administrative matters), 
complaints, and denunciations regarding the use of the aquifer. 
 
• Promote the gathering or concurrency of technical, financial, material and 
technological resources that may contribute to the sustainable management of the 
aquifer. 
 
• Cooperate in conflict resolution and consensus-building regarding the use and 
distribution of the aquifer’s groundwater 
 
• When necessary request the CONAGUA or the respective RBC to intervene in any 
conflict-resolution situation.  
 
• Support in the design and implementation of any Agreements of Cooperation 
between the COTAS and any relevant authority or stakeholder. 
 
Finance and Economic Valuation 
 
• Promote the coordination and complementarity of financial resources destined to 
support the sustainable management of the aquifers. 
 
• Create a trust-fund to carry out studies, projects and initiatives that may contribute to 
the rational and efficient use of the aquifer’s groundwater.  
 
• Support the development of any financial feasibility plans to support the 
implementation of any policies, programmes and initiatives that may contribute to the 
sustainable management of the aquifers.  
 
• Cooperate with the CONAGUA in the implementation of the National Water Finance 
System.  
 
• Contribute in the socialisation and enforcement of the ‘economic value’, water-user 
and pollution-payment principles. 
 
Accountability, Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
• Support the monitoring and evaluation of any policy, programme and initiative 
implemented in the aquifers. 
 
• Support the establishment and implementation of any accountability mechanisms 
deemed necessary to support a transparent implementation of any policy, 
programme and initiative in the aquifers 
 
All these aforementioned functions appeared in several policy guidelines and have 
not been altered in their narrative. They have only been regrouped and fit in the 
different dimensions. The translation is mine.  In reality when we look in more detail 
at the ‘real scope’ of the Laguna-Seca COTAS –as a research sample of the 
COTAS– we find that it is considerably more narrow and ‘peripheral’ than the one 
described in the 2004 NWL and the policy documents.  Usually what happens is that 
	   244 
the COTAS needs to design an Annual Work Programme in coordination with the 
CONAGUA, and that later is implemented through the year.  This Programme 
comprises activities that although relevant, are definitely more reduced and have little 
‘real’ impact over groundwater over-exploitation. The CONAGUA provides most of 
the financial resources for this Annual Work Programme. 108 
 
• The MSPs for Groundwater Management, COTAS’ Institutional Structure 
 
The institutional structure of the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS, is also 
established in the 2004 NWL, the Organisation and Operation Rules of the RBCs 
and Auxiliary Bodies (CONAGUA; 2000), and the Basic Documents of the River 
Basins Councils and Auxiliary Bodies (CONAGUA, 2010).  The institutional structure 
is comprised of the following entities: the Aquifers Water Assembly, the Governing 
Board, the Consultative Technical Group, the Water-users Vocals, the Consultative 
Water User Groups, the Technical Secretary, and the Invitees. The following is a 
brief description of this structure. 
 
• Aquifer’s Water User Assembly:  The Aquifer’s Water User Assembly represents the 
social basis of the respective COTAS.  In reality it is not an entity, but more so of the 
political meeting place where all the water user groups in the aquifer ‘meet’ for mainly 
two purposes: to select the COTAS representatives and to discuss ‘groundwater 
resources management’ matters. So, in this sense, the Aquifer’s Water User 
Assembly is also a deliberative arena.  All the water users recognised in the NWL can 
participate in the Assembly, including: agriculture, social, livestock, industry, 
aquaculture, and urban-public.  In principle the water assembly should meet at least 
three times a year, but can be convened to address any extra-ordinary matter.  
 
• President, Treasury, and Secretary (part of the Governing Board): These individuals 
are entrusted with the coordination of the activities and the initiatives of the COTAS 
and representation of the COTAS’s members vis à vis any government authorities 
and other external parties.  They are also entrusted with the management and 
accountability of the COTAS’s financial resources. The three posts are chosen 
through a democratic process and by the Water User Assembly of the Aquifer. 
 
• Consultative Technical Group: It is comprised by the federal and state government 
representatives of agencies directly involved in water users’ economic development 
and productive activities and with a remit of authority that includes the respective 
aquifer’s zone.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 In Annex 4 of this document the reader can find one example of the Annual Work 
Programme of the Laguna-Seca COTAS.  All the different activities performed by the COTAS 
are included, and it is possible to assess that most of them are related to technical studies, 
census, capacity building and facilitation.  So there is a sharp comparison between the 
institutional scope that appears in the policy documents and the ‘real’ scope of the Laguna-
Seca COTAS.  
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• Water-users Vocals (part of the Governing Board: These individuals represent the 
different water user groups, including agriculture, social, livestock, industry, 
aquaculture, and urban-public groups. The number of water user vocals active at any 
given time is decided by the Aquifer’s Water User Assembly, but it is recommended 
that no more than 3 individuals should represent a particular water user group, and in 
order to facilitate public deliberation processes, consensus-building and decision-
making.  
 
• Consultative Water User Groups: They are comprised by the all the respective water 
users of each of the water uses recognised by the NWL.  The Water-User Vocals are 
the representative of these Consultative Water Groups.   
 
• Technical Secretary: Constitutes a support unit for the COTAS.  Its main role is to 
prepare and provide all the necessary technical information for the analysis and 
discussion of the aquifer’s and the water users’ problems. It is also provides logistical 
support for all matters concerning the functions and activities of the COTAS.  This 
role can either be assumed by a CONAGUA’s civil servant –the preferred option by 
CONAGUA– or by any citizen selected for its qualifications and knowledge by the 
Governing Board. 
 
• Invitees: This group is open to any representative of universities, research centres, 
non-governmental organisations, professional associations, and the like, that may 
contribute to the sustainable use of groundwater.  
 
 
Figure 16: Institutional Design Structure of the CONAGUA COTAS 
 
CONAGUA, 2012b 
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The most important and active entities within the institutional design structure of the 
COTAS are the ones that are integrated in the Governing Board and the Technical 
Secretary.  All of the posts in the Governing Board are honorary; this is to say 
individuals do not receive any form of monetary remuneration for the activities they 
undertake on behalf of the COTAS. The Technical Secretary is the only post that 
carries an economic remuneration and the individual selected for the post is chosen 
by his/her technical expertise. The Technical Secretary is in charge of developing the 
Annual Work Programme and other projects. The Governing Board should in 
principle meet every three months, but this is not mandatory.   The meeting place 
selected for all forms of meetings (i.e. the deliberative arenas) is selected by each 
COTAS, and most of the times is a public place provided by someone, either a user 
group that has a large enough venue or by a government agency.  The Technical 
Secretary (the entity) has a physical office were the Technical Management Team 
(usually one or two persons more) work and carrying out the activities of the COTAS.   
 
• Stakeholder Involvement (Rights, Responsibilities and Roles) 
 
There are two sources defining the rights, responsibilities and roles of the 
stakeholders participating in the COTAS: what is generally established in the 2004 
NWL, and was it is established in the ‘constitutive acts’ of each of the COTAS as 
they become registered ‘associations of civil society’ (asociación civil). The 2004 
NWL establishes the rights, responsibilities and roles of all the water users 
throughout the water resources planning and management process, and to which all 
citizens are subject to, most abide to and benefit from.  So citizens, in principle as 
water users, have rights to use water resources under certain parameters imposed 
by the Law, and have also responsibilities that they most fulfil to be under the ‘rule of 
the law’.  Relevantly, the 2004 NWL grants all water users the participatory rights that 
allow them the possibility –if so they wish– to be able to become members of the 
COTAS, and hence to perform the roles established as part of the their institutional 
scope.  There are, of course, a number of other legal sources the structure the rights 
and responsibilities of water users –as citizens– such as the Constitution, the 
Participatory Planning Law, the Agricultural, Livestock, Rural Development, 
Fisheries, and Feed Law, etc., and that support also this definition. In reality there 
are a number of legal and planning documents that create a dense and complex 
system that determines these rights, roles and responsibilities, and so these 
documents circumscribe water users’ agency.  In reality knowledge of this system is 
what allows certain water users to benefit from these rights, responsibilities and 
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roles, and, on the other hand, ignorance about it marginalises and excludes a great 
majority of water users. Also knowledge of this system allows certain water users to 
contest the roles ascribed to them and to generate some form of ‘countervailing 
power’. 
 
The other source of rights, responsibilities, and roles is what is stipulated in the 
constitutive acts of the COTAS as they become established a civil associations.  
Accordingly, each COTAS will become a civil association to be able to organise the 
rights and the responsibilities of the COTAS’s membership, and to be able to capture 
financial resources. These financial resources are received in the form of ‘conditional 
grants’ by the State, the membership contributions, and also by other donors.  So for 
example, in such constitutive acts typically their chapters describe the membership’s 
prerequisites, membership categories, the association’s structure –that in this case 
needs to conform with the institutional structure provided by the 2004 NWL and 
describe above–, the membership rights –of voice, vote, exit, information, 
representation, financial support, membership contributions, etc. In this constitutive 
acts the responsibilities of the COTAS’s President, Technical Secretary, Treasury, 
and other functional figures is also clearly established, as well a the decision-making, 
management, accountability and transparency procedures. It is important to establish 
that the COTAS receive legal advice for the design of their constitutive acts and that 
institutional parameters described in the official documents supersede any 
parameters established in the constitutive acts.109 
 
• The MSPs for Groundwater Management, COTAS’s Efficiency, Effectiveness and 
Equity: Commentary on the Drawbacks and Contradictions  
 
When looking at the ‘impressive’ list of ‘scope functions’ of the MSPs for groundwater 
management, COTAS, the first impression is that they could be extremely active and 
influential institutions, but this is not really the case, and for a number of reasons. 
Ultimately, despite the efforts made by the COTAS to participate in ‘supporting’ 
different processes linked to groundwater management (i.e. planning and generation 
of information; promotion of social participation; management coordination, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 In the Annex 1 of this document I included the constitutive act of the Laguna-Seca COTAS 
for the interested reader. It is standard constitutive act for a civil association and a fairly 
simple document, but it is telling of about the institutional design features of the COTAS. 
Interesting articles to read are: art 4 on the functions of the Laguna-Seca COTAS, provisos 
for the organisation of the Assembly of Water Users (Art 19 to 32) and for management of the 
organisation (Art 33 to 40).  
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consensus building/conflict resolution; finance and economic valuation; and 
monitoring and evaluation) the final result, after more than 15 years of existence, is 
that, as an institutional form, the COTAS have not managed to control groundwater 
over-exploitation and stabilise their pertaining aquifers –except in two very particular 
cases, the Santo Domingo and the Costa de Hermosillo COTAS. But how can they, if 
it is not in their power to do so? I will address this point in more detail later in this 
section. Still, the COTAS are valuable institutions in several dimensions, as I will also 
attempt to describe in this section and the following ones in this chapter.   
 
If we look broadly at the COTAS achievements in terms of their institutional scope it 
is possible to make the following commentary. 110  In terms of ‘planning, studies and 
information generation’, the COTAS generally play some role in performing some 
activities. In matters concerning the production and socialisation of technical 
information, the COTAS frequently support the production of relevant technical 
hydro-geological studies about their aquifers that, in turn, support the development of 
the groundwater management plans. In practice what happens is that CONAGUA 
provides the COTAS with financial resources for them to outsource the technical 
studies and under its supervision. Still an advantage is that COTASs’ Technical 
Management Teams usually has close relationships with some water users and so 
the information provided is generally more updated and possibly also more reliable.  
 
The COTAS also participate during the production of the groundwater management 
plans, and their members provide relevant information and view points, albeit the 
comment made by some water users is that not always all of their concerns are 
reflected in such plans.  This is hardly a form of decentralised decision-making, and 
the problem has some structural causes.  It is also important to emphasise that 
notwithstanding the COTAS may participate in the production of a groundwater 
management plan for the aquifer, if this plan does not turn into an aquifers by-law, 
then the exercise is sterile, because no meaningful legally binding action may be 
taken, and specially the ones related to the reduction of groundwater abstraction 
volumes to water users. This important aspect will be addressed in more detail later 
in this section.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 This doctoral research does not attempt to be a comparative work. Still it is possible to say 
that the COTAS in general share the same overall situation and manifest very similar 
drawbacks.  This opinion is based on various informal interviews and meetings with senior 
level civil servants in charge of the institutional development of the CONAGUA, scholars that 
have researched the topic in-detail and also groundwater users from across the country.  
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The COTAS also support their membership in terms of the ‘promotion, socialisation 
and social participation’.  They support the socialisation of relevant information about 
the national policy framework, groundwater management best practices, the main 
challenges faced by their aquifers, relevant government support available to 
groundwater users (e.g. programmes, initiatives, etc.), changes in administrative 
processes and legal frameworks, etc. This, in the opinion of groundwater users 
themselves, has a very positive impact in the community of groundwater users.  One 
area where the COTAS usually also participate with more positive impacts is the 
production of awareness raising and water education campaigns. In this case, the 
COTAS also hire universities, research centres and consultants to design these 
campaigns, again ultimately financed by the CONAGUA.   
 
An extremely important aspect to evaluate is how the COTAS promote and enable 
social participation.  In my opinion the COTAS, in certain ways, do promote social 
participation/involvement, albeit in a fairly limited way.  This limitation is product of 
CONAGUA’s understanding about what social participation/involvement means and 
also the extremely centralised, bureaucratic and complex process related to the 
establishment of ‘aquifers abstraction by-laws’.  The 2004 NWL sustains that water 
users have the right to participate in the water resources management and planning 
process through different pathways and entry points, one of them being the COTAS. 
So an important contradiction rests in the State’s understanding or definition of what 
social participation means. Notwithstanding the rhetoric and the effort in enabling the 
MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS, no social participation is meaningful if 
it is not really influential or determinant over the necessary decisions and processes 
that need to be taken to address a governing problem.  Unfortunately, this is the case 
of the COTAS in terms of groundwater management. So, despite the COTAS may 
engage in a groundwater planning process, by producing relevant information, 
convening groundwater users to discuss problems, engage in the production of 
groundwater management plans –through a consensus building and democratic 
process–, etc., if they only remain consultative bodies, without strong executive 
powers they are destined to be weak institutions, and hence, their impact as a social 
participation mechanisms –and socio-political governance arrangement for that 
matter– is rather limited.  On this Marañon and Lopez (2008) comment:  
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“The COTAS are carrying out an important activity in terms of groundwater 
management, notwithstanding they do not play a decisive role supporting the 
CONAGUA, specially in taking the control of the allocation of water 
concessions and the implementation of sanctions when confronted with 
irregularities. If the State wishes to strengthen them, it is necessary that this 
organisations command greater acknowledgment and recognition on behalf of 
the authorities and in order to increase their social recognition and acceptance 
from the water users.  This requires changes in the conceptions regarding 
public policy and social participation. The first should be understood a ‘social 
space’ where State and civil society converge for decision-making.  The 
second should be conceived as the ‘vector’ that conveys decision-making 
powers from the State’s realms to society, in such a way that citizens can take 
decisions over their own daily problems, in this case over matters concerning 
groundwater scarcity and the difficult challenges that have to be met to solve 
the problem in a co-responsible way and through co-governance with the 
authorities. “ (Marañon and Lopez 2008: 136. Translation: Mine). 
 
There is also another important source of the COTAS weakness in terms of social 
participation and that has to do with the ‘due legal and political protocol’ behind the 
enactment of the aquifers’ abstraction by-laws. This process is extremely convoluted, 
bureaucratic and centralised and hinders directly, not only the capacity of the COTAS 
to be authentic institutions to enable social participation, but the actual groundwater 
management process. I will attempt to explain this situation in the next paragraphs. 
 
After any COTAS has been promoted, established, the aquifer’s geo-hydrological 
studies developed, and the groundwater management plan produced –through 
consensus building–, then groundwater users arrive to the ‘start’ point of the due 
process to produce an aquifer’s by-laws –ultimately the instrument that establishes 
legal binding commitments in terms of groundwater management processes.  
Highlighting certain important aspects of this process, it is worth commenting that 
any aquifer’s abstraction by-laws has to go through several legal validations.  The 
first legal validation has to be pronounced by the legal department of CONGAUA (a 
process that could take 9 months to a year).  Then the document goes through a 
second validation in the legal department of SEMARNAT (again a process that goes 
back and forth until both parties are satisfied, and could take several months, maybe 
a year). Once both legal validations are pronounced, the document goes for a third 
legal validation and authorisation, this time at the Federal Commission of Regulatory 
Betterment (Comisión Federal de Mejora Regulatoria, COFEMER).  The COFEMER 
is the institution in charge of supervising that all legal and regulatory instruments are 
‘clear, simple, applicable, transparent and possible to enforce’ (the validation in 
COFEMR could take another 5 months, and if no new recommendations are of 
considerable importance to the process to begin all over again).  Once the document 
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is back from the COMEFER, it needs to be signed by the General Director of the 
CONAGUA (a process that could take also a few months).  After all of this, the by-
laws goes to the Office of the Presidency, where its legal and political officers also 
review the legal document and assess the political implications of the by-laws (a 
process that could also take also several months).  It is only after all these steps are 
taken that the President of Mexico signs the aquifer’s by-laws, that are later 
published in the Official Diary of the Federation (Diario Oficial de Federacion), when 
finally they become an official and legally binding regulatory instruments. 111 
 
Figure 17: Aquifers By-Laws Enactment Process 
 
Source: Informal power point presentation, CONAGUA 
 
Overall, and if everything goes well, a due process such as this could take three, to 
maybe five years. This situation frequently deters literally ‘anyone’ from initiating a 
by-laws enactment process.  Information regarding how many aquifers by-laws have 
actually been produced is controversial, but it seems that only 5 or six aquifers by-
laws have ever been published in the Official Diary of the Federation.  With such a 
complex and long due legal process, the whole public participation exercise is in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 I am grateful to Dr Guillermo Chavez Guillen, Manager of Groundwater Management at 
the CONAGUA and Ms Lydia Mead, Deputy Manager for River Basin Councils and Auxiliary 
Bodies for explaining the due process for enacting aquifers by-laws. 
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reality a non-starter.  In this case, Meuleman (2008) when reflecting on some 
important meta-governance strategies –in chapter 2–, he speaks about making sure 
to match socio-political governance strategies and instruments, with regulatory and 
hierarchical ones, as frequently there are important incompatibilities between them. 
This is the case for the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS, in their 
institutional role to support the control of groundwater over-exploitation, and the due 
process or protocol for enacting any aquifer’s by-laws. There is a need to change     
–simplify and decentralise– the protocol in the production of aquifers abstraction by 
laws, if this instrument is to be effective and compatible with the role of the MSPs for 
groundwater management.  What the present due process evidences is the 
extremely centralised control and decision making powers that go even to the 
President’s Office. 112 
 
In terms of ‘management, coordination and consensus-building/conflict resolution, 
this dimension is probably where the COTAS ultimately have the smallest role and 
consequently the least impact, and this is where we also find some structural causes 
affecting their performance. Strictly speaking, the COTAS only play a very marginal 
role in groundwater management.  It is important to clarify that the COTAS are not 
really autonomous, executive and financially sustainable institutions. This is to say 
they have no decision-making authority over the allocation and reduction of 
groundwater concessions, nor the implementation of groundwater management 
plans, nor the enactment of aquifers’ by-laws. The COTAS depend politically and 
financially –almost entirely– from the State –be it the central or local authority.  As it 
stands, the COTAS remain weak and ‘peripheral’ consultative bodies with little 
margin of action over the groundwater management process. Wester, Sandoval and 
Hoogesteger (2010) concur with this opinion: 
 
“Between 1995 and 2000, the CNA did not publish any policy document 
outlining the structure and tasks of the COTAS or how they should be formed. 
However it became clear that the CONAGUA only intended the COTAS to be 
consultative bodies, without any clear legal status or decision-making powers, 
in which aquifer users, government water agencies and organised groups from 
civil society would interact concerning groundwater management, under the 
auspices of the CONAGUA. It is the shared perception of the researchers and 
a former policy-maker that the CONAGUA was very reluctant to design aquifer 
management organisations with any real clout in groundwater management.” 
(Wester, Sandoval, and Hoogesteger, 2011:891) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 In the opinion of both Dr Judith Dominguez, former Manager of Water Policy and scholar 
at the Colegion de Mexico, the legal protocol to enact an aquifer’s by-law is probably one the 
most hindering factor in the pursuit of a more participatory sustainable groundwater resources 
management.  
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The COTAS also have very little capacity to enable greater stakeholder cooperation, 
because they are not executive bodies, and they are perceived as weak institutions 
by other State agencies and other stakeholders. Only some smaller efforts of 
stakeholder cooperation have been available to the COTAS, for example, through 
the interaction they have with other government institutions in order to gain access to 
small financial and technical support to implement certain initiatives. For example, 
frequently the COTAS work with the SAGARPA to harness financial resources for 
irrigation technology modernisation and agricultural conversion. Regarding to the 
development of infrastructure, their role in this dimension mostly focuses in the 
coordination of work related to rehabilitation of wells and the modernisation of 
pumping equipment, again most of the times financed by the CONAGUA or 
SAGARPA.  So in a way they do support the concurrence of technical, financial and 
social resources to support the small actions related to infrastructure maintenance, 
and the like.   
 
Regarding consensus building and conflict resolution the COTAS do recreate 
deliberative arenas that can help to air conflicts and attempt to generate consensus 
about groundwater management challenges, groundwater management objectives 
and more generally the groundwater management plans. Still despite their 
importance as socialisation mechanisms, these deliberative arenas are relatively 
weak, also for a number of structural reasons. The COTAS continue to have a limited 
capability to convene groundwater users to participate as active members of the 
institution –including their deliberative arenas–, as typically on average only 20% to 
25% of the groundwater users of any respective aquifer is an active member of their 
respective COTAS, and so their social basis is extremely weak, and thus so their 
political legitimacy (Moreno, Marañon, Lopez, 2010; Wester, Sandoval, and 
Hoogesteger, 2011). 113 
 
This important problem is path-dependent on the way the CONAGUA usually 
establishes the COTAS, as they rush through the process without due care for 
promoting the idea and of being inclusive and broad in the convening process. There 
is also a problem of political representation, as some users feel completely 
unrepresented by their respective vocals in the Governing Board. This has also to do 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 This situation becomes evident every time one attends to any of the COTASs’ deliberative 
arenas, as there is a reduced turn out on behalf of groundwater users. Also the case is that in 
most occasions the same people are the ones showing at these deliberative arenas. This is 
an important problem that affects the political legitimacy and the ‘power of’ the COTAS.  
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with the great diversity or heterogeneity of groundwater users in the country, a 
situation that complicates the legitimate representation of interests, the management 
of conflicts and the eventual, if not extraordinary, production of consensus in matters 
concerning groundwater management. There is also the problem of 
misrepresentation of interests, as at times people who only seek to favour their 
positions and that of their group-faction capture the positions of Water-user Vocals.  
The problem of lack of political representation is an important problem. On this Perez 
(2010) comments: 
 
“Socio-economic differences, such as education, organizational capacity, 
economic capacity, amongst other, are mentioned by some authors as the 
main sources of inequality in political representation; while some water users 
are represented in the COTAS by the largest domestic and transnational 
companies, others are represented by the small holders. Hernandez de 
Alvarado also highlights these same problems, asserting that the main problem 
has its roots in the way CONAGUA convened the water users, whereby the 
representatives of the Ejidos were left out, and only prominent figures of the 
regional productive sectors were then selected for most of the COTASs’ 
Governing Boards, leaving the regional elite in charge.” (Jimenez, 2010:77) 
 
In terms of the ‘finance and economic valuation’ dimension, the role of the COTAS is 
also fairly limited.  Most of the COTAS depend on the financial support from the State 
to undertake their activities. In most of the cases the salary of their Technical 
Secretaries is paid by the State, a situation that also serves to exercise ‘power over’ 
them.  In certain cases the COTAS find other sources of finance from social and 
environmental philanthropic organisations and non-governmental organisations. In 
most of the cases the COTAS once established they rapidly become associations of 
civil society, and once this legal status is achieved they can open trust-funds or 
‘current accounts’ in commercial banks that allow them to receive financial resources 
in a transparent and official manner. In some cases the COTAS establish ‘annual 
contribution quotas’ and ‘service contribution quotas’ that they charge to their 
membership for administrative and technical services.  Still in all of the cases the 
COTAS are not really self-sustaining institutions (Moreno, Marañon, Lopez, 2010; 
Wester, Sandoval, and Hoogesteger, 2011). 114 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 In a focus group co-organised with the CONAGUA Office in the State of Guanajuato, the 
participants highlighted the financial dependency and financial constraints as the main 
problems of the COTAS. Unfortunately, groundwater users do not see any feasible 
alternatives for financial independence.   
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In matters concerning the ‘accountability, monitoring and evaluation’ dimensions the 
COTAS do work to support the enforcement of the rule law, as their membership has 
the opportunity to monitor closely what is happening in the aquifers territory. They 
are also in a strong position to notice illegal well drilling and also any acts of 
corruption that they have to report to the relevant authority.  This is yet another 
important structural limitation, as they do not have any powers to enforce the law nor 
to execute sanctions. 
 
• ‘Power’ in the context of the MSPs for Groundwater Management: A Succinct 
Commentary 
 
In this section I will engage in a succinct description of how power relationships seem 
to play out in the context of the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS, and 
using the characterisations presented in chapter-2: power in, power of, power over 
and countervailing power. 115 
 
‘Power in’ in the context of MSPs plays out in several dimensions or avenues. 
Amongst one of the most important dimensions is of course between the State and 
the Governing Board, the Technical Secretary and the Water User Vocals. Perhaps 
one of the most important moments when this power relationship plays out is during 
the definition of the groundwater management plan. Frequently, the case is that 
groundwater management plans are contracted out by the CONAGUA State Offices 
to consultancy services that have limited time and limited resources to deliver. They 
also seem to have limited knowledge about participatory process as they are mostly 
engineering firms. So they produce highly technical groundwater resources 
management plants that offer most of the time technical-rational solutions –like 
technological modernisation, agricultural conversion, water rights transfers, etc.  
Hence, the solutions to not really address the conflictive and complex issue of 
groundwater re-allocation and groundwater abstraction reductions. Then they later 
present their findings and strategies to the COTAS, of course eliciting strong 
negative responses, due to the lack of participation and the lack of commitment to 
address the real problems faced by the groundwater users. As the plans require the 
consensus to be implemented, then a consensus-building process usually starts and 
in order to modify the groundwater management plan. This form of resistance is an 
expression of countervailing power, as actually the COTAS is able to challenge the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 The insights on the workings of power in the context of the MSPs for groundwater 
resources management derive from conversations with members of the COTAS, and by 
attending to the various deliberative arenas organised by the COTAS.  
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State in its intentions and proposals, and re-orient policy process through a different 
pathway.  
 
Obviously, ‘power in’ the COTAS also plays out between water user members during 
the development of the groundwater plan, as different groundwater users have 
different concerns and interests. For example, industrial users usually consider that 
they are already taking measures to mitigate their impact over the aquifers –through 
technological means like water re-use and natural resources conservation measures 
oriented at protecting recharge areas. This happens a lot for example in places were 
important soft drinks and beer bottling companies operate, and so they are fast to 
point out that the main culprit of groundwater over-exploitation is agriculture, so they 
strongly voice their concerns for the need to reduce agricultural water use.  The 
agricultural producers on the other hand obviously seek to protect their water 
concession volumes, and so a tense process of shaming and blaming starts –this 
happened a lot in Queretaro Valley Aquifer, the first COTAS that I first researched, 
as there is an important bottling company of the Coca-Cola Company.  At that time 
the Coca-Cola Company was adamant in blaming agricultural producers of wasting 
valuable water, that could be use in higher value economic activities with greatest 
economic benefit for the whole of society.   
 
Another important moment when ‘power in’ the context of MSPs plays out is during 
the definition of the COTAS yearly ‘activity programme’. During this moment the 
Governing Boards of the COTAS negotiate with the CONAGUA State Offices what 
activities the COTAS will be doing with the budget provided by CONAGUA.  As it is 
important for CONAGUA to maintain the ‘notion’ or ‘perception’ that they support the 
COTAS and that democratic decision making exists, frequently there is some leeway 
in the negotiations and the COTAS have some room of manoeuvring to define their 
yearly ‘activity programme’. It is important to highlight the value of the COTAS 
deliberative arenas, as negotiations undertaken there with the presence of several 
COTAS members, and other stakeholders help to shape and tame the positions and 
attitude of State representatives, that are then somewhat obliged to concede to 
reasonable points under the pressure of needing to be open, transparent and 
supportive. So the contribution of the COTAS deliberative arenas to enabling 
countervailing power is critical.  One last comment is necessary, of course the way 
‘power in’ plays out is very much context specific, thus in this case what I am 
presenting are only general tendencies and observations that are circumscribed by 
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the limitations to the fieldwork I experienced and already explained in the introduction 
of this document.  
 
‘Power in’ also plays out through the manifestation of the second dimension of power 
–the definition of the agenda.  In the case of the COTAS this form of power is clearly 
established since the outset of the political process, as the COTAS are ex-ante –so 
to speak– limited in their scope, remaining consultative bodies, incapable of 
addressing the real groundwater management challenges. ‘Power in’ the COTAS 
also manifests through the strong influence that the CONAGUA has over the 
definition of the COTASs’ work-plans (i.e. in the definition of their work agenda).116 
 
‘Power of’ in the context of the MSPs for groundwater management is very much 
circumscribed by the 2004 NWL.  Accordingly, the 2004 NWL clearly establishes that 
the COTAS are only ‘consultative bodies’, with no executive powers.  The COTAS 
role is only that of being advisory entities that support the relevant authorities in the 
groundwater planning and management process. The ‘power of’ dimension is also 
circumscribed by the COTASs’ financial dependence of CONAGUA, as they receive 
most of their budgets from it. This also serves to limit their room of manoeuvre.  So 
the COTAS ‘power of’ is mostly oriented at the generation and socialisation of 
information, carrying out technical studies, capacity building workshops and 
awareness raising campaigns. In certain occasions the COTAS manage to find 
financial resources form other sources in order to undertake activities, but these have 
to comply with the rule of law, that limits the COTAS from exercising any form of 
authoritative act. The COTAS can also carry out important advisory activities in 
support of their membership and on a number of administrative process and red tape 
that are required to, for example, regularise water concessions, gain access to 
government support, pay fines, etc.  So, albeit limited, this are some of the main 
dimensions of ‘power of’ available to the COTAS. 
 
There is another important dimension of ‘power of’ that plays in favour of the COTAS, 
and this is manifested in the ‘network power’ that the COTAS –and mostly the 
Governing Board and the Technical Secretary– have.  Most of the time the 
Governing Board and the Technical Secretary of a COTAS are well ‘networked’ 
individuals that have ‘contacts’ across different government agencies, a situation that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 In the next section of this chapter we will look in more detail at the Laguna-Seca COTAS 
Annual Work Programme, and I will have an opportunity to comment on it more precisely.  
Still one thing is worth commenting now, it is clear that their agenda is very limited in its scope 
and in its potential impact to address the crucial drivers of groundwater over-exploitation.  
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helps them to gain relevant information in a timely manner.  An example of this is 
when government agencies open up ‘programme inscription windows’ (ventanas de 
inscripción a programas). This windows open only for certain periods and give 
access to several government assistance programmes.  The COTAS is a good 
position to acknowledge these opportunities and then mobilise groundwater users to 
benefit from these programmes.  
 
On the issue of ‘power over’ the MSPs for groundwater management, it is clear that 
the State exerts this dimension of power through multiple pathways. The first one is, 
as already mentioned, through the definition of the COTAS’s role in groundwater 
resources management, and clearly established in the 2004 NWL.  The law clearly 
limits the role of the COTAS to that of being advisory bodies.  The second very 
definitive pathway is through the financial dependence that the COTAS have to the 
CONAGUA.  This situation clearly makes them susceptible to the definition of their 
role and their agenda.  Another important dimension of ‘power of’ that is a little more 
subtle, but that is highly determinant in that it builds a strong path-dependency is 
through the way that the CONAGUA carries out the ‘convening process’, as these 
processes across the country have been generally rushed through without a careful 
and broad inclusion of stakeholders, a situation that affects their legitimacy, and also 
their power.  
 
I will devote words to complete this dimension power in chapter-7 when I explain the 
State meta-governance strategies and capacities that the CONAGUA exercises over 
them.  
 
6.3. The Experience of the COTAS in the State of Guanajuato: A Paradoxical 
and also Contradictory Experience 
 
6.3.1 Institutional Development History: Some ‘Critical Junctures’ 
 
Historical Institutionalism highlights the role of critical junctures in the process of 
institutional change and development; that is of the presence of historical events that 
because of the particular sequencing and timing they precipitate this change. This is 
the circumstance of the paradoxical case of the COTAS in the State of Guanajuato, 
where their establishment and institutional development process was initially 
supported in an ‘extraordinary’ way by the State Governor, the Secretary of 
Agriculture and Rural Development of the State of Guanajuato (Secretaría de 
Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural SAyDR) and then the State of Guanajuato Water 
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Commission (Comisión Estatal de Agua de Guanajuato, CEAG), and where, at least 
initially, the prospect of them actually addressing rampant groundwater over-
exploitation through greater social participation and stakeholder cooperation seemed 
promising. In time the challenges have proven difficult to surmount and their 
contribution towards these ends have been more tamed.  
 
The COTAS in the State of Guanajuato began to be established in 1997, a few years 
after they started to be established by the CONAGUA in other states of the country, 
and under the MASAS Programme supported by the World Bank. This process was 
driven by an important groundwater management crisis, product of a rapid expansion 
of irrigated agriculture that increased from 56,679 ha in 1966 to 367,000 ha in 2000, 
76.6% of which are irrigated with groundwater  (CEAG, 2006). The state has also 
experienced a rapid process of urbanisation and industrialisation, and important mid-
size and emerging cities are located in the state, as well as important industrial parks 
(Wester, Sandoval, Hoogesteger, 2011).117  As a result, across the state, aquifers 
had been experiencing a lowering in their ‘water tables’ of approximately 2 meters 
per year, and sometimes declining at a rate of even to 3.5 meters near cities.  This 
should not have stricken by surprise, as the number of wells had increased 
steadfastly from being approximately 650 in the 1950s to 17,000 in 2000 (Foster, 
Garduño, Kemper, 2004).  The regions within the state that had been more severely 
affected were the central el Bajio region and the Laguna-Seca area. Consequently, 
groundwater over-exploitation became a water security concern, even more 
aggravated by the inter-state competition over surface water resources of the Lerma-
Chapala River –also one of the most over-exploited rivers in the whole country 
(Marañon, 2010).  
 
The establishment of the COTAS in the State of Guanajuato started in 1997 and was 
backed by the then State Governor, Mr Vicente Fox, who very much supported any 
decentralisation State-strategy under the framework of the ‘New Federalism’ 
discourse promoted by President Ernesto Zedillo’s administration (1994-2000), and 
driven by the State’s financial crisis and the continuation in the implementation of 
Neoliberalism in Mexico, and since the presidency of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-
1988), as described in chapter 5 of this document.  Vicente Fox –an active member 
of the opposing National Action Party (Partido Accion Nacional, PAN)– sought every 
opportunity to contest centralism and promote greater state-level sovereignty in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 It is important to establish that agriculture represents 83% of groundwater abstractions in 
the state of Guanajuato, but it is also critically important for industrial and domestic use, as 
99.3% of the water uses by such sectors depend on groundwater (CEAG, 2006).  
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public policy matters. Also, the State of Guanajuato is one of the driest states in the 
whole country and paradoxically also one of the largest agricultural producing states, 
and so for Governor Fox water security became a central concern of his 
administration, as well as an important ‘ideological banner’ that would help him build 
a larger political platform with presidential ambitions.  
 	  
Table 3: Initial Phase of Institutionalisation of the Guanajuato COTAS 
COTAS Establishment as 
MSPs 
Establishment as 
associations of civil 
society 
Celaya 
León 
Silao-Romita 
Río Turbio 
Irapuato-Valle Santiago 
Salvatierra-La Cuevita 
Pénjamo-Abasolo 
Acámbaro-Cuitzeo 
Moroleón-Ciénaga Prieta 
Rio Laja 
Jaral de Berrios 
Ocampo 
Xicahú 
Laguna-Seca 
Consejo Estatal Hidráulico 
1997 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2000 
1999 
1999 
1997 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2000 
1999 
2000 
 Note: Elaborated with information on the institutional history of the COTAS 
 
At the centre of his political project was also the enabling of greater social 
participation across all policy sectors, a strategy that had some other calculated 
motives. The first one being that this new push for social participation sought, more 
than anything else, to dismantle former clientelist networks built by the PRI during 
past administrations and build new ones under the control of the PAN. 118  The 
second one, to begin to build a more robust precedent for his outspoken support for 
democratic practice and the need to further the democratisation of the political 
system, a discourse that years later helped him in his intention to contend for 
presidential elections in the context of an already weekend PRI –that had maintained 
one-party rule over 70 years. Some years later in 2000, Mr Vicente Fox won 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 In interviews with civil servants in the State of Guanajuato, they all concur that they had 
political pressures to re-shuffle the distribution of State resources in order to dismantle the old 
clientelist networks and build new ones under the control of the PAN.  
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alongside the PAN the presidency, soon after declaring water a matter of ‘national 
security’.119  
 
The IMTA’s team in the State of Guanajuato designed a different model of COTAS 
than the one being supported by the CONAGUA at that time, a situation that also 
created important tensions between CONAGUA and the State Governor. In the 
perspective of the SAyDR and the IMTA, the establishment of the COTAS needed to 
follow a ‘bottom-up’ approach, and the central idea was for these new institutions to 
really represent ‘political spaces’ were water users and government could gain a 
clearer understanding of the gravity of groundwater depletion and could collectively 
discuss and take decisions to address the challenges faced (i.e. to really become 
institutions with real decision making powers and capacity to implement corrective 
actions). In 1998, the responsibility of the COTAS in the State of Guanajuato was 
shifted to the CEAG.  This move had some important implications in terms of the 
orientation and institutional design features of the COTAS, this time influenced by 
another group of seasoned civil servants at the CEAG.  Wester, Sandoval and 
Hoogesteger (2011) explain the nature of this changes in the institutional scope and 
structure of the COTAS:  
 
“The move to the CEAG led to several changes in the structure of the COTAS.  
The most salient differences were that the CEAG decided to form the Board of 
the COTAS with only water user representatives –and not civil servants. In the 
CEAG model, the membership of the COTAS was to consist of all the water 
users of an aquifer, defined as those extracting groundwater for agricultural, 
industrial or commercial use, while urban inhabitants would be represented 
through the municipal water supply companies.  The CEAG was quite clear 
that the COTAS should be legally recognised organisations that would focus 
on regulating and conserving water. Most importantly, the COTAS were to 
reverse aquifer over-exploitation and recover groundwater levels by reaching 
agreements on aquifer management and agreeing actions to regulate, 
conserve and efficiently use water. To achieve these goals it was foreseen that 
the COTAS would: propose aquifer rules and regulations for the sustainable 
use of aquifers; propose a local water plan and participate in the formulation of 
the State Water Resources Plan, most relevantly participate in the granting of 
water concessions, and monitor the aquifer rules and regulations and the 
volumes of water extracted.” (Wester, Sandoval and Hoogesteger, 2011: 892) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 President Fox’s interest in water resources management was behind the candidacy and 
successful bid of Mexico to organise the 4th World Water Forum in Mexico City in 2006.   
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Figure 18: The MSPs for Groundwater Management COTAS: Institutional Design 
Source: Wester, Sandoval, and Hoogesteger, 2011 
 
So there are number of important differences then between the CONAGUA’s COTAS 
model and that of the initial CEAG’s model and in terms of institutional scale, scope 
and structure.  In term of institutional scale an important difference is that the 
CEAG’s model made emphasis on ‘conjunctive use’ and IWRM; that is in attempting 
for the COTAS to have a greater saying in the definition of the State Water 
Resources Plan and, hence, in working towards establishing and managing the 
impacts of surface water resources management and groundwater management 
together in order to foster more stakeholder cooperation. In terms of institutional 
scope the conception was dramatically different, as the COTAS in the State of 
Guanajuato were not initially conceived as consultative bodies, but as actual 
executive bodies with autonomous decision-making powers in all matters pertaining 
to groundwater planning and management, and most relevantly in terms of granting 
concessions, and monitoring. The idea was also for the COTAS to gradually become 
financially autonomous. In term of institutional structure they had sought to have a 
greater presence of water users in the Governing Boards of the COTAS, and also to 
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have as their Technical Secretary not a civil servant from CONAGUA, but an actual 
technically qualified individual chosen by the water users, but totally independent 
from government. For the CEAG a critical step was for each COTAS to become a 
civil association.  
 
The CEAG organised for the establishment and institutional development of the 
COTAS a strategy that followed the next stages: convening; legal constitution; 
development of the groundwater management plan; establishment of the aquifers by-
laws; and organisational development.  Starting in 1998, the aim was to finish the 
first two phases for 14 COTAS by year 2000, a rather ambitious target.  According to 
policy makers involved in the process, the political pressure of finishing before the 
presidential elections at the end of 2000 really hampered the convening process, as 
it was not possible to construct an inclusive and broad social bases for the COTAS, a 
situation the created an important path-dependency. On this Wester, Sandoval and 
Hoogesteger (2011) explain:  
 
“CEAG chose first to form the COTAS, and then to expand user participation. It 
is the authors’ shared perception that by neglecting to bring together the 
majority of the aquifers’ users at the start to arrive at a shared understanding of 
the problems faced by the aquifers and the possible solutions, CEAG failed to 
create a sense of ownership among water users that the COTAS was their 
organisation.  Later on, this proved to be an obstacle for consolidation.  The 
lack of adequate representation of the groundwater users in the COTAS made 
it difficult to reach consensus on reductions in groundwater extractions, and 
many users did not see the COTAS as a user organisation, but as an 
extension of the government.” (Wester, Sandoval and Hoogesteger, 2011: 893) 
 
By late 1999, the whole of the state of Guanajuato was covered by a COTAS. From 
then, during the next Presidential term of Vicente Fox (2000 to 2006), the COTAS 
strongly depended on the CEAG financial support to cover for their operational and 
technical activities. During that period the state budget for the COTAS reached 
nearly US 10 million, divided in US 4 million for operation costs and the rest for 
technical studies –by all means an unprecedented account. The institutional 
development efforts concentrated in attempting to correct the lack of user 
involvement and formulating groundwater management models for each aquifer        
– that are the basis for planning and management.  The strategy was that once with 
the models and information, groundwater users would approach the COTAS out of 
curiosity and interest.  This strategy functioned and gradually the number of 
membership in the COTAS rose from only 255 water users in 2000 to 8, 610 (of an 
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estimated universe of 13,500 – 16,500 well owners)(CEAG, 2006). Simultaneously, 
the CEAG implemented a large information socialisation and capacity building 
campaign to train water users in different aspects related to IWRM and participatory 
groundwater management.  
 
Still it is important to mention that the ambitious plans of turning the COTAS in to 
authentic MSPs with the capacity to decide over the allocation and size of 
groundwater abstractions had to be recast. One of the main reasons is that the state 
Governor and the CEAG were overtly optimistic of their capacity to fight the 
centralisation of State power, and gain control over the power to allocate, change 
and cancel groundwater concessions, a situation that simply did not materialise         
–centralisation is too embedded in the political system.  In this case, the CONAGUA 
retained the sole federal power to manage the allocation of groundwater water 
concession titles.  In the opinion of experts (Marñon, 2010) this struggle between two 
State power centres significantly reduced the prospects of the COTAS reaching their 
goals. It is worth highlighting now that this struggle for greater decentralisation 
evidences the importance that having the power to allocate water concession titles 
represents for political power, a power the central-State will not cede easily –another 
critical juncture that in this case played out against the institutional development of 
the COTAS in the State of Guanajuato.  
 
Consequently, the institutional scope of the COTAS had to be severely tamed from 
being an executive entity to be more of a consensus-building, planning, information 
socialisation, awareness-raising and capacity-building one. At that point in time 
(approximately in 2006 and towards the end of President Fox’s administration), and 
under the circumstances, an interesting strategic selectivity was considered to 
provide greater empowerment to the COTAS. This time in coordination with the 
CONAGUA, the CAEG pushed for the COTAS to have some form of delegated 
capacity to support their membership by providing different forms of administrative 
support and liaison services.  From then on, the COTAS support groundwater users 
in their legal and administrative processes with CONAGUA, such as regularisations 
of concession titles, organisation of the necessary paperwork for groundwater users 
to gain access to federal and state level support programmes, etc. However, I would 
like to emphasize that the original idea for the COTAS did not consolidate and from 
that point in time their path of institutional development was severely limited, some 
say ‘truncated’.  	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Table 4: Main Difference between the Conagua’s and the Guanajuato COTAS Models 
Guanajuato COTAS (Technical Water 
Councils) 
Conagua COTAS (Technical Groundwater 
Committees) 
Conjunctive use and IWRM Groundwater only 
Strong civil society participation with State 
participation in the Consultative Group and 
to support technical input 
Stronger State presence with the 
participation of civil society 
Initially executive, autonomous and 
financially self-sustaining MSPs 
Later, same as CONAGUA’s COTAS 
Consultative entities with no executive 
powers 
No authoritative acts No authoritative acts 
Technical Secretary appointed by the 
Decision of Board 
Technical Secretary appointed by 
CONAGUA and most of the times a civil 
servant 
Financial and administrative autonomy (trust-
fund) 
Financial and administrative dependency 
from CONAGUA 
FIPASMA Trustfund to support the COTAS no 
State Water Council (second tier COTAS 
organisation) 
no 
Note: Elaborated with information on the COTAS. 
 
 
 
 
There are two other important differences that deserve attention.  The CONAGUA’s 
State Office in Guanajuato and the CEAG created the Social Participation for Water 
Resources Management Trustfund (Fideicomiso para la participación social en el 
manejo del agua, FIPASMA).  The FIPASMA is a special purpose trustfund to 
support the institutional development of the COTAS.  It was created in 2000 and on 
average it harnesses approximately US$300,000 per/year that distributes across all 
the COTAS, and for them to carry out their Annual Work Programme. I will like to 
emphasise that an important pathway through which the ‘power over’ dimension 
materialises is through the signing of Agreements of Cooperation (AofC) between the 
CEAG and the COTAS in Guanajuato. 120   This document is a legally binding 
document that establishes the terms of a cooperative relationship between the CEAG 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Please see annex 2 in this document. In it I present the Agreement of Cooperation (AofC) 
between the CEAG and the Laguna-Seca COTAS. This AofC is a standard document that is 
entered into by the CEAG and all the COTAS.  A careful reading of this document makes 
clear that this instrument is not a flexible agreement at all, allowing the COTAS to define is 
orientation and work programme. Actually it leaves very few spaces for the COTAS to take 
decisions and it narrows down their institutional scope. I invite the reader to take a look at it.  
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and all of the COTAS –independently. Theses AofCs establishes the responsibilities 
and rights acquired by the parties, the orientation and type of activities to be 
developed, and most importantly the amount of financial resources to be provided by 
the CEAG to the COTAS.  In 2011 and 2012 for example each of the State of 
Guanajuato COTAS received approximately US$50,000, which is truly not a big 
amount. The amount received is to be allocated to activities jointly defined by the 
CEAG and the COTAS, leaving really only little room form manoeuvring.  
 
The second important element was the creation of the State level Water Resources 
Committee (Comite Estatal Hidráulico, CEH).  The CEH functions as a second tier 
organisation that is comprised by all the COTAS and that provides greater exposure, 
political influence, and at times technical expertise to them.  The CEH intervenes at a 
higher political level in support of the COTAS. It is the opinion of some groundwater 
users that the currently the CEH is not working well, actually that it has been 
‘captured’ by interests that not necessarily attune with those of the COTAS. The CEH 
has become an entity that competes for financial resources to continue existing. No 
other state in the country has a second tier organisation in representation of their 
respective COTAS.  An interesting fact is that recently in the 2011 Annual COTAS 
Meeting in the State of Guanajuato –that is organised on a yearly bases– the COTAS 
decided to embark in the creation of National Confederation of COTAS, again to 
make attempts to gain a higher level of exposure and political representation.  
 
 
• The State of Guanajuato MSPs for Groundwater Management, COTAS’ 
Efficiency, Effectiveness and Equity: Commentary on the Drawbacks and 
Contradictions 
 
The commentary regarding the drawbacks and contradictions of the State of 
Guanajuato MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS reflects the same 
orientation of the previous commentary regarding the CONAGUA’s COTAS, except 
that perhaps the contradictions are harsher.  In this case and at a point in time, there 
was a real impetus to support the establishment of truly decentralised and 
participatory MSPs for groundwater management, that later was very much tamed by 
the power-struggle between two power centres within the State, the CONAGUA, 
representing the interests of a power bloc supporting centralisation and federalisation 
strategies, and the CEAG and the CONAGUA’s office in the State of Guanajuato, 
that sought more local control, greater social participation and democracy.  Ultimately 
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the ‘winner’ was the central State, but at the loss of a more sustainable, participatory 
and democratic groundwater management model.  Some counterfactual questions 
may be lightly asked, for example, what could have happened if the State of 
Guanajuato could have become a pilot region to really try out greater decentralisation 
and empowerment in groundwater management, and under the support and the 
‘vigilance’ of the CONAGUA? Questions like this are really difficult to respond, but 
what is clear is that the CONAGUA was not really prepared to support this form of 
socio-political governance arrangements, despite the strong rhetoric, and despite the 
recognition that all the other State-strategies had utterly failed (are still failing).  Some 
comments on the role of the State in this process are made in following chapter.  
 
Generally speaking, efficiency and effectiveness are rather slim, as described in the 
section above. Except in two cases were groundwater demand is not considerable, 
no COTAS in the state of Guanajuato has achieved the stabilisation of its respective 
aquifer. Some minor and peripheral impacts regarding certain scope dimensions 
exist, like in the case of the other COTAS in the country. In the words of some of the 
COTASs’ Technical Secretaries and the groundwater users in the state of 
Guanajuato, the consolidation of water concessions in the hands of the biggest agro-
industries and large landholders continues. Every year more small landholders and 
ejidatarios leave their lands and transfer their water rights.  Agricultural interests 
continue to over-exploit the aquifers, despite representing a grave water security risk, 
and under the aegis of the CONAGUA. I concur with Moreno, Marañon and Lopez 
(2010), the State plays a central role in supporting groundwater over-exploitation and 
undemocratic groundwater management processes.  Consequently, the process of 
accumulation by dispossession thrives and the main drawback is in terms of social 
equity and environmental justice. I will know turn to deploy the fourth moment of 
analysis.  A quick look at the over-draft rate of the aquifers in the State of Guanajuato 
is a telling experience.  
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Table 5: Overdraft Rate of the State of Guanajuato Aquifers 
 
Availability  
Mm3 
Recharge 
Mm3 
1101 XICHU-ATARJEA 4.120181 40.3 
1103 OCAMPO 4.575785 6.4 
1104 LAGUNA-SECA -26.056625 128.5 
1106 DR. MORA-SAN 
JOSÉ ITURBIDE -21.906922 38.4 
1107 SAN MIGUEL DE 
ALLENDE -8.469726 28.6 
1108 CUENCA ALTA DEL 
RÍO LAJA -60.238886 139.7 
1110 SILAO-ROMITA -120.200000 243.5 
1111 LA MURALLA -10.877058 34.8 
1113 VALLE DE LEÓN -177.673448 156.1 
1114 RÍO TURBIO -3.334583 110.0 
1115 VALLE DE CELAYA -132.875798 286.6 
1116 VALLE DE LA 
CUEVITA -4.246128 5.9 
1117 VALLE DE 
ACÁMBARO -47.200000 102.5 
1118 SALVATIERRA-
ACAMBARO -41.589061 28.4 
1119 IRAPUATO-VALLE -162.527706 522.2 
1120 PENJAMO-ABASOLO -126.361646 225.0 
1121 LAGO DE CUITZEO -2.200000 7.1 
1122 CIENEGA PRIETA-
MOROLEON -122.100000 85.0 
Note: Extracted from: 
www.conagua.gob.mx/disponibilidad.aspx?n1=36&n3=94 
 
 
6.4. The Democratic Performance Assessment of the Laguna-Seca COTAS in 
the State of Guanajuato 
 
6.4.1. The Laguna-Seca COTAS: Introduction and Some Basic Facts 
 
The Laguna-Seca COTAS was the first of the 14 COTAS to be established in the 
State of Guanajuato in November 1997, and received the name of the watershed it 
covers, the Laguna-Seca Watershed, that also gives the name to the aquifer, the 
Laguna-Seca aquifer. It later became a registered civil association in December 
1999.  The geographical extension of the Laguna-Seca aquifer is of 1900 km2 and 
spreads across 8 municipalities: San Diego de la Union, Dolores Hidalgo, San Miguel 
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de Allende, San Luis de la Paz, Victoria, Doctor Mora, Tierra Blanca, and San José 
Iturbide. The total population of the region is of 223,230 inhabitants, spreading 
across approximately 633 localities (CONAPO, 2010).  This also corresponds to the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS scale.  
 
Figure 19: Laguna-Seca COTAS: Localisation 
Source: Informal presentation Laguna-Seca COTAS, Technical Management Team 
 
According to REPDA (2010), the present groundwater abstraction volume registered 
is of 139,503,232 m3/year, against the annual estimated recharge rate of 
128,500,000 m2/year, producing an annual deficit of 11,003,232 m3/year.  The 
average depth of the static water level has dropped steadily from 40.00 meters in 
1970, to 109.00 meters in 2003 and to 260.00 in 2010 (Laguna-Seca COTAS, 2010). 
The primary groundwater uses of the Laguna-Seca aquifer are agriculture –by far–, 
than industry and then the services –hotels and resorts. There are 1205 active wells 
across the different municipalities, of which 863 correspond to agricultural water use, 
216 for urban-public use, 117 for domestic use and 9 for industry.  There are 31,670 
ha of irrigated agriculture.  The main produce is alfafa (6000 ha), followed by maiz 
(3000ha) and the broccoli (1800ha). Alfalfa is a very water intensive produce. The 
Laguna-Seca Aquifer is under a strict ‘groundwater exploitation prohibition zones 
declaration’ status since the 1957, a legal-regulatory situation that has been 
reinforced and become stricter since then with subsequent declarations.  
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Figure 20: Aquifers in Guanajuato 
 
Source: Informal presentation Laguna-Seca COTAS, Technical Management Team 
 
Figure 21: Lagua Seca COTAS: Wells/Abstractions Localisation 
Source: Informal presentation Laguna-Seca COTAS, Technical Management Tea, 
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Being the first COTAS established in the State of Guanajuato, according to policy 
makers and researchers (Marañon and Lopez, 2010) due care was taken during the 
convening stage to socialise the idea of the COTAS amongst the greatest number of 
stakeholders and potential members, attempting to be inclusive of all the different 
water user groups.  As it was the first COTAS to be established in the State of 
Guanajuato two factors affected stakeholder participation: on the one hand there was 
the usual stakeholder reluctance to participate in any government effort, but also 
there was ‘intrigue’ about the concept. Since its establishment the COTAS’s 
Governing Board selected a very active and competent Technical Secretary that has 
remain in her post since then. In the view of researchers and practitioners the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS is one of the most active in the region. It has produced a 
number of thorough and technical competent hydro-geological studies, two 
groundwater management plans, supports the groundwater users in all 
administrative and legal procedures, has managed to secure financial resources 
every year for its activities –mainly from CONAGUA, but also from private sources–, 
and most importantly, has managed to develop some form of countervailing power.  
This overall situation urged me to select it for the deployment of fourth moment of 
analysis.  The next section of this chapter devotes efforts towards de democratic 
performance assessment of the Laguna-Seca COTAS, and by establishment its level 
of attainment of the potential democratic effects: developmental, public, and 
institutional effects.   
 
Figure 22: Laguna-Seca COTAS: Wells and Urban Settlements 
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6.4.2. The Democratic Effects of the Laguna-Seca COTAS 
 
• Developmental Effects: Generation and Socialisation of Useful Information 
 
The Laguna-Seca COTAS plays an important role in the generation and socialisation 
of information through multiple pathways. It supports the CONAGUA’s information 
socialisation efforts by distributing amongst its membership important information 
regarding relevant and current groundwater management laws and regulations –and 
their yearly modifications. CONAGUA has a limited capacity to socialise information 
across the countryside and to all groundwater users in the Laguna-Seca watershed 
area, who are highly dispersed in the territory and have little interaction with the State 
institutions. In this case, the Laguna-Seca COTAS is in a better position, not only to 
share information with its groundwater users, but also very importantly, to assist 
them in developing a good understanding of it.  There are other important examples 
of this situation regarding important legal and policy information produced by other 
State institutions –at a federal and state-level. 
 
The Laguna-Seca COTAS also assists the CONAGUA in the socialisation of current 
information regarding basic administrative procedures that groundwater users need 
to engage with regularly, such as the regularising of groundwater concessions; the 
payment of outstanding electricity bills and the procedures to enrol in the electricity 
subsidy programme for agriculturists –the tariff 09–; the procedures to transfer 
groundwater concessions; the expansion and rehabilitation of groundwater wells; and 
the procedures to benefit from the technical and financial support provided by federal 
and state-level agencies.121  Another important function of the Laguna-Seca COTAS 
regarding the socialisation of information is through helping to organise consultation 
processes regarding technical groundwater studies and management plans 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 It is important to mention that in the opinion of several groundwater users of the Laguna-
Seca COTAS interviewed or with whom informal conversations were carried out –especially 
from the social-rural sector– most of the administrative and regulatory procedures concerning 
groundwater management and technical support programmes for groundwater users are 
extremely intricate and difficult to understand. This situation is considered by many 
groundwater users to be a deterrent to engage with the State institutions on these matters, 
losing the opportunity to be regularised, as well as to benefit from a number of State 
programmes. Perhaps it is worth highlighting that this situation is an important source of 
social inequality and so the presence of the Laguna-Seca COTAS is quite positive as it helps 
to reduce the negative impacts of this situation. As such, the Laguna-Seca COTAS’s 
personnel have received capacity building on these legal and administrative matters and can 
support groundwater users with these procedures. Also, the Laguna-Seca COTAS’s 
personnel have also developed networks in the public sector that support them to undertake 
this legal and administrative procedures on behalf of the groundwater users that are members 
of the Laguna-Seca COTAS, this is to say the have developed some form of network power.  
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developed by State institutions and other social actors.  As such the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS has assisted in the socialisation of two different groundwater management 
plans, one produced in partnership between the COTAS and the IMTA (2004), the 
other one presently produced by the CONAGUA and the CEAG (2012); and a 
technical study by the CEAG and the World Bank (2009).  The Laguna-Seca COTAS 
has played a central role in the socialisation of these documents amongst 
stakeholder, a process that, in turn, has triggered reactions on their behalf.  
 
On the other hand, the Laguna-Seca COTAS is itself also an important provider of 
information for the State, as part of its mandate is to organise several information 
generation activities regarding the condition of the aquifer and the activities and 
perceptions of its users.  On this matter, the Laguna-Seca COTAS for example 
generally participates in the development of well inventories (each year); the 
production and monitoring of piezometric information; and the development of 
climate information  –produced through automatic climate stations that belong to the 
COTAS.122  Thirdly, and most importantly, the Laguna-Seca COTAS is also a useful 
provider of information on matters concerning the activities of groundwater users, for 
example the type of agriculture produce harvested by agriculturalists in the aquifer’s 
area, the localisation and extension of agricultural plots; the different irrigation 
methods and practices implemented by agriculturalists, etc.  This information is also 
extremely relevant for policy-making and without the intervention of the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS and the participation of groundwater users it would be extremely difficult and 
expensive to gather. It may be stated that this situation also contributes towards 
other democratic effects, which are the reduction of bounded rationality and the 
enablement of social learning, as well as effective problem solving. 
 
The Laguna-Seca COTAS has developed very important and high standard technical 
documentation. As mentioned before, the Laguna-Seca COTAS produced in 2004, in 
partnership with the IMTA, a groundwater management plan, entitled “Proposals for 
the Operation and Sustainable Management of the Laguna-Seca Aquifer, The Use of 
Water for Irrigation.” This document is the most comprehensive and relevant study 
and plan developed so far for the aquifer. It offers in-depth technical information 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 It is recognised by the Laguna-Seca COTAS’ members and also civil servants, that the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS’ inventories are the most up-dated and complete. This information is 
extremely valuable for policy-making and regulatory purposes and it is difficult to see how the 
CONAGUA could actually manage to have produced it without the support from the COTAS, 
as it is not only an extremely labour intensive and time consuming process, but also because 
the information is difficult to gather, mainly because groundwater users are sometimes 
reluctant to hand it over to the authorities.  
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regarding the situation of the aquifer; the socio-economic characterisation of the 
users and economic activities of the region and their main trends; the impacts of 
these on the sustainable use of the aquifer, and through the use of sophisticated 
groundwater modelling techniques.  Finally, it offers some robust strategies to 
address some of the main groundwater management challenges faced, focusing on 
irrigation modernisation and water demand management strategies. 123  This 
document also plays an important empowering role, as it has been used by the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS to contrast it with other government strategies and proposals 
for the management of the aquifer.  So in a way it has provided also the Laguna-
Seca COTAS with a tool that enables them to have some form of countervailing 
power, as they can contrast it against other visions regarding the nature and the 
characterisation of the groundwater challenges, and as such also assists in the 
production of the additional democratic effects of political equality and effective 
problem solving. 
 
There is another relevant activity of the Laguna-Seca COTAS regarding the 
generation and socialisation of information that is somewhat contradictory, and on 
which the members of the Laguna-Seca COTAS and relevant authorities do not 
unanimously agree. The Laguna-Seca COTAS, at times, also informs the relevant 
local authorities about the illegal drilling of groundwater wells; the illegal transfer and 
fragmentation of groundwater concessions; the existence of illegal polluting activities, 
etc.  This in reality is actually some form of policing activity, a situation that has 
generated some tensions between the Laguna-Seca COTAS and some groundwater 
users.124  
 
• Developmental Effects: Limiting the Impact of Bounded Rationality and Enabling 
Social Learning Processes 
 
It is possible to say that by itself, the establishment of the Laguna-Seca COTAS 
supported the reduction of ‘bounded rationality’ and the enablement of social learning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 If the reader is interest, this document can be found at:  
http://chac.imta.mx/instituto/historial-proyectos/rd-muestras-2004.html 
124  Several groundwater users vented during one of the deliberative arenas some form of 
frustration when referring to this situation, as frequently the case has been that the Laguna-
Seca COTAS has denounced illegal activities to the relevant authorities –acting on behalf of 
the sustainability of the aquifer– and no action is later taken to address these situations. 
Another important aspect to consider regarding this denouncing activities is that the COTAS 
cannot ‘blow the whistle’ on every illegal situation they encounter, principally because it is not 
their current role to police nor to enforce the law, but also because if they turn into ‘informers’ 
they will lose the possibility of engaging later into more participatory and cooperative 
behaviour amongst groundwater users.	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processes.  The convening and establishment phases of the Laguna-Seca COTAS 
involved, as already mentioned, the mobilisation of groundwater users to discuss the 
common groundwater problems experienced by most of them; and also to reflect on 
the possible measures to address it –one of them being the establishment of a 
COTAS per se.  This initial process entailed a number of meetings and activities that 
enabled raising the awareness amongst groundwater users about the seriousness of 
local groundwater over-exploitation problems and about the need to urgently address 
such problems.125  It is worth stressing that this initial convening and establishment 
phases are extremely important, because through them stakeholders begin to create 
some form of shared and collective understanding on the many different pressing 
challenges and prospects faced by them to manage the aquifer in a more sustainable 
manner. This process also seems to be an initial contribution towards lessening the 
impact of bounded rationality.   
 
Following these initial phases, and after the Governing Board of the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS was established, its members went through a thorough capacity-building 
process on several matters concerning groundwater regulation and groundwater 
management practices. They even went to the Edwards Aquifer in California to study 
the institutional set up. The idea behind these capacity-building efforts was to 
encourage Board members to gain access to best practices in order for them to later 
socialise them amongst their groundwater user groups, thus contributing again 
towards the reduction of bounded rationality. 
 
Furthermore, the Laguna-Seca COTAS organises, in partnership with the Conagua 
and the CEAG, a reduced amount of capacity-building workshops on several themes, 
including for example: technical and legal aspects of groundwater management, 
such as groundwater user rights and obligations updating; and water productivity 
strategies in irrigation and agricultural reconversion. It is important to mention that 
during these capacity-building workshops there is also the opportunity for 
stakeholders to share their own experience and concerns about different matters 
concerning water productivity practices and other technical aspects of groundwater 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 The process of initial configuration of the Laguna-Seca COTAS entailed a number of multi-
stakeholder meetings. This process had s positive impact over the enablement of social 
participation in the social learning process. In other cases this initial convening and 
establishment phases were more hurried, having a negative effect on extent on the 
achievement of this and other potential democratic effects. In the case of the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS these phases took almost nine months  
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management, thus generating a richer social learning experience.126  This capacity-
building effort undertaken by the Laguna-Seca COTAS in partnership with 
government is negotiated and carried out on a yearly bases, as it is mostly financed 
by the CONAGUA state office in Guanajuato.  
 
In interviews with the Laguna-Seca Technical Team and also some of its members 
the opinion is that the process of social learning amongst stakeholders has also 
generated some form of collective identity and common purpose, amongst 
membership.  This situation, generally speaking, has also played some role in the 
institutional development of the Laguna-Seca COTAS. This also happens through 
the different capacity-building workshops and meetings, through which a sense of 
collective identity has gradually conformed; as well as through the other activities 
carried out by the Laguna-Seca COTAS.  Still, when the Team and water users 
expressed their opinion it was tainted with concern, as they are aware that whether 
these collective identity and sense of common purpose solidifies is critically 
dependent on a number of factors such as the level of participation and inclusion of 
stakeholders; the quality of the public sphere they are capable of generating; the 
level of effectiveness of the Laguna-Seca COTAS, amongst other factors. Finally, the 
reduction of bounded rationality and the enablement of social learning processes 
directly contribute to the potential democratic effect of effective problem solving.  
 
• Developmental Effects: Development of Critical/Citizen Skills and Political 
Education 
 
The Laguna-Seca COTAS is a space for the socialisation amongst participant 
members of issues and concerns regarding groundwater management challenges. 
Indeed, part of the central activities of the Laguna-Seca COTAS is to organise 
several activities that create enabling environments for the development of 
critical/citizen skills and political education. For example, and as already mentioned, 
the Laguna-Seca COTAS organises a number of capacity-building workshops on 
several important themes. During such workshops the individuals learn about a 
number of important issues concerning groundwater management, something that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 When interviewing groundwater users, most of them concur that the capacity-building 
workshops have been extremely useful and satisfactory. Most of them will welcome the 
possibility of taking more workshops on a regular basis and of topics not only related with 
groundwater management issues, but also in terms of technological innovation and 
agricultural commercialisation strategies. Also in interviews with the Technical Management 
Team, they are willing to organise more workshops, but the main barrier for this activity is the 
lack of financial resources and government support. 
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has a direct contribution towards the goal of political education. These workshops 
also represent an opportunity for groundwater users to develop important critical 
skills, by sharing amongst themselves their knowledge and experience. This situation 
also represents an important opportunity for the Laguna-Seca COTAS’ members to 
develop a greater awareness not only about their situation as groundwater users, but 
also about the situations that others are experiencing. This valuable experience 
seems to have supported developing some sense of collective identity and perhaps 
some sense of collective responsibility amongst participants, as already 
mentioned.127  
 
It is important to highlight, that it is not that the Laguna-Seca COTAS members do 
not already know about their situation, when it is quite clear for them that day to day 
groundwater tables are found at lower levels, and therefore water has to be pumped 
for longer periods, a problem that not only implies an increase in electricity costs, but 
that the quality groundwater is also deteriorating.128 This critical situation affects 
agricultural producers and is putting at risk the viability of their livelihoods. So, it can 
be considered that, by participating in the Laguna-Seca COTAS and sharing and 
hearing their own different experiences amongst themselves a more comprehensive 
understanding is developed, not only about the urgency and the extent of the 
situation, but also about the need to exercise pressure over the authorities to make 
greater attempts to address the problem unwaveringly.  
 
As previously stated, one of the main functions of the Laguna-Seca COTAS has 
been to organise a series of sequential meetings to engage in an open dialogue 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 It was possible to establish through interviews and ‘coffee-brake’ conversations with the 
groundwater users that they all share grave concerns about groundwater over-exploitation, 
the weak position of the Laguna-Seca COTAS, the lack of financial support for its activities, 
the level of corruption perceived in State institutions, amongst other topics. So in this sense, it 
is possible to state that there is a collective identity as members of the Laguna-Seca COTAS 
and a more or less unified view about the problem. Regarding a sense of collective 
responsibility, this assessment is more difficult to make. During conversations, some people 
show genuine attitudes of commitment towards finding ways to address groundwater over-
exploitation, still the only way to really find out if this is actually true can only be seen when 
the time comes for each user to reduce the amount of water used and abide to the aquifers’ 
by-Laws. In my opinion an important barrier to increase this potential democratic effect is the 
limited number of participation in the COTAS.  
128 This situation affects social groups in a differential manner. That groundwater tables are 
being lowered steadfastly implies that only the producers with financial capacities to pay for 
electricity bills, groundwater pumping equipment and also to increase the depth of their wells 
are the only ones that stand a chance to keep producing and maintain their rural livelihoods.  
For the rest, it is simply too costly. This situation for the young people implies migration to 
other places to find jobs elsewhere, and for the elder this actually renders them extremely 
vulnerable, because migrating is not really an alternative for them. 
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regarding the groundwater management plan for the aquifer. Accordingly, 
participants in those meetings enter into a social dynamic where complex information 
is presented and debated amongst themselves and with the authorities, most of the 
time in an orderly fashion. Individuals participating in these deliberative arenas 
engage in the presentation and public deliberation of ideas. Such meetings need to 
conform to some general rules of social interaction and public deliberation, 
established by a facilitator or moderator –most of the times. These public deliberation 
‘rules’ are generally in line with urging participants to respect each other; to wait for 
turns for having a chance to speak and avoid interrupting other speakers; to avoid 
monopolising the conversation, to express ideas concretely and avoid rambling, etc.  
In the case of the Laguna-Seca during all the meeting that II have attended the 
Technical Secretary of the President have spelled out the rules of engagement or 
interaction.  This situation again contributes towards the generation of citizen skills. 
 
In the meetings attended so far, it was possible to observe that there are cases were 
individuals have either ‘natural’ skills for presenting arguments or have developed 
such skills through practice (i.e. through their participation in other public deliberation 
processes).129  In any case, individuals participating in such meetings are socialised 
into the dynamic of a deliberative arena, where they are enticed to present ideas and 
problems clearly and succinctly, engage in deliberation process with the rest of the 
participants and arrive at some form of negotiated output through consensus-building 
or voting. It is important to mention that most of the groundwater users interviewed 
that have participated in either workshops or meetings find that they have learned 
about the dynamics of public deliberation and that they feel more confident to engage 
in this type of processes.130  This could be a very important developmental outcome, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Perhaps an interesting observation to make is the following. During the participation in 
workshops and meeting it is possible to identify individuals with great eloquence, and so they 
manage to communicate messages to the audience in a clear and even impressive manner. 
In some occasions this has nothing to do with scholarly education. Still when exploring the 
matter further, it is possible to find that most of these individuals generally already have 
participated and frequently attend various others deliberative aneas, concerning other 
matters, for example agricultural committees, producer organisations, stock-breading 
organisations, community committees, etc. This situation seems to corroborate Warren’s 
(2001), assumptions that the richer the associative activity of an individual the stronger the 
developmental effects.  
130 It is pertinent to mention that the COTAS is not the only venue –the only association– 
where groundwater users participate, there are other venues such as agricultural production 
and stock-breading associations –organised manly by the SAGARPA and other government 
institutions– and where groundwater users gain knowledge about the their situation, where 
they can practice their citizen skills and be involved in associative activity and public 
deliberation processes that contribute to their political education. Indeed associative 
democrats, like Warren, consider that the richer the associative terrain and associational 
ecology of a particular society, the stronger the democratic effects. On this please see Mark 
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especially if the Laguna-Seca COTAS becomes a stronger institution, increases its 
activities and interaction, and exercises greater influence throughout the groundwater 
management process. 
 
It seems possible to say that groundwater users participating in the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS activities –mainly in the deliberative arenas– have developed an 
understanding or appreciation that it is only though collective action or cooperation 
how they will be able to address the urgent groundwater overexploitation problems 
they face.131  It is possible to say also that perhaps amongst the core groups in the 
COTAS –that is the Technical Management and the Governing Board —a sense of 
solidarity has developed, manifested through their constant support to the activities 
and positioning of the Laguna-Seca COTAS.132  Indeed the Laguna-Seca COTAS 
Technical Management Team is always carrying out outreach activities, enticing 
groundwater users to become members of the COTAS and also to continue 
participating in all the meetings and activities. As such the COTAS can be 
considered to be fostering the development of a more responsible, informed and 
proactive citizenship. 	  	  
• Public Sphere Effect: Creation of Deliberative Arenas and Enablement of Public 
Deliberation / Public Justification and Transparency and Accountability through 
Public Scrutiny  
 
The Laguna-Seca COTAS has created some form of deliberative arenas around 
issues concerning the sustainable and equitable management of the aquifer. Indeed 
part of the main of objectives of the Laguna-Seca COTAS has been to attempt to 
enable a broad, inclusive and open public discussion on the most pressing problems 
faced by groundwater users and also on the potential measures to address such 
problems. So, in principle, the Laguna-Seca COTAS has enabled the development of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
E. Warren, Democracy and Association (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 
206-216. 
131 In the interviews made to groundwater users that have regularly participated in the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS’ deliberative arenas, the general appreciation is that they do have 
developed a greater understanding that the problems they are facing can only be solved 
through cooperation.  
132 On this it seems relevant to comment that the members of the Governing Board –the 
President, the Treasurer and the Secretary – as well as the Vocals, these roles are 
completely honorary, that is to say individuals do not receive any salary for the activities. 
Furthermore, it should be considered also that these individuals at times devote a significant 
amount of time to the further the objectives of the Laguna-Seca COTAS, they pay their own 
transportation costs for meetings, and sometimes even disburse from their personal financial 
resources to support certain logistical activities, such as coffee breaks, lunches, petrol, etc.  
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the public sphere through a number of ways. Initially, the Laguna-Seca COTAS 
supported the generation and socialisation of relevant information regarding the 
situation of the aquifer in a deliberative arena. Accordingly, it is through this 
socialisation process how individual and public opinion was mobilised, and issues 
and concerns were debated.  Afterwards, during the organisation of other 
deliberative arenas a range issues have been discussed openly between 
stakeholders, and including the participation of State representatives.  
 
A very important moment of the public sphere enabled by the Laguna-Seca COTAS 
is during the discussion on the orientation and content of the groundwater 
management plan. This is an interesting moment where a form of communicative 
rationality is enabled.  Here it is very important to mention again the critical role of the 
mediator or facilitator of the public deliberation process and the methodology used to 
organise the process of public deliberation. Accordingly, the role of the mediator has 
been critical for the generation of a vibrant and purposeful public sphere, centred in 
the public deliberation of the groundwater management plan. As such the moderator 
has been responsible for establishing some rules of engagement during the process 
of public deliberation. Commenting on the moderator’s role I also want say the he/se 
is responsible for allowing all voices to be heard and to exercise neutrality and good 
judgement in support for a democratic public sphere. 133  This situation is not 
straightforward, and requires knowledge and experience regarding to mediation and 
consensus-building techniques. 134  
Another important public sphere effect generated by the Laguna-Seca COTAS is the 
support of transparency in decision-making processes both through the exercise of 
public justification and also of public scrutiny. At a general level of argumentation, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 During this PhD research investigation it was possible to be present in a number of 
groundwater management plan-making meetings and to witness the role of the facilitator, 
specially the case of the Queretaro Valley Aquifer. It is possible to say that the moderator was 
a highly qualified individual in the application of the ZZOP methodology and also in alternative 
conflict resolution, so the meetings were carried out in an orderly and purposeful manner. In 
the case of the COTAS-Laguna-Seca the moderators have been its President and its 
Technical Manager. Both individuals have plenty of experience in conducting meetings 
purposefully and with the presence of different stakeholders.  
134 It is important to refer also to another extremely relevant factor influencing the production 
of the COTASs’ public sphere during the process of discussion of the groundwater 
management plan, the use a robust analysis and decision-making methodology. In certain 
cases, the COTAS have used the ZZOP methodology –the German result-oriented project 
planning methodology. This methodology is divided in four main stages that allows for the 
orderly identification and characterisation of stakeholders, the identification of problems, the 
development of objectives, the development and presentation of alternatives/measures, the 
creation of work-plans and the follow-up and evaluation of actions. For further information on 
the application of the ZZOP methodology in the context of the COTAS please see the 
following webpage: https://www.u-cursos.cl/fau/2010/2/DIH-506/1/material.../455603 
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during the groundwater management plan-making process, and other technical 
meetings, all the stakeholders –including government officials and groundwater 
users– needed to present their arguments publicly, that is to say, they had to engage 
in a process of public justification of their ideas and positions. Consequently, the 
deliberative arenas have developed a chance then for the presentation of arguments 
and for the presentation of counter-argumentation also, a situation that has allowed 
for the possibility to arrive at more consensus-driven decisions on the groundwater 
management plan. This exercise of public scrutiny has been extremely relevant in 
two important ways. The first one, the public sphere seems to have produced the 
transformation of interests/perspectives, or at least maybe the taming of such. 
Secondly, the public sphere has also empowered the Laguna-Seca COTAS in a 
somehow natural way. For example, recently it was possible to attend to the 
presentation of a new groundwater management plan for the Laguna-Seca aquifer 
(i.e. the Operative Programme for the Sustainable Management of Water Resources, 
POMSA-Laguna-Seca COTAS). Unfortunately, this POMSA was not produced 
through a bottom-up approach and without any thorough consultation with the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS’s Governing Board, much less with the groundwater users, a 
situation that has created an extreme discontent amongst them. In this meeting the 
members of the COTAS had the opportunity to discuss the content, the orientation 
and the methodology used to produce the Laguna-Seca POMSA. It became totally 
clear for the government officials present at the meeting and for the groundwater 
users also that the groundwater management plan would not be accepted in its 
present form.135  This situation generated an important form of countervailing power, 
and now the Laguna–Seca COTAS has been entrusted with the organisation of wider 
consultation process to amend the POMSA together and with the participation of 
stakeholders.  
 
The pursuit of greater accountability in decision-making processes in terms of the 
government’s and groundwater users’ actions is achieved by the generation of the 
COTAS public sphere. During the process of public deliberation on matters 
concerning the management of the aquifer, government officials have been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 The decision taken by government authorities during this meeting is for the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS to review the groundwater management plans. Presently, this situation still is under 
negotiation and there are two possibilities. The first option is for government to condition the 
allocation of financial resources to the elaboration of a reviewed document by the COTAS to 
be delivered in December. The other possibility is that part of the budget to be allocated for 
2013 will be channelled to a broader consultation, revision activities and the consensus-
building process. It is possible to consider that this decision is extremely important, as the 
POMSAS will determine the strategies to be followed by the COTAS in the mid-term.  
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confronted with tough questions and opinions regarding issues related to government 
action. Again using the example of the POMSAs, groundwater users have blatantly 
manifested to be against the content and the orientation of this Programme, 
threatening public officials to disavow it, if made official by the CONAGUA. They 
have also severely questioned the credentials of the consultancy company working in 
the elaboration of the POMSAS, as it is mostly a strategic management consultancy 
firm, and does not hold the necessary political, socio-economic and technical 
qualifications to work on the complex issues surrounding groundwater management. 
 
A very important aspect that several members of the Laguna-Seca COTAS –and 
also of other COTAS– have highlighted during interviews is that groundwater users 
need to perceive the deliberative arenas useful to advance their individual and the 
collective interests.  They need it to find it worthwhile to participate in them in order 
be enticed to attend, after it takes time and effort to get there. They either need to 
consider that they are learning something new, that they are influencing decision-
making process or at least that their opinions are being heard, etc. It is relevant to 
mention, that in this sense, the public sphere created by the Laguna-Seca COTAS is 
still fragile, because people will begin to abandon it if no clear outputs are achieved 
to further support groundwater users to solve their immediate problems and also the 
long-term sustainability of the aquifer. Also the Technical Management Team made 
emphasis on the need to identify ‘positive people’ and ‘allies’ in order to be able to 
create a productive and purposeful public sphere, as the presence of ‘negative’ 
people derails productive public deliberation processes. One last important 
consideration, regarding this matter, is that, when convened, the presence of 
government stakeholder is paramount to legitimise and actually empower the public 
spheres. The above concerns have urged the Laguna-Seca COTAS’ Technical Team 
for a careful planning in the scheduling of the deliberative arenas.  
 
• Institutional Effects: Keener Political Representation and Greater Political 
Equality 
 
It is possible to say that the Laguna-Seca COTAS supports the pursuit of a keener 
political representation aimed at achieving greater political equality. This potential 
democratic effect has been pursued again through a number of pathways. First, it is 
possible to maintain that the Laguna-Seca COTAS is indeed an official and legitimate 
political representation channel through which groundwater users can voice their 
ideas, proposals and discontent in attempt to obtain responses from the competent 
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government authorities. Secondly, a very important manner in which the Laguna-
Seca COTAS has provided keener political representation and the pursuit of political 
equality is through facilitating groundwater users to have access to different types of 
State’s programmes. On this, as it has been commented before, it is important to 
emphasise that the way in which this programme’s operation rules are designed, 
actually creates important barriers for certain social sectors to gain access to them –
especially the small landholder and the small-scale ejidatarios.136  Furthermore, the 
lack of access to State resources worsens by the presence of corporatist and 
clientelist relationships, whereby a great proportion of the allocation of government 
funding goes through organised channels interest representation, diminishing the 
opportunity for these small landholders and ejidatarios to have access to much 
needed financial and technical support.  Thirdly, another important aspect related to 
the pursuit of a keener political representation and greater political equality is that the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS has also helped groundwater users to benefit from a diversity 
of private and international technical and financial support.  A clear example of this is 
the relationship that the Laguna-Seca COTAS has established with private 
foundations that support some of its activities, like Fundación Guanajuato with whom 
a capacity-building project on sustainable irrigation technologies was launched in 
2008. 
 
 
Through interviews with Laguna-Seca COTAS’s Technical Management Team and 
also with groundwater users a recurrent theme is the presence of corruption. It is 
important to be careful regarding this situation, and no evidence has been shown to 
corroborate allegations, but the general commentary and social perception is that 
corruption is pervasive, and that groundwater users encounter it almost at all contact 
points with the State institutions. Corruption also affects political equality, because 
groundwater users with financial resources or political connections receive 
preferential treatment, solving issues rapidly and also gaining access to government 
support. As such the Laguna-Seca COTAS has provided a strong and legitimate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 As already mentioned the paperwork and due process required to receive government 
support is rather complex, and so certain social sectors are deterred from engaging. Also it is 
important to mention that besides this problem, the operation rules of some of the 
programmes require of financial counterparts on behalf of the groundwater users, and that 
are way above the possibilities of many of them. This situation acts as yet another important 
source of social inequality, as the government support goes then to social actors that are 
already well off; leaving the most marginalised outside their scope of aid. Through the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS it has been possible to voice these concerns in an attempt to modify 
some of these programmes operation rules.	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political representation that protects groundwater users from being caught in a web 
of corruption and at the same time attempts to facilitate the expediency of all forms 
administrative procedures. On this, for example the Laguna-Seca COTAS provides a 
keener political representation by helping groundwater users to engage in different 
forms of legal and administrative paperwork. In this sense, the Technical 
Management Team at times is able to pool a number of groundwater users to help 
them engage in these enduring and complex processes. So, the Technical Manager 
will then help such groundwater users to fill paperwork, assemble all the necessary 
documentation and present the information at the relevant government offices and, 
most importantly, at the right time. It is frequently the case that the COTAS is able to 
provide this service to groundwater users in a cost-effective and timely way. 137 
 
The Laguna-Seca COTAS’ Governing Body and its Technical Team also participate 
in other important venues of associative activity pertaining to the water sector and to 
other policy sectors. In the case of the Laguna-Seca COTAS, the President and the 
Technical Manager participate in SAGRAPA’s Sustainable Rural Development 
Council and the CONABIO’s Biosphere Reserve Councils. This political 
representation is important, because it has opened spaces in different networks of 
contacts and has created important possibilities for technical and financial support.138  
It is also represented at the State Water Council (Consejo Estatal Hidráulico) and 
lastly, the Laguna-Seca COTAS also assists groundwater users to engage with the 
Federal Commission of Electricity (Comisión Federal de Electricidad, CFE), and to 
gain access to very important electricity subsidies for groundwater pumping.139 
 
 Each year the Laguna-Seca COTAS enters into an AofC with the CEAG. Through 
this agreement of cooperation the COTAS receives financial support to carry out a 
Annual Work Programme, and that generally includes the updating of the 
groundwater well inventory, capacity-building workshop and other public 
communication activities. It is important to mention that through this agreement of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 On this a small detail to add is that at times the Laguna-Seca COTAS Technical Team 
charges a small cost-recovery and symbolic fee to undertake these assistance services. 
These quotas are only voluntary.  
138  It is not the case of the Laguna-Seca COTAS, but in some other COTAS, their 
representatives are also present in at the CONAFOR reforestation meetings. This experience 
is also interesting, because through the intermediation of the COTAS with CONAFOR, 
agriculturalist can actually gain access into the payment for environmental services 
(reforestation) schemes, receiving significant compensation for reforestation practices in their 
territories. 
139 It is important to comment that this subsidy has been extremely criticised for being one of 
the main factors behind groundwater exploitation. Please see Forcada, Sangines y Piña 
(2008) and Guerrero, Yuñez, and Medellin (2008). 
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cooperation the Technical Management Team is also paid and the office costs of the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS are covered. 140 
 
• Institutional Effect: Greater Transparency and Accountability  
 
Initially, it is possible to say that the Laguna-Seca COTAS supports the realisation of 
the democratic effect of greater transparency and accountability by way of 
contributing to other democratic effects, such as the generation and socialisation of 
information and the public sphere effects, that in turn, have an impact on the pursuit 
of greater transparency and accountability. Therefore, the achievement of the 
democratic effect of greater transparency and accountability through the generation 
and socialisation of information is most clearly seen for example in the production 
and socialisation of information that demands governmental response and attention.  
For example, regarding the last aquifer’s well inventory and technical studies, 
dangerous pollution sources that put at risk the integrity of the aquifer and the health 
of groundwater users were identified, putting this problem at the centre of public 
sphere and therefore, demanding a government response. Other important aspect of 
this situation has to do with groundwater user right transfers, whereby individuals are 
required to register this situation and follow due paperwork, in this sense the COTAS 
has enough leverage to request government information regarding this transfers, to 
later share it with there membership.141   Indeed supporting groundwater uses to 
legitimately access information regarding these situations and others –such as 
sources of programmatic funding– supports in this case the pursuit of greater 
transparency and accountability; and specially in the case of a country such as 
Mexico, where generally speaking, access to strategic information –that is 
information that is useful for decision-making– is simply something that is difficult to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Please see Annex 3 and 4 of this document for examples of the 2011 and 2014 Annual 
Work Programme of the Laguna-Seca COTAS. 
141 Open and timely access on the water rights transfers is important because in aquifers with 
depression cones, such transfers may worsen groundwater abstraction conditions for 
neighbouring wells, and thus these transactions require to be strictly regulated, something 
that generally speaking is left unsanctioned by the authorities at transfers are permitted by 
law. Furthermore, in the context of groundwater governance institutions, decisions over this 
matter should not be considered only private decision or private market transactions, but 
should be subject to deliberative decisions based on consensus-building, not only in the 
pursuit of private gain, but for a better management of the ‘commons’. This situation indeed 
opens up an interesting discussion regarding the compatibility between modes of governance 
–in this case between deliberative governance, so to speak, and a market instrument. 
Accordingly, it could be reasonable to consider that the second should abide to the first and 
be subject to oversight.  
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come by. As remarked before, the creation of the COTAS’s public sphere has also 
direct impacts over the pursuit of greater transparency and accountability.  
 
A very important aspect that has already been touched before in this chapter is the 
one related to anti-corruption fighting, through greater transparency, accountability 
and public scrutiny. Indeed as already been mentioned the Laguna-Seca COTAS 
has contributed in the fight against corruption by exercising its right to access to 
information, by informing on illicit acts to the competent authorities, by publicly 
questioning the attitudes and actions of state institutions, and also by attempting to 
foster a culture of legality, transparency and accountability with the groundwater 
users.   
 
There is also the issue of the Laguna-Seca COTAS’ internal and external 
accountability issues. It is appropriate to comment that the Laguna-Seca COTAS 
follows a rigorous system of bookkeeping regarding its financial accounts. As such 
clear financial accountability measures have to be followed according to the Laguna-
Seca COTAS Operation Rules, that require the COTAS’s Technical Management to 
have a Treasurer and Supervising Committee to whom all financial information is 
presented. Other sources of accountability are the operation rules pertaining to the 
agreements of cooperation the Laguna-Seca COTAS enters into with State 
institutions and that have their own financial accountability regulation systems. There 
is also the normal financial accounting that they have to follow as an association of 
civil society, and that has to be presented on a yearly bases to the Federal Treasury, 
like all other associations of civil society.  
 
The Laguna-Seca COTAS is also accountable in efficiency terms, and thus it has to 
produce results in accordance to a yearly work-plan. Accordingly, in the case of the 
agreement of cooperation with the Conagua, that is agreed upon at the end of each 
calendar year, the Laguna-Seca COTAS has to present monthly progress reports. In 
fact the terms and conditions of each year’s agreement of cooperation’s are critically 
dependent on the timely and accurate production of such progress reports.  Very 
importantly, in terms of its internal accountability also the Laguna-Seca COTAS 
Technical Management is also responsible of performing the activities agreed upon 
by the Governing Board in previous consultation with the groundwater users.  This is 
to say that the Technical Management has to abide to the mandate, mission and 
objectives agreed by consensus and established in its constitutive act.  
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• Institutional Effects: Political Legitimacy  
 
It is important to remember that the Laguna-Seca COTAS is an auxiliary entity of the 
RBCs and its existence and role is present in the 2004 National Water Law; so as 
such it is fully entitled to support State institutions in all activities oriented at fostering 
a more sustainable groundwater management and through the participation of 
groundwater users. This situation, in principle, not only gives clear political legitimacy 
to this and all COTAS, but also some form of official political leverage. Besides this 
important situation there are other extremely relevant sources for the realisation of 
this potential democratic effect.  
 
An important consideration highlighted by groundwater users and the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS’s Governing Board’s members is that for them, at least, the COTAS gains 
political legitimacy through contestation and through the use of their countervailing 
power, notwithstanding its important limitations. Accordingly, groundwater users feel 
that their interests are represented through the COTAS and that government actions 
are tamed or at least put into the open for discussion. It is possible to say also that 
the COTAS gains its internal and external legitimacy through its credibility with the 
users and the State institutions. In the case of its internal legitimacy amongst its 
members, in reality it political legitimacy has been constructed almost through ‘word 
of mouth’. In this sense, as the COTAS continues to provide useful advice and 
support its users, these in turn, will continue to recommend other groundwater users 
to approach the COTAS, and become members in order to benefit from its services 
and its political representation. So it is actually through its usefulness, diligence and 
respect of the rule of law, that the Laguna-SECA COTAS has gained its internal 
legitimacy.  
 
The Laguna-SECA COTAS has also pursued its political legitimacy through 
responsiveness and efficiency. Accordingly, the Governing Board of the COTAS and 
the Technical Management Office have clearly realised that its legitimacy lies also in 
their level of responsiveness to the problems and concerns of its membership, and 
also in the level of effectiveness in which they can address issues and solve 
problems. This situation is important, because although the great majority of 
groundwater users interviewed or with whom conversations were sustained, consider 
that the COTAS is indeed responsive and efficient for certain aspects –that have 
already been mostly referred to in the past sections of this chapter–, they also 
consider it to be extremely limited in other substantive functions and capabilities. This 
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situation does not only has to do with the Laguna-Seca COTAS per se, but is 
common to other COTAS, as explained in the previous sections of this chapter.  
Hence, the Laguna- Seca COTAS’ members generally consider, for example, that it 
does not carry enough political leverage, does not really have an impact over 
groundwater over-exploitation, does not have enough financial resources to sustain a 
more influential operation and to support a greater number of people, etc.  
 
Very importantly the political legitimacy of the Laguna-Seca COTAS has been gained 
through the individuals that participate in them. In this sense, there has been care in 
the configuration of its Governing Board, it Technical Management Team, the Main 
Vocals/Representatives, and its Supervisory Committee, as the individuals that are 
part of such bodies all command the respect from part of the community and hold 
good reputations’ and are considered to be law-abiding citizens. Finally, the Laguna-
Seca COTAS has also gained its legitimacy, as already mentioned through honesty, 
transparency and accountability. In its constitutive act there are a number procedures 
that serve to support transparency and accountability.  
 
• Institutional Effects: Stakeholder Cooperation throughout Governing Process 
 
The Laguna-Seca COTAS, regardless of the small room for manoeuvre it has, it 
does provide some stakeholder cooperation, externally with a number of institutions 
and organisations, and internally with its membership. Some of these roles have 
already been mentioned before in the course of the exposition on the democratic 
effects of the Laguna-Seca COTAS. Still, perhaps its worth emphasising that the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS works with the CONAGUA in several matters, for example 
under the auspices of the Well Rehabilitation Programme of the CONAGUA, the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS provides technical and administrative support in the 
implementation of the Programme. In fact, the Laguna-Seca COTAS is entrusted 
with the contracting-out of the technical and construction works, as well as with the 
supervisory role. So far the Laguna-Seca COTAS has assisted in the rehabilitation of 
close to 25 wells across the territory of the aquifer. 
 
The above is only one example of this stakeholder cooperation role, and already 
other coordination activities have been described above in previous sections of this 
chapter. So, it seems important to comment that the Laguna-Seca COTAS has 
already created a relatively stable network of cooperation with some government 
authorities, academic centres and also some foundations. It is indeed one node on 
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matters concerning the sustainable management of the aquifer, a situation that is 
influenced by the leadership and the personal networks of the people that are part of 
the COTAS’ Governing Board.  
 
More recently, in order to gain access to greater financial sustenance the Laguna-
Seca COTAS recently began to engage in some form of consultancy service for the 
CONAGUA and the CEAG, and by undertaking different kinds of technical studies. 
This situation, although supporting the role of the Laguna-Seca COTAS in 
groundwater management, has also created some form of tension between 
groundwater users and also with the State institutions. This tension has to do with 
the opinion of some groundwater users that the COTAS should not turn into a 
consultancy entity, because its role should be more political and critical.142	  	  	  
• Institutional Effects: Effective Problem Solving and Alternative Mode of 
Governance 
 
It is difficult to assess in a clear-cut manner the contribution of the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS to effective problem solving and the construction of an alternative mode of 
governance, specially when in reality the groundwater over-exploitation problem 
surpasses in many ways its capabilities, and also its remit –as after all the COTAS 
are only consultative bodies.  So, in terms of its contribution to effective problem 
solving it is possible to say that the Laguna-Seca COTAS has had a meagre and 
indirect role.  In reality, in terms of the reduction of groundwater over-exploitation the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS’s contribution has been probably null, as it cannot really act 
over the critical problem: the reduction and control of groundwater concessions. 
Notwithstanding this appreciation, if we tame down our expectations, it is possible 
consider that the Laguna-SECA COTAS plays a different role that has an important 
value for the local water polity, and as elaborated in the previous sections of this 
chapter.  In the end the Laguna-Seca COTAS does contribute to the attainment of 
some other democratic effects, and this has a value as it addresses some of the 
undemocratic forces present in the local water polity.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 There is another source of tension that has to do with this situation. In some cases other 
COTAS have carried out deficient technical work and have delivered their results behind 
schedule, a situation that ha generated a bad precedent with the State institutions and 
creates difficulties for further engagement in this type of activities. In the opinion of scholars 
such as Marañon and Lopez (2010) and Torregorsa (interview), this situation is also creating 
the danger of developing important dependencies from the State and also of co-optation of 
the COTAS. 
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In terms of the Laguna-Seca COTAS’s contribution towards the creation of an 
alternative mode of governance, in my opinion, albeit it does not really have 
executive decision-making powers, it is still creating an important precedent as an 
incipient form socio-political governance arrangement; and although it seems that its 
institutional development has reached a plateau –that seems difficult to surpass if 
more broader structural changes do not come along– it still produces some other 
democratic effects and it still manages to support a socio-political governance 
process, with some level of social participation and stakeholder cooperation.  
 
6.4.3.The Preconditions that Affect the Democratic Performance of the Laguna-
Seca COTAS: Institutional Design Features and Contextual-Background 
Conditions 	  
• Institutional Design Features: Broad Stakeholder Participation and Interest 
Pursuit  
 
A serious institutional design flaw of the Laguna-Seca COTAS that affects the pursuit 
of the potential democratic effects –developmental, public sphere and institutional 
effects–is its limited capacity to convene groundwater users to participate in it as 
regular members. In reality only 675 groundwater users (37% of the total 
groundwater users of the aquifer) are registered members of the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS. A second important institutional design flaw is that the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS has not managed to include all the relevant stakeholders in its membership.  
To date only 5 members of the industrial use participate in the COTAS, and do it so 
sporadically. No large-scale landholders participate at all in the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS.  Mostly the mid-size landholders are the ones participating more regularly, 
alongside a smaller number of small-scale landholders and ejidatarios (8 ejidatarios) 
This situation is despite the efforts made by the Technical Management Team to be 
inclusive. Of course, that stakeholder participation is limited creates problems for the 
attainment of the three forms of potential democratic effects. Most importantly in 
terms of the institutional effects, the attainment of greater political legitimacy and 
equality is hampered, as in reality the Laguna-Seca COTAS cannot be considered 
representative of the interests of the majority of stakeholders. 
 
There are several factors affecting this level and form of stakeholder participation. 
One way to explain this flaw is that the aquifer covers a very vast territory, and so 
convening all stakeholders to attend to meetings and participate more proactively is 
difficult and would require a specific strategy and financial resources to address this 
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situation. This vast extension of the Laguna-Seca aquifer is also a barrier for the 
attainment of developmental effects, as the timely socialisation and distribution of 
relevant information, as well as its retrieval is difficult. Socialising and gathering 
information is a costly activity for the Laguna-Seca COTAS. This same situation 
creates a problem in terms of the participation in the deliberative arenas and other 
meetings convened by the COTAS, as some stakeholders also find it difficult and 
costly to travel to them. So, frequently the turn over in the deliberative arenas 
organised by the Laguna-Seca is low.  This is why scholars like Moreno, Marañon 
and Lopez (2010) consider that it would be more adequate to create smaller 
‘groundwater management units’ with more or less the same scope and institutional 
structure of the COTAS, but with a smaller scale.  
 
In conversations with the Technical Team, they feel that industry does not often 
participate because they consider that the COTAS cannot really address the critical 
problem of reducing groundwater abstractions.  Industry also feels that already they 
are doing all they can by re-using water in their processes and premises, and so 
there is little to discuss.  They also want to avoid conflict with other groundwater 
users. In the case of small-scale landholders and ejidatarios, they do not participate 
constantly, because it is expensive for them to travel to the meetings’ venues and to 
take the time to attend –as most people really live day-by-day.  Unfortunately, the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS has limited financial and human resources to ensure that 
marginalised and disenfranchised stakeholders participate in the COTAS.  Still 
despite these limitations the Technical Team does devote efforts to support these 
stakeholders the best they can. At times they even hire a transport services to pick 
up stakeholders at ‘strategic points’ along the way.  
 
The Technical Team talked about an important consideration that could help improve 
stakeholder participation. They are wandering if it would be a ‘good idea’ to make the 
membership to the COTAS compulsory, as part of the responsibilities of groundwater 
users –just like paying their water rights.  This is an interesting consideration with no 
clear-cut responses.  In principle these types of socio-political governance 
arrangements should function on a voluntary basis, but maybe making participation 
compulsory is another possibility.  So relevantly, it is possible to say that the 
perceived and real weakness of the COTAS deters social participation/involvement, 
and at the same time the lack of such participation/involvement contributes to its 
weakness. A vicious cycle that in my opinion is by design; that is to say the State has 
considered it this way.  
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Both problems, the low level of stakeholder involvement and the limited scope of 
stakeholder participation, are also affected by the path-dependency generated by a 
third institutional design flaw that has to do with how the COTAS was established.  
Despite some extra-ordinary effort was made during the convening phase of the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS to be broadly inclusive, this process was still rushed through –
in relation to the amount of time that is necessary to really enable social 
participation–, giving little time for the idea to be socialised across all stakeholders, 
and giving little time for stakeholders to react. This is an important aspect that has to 
change if the CONAGUA wants the COTAS to have an opportunity to be successful. 
Again, in my opinion, I believe that the characteristics of this process are also by 
design.  
 
• Institutional Design Features: Internal and External Accountability and 
Transparency  
 
The institutional design features of the COTAS do provide for internal and external 
accountability and transparency, and this is based in several main mechanisms. The 
first one is the deliberative arena.  It is in the context of the deliberative arenas where 
accountability, responsiveness and transparency are played out. Here it is important 
to recall that the institutional structure of the MSPs for groundwater management, 
COTAS, provides for two forms of deliberative arenas.  The first one is the Assembly 
of Water Users, and the second one is the deliberative arena of the Governing 
Board. During the Assembly of Water Users the members of the Governing Board 
present relevant information, including a progress report on how the COTAS has 
advanced in its ‘Annual Work Programme’ and other relevant situations.  It is in this 
context that the Governing Board is responsive to the COTAS -overall- and the 
Water User Vocals to their constituencies.  It is during the Governing Board’s 
deliberative arenas when the different COTAS officials discuss a range of different 
matters and concerns regarding groundwater management, and when decisions are 
taken regarding the role of the COTAS in this process. Decisions are taken if 
possible by consensus, if not by voting.  During this deliberative arenas the 
President, Secretary, and Treasury all respond to any questions or concerns on 
behalf of the Water User Representatives, Government Authorities and other 
stakeholders.  The Technical Secretary does the same.  
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Another source internal democracy is promoted or structured by the accountability 
and transparency provisions present in the Laguna-Seca COTAS ‘constitutive act’ in 
its condition as a ‘civil association’.  In this constitutive act there is a specific 
‘accountability and transparency’ section that clearly stipulates the different 
mechanisms and processes to these purposes.  Ultimately as a civil association the 
Mexican Civil Code structures the penalties and sanctions if the organisation or a 
person in the organisation breaches the law.143 
 
In terms of external accountability, responsiveness and transparency, the Laguna-
SECA COTAS is required to present an Annual Activity Report to CONAGUA that 
describes in-detail the activities performed by it. It is also required to present a 
Annual Financial Report describing the manner in which the financial resources 
provided by the CONAGUA have spent during the previous year. If so considered, 
the CONAGUA can ask for this financial report to be audited by an external auditing 
firm. It is only after both reports are cleared that the Laguna-Seca COTAS receives 
its financial replenishment for the next year.  
 
• Institutional Design Features: Decision Making through Reasoned Deliberation 
and the Force of the Better Argument  
 
As mentioned above the Laguna-Seca COTAS provides for different deliberative 
arenas where different relevant matters are discussed openly and freely by the 
stakeholders attending them.  Generally speaking, there is always a moderator –that 
can be at times the President, Secretary, Treasury or the Technical Secretary.  There 
is seems to be amongst participants a general understanding of the ‘rules’ that norm 
the behaviour during public deliberation: people wait their turns to talk, the moderator 
asks for short and ‘to the point’ statements, meetings are venues that allow are 
reasonably confortable and safe, etc. 
 
I witnessed some important discussions regarding for example the orientation and 
content of a new groundwater resources management plan –the Laguna-Seca 
POMSA–; and albeit the topic was contested and the COTAS ‘s membership was 
extremely anxious about the way this programme was developed –without due 
stakeholder participation–, the deliberative arena was kept ‘civilised’ and functional.  
Stakeholders were communicating and the State was made accountable for the way 
it organised the process. As a result of the public deliberation process, the State had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 The Laguna-Seca COTAS constitutive act is integrated as annex 2 of this document and 
for the interested reader to review.  
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to respond to the democratic pressures, and so the decision was made to fully review 
the POMSA through the organisation of an open and inclusive dialogue with the 
participation of all the relevant stakeholders.  
 
Still, not all is good.  The deliberative arenas of the COTAS suffer from the lack of 
stakeholder representation, as frequently not all the representatives that need to 
attend do so, and also not all the stakeholders that would like to attend can do be 
there.  In this sense, the deliberative arenas generally lack the political legitimacy 
necessary to support and strengthen their decision-making capabilities. The 
Governing Board and the Technical Team are all aware of this situation, but they do 
not have the financial resources to support a broader participation at every 
deliberative arena organised.  This is an important problem. Also, the deliberative 
arenas cannot be organised that frequently -for all the aforementioned reasons-, so 
the opportunity for stakeholders to engage in public deliberation is rather limited, a 
situation that in turn, affects the overall democratic performance of the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS.  
 
• Institutional Features: Political Equality and the Common Good as Institutional 
Design Principles 
 
When looking at the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS, institutional scope 
established by the 2004 NWL –and other documents–, it is possible to consider that 
the common good and political equality are embedded in their institutional design 
principles. The COTAS, de jure, are all about harnessing an inclusive social 
participation/involvement and enabling greater stakeholder cooperation throughout 
the groundwater management process.  As such the COTAS are suppose to 
participate in many relevant processes that ultimately would represent supporting the 
pursuit of political equality and the common good.  Unfortunately, de facto, the 
Laguna-Seca has a limited capacity to provide for political equality and the common, 
as I already discuss in the respective section addressing the potential democratic 
effects of the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS.  In this sense, in order 
for the Laguna-SECA COTAS to have greater capacity to attain political equality and 
the common good it would require to be a more powerful entity.  Still as already 
explained also in the respective section, the Laguna-Seca COTAS does provide for 
some of countervailing power that indeed has changed the conditions of some of its 
most marginal and disenfranchised members.  
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• Contextual Background Conditions: Relationship with the State 
 
The relationship of the COTAS with the State is an aspect that is extremely influential 
in the definition of the Laguna-Seca COTAS’s capacity to produce democratic 
effects, and more broadly its institutional development. Let me recall, that the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS is ultimately a socio-political governance arrangement 
designed and established by the State, and thus there are some inherent limitations.  
In this sense, the State clearly determined that the COTAS are only consultative 
bodies, with no executive powers, no political autonomy (that is they need to abide to 
the rule of law, and they cannot change their scale, scope and institutional structure. 
They are also mostly financially dependent on the State. Ultimately, the State 
establishes the COTAS and can terminate them also, or let them wither away –like 
was the case of the Querétaro Valley COTAS.  So in reality the COTAS are not 
decentralised institutions that can take decisions and then execute them accordingly. 
Their empowerment is relatively small and circumscribed. This is the operational 
context of the Laguna-Seca COTAS, and it is within this context, these ‘structural 
conditions’, that it manoeuvres in its pursuit of objectives and endeavours. A clear 
example of this is the AofC between the CEAG and the Laguna-Seca COTAS that 
serves really as an instrument of control, rather than as instrument to enable 
cooperative relationships. I would like to refer to a number of clauses in this AofC 
that are telling about the spirit of the relationship between the State and the COTAS. 
 
“Art. 3: “The financial resources’ disbursement (for the COTAS) is conditioned 
to the progress validation undertaken by the CEAG, who will present an 
opinion about them to the Technical Committee of the FIPAMSA, who will then 
take a decision to either approve the disbursement or make observations.” 
(2012 AofC between the CEAG and the COTAS: p. 5) 
“Art.7: The COTAS is obligated to develop its maximum capacities and apply 
its knowledge to fulfil the instructions that the CEAG makes regarding the 
activities to be undertaken under this AofC. The COTAS is obligated to comply 
to this instructions and communicated through the Social Management Office 
of the CEAG.” (2012 AofC between the CEAG and the COTAS: p. 6) 
Art 8: When and if the COTAS or the CEAG receive any confidential 
information, marked as ‘reserved’ or ‘confidential’, the parties will abstain to 
communicate to any third parties.” (2012 AofC between the CEAG and the 
COTAS: p. 6) 
“Art 10: The parties accept that any result or any information product of the 
activities undertaken under this AofC will belong exclusively to the CEAG.” 
(2012 AofC between the CEAG and the COTAS: p. 7) 
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Art 11: The CEAG may terminate this AofC in any moment, and should 
communicate in writing with 30 days notice. In such a case the CEAG will only 
cover the financial expenses incurred during those 30 days.” (2012 AofC 
between the CEAG and the COTAS: p. 7) 
 
A number of strategic-selectivities have also affected the present status of the 
Laguna-SECA COTAS, like for example the way they it was established without due 
consideration for building a broader social base –a situation that would definitely 
would have convey it with greater empowerment–, the limited and conditional 
financial resources that it receives to operate, the general ambivalence towards its 
institutional development, and the lack of consistent meta-governing strategies to 
support it. Overall, the relationship with the State has definitely influenced –and is 
influencing– the Laguna-Seca COTAS institutional development path, in my opinion 
in detriment of its full potential as an MSP for groundwater management.  If the new 
meta-governance strategies being implemented in the State of Guanajuato with the 
SIMSA fully materialise, maybe the relationship of the Laguna-Seca COTAS with the 
State might change, and it may attain greater empowerment (i.e. network power) to 
support greater social participation/involvement, stakeholder cooperation, and 
ultimately also the attainment of stronger democratic effects.  
 
• Contextual Background Conditions: Substantive Political Equality and Social 
Equity  
 
Conditions of political equality and social equity play out in many different and 
complex ways, influencing the democratic performance of the Laguna-Seca COTAS. 
The following narrative is just a succinct elaboration on this aspect.  For example, if 
we look at the composition of the Laguna-Seca COTAS’ Governing Board, its 
Presidents, Secretaries and Treasuries generally have all been people with a high 
level socio-economic profile, usually mid-sized landholders agriculturalist and 
stockbreeders.  This ‘power positions’ within the Laguna-Seca COTAS are held by 
popular election, but access to those positions is somehow predetermined by socio-
economic status. This is because groundwater users search for people with enough 
financial resources, influence, education and ‘networks’ to support the roles that this 
type of political positions imply and to serve the goals of the COTAS. It is important 
to remember, that albeit the groundwater management role of the Laguna COTAS is 
small, it still manages to have access to some financial resources that they later 
distribute.  
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In the case of Technical Secretary, a qualified sociologist with managerial experience 
has carried out the job since the establishment of the COTAS.  Access to this 
position has been determined mostly by professional qualifications. In the case of the 
Water User Vocals, these positions are also held by popular election and the profile 
is relatively more mixed, but still the individuals selected usually already command 
the respect of their constituencies, because they are either successful economically 
or have also played some previous political role.  It is relevant to highlight that in the 
case of the Laguna-Seca COTAS almost all of this ‘power positions’ are male 
dominated, except for the Technical Secretary –a situation that is highly unusual.  
Gender inequality is definitely a great challenge. 
 
In terms of the ‘usual’ participants to the deliberative arenas, it is possible to say that 
most of them (perhaps an average of 70% of the attendees) are mid-size and large 
landholders that are capable of attending to these sessions and that have enough 
information, education and political understanding to realise that participating in the 
Laguna-Seca COTAS may bring some individual and collective benefit.  The rest of 
the participants are small-scale landholders and ejidatarios, but it seems to be that 
they mostly participate when specific topics are going to be discussed, and mostly on 
the occasions when access to different forms of government support is going to be 
the main topic of discussions.  They also attend upon special request of the 
Technical Secretary, who sends for them, and when the topics of discussion demand 
their participation and support.  When talking informally with some ejidatarios they all 
recognise the supportive role granted by the Technical Team, so when they are 
summoned to participate for a specific purpose, they usually assist.  Still, as I already 
mentioned in previous sections of this chapter, it is generally difficult for the small-
scale producers and the ejidatarios to attend to these meetings, because the 
economic cost of travelling to the venues and also of spending a day away from their 
work is sometimes difficult to bear.  
 
The way that socio-economic inequalities also play out in the Laguna-Seca COTAS 
is through the social interaction in the deliberative arenas. In many of the deliberative 
arenas I attended the participants who exercised more thoroughly their right to voice 
are mid-size and large landholders, and the representatives of industry and urban-
public use; and not so much the small-scale landholders and the ejidatorios.  On 
many occasions the role of the moderator is to actually entice their participation.  In 
informal conversations with the ejidatarios most of them are not really interested in 
the policy process or politics (la política), but they do participate in the Laguna-Seca 
	   298 
COTAS because in the past they have benefited tangibly or materially from this, a 
situation that remains a powerful incentive.  
 
It is important to acknowledge that the allocation and change of groundwater 
concessions remains in the hand of the CONAGUA (in its central office). So when 
any actor wants to change their allocations they do not go through the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS, they go directly to the CONAGUA, a situation that is source of inequality, 
because it is usually the case that the more powerful actors have the necessary 
networks to ‘open the doors’ of the institution to pursue their interests.  Another very 
important way in which socio-economic inequality plays out in the context of 
groundwater management, but that the Laguna-Seca COTAS cannot do anything 
about –or very little– is that the groundwater users that have financial resources to 
dig more profound wells and buy more expensive pumping technology are the ones 
that continue to benefit from the ‘commons’.  The rest, if they happen to have their 
well situated in an abatement/depression cone they suffer the immediate 
consequence of the tragedy of the commons and they gradually loose their physical 
access to water, although legally they are still hold the entitlements. In any case what 
the Laguna-Seca COTAS has sometimes managed to do is to support the 
refurbishment of wells and the buying of pumping equipment –for the ejidatarios.  
This is not necessarily a sustainable solution, but it helps them to maintain their 
livelihoods.  This situation, as I already mentioned before, drives the legal and illegal 
water transfers.  The COTAS is also not at the centre of controlling or monitoring 
these transactions, and thus has no bearing in the process. Finally, corruption is also 
a great amplifier of socio-economic inequality.  The Laguna-Seca COTAS attempts 
to play positive a role in controlling corruption, but again has no authority to sanction 
or persecute, so it only denounces it.  
 
6.5. End Comments to this Chapter 
 
Groundwater management in Mexico is at crossroads, if the rampant groundwater 
over-exploitation rates continue, the livelihoods and socio-economic viability of 
regions and urban settlements will be severely compromised.  In several cases 
already we have seen that ‘water security’ is ‘bought’ through incredibly expensive 
‘infrastructure solutions’, the building of long aqueducts and water transfers that only 
move the socio-economic and environmental problems to other neighbouring regions 
and into the future –a typical feature of the capitalist environmental crisis and its 
preferred policy options. This is the case of the Queretaro Region, the first fieldwork 
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area chosen for this PhD and where the Queretaro Valley COTAS withered away 
after the decision to build the aqueduct was taken. In the case of the Laguna-Seca 
Aquifer, in several places with harsh ‘abatement cones’ landowners-producers have 
had to abandon their ranches for good, leaving their livelihoods, property and 
birthrights. These types of solutions and problems only attest to the incapability of the 
Neo-liberal Statehood formation in developing ‘institutional solutions’, instead of 
infrastructural ones, evidencing a crisis in water resources management and more 
broadly water politics.   
 
Traditional hierarchical and regulatory instruments do not address well the problems 
related to the ‘tragedy of the groundwater commons’, evidence of this has been 
retrieved from cases all over the world, including Mexico.  This is the reason why 
other strategies oriented at enabling socio-political governance arrangements 
attempting to enable authentic social participation/Involvement and stakeholder 
cooperation have been developed, sometimes a bit more spontaneously, and some 
other times by design. Therefore, the State-strategy to establish MSPs for 
groundwater management, COTAS, in Mexico seemed an adequate and timely 
response, initially.  Unfortunately, today after 15 years of being established, the 
COTAS remain peripheral to the problem of groundwater over-exploitation, and with 
very little influence over the groundwater management process.  There are several 
reasons for this situation, as this chapter has evidenced.  
 
In the history of the Mexican water polity there has been two different attempts to 
conform MSPs for groundwater management, as new forms of institutional innovation 
for socio-political water governance.  The first one implemented by the CONAGUA’s 
central offices, and that evidence shows was more of a rhetoric exercise alleging 
support for the implementation of IWRM principles, decentralisation processes, social 
participation, stakeholder cooperation and democratic planning. The reality is that the 
CONAGUA’s strategy of implementation of MSPs for groundwater management, 
COTAS, is full of drawbacks and contradictions.  The drawbacks are clear: the 
COTAS have not been able to address groundwater over-exploitation; they remain 
extremely weak institutions; their role is only consultative which in practice means 
that they to not have any definitive role in groundwater management; they are not 
financially self-sustaining, so they depend mostly on the financial support from the 
State, a situation that limits their scope of action and their countervailing power; they 
only enable a limited social participation and stakeholder cooperation, because they 
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usually are established without the necessary care for building their social basis; and 
sometimes they present important political legitimacy and political representation 
problems, because they are captured by powerful socio-economic actors and remain 
exclusionary of minorities. The severity or particularity of these problems, of course, 
can vary on a case-by-case basis, but this is the general tendency. Despite the open 
criticism from the COTAS themselves, scholars and even civil servants at the 
CONAGUA, the State does not seem willing to embark in a progressive institutional 
reform process that could strengthen the COTAS. Furthermore, the contradictions 
continue to manifest. One of the first Presidential Decrees of the new President 
Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) was to declare the whole of the country under the 
figure of an abstraction prohibition zone.  With this move the central-State 
strengthens its control, not over groundwater over-exploitation –a history has 
proven–, but over the allocation and use of groundwater resources –something 
completely different. Scholars and practitioners were hoping for this Presidential 
Decree to be accompanied by greater support towards the strengthening of the 
MSPs for groundwater management, but this has not been the case.  
 
The second attempt corresponds to the effort made by the State of Guanajuato to 
implement also MSPs for groundwater management.  Initially this exercise 
manifested some promising features, specially because it appeared that the 
Guanajuato COTAS would be fully decentralised, autonomous, executive and 
financially sustainable socio-political governance arrangements, with a substantive 
role and influence over groundwater management processes. Initially, this initiative 
benefited from a series of critical junctures that enabled some progressive prospects. 
Unfortunately, the initiative lost momentum against the power of the central State, 
whose reluctance to loose control hindered the institutional development of the 
COTAS.  Ultimately, the CONAGUA at a central level remains in control over the 
allocation and re-allocation of groundwater concessions, where –if managed properly 
and with the participation of groundwater user– the real power to manage 
groundwater over-exploitation lies. Also, the shift in the local leadership in the CEAG 
and in the CONAGUA State Office in Guanajuato has also hindered the process, as 
the more progressive ‘power blocs’ seem to have left and with this the support for the 
institutional development of the COTAS has dwindled. This situation warns against 
the Historical Institutionalist concerns with the existence of ‘precipitating’ causes or 
drivers that fade away fast, and that when elements change the orientation of 
institutional change also declines.  This is worrying, because it could mean that 
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democratisation is not really a ‘structural’ cause, but that obeys only to the presence 
of other underlying and circumstantial drivers.  
 
 As such, currently the Guanajuato COTAS remain also in some form of stalemate or 
plateau, they exist similarly only as consultative, financially dependent and weak 
institutions, practically witnessing the depletion of groundwater resources mostly 
from the sidelines.  A vague reminiscence of the initial project remains in the tenacity 
and commitment of some of the Governing Boards and Technical Management 
teams of some of the State of Guanajuato COTAS, but mostly the ‘mood’ of the 
groundwater users is rather pessimistic, as the expectations have not been fulfilled 
and the challenges of the COTAS seem to outweigh their prospects. This negative 
situation seems to be created a strong path-dependency against the prospect of the 
COTAS ever becoming more active and influential socio-political governance 
venues. An interesting new initiative, the SIMSA, this time from the CONAGUA State 
Office in Guanajuato shows some promising possibilities, but as we will see in the 
next chapter already there are some concerns. Meanwhile the problem of 
groundwater over-exploitation still continues pervasively, alongside other worrying 
problems: legal and illegal water concessions transfers, and land and water 
grabbing.  
 
More specifically, if we look at the institutional scope of the COTAS, it seems that the 
aquifers are sometimes management units that are simply to extensive in their 
territory, a situation that deters the possibility of generating a ‘group identity’ and of 
facilitating the participation of all the groundwater users in the deliberative arenas 
and other initiatives. In terms of institutional scope the COTAS do seem to play an 
active role in ‘planning and the generation of studies and information’, as most of the 
COTAS do participate in the development of groundwater management plans, and 
most of the financial resources allocated by the State to the COTAS are ear-marked 
for these activities. In terms of the ‘promotion, socialisation and social participation’ 
functions, these seem to be less far-reaching, they do promote and socialise 
important information, but their capacity to elicit and enable social participation is 
limited and their social basis is shallow, a situation that has an extremely negative 
and weakening impact.  Regarding the ‘management, coordination, and consensus-
building/conflict resolution’ functions, these again are fairly limited.  In practice the 
COTAS do not perform or have any real saying in groundwater management.  Their 
role as coordinating entities is not fully recognised either, because they are perceived 
as weak institutions by other State agencies and stakeholders. They are equipped to 
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be a consensus building and conflict resolution sight, but again as they remain 
peripheral to groundwater management and remain consultative bodies they do not 
carry the political clout or the legitimacy and representation to function properly to 
these purposes.  In terms of their ‘finance and economic valuation’ functions, the 
COTAS do make efforts to constitute as ‘civil associations’ to be able to receive 
funding, but usually the case is that they manage to capture very little resources from 
external sources. Unfortunately, they are mostly fully financially dependent from the 
State, a situation that makes them extremely vulnerable and subject to many 
dimensions of ‘power in’ and ‘power over’.  They do contribute in the economic 
valuation of groundwater resources, as it is part of their capacity-building activities.  
Finally, in terms of accountability, monitoring and evaluation, they do support the 
monitoring and evaluation of groundwater management policy and regulations; and 
they also have accountability mechanisms towards the State and their membership, 
but they do not have any enforcing or ‘penalizing’ function. Under these general 
conditions, that COTAS cannot, at all, address the groundwater over-exploitation 
they face.  
 
The contradictions in the Mexican water polity are profound in that the strong 
limitations of both the centralist-hierarchical-regulatory State-strategies and the lack 
of true support for the institutional development of the MSPs, actually create a 
governing void that perpetuates the ‘tragedy of the groundwater commons’.  In reality 
the centralist-hierarchical-regulatory and the MSPs strategies as they currently stand 
are not synergic strategies and remain at odds, a situation that has already been 
identified as problematic in the governance studies literature. Furthermore, the 
current institutional weakness of the COTAS is creating an important path-
dependency that could be difficult to break, if by chance there are any future 
attempts to revert this situation.  
 
I will be optimistic in my round-up comments about the democratic performance of 
the Laguna-Seca COTAS by saying, that despite all of the contextual or structural 
limitations, it is a source of developmental, public sphere and institutional effects.  
Furthermore, the analysis of the democratic performance of the Laguna-Seca 
COTAS shows that the Laguna-Seca COTAS has been able to develop some form of 
countervailing power that remains a source of democratic effects and renewal, a 
situation that has to be appreciated against the backdrop of the highly centralist, 
hierarchical and even autocratic role that certain power centres of the Mexican State 
play throughout groundwater resources management. Recalling the different 
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considerations presented in chapter-1 regarding the compatibility ‘conditions’ of 
socio-political governance arrangements with current liberal democratic practice       
–incompatible, complementary, transition, instrumental–, it is possible to say that in 
the case of Mexico the nature and characteristics of the democratic practice in the 
country make socio-political governance arrangements incompatible.  This reflection 
supports also another important consideration with broader implications, as I 
describe in the end of this chapter. 
 
“I’m a pessimist because of intelligence, but an optimist because of the will.” 144   Still, 
I would like to end this chapter with an optimistic perspective. The study of the 
establishment and institutional development of the MSPs for groundwater 
management, COTAS, helps to confirm the hypothesis guiding this PhD research, 
that the role of the State in the institutional development of the MSPs for groundwater 
management has been highly contradictory and limiting, but that socio-political 
governance arrangements, like the MSPs for groundwater management, still allow 
for the contingency in political processes and the array of social forces to offer 
uncertainty and maybe enable opportunity for a more socially progressive, 
democratic and sustainable groundwater resources management. In this sense, I 
would like to comment on the role of social agency. I was impressed by the tenacity 
and perseverance of the Laguna-Seca COTAS Technical Management Team.  It is 
amazing how the Laguna-Seca COTAS –despite so many ‘structural’ limitations and 
from a remote office in the ‘middle of nowhere’– has managed to defend the interests 
of its membership and of the aquifer, and by developing some form of countervailing 
power..    
 
Nonetheless, an important point to make is that the preconditions that affect the 
attainment of the democratic effects of the COTAS are very real.  Some of these 
preconditions may be addressed through changes in the institutional design features 
of the COTAS, a situation that would require careful consideration, but also most 
importantly political will on behalf of the State –more specifically on behalf of certain 
power blocs behind the State. In reality the prospect and challenges of the COTAS to 
become more empowered and democratic venues for socio-political groundwater 
governance lie in broader and deeper political democratisation and social equity 
reforms that are difficult to foresee in the context of the present socio-political and 
economic context.  In this process the role of the State seems will continue to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Rosengarten, F (ed (2011), Antonio Gramsci, Letters from Prison, Vol. 1, New York, USA, 
Columbia University Press, Verso, p: 17 
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strikingly limiting. I suppose this one reason why the more critical scholars –the ones 
really following the original Political-Ecology tradition– are increasingly and 
worryingly becoming more interested in the dynamics of water conflicts and social 
movements.   
 
The next chapter will focus on some incipient State meta-governance strategies and 
capacities that are being considered by the CONAGUA and the CONAGUA State 
Office in Guanajuato.  It will also develop a more insightful argumentation on the role 
of the State in the establishment and institutional development of the MSPs for 
groundwater management, COTAS.  
 
Figure 23: The Laguna-Seca COTAS 
“ The Contingency of Countervailing Power” 
 
 
 
Source: Informal presentation Laguna-Seca COTAS, Technical Management Team 
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Chapter 7: The State Meta-governance Strategies and Capacities, and the Role 
of the State in Water Resources Management: The Fifth and Sixth Moments of 
Analysis  
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter corresponds to the implementation of the fifth and sixth moments of 
analysis of the heuristic-analytical device (v. The State’s Meta-governance Capacity 
Assessment and vi. the Role of the State in the Establishment and Development of 
Socio-political Governance Arrangements and Water Resources Management). It 
starts with presenting a brief elaboration on some recent developments regarding the 
CONAGUA’s meta-governance strategies being considered for governing over the 
MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS. Although these considerations show 
that some progress is being made in terms of ideas and intentions, these 
considerations are still somewhat ambiguous and general. A commentary on this 
situation will be made in the first section of this chapter. In its second section, it 
devotes efforts to present some recent developments in terms of the meta-
governance strategies developed by the CONAGUA’s State Office in Guanajuato: 
the implementation of the Integral System for the Management of Aquifers (SIMSA 
para el Manejo de Acuíferos, SIMSA).  The SIMSA is a promising system that may 
help to support the institutional development of the COTAS in the State of 
Guanajuato, and in my opinion represents a progressive meta-governance strategy. 
Finally, the chapter addresses the issue of the role of the State in the institutional 
development of the MSPs for groundwater management and more broadly water 
resources management, and as a manner of summarising or concluding upon what 
already has been elaborated throughout this document on the subject matter. 
 
7.2. CONAGUA’s Meta-governing Strategies for the MSPs for Groundwater 
Management, COTAS: Some Reflections on Recent Developments 
 
Until very recently the CONAGUA had not really considered developing the 
necessary meta-governance strategies and capacities to consistently govern and 
support the institutional development of the MSPs for groundwater management, 
COTAS. The governing process over the COTAS was mostly carried out 
haphazardly through the initiative and discretion of individual civil servants –at 
different State offices or ‘power centres’– who tried different options according to the 
ideas and resources at their disposal.  In some cases, like the State of Guanajuato 
and at least for some time, there was more or less a consistent meta-governance 
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strategy that had some positive impacts over the institutional development of the 
COTAS, as described in the previous chapter. Still when leadership behind this 
process left their official functions as civil servants, the institutional development 
process of the COTAS stalled  –amongst other important reasons, as elaborations in 
the previous chapter describe. Still the general opinion of scholars and practitioners 
is that at a national level, strategies were at best inconsistent and periodical 
(Escolero, 2005; Marañon and Lopez, 2008; Wester, Sandoval and Hoogesteger, 
2010).  Only very few policy documents helping to steer and orient policy makers 
exist, and as already mentioned they only give some general idea about how to 
proceed with the establishment and institutional development of the COTAS.  
 
At a national level, CONAGUA’s main strategy, before approximately 2010, was to 
continue to establish COTAS across the country, using only a few prescriptive and 
descriptive documents to guide their own regional/local staff and the water users 
about the establishment and institutional development process (CONAGUA, 2000, 
the 2004 NWL; CONAGUA, 2010). For the 2006-2012 CONAGUA’s administration 
the strategic importance of groundwater management was more openly recognised, 
including also the role of the COTAS in that process.  So, some actions were taken 
to develop a more consistent approach in the institutional development of the 
COTAS.  Still at the beginning of the administration’s term, CONAGUA’s position was 
mostly oriented at the establishment of more COTAS, without really offering a more 
thorough and consistent support for their institutional development. This strategy has 
been criticised by some senior and mid-level civil servants in CONAGUA, because it 
has created a very complex scenario:  there are more COTAS across the country 
that require support, and the process has generated amongst groundwater users 
large expectations about their opportunity to meaningfully participate in the governing 
process; expectations that, under the present situation, will remain unmet. 145 
 
Still there seems to be some sign of progress, as more current policy documents 
attest to the need to change the COTAS’s weak situation and begin to more 
proactively support their institutional development (CONAGUA, 2010; CONAGUA, 
2011). These documents begin to describe some initial considerations regarding how 
to better govern (i.e. meta-govern) over the COTAS and what kind of support they 
require to enable their institutional development process.  For example, CONAGUA’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 I am grateful for the information and insight provided by Ms Lydia Meade and Mr Jose 
Alfredo Jimenez –both at the River Basin Management and Auxiliary Bodies Office of 
CONAGUA– on CONAGUA’s efforts to develop a more coherent meta-governance strategy 
to support the MSPs for groundwater management.  
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‘2030 Water Agenda’, clearly stipulates –under its Strategic Initiative No. 1– the need 
to more strongly support the COTAS through 4 important pathways: giving them a 
more relevant role in groundwater management; developing the capacity of their 
representatives to intervene closely in the management and planning of the aquifer; 
developing information systems on the dynamics of the aquifers and the knowledge 
of withdrawals and recharge rates; and ensuring their financial operation through 
legally binding procedures linked to withdrawals (CONAGUA, 2010).  More details on 
these elements will be presented below. Other policy documents, like the reviewed 
version of the ‘Basic Documents of the RBC and Auxiliary Bodies’ (Docmentos 
Básicos de los Consejos de Cuenca, CONAGUA, 2010b) also consider a number of 
meta-governing strategies that I will also present below. To organise the presentation 
on the meta-governance strategies I will follow the characterisation on the meta-
governance strategies and capacities established by the heuristic-analytical device: 
coordination and steering; enabling social participation; institutional support, 
democratic vigilance, and policy consistence. 
 
• Coordination and Steering of the MSPs for Groundwater Management 
 
In CONAGUA there is a specialised office that seeks to coordinate the activities of 
the COTAS nationwide, and form where most of the strategies and policies are 
designed.  In terms of steering and coordination, CONAGUA’s position is very much 
oriented at socialising a number of ideas amongst groundwater users regarding the 
role of the COTAS and the role of groundwater users in them. This strategy seeks to 
generate a shared vision about their role in groundwater management. More 
recently, in a couple of documents there is a more direct mention to the notion of 
‘water governance’ and also ‘co-responsibility’ as two central elements for the 
institutional development of the COTAS. The following fragment of the Basic 
Documents of the RBCs and Auxiliary Bodies (CONAGUA, 2010b) reflects this 
situation:  
 
“Starting from the notion that water is a vital natural resources and common 
good that should satisfy the needs of society in the most equal manner, it is 
necessary to have in place the necessary fora that concentrate all the 
stakeholders in order to enable decision making processes that may allow the 
equal use of groundwater resources and through the active, informed and 
responsible stakeholder participation.  Social co-responsibility in our country is 
being sought through the sum of all the efforts of all the stakeholders 
participating in the river basin councils and its auxiliary bodies, but in order for 
each one to assume commitments and responsibilities, it is necessary that 
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each stakeholder has a clear and specific role that he can perform.” 
(CONAGUA, 2010b: 62) (Translation: Mine) 
 
Hence, efforts are being devoted to the production of more in-detail and clear 
methodological guidelines clarifying the COTAS’ objectives, their roles and 
responsibilities in groundwater management.  These guidelines also aim to clarify the 
COTAS’s ‘ideal’ institutional design structure and institutional development process. 
There are also important considerations regarding to the necessary legal reforms 
that would provide more solid grounds for the reinforcement of the COTAS’s role in 
groundwater management. On this aspect of the situation the 2030 Water Agenda 
(CONAGUA, 2010) considers:  
 
“The organisational and promotional work of the COTAS has shown their 
potential to undertake tasks of greater magnitude such as intervening in the 
measurement and monitoring of flows withdrawn from the aquifers, and in 
planning, management and regulation of the use of aquifers; to achieve this, 
their intervention needs to be legally reinforced for this and other important 
support tasks for the institutional administration of the nation’s water, modifying 
the legal rules that facilitate their intervention.” (CONAGUA, 2010: 35) 
(Translation: Mine) 
 
There are other aspects of the coordination and steering aspects of the meta-
governance strategies that are reflected in the sections below, but share also some 
concerns with the other dimensions of the meta-governance strategies, and thus I 
have decided to elaborate on them in the subsequent sections.  
 
• Enabling Social Participation and Stakeholder Cooperation 
 
An important comment to make is that recent modifications (2008) –not reforms– to 
the 2004NWL clearly stipulate that the State is required to proactively support civil 
society in water resources management processes, including its participation in the 
MSPs, and so the legal basis to further enable social participation is more clearly 
established. Whether CONAGUA abides or not to these changes remains to be 
seen. Chapter 5, Art. 14-bis of the 2004NWL (last reform 2008) stipulates:  
 
“CONAGUA should support organisations of civil society with interests and 
activities related to integrated water resources management, to participate in 
the river basin councils, as well as the river basin commissions and the 
COTAS. In the same manner it will facilitate the participation of research 
centres, professional associations, and other civil society organisations, and 
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whose participation may enrich the water resources planning and management 
process.” (NWL, 2004, Chapter 5, Art. 14bis). 
 
Advancing in the legal basis for social participation is a step forward, but the 
challenges of enabling social participation in real life contexts are complex; especially 
under the context of a highly centralised and hierarchical State. As already 
mentioned, so far CONAGUA’s main meta-governance strategies to address these 
challenges have been rather timid or narrow, and seem to centre in attempting to 
support a wider participation of stakeholders –through for example better organised 
convening periods and socialisation of information processes, the use social 
promoters, and also a greater allocation of financial resources to support the 
participation of minority and marginalized groups.  Still financial resources are scarce 
–at least for these purposes– and there seems always to be a rush to establish new 
COTAS, a situation that damages the democratic process, as reflected before.  
 
It is worth mentioning, that more recently philanthropic foundations –such as the 
Gonzalo Río Foundation and the Femsa-Coca Cola Foundation– and non-
governmental organisations –such as The Nature Conservancy and the World Fund 
for Nature– have become more interested in enabling socio-political governance 
arrangements, and hence have been supporting greater social participation in the 
MSPs –although not exclusively only for the case of the COTAS, but also at the level 
of micro river basins, and mostly directed at the establishment of payment for 
environmental services.  At the local level there are also examples of more local-level 
non-governmental organisations that support the participation of minority and 
marginalised groups in the MSPs.146  Indeed an important part of CONAGUA’s meta-
governing strategies should focus in developing greater coordination with more 
organisations of civil society.  
 
Social participation requires careful consideration so as to what kind of ‘structural’ 
conditions determine the possibility or opportunity of different stakeholders to 
participate in the MSPs.  To date I have not seen any published policy document 
produced by the CONAGUA attempting to address this situation carefully, although 
through conversations with mid-level civil servants they are of course aware of the 
challenges.  Responses regarding the absence of meta-governance strategies to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 For some interesting examples of this situation please see: Pare, L; Robisnon, D and M A 
González (eds) (2008) Gestión de Cuencas y Servicios Ambientales, Perspectivas 
Comunitarias, México, D.F. Mexico, INECC. 
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enable greater social participation most of the times imply that there are simply not 
enough financial resources to support it and that the present legal framework –that 
maintains the COTAS as consultative bodies– also deters a great number of 
groundwater users from participating in them. The opinion is that if the COTAS were 
really to be at the centre of decision-making, social participation would increase. 
 
Regarding stakeholder cooperation there are also some very recent developments 
that deserve some attention, like the SIMSA in the State of Guanajuato, and that will 
be described in a later section of this chapter. On CONAGUA’s side, worth 
mentioning is that recently the IMTA was commissioned by the CONAGUA to 
develop a study oriented at providing policy recommendations to enable greater 
inter-institutional and stakeholder cooperation. This work has developed a complex 
matrix of interrelationships that establish potential synergies or complementarities 
between different government programmes (i.e. the potential interactions between 
programmes being implemented by different government agencies and non-
governmental organisations).  The study also focuses in distinguishing different 
levels of stakeholder engagement: coordination, cooperation, collaboration, and 
socio-political governance. The study is also oriented at assessing different or rising 
‘policy networks’ around specific programmes. For this study two broad thematic 
subjects were selected: urban water security for the city of Querétaro, and 
groundwater management in the State of Guanajuato, and looking more specifically 
at the SIMSA experience. 147 
 
Other elements related to enabling social participation have to with enabling better 
stakeholder representation in the COTAS’ activities, an aspect that will be addressed 
in more detail below under the democratic vigilance meta-governance strategies.  
 
• MSPs Institutional Support: Financial, Technical and Capacity-building Strategies 
 
Capacity building is central for meta-governance strategies.  Since some time back 
the CONAGUA has been providing relevant capacity-building courses in several 
important aspects related to supporting a more sustainable groundwater 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 I would like to mention that I am part of the team of consultants participating in this study, 
and I remain very much interested in continuing to study meta-governance strategies, as well 
as the rise of policy networks, and in order to provide policy recommendations to enable 
greater stakeholder involvement and inter-institutional coordination. In my opinion one of the 
most important challenges faced by the Mexican water polity is to address the lack of social 
participation and the ‘silo-effect’, as there is little inter-institutional coordination.  
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management. On this there have been several initiatives providing ‘traditional’ 
courses such as IWRM and groundwater management technical, legal and 
institutional issues.  A lot of these courses have been provided by the IMTA. More 
recently, other themes have emerged also as a priority, such as consensus-building 
and alternative conflict resolution techniques.  Several middle level civil servants 
have realised that the COTAS’ ‘Technical Management Teams’ and probably also 
the members of the Governing Boards of the COTAS need to be able to support the 
efficient functioning of deliberative arenas, and for this they require abilities on 
consensus-building and conflict resolution. It remains to be seen if this initiative 
prospers.  
 
In terms of the financial aspects, there are also some interesting strategies being 
thought that could provide more financial autonomy, and greater independence to the 
COTAS. The strategy seeks to foster three basic conducts: measuring groundwater 
abstraction, valuing groundwater, and providing financial incentives for these 
behaviours. The following extract reflects what it is now being pondered:  
 
“The formation of a fund for the operation of the COTAS could be constituted 
from the application of a figure of around 5 to 10% of the income from water 
duties and procedures carried out by the CONAGUA and that are paid by the 
users of each aquifer. The fund will grow as users measure the withdrawals 
and pay their corresponding duties. Greater percentages could be conditioned 
to them and destined to water-saving infrastructure development, artificial 
recharge, and catchment management to facilitate infiltration. A process of this 
nature will allow sustainable long-term financing of the operation of the COTAS 
and will encourage investment in efficient water use.” (CONAGUA, 2010:35) 
(Translation: Mine) 
 
• Democratic Vigilance 
 
Regarding meta-governance strategies concerning the democratic vigilance of the 
COTAS there are some considerations so as to how to achieve greater stakeholder 
inclusion and political equality.  CONAGUA is considering increasing the number of 
Water-user Vocals in the Governing Board of the COTAS, probably including up to 
three to five vocal-representatives per water user groups.  More specifically, the idea 
is to increase to this number only the representatives of the agricultural and the 
urban-public water users –the most important water users in terms of groundwater 
abstraction percentages across the country. This consideration seeks to address 
important problems related to the lack of representativeness and ‘capture’ generated 
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by the existence of a sole Water User Vocal’s representatives.  This situation will 
allow different ‘factions’ within each water user groups to be represented in decision-
making processes. With this action CONAGUA is hoping to strengthen also the 
political legitimacy of the COTAS.  It remains to be seen if this initiative prospers.  
 
Information serves democracy and empowerment, and so CONAGUA is also 
considering to provide even greater support to the COTAS in the generation of 
relevant information regarding the conditions of the aquifer, the groundwater 
challenges faced, and the pathways for change.  To this purpose CONAGUA is 
thinking different options to channel larger amounts of financial resources to the 
development of technical studies, a process to be managed entirely in by the 
COTAS. In order for this to happen, the COTAS first need to be established as non-
for-profit secondary associations (asociaciones civiles sin afán de lucro), so as to be 
able to receive financial support from government and other sources. The idea is that 
the COTAS can then hire special service providers to develop any of the studies they 
deem necessary to support a more sustainable groundwater management.  The 
COTAS will also be accountable for the use of these financial resources, so strict 
accounting and transparency measure will also apply.  Efforts to establish a legal 
task force to support the COTAS in their consolidation as civil associations are 
presently underway.  
 
Another aspect related to ‘information’ is its socialisation.  The assessment made is 
that frequently relevant information regarding matters concerning the condition of the 
aquifers, as well as policies, programmes and initiatives for sustainable groundwater 
resources management of aquifers does not really arrive to all the stakeholders.  So, 
frequently stakeholders do not have the necessary knowledge about situations  –
challenges, problems, opportunities–, and thus they cannot really participate 
meaningfully. CONAGUA, therefore, is considering different options to attempt to 
disseminate relevant information in a timely manner.  So far, ideas focus in the use of 
web-based technologies, face-to-face meetings, and paper-based information.  The 
following abstract is illustrative of CONAGUA’s intentions:  
 
“It is essential that the COTAS have access to complete and reliable 
information that allows them to comprehend the behaviour of their aquifers, 
which is why information systems must be developed that are accessible to 
users, where they can consult the data on the allocation of water concessions, 
the volumes authorised and those that are affected, the latter requiring 
measurements.  (...) As can be observed, without information, the process of 
organisation and participation of users loses sense and can generate negative 
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results sus as a lack of trust and belief from the stakeholders towards the 
authorities, which would subsequently make the ordered management of water 
resources more difficult.” (CONAGUA, 2010:35) (Translation: Mine) 
 
 
• Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms 
 
In order to be able to evaluate the impact of the COTAS in terms of the sustainable 
management of groundwater resources, as well as to evaluate their institutional 
development process as MSPs for groundwater management, the CONAGUA is 
considering developing a monitoring and evaluation system capable of assessing 
both substantive and procedural indicators.  Accordingly, the first group of indicators 
will reflect the actual impact of the COTAS in the reduction of groundwater 
abstraction rates; the efficient and sustainable use of groundwater resources; and 
ultimately, the stabilisation of the aquifer. The second set of indicators will attempt to 
measure the role of the COTAS in the organisation of social participation/involvement 
and stakeholder cooperation (e.g. socialisation of information, education and 
capacity building, legitimacy in decision making, etc.). Within this second set of 
procedural indicators, CONAGUA is also considering developing ‘social perception’ 
indicators that would reflect the way in which society actually considers or perceives 
the role of the COTAS in the sustainable management of aquifers. The idea behind 
the creation of this new monitoring and evaluation system is to actually be able to 
determine the role and influence of the COTAS in both the sustainable management 
of the aquifers and in their capacity to enable social participation/involvement and 
stakeholder cooperation. Below I present some tentative indicators developed by the 
CONAGUA (CONAGUA, 2010). The translation is mine, and efforts were made to 
produce an exact translation of the narrative.  To my mind, the ambiguity and even 
inconsistency in the narrative reflects that it is still very much work in progress.   
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Table 6: CONAGUA’s Procedural and Substantive Indicators for the COTAS 
(Proposal)  
Criteria Description Possible Measurable Outputs 
 
 
Representation 
The participants in the COTAS should 
represent a significant percentage of 
the total groundwater users of the 
aquifers. In principle, the more 
diversity and heterogeneity of 
stakeholders involved, the more 
democratic the COTAS may be. 
In a first stage a statistical system may be 
developed that may register the number of 
participants and classify them according to 
water use, and to assess how many water 
users from which water user group is 
participating. Other things may be 
measures such a frequency in attendance. 
 
 
 
Independence/ 
Equality 
Ideally, the convening and 
participation processes should be 
conducted in an independent manner, 
without biases, safeguarding the 
equality of all stakeholders. This 
implies, amongst other measures, the 
correct transmission of information, 
availability of means, as well as the 
absence of intimidation practices 
amongst stakeholders and others.  
Requires the creation of a series of 
indicators to assess the process and 
impact of information socialisation. Implies 
also the development of a social 
perception indicator regarding the equality 
of participation.  
 
 
        Active  
Implication 
The participating public should be 
present and active during the 
definition of problems, and the debate 
surrounding the definition of the 
problems’ principle parameters, and 
not only consider their participation 
during the definition of solutions.  
Requires the creation of a ‘tasks control 
system’, where every product clearly 
indicates who participated, and every 
action or initiative determined to also have 
a direct and accountable responsible. In 
this way, the level of participation of each 
stakeholder could be measured.  
 
 
Effectiveness/ 
Influence 
Social participation should have a 
direct impact in the decision making 
process. In order to achieve this it is 
necessary that the decentralisation 
process to be complete or for the 
COTAS to have access to the 
relevant authorities.  
Requires the design and implementation of 
a careful assessment methodology 
regarding the range in which the sessions 
are developed, and actions are attended, 
and that goes from active participation to 
co-responsibility.   
 
Transparency 
Stakeholders’ representatives and 
stakeholders themselves should be 
able to witness and influence the 
decision making process.  
Requires the assessment of the 
socialisation and decision-making 
mechanisms. 
Access to 
Resources 
All the stakeholders should be able to 
have access to the resources needed 
to implement their tasks.  
Requires the evaluation of concrete 
support: capacity-building workshops, 
logistical support, financial resources, etc. 
Definition of 
Goals 
The nature and reach of the 
objectives and activities of each 
stakeholder should be clearly defined. 
Requires an assessment of the quality of 
the agreements, in terms of actions, 
duration, responsibilities, etc. 
Organisation of 
Decision-
making 
Processes 
An adequate mechanism should exist 
to structure decision-making 
processes.  
Requires the development of decision 
making monitoring system to assess the 
level of consensus attained, the number of 
votes casted to arrive to an agreement, the 
number of participants in the debate 
previous to arriving to a decision, etc.  
Note: This table was taken in full from CONAGUA (2010), Documentos Básicos de los Cnsejos de 
Cuenca y Organismos Auxiliares, México D.F. México, p.65 
 
 
 
 
	   315 
• Consistent Meta-governance Policy 
 
As already mentioned CONAGUA’s meta-governing strategies are still very incipient, 
so it is not possible to say that there is consistency in its approach, except that so far 
CONAGUA is clear that the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS, are only 
consultative bodies.  So despite the efforts in other ‘power centres’ to promote a 
more progressive meta-governance strategy, this is what truly structures or 
determines the institutional development path of the COTAS.  As the reader will see 
in the next section, what is happening in the State of Guanajuato offers some 
interesting prospect for the COTAS having a greater role in groundwater 
management. Nevertheless, this effort is still within the framework provided by the 
2004 NWL, and the federal policy regarding the role of the COTAS in the Mexican 
water polity.  
 
7.3. The CONAGUA’s State Office in Guanajuato: Some Recent Meta-
governance Strategies over the MSPs for Groundwater Management, COTAS 
 
Within the framework of the 2030 Water Agenda and under its Strategic Initiative -1, 
the CONAGUA State Office in Guanajuato designed a new and interesting way to 
support the institutional development of the COTAS, the implementation of an 
Integral System for the Sustainable Management of Aquifers, SIMSA. The SIMSA 
seeks to address several aspects involved in sustainable groundwater management 
and through different pathways. It has five strategic objectives: increase the recharge 
rate of the aquifer, diminish groundwater demand, develop a new water culture, 
improve the management of water across all sectors, and improve the legal and 
institutional arrangements. 148 
 
The point of departure the SIMSA was to consider the need for an ‘integral solution’ 
that considers the socio-economic and environmental dimensions involved in the 
sustainable management of aquifers.  Part of this integral solution is to understand 
how different stakeholders interact with the aquifer, and with each other, in order to 
support the development of long-term and comprehensive groundwater management 
plans for each aquifer. So, the following step was to develop a wide-ranging 
stakeholder map that identifies the different potential interactions of each stakeholder 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 I am grateful to Edgar Abelleyra, at then Deputy Manager for River Basin Councils and 
Social Management of CONAGUA’s State in Office in Guanajuato for the information and 
insight on the SIMSA.  
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with the aquifer and also with wider natural resources and socio-economic processes 
that affect its long-term sustainability.  The purpose was to clearly identify also the 
responsibilities and the capacities that each stakeholder has to intervene in 
groundwater management processes.  The matrix below identifies (in the x-axis) the 
different stakeholders, classifying them in terms of governmental and non-
governmental organisations. In the y-axis we find different functions that need to be 
undertaken to manage the aquifer in a sustainable manner. The potential 
interventions are established in at the crossings of the x- and y-axes.  Each of the 
crossings is then characterised by the relevant role of the stakeholder involved: 
principal actor, supportive actor, normative actor, and information manager.  
Although the matrix is blurred the reader may capture the idea.   
 
The second step was to define how and when each actor could intervene, and most 
importantly who would coordinate the interventions required. This is where the 
proposal is extremely innovative, as the CONAGUA State Office in Guanajuato 
planned for the MSPs for groundwater management, COTAS, to be at the centre of 
the coordination process, and supported by their respective Consultative Technical 
Group. The diagrams below seeks to describe this.  
Figure 24: The SIMSA: Inter-Institutional Coordination Matrix 
 
Source: CONAGUA State Office in Guanajuato, SIMSA, 2012 
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Figure 25: The SIMSA: The COTAS as Stakeholder Cooperation Nodes 
 
 
Source: CONAGUA State Office in Guanajuato, SIMSA, 2012 
 
 
The second phase implies the design of an Operative Programme for the 
Sustainable Management of the Aquifer (Programa Operativo de Manejo Sustentable 
del Acuífero, POMSA) for each aquifer. These POMSAS will commence with a 
thorough integration of relevant information produced to-date on each of the 
aquifers’, including: their hydro-geologic and socio-economic situation and the 
generation of any basic or complementary information required to sustain a technical 
competent and scientifically based groundwater management process. Then a 
consensus-driven groundwater management plan making process would start and 
with due consideration for social participation and stakeholder involvement.  One 
central aspect of the POMSAs is to develop a project portfolio with actions that can 
achieve synergies and that can be carried out by individual stakeholders –according 
to their institutional mandates, responsibilities and capacities. The important aspect 
here is to coordinate actions, and as already mentioned the selected entities for this 
are the COTAS (CONAGUA State Office, 2011).  
 
A third important aspect involved the design of a web-based project management 
tool that can be, in principle, accessed by all participating stakeholders and COTAS’s 
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membership. This will help to support transparency and accountability in project 
implementation.  
 
 
Figure 26: The SIMSA: Web-based Monitoring and Follow up System 
 
 
 
Source: CONAGUA State Office in Guanajuato, SIMSA, 2012 
 
A fourth important aspect considered the restructuring of the ‘network of social 
participation’. This dimension involves widening the social bases of the COTAS. This 
is deemed crucial for supporting the political legitimacy of the exercise and for really 
developing POMSAS that reflect the concerns and the objectives of the groundwater 
users. At the moment of the PhD research’s fieldwork a new convening and social 
participation strategy was being designed. 
 
It is too early to say more about this new meta-governance approach being 
implemented in the State of Guanajuato, but it is possible to say that some ideas look 
promising, and specially the considerations regarding the need to broaden the 
COTAS social bases and of locating the COTAS at the centre of the stakeholder 
cooperation efforts. If this idea materialises, it will convey them with ‘network power’, 
an important form of power in the context of socio-political governance, and if the 
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intention is to build a policy network that may support groundwater resources 
management.149 
 
7.4. The Role of the Neoliberal Statehood Formation in the Establishment and 
Institutional Development of the MSPs for Groundwater Management, COTAS 
 
In the previous chapter I have established that the MSPs for groundwater 
management, COTAS, in the Mexican water polity remain only consultative, 
financially dependent, weak and vulnerable institutions that exert an extremely 
reduced role in groundwater management.  In some cases, out of the tenacity and 
perseverance of their Governing Boards and Technical Management teams, the 
COTAS have supported the attainment of some scant democratic effects, and do 
play a minimal, yet important, redistributive role.  I have also ascertained that the role 
of the State in the establishment and institutional development of the MSPs for 
groundwater resources management has mostly been limiting and contradictory, and 
has produced important drawbacks and path-dependencies.  But talking about the 
State in this manner only reveals an immediate or cursory level of understanding, 
and there are other elements in the interpretation about the role of the State that 
deserve some elaboration.  In this endeavour I would like to return to the post-
Marxist and Strategic-Relational views on the State developed by Poulantzas and 
Jessop.  
 
In the Mexican water polity the State has definitely proven not to be a monolithic 
entity, but a strategic field comprised by different power centres that exercise their 
authority and power to support the stabilisation of different State projects. In the case 
of the establishment and institutional development of the MSPs for groundwater 
management in the State of Guanajuato, it was possible to identify at least two power 
centres, the CONAGUA –at the central level– and the CEAG and the CONAGUA 
State office in Guanajuato at a local level.  These two power centres entered into an 
important power struggle to influence the definition of the institutional development 
path of the COTAS.  Ultimately, the CONAGUA –at the central level–, as a result of 
the historical construction of a strong centralisation and federalisation of authority 
and power, retained the ‘supremacy’ and strength to determine this process. As 
result of this political struggle, and despite the initial efforts of the CEAG and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 In the last year policy makers in CONAGUA have become more interested in the concept 
of ‘policy networks’ and want to know more about it. Accordingly, they have commissioned 
another study to assess the policy networks around different water resources management 
problems.  
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CONAGUA State Office in Guanajuato, the State of Guanajuato COTAS remain only 
consultative, financial dependent, and weak institutions, like the great majority of the 
rest of the COTAS in the country.  
 
It is my impression that either party did not fight this political struggle lightly, because 
ultimately the ‘stakes’ were very high: a redefinition of a State project, and inherently 
a redefinition of State-society relationships in the governing over groundwater 
resources. On one side of this political struggle, the central-State acting to continue 
holding the centralist power and authority over groundwater resources management 
–despite the obvious drawbacks–, and on the other side, the CEAG –and the State 
Governor Vicente Fox– ‘allegedly’ fighting to support a different State project based 
on greater decentralisation, a progressive form of new federalism, greater social 
participation and stronger democratic practice.  In the end the central-State 
predominated. Also as leadership changed in the State of Guanajuato the 
progressive reform momentum was mostly lost. This seems to imply that ‘power 
blocs’ in the Mexican water polity are not only mobile, but also shift priorities, 
pragmatically.  
 
It is possible also to make some other observations regarding the characteristics of 
the State in the Mexican polity as a strategic field, this time in terms of an internal-
institutional strategic field.  Throughout the research it was possible to locate also 
different power centres within the CONAGUA –central office– that sometimes work 
synergistically, but that also sometimes are antagonistic.  In the case of the 
institutional development of the COTAS, the most important centres that participate 
in this field are the General Director’s Office, the Deputy Technical Direction –where 
the Groundwater Management Office is located–, the River Basin and Auxiliary 
Bodies Management Office –that deals directly with the institutional development of 
the COTAS– and the Deputy Administration Direction –that manages the REPDA, 
and ultimately the allocation and re-allocation of groundwater concessions.  Each 
has it own turf that is zealously guarded. It is my impression that these power centres 
do not necessarily work together and at times obey to slightly different priorities.  
Indeed there is a  ‘silo’ effect operating and a lack of internal coordination. This 
doctoral research did not address this specific situation, and so no evidence can be 
presented, but still I venture to make these comments because they seem relevant, 
and derive from interviews with different relevant individuals.  
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In my opinion the Deputy Administration Direction has not been ‘fully’ supportive of 
the idea of strengthening the COTAS, as for them the problem lies in precisely 
strengthening the REPDA as a regulatory instrument, and thus they consider that the 
State should devote greater institutional efforts and financial resources to build a 
more robust REPDA and to ‘really’ enforce it across the country. The vision here is of 
a strong central State and the use of strengthened hierarchical-regulatory 
instruments. It seems that the vision of the Deputy Technical Direction is that the 
problem is technical, the State simply lacks the capacity to know what is happening 
with the aquifers, and thus, it is difficult to manage them.  The State also lacks the 
capacity to produce robust groundwater management plans in all the aquifers, and of 
course there is the ‘huge’ problem with the due protocol to enact the aquifers’ by-
laws. Some individuals in this Deputy Technical Direction seem supportive of the 
idea of the COTAS, especially in activities related to the development of the 
necessary studies and also the groundwater management plans, but not necessarily 
as autonomous executive agencies. It is at the River Basin and Auxiliary Bodies 
Management Office were we find the most supportive opinion regarding the 
institutional development of the COTAS, and where it is possible also to find some 
level of frustration.  All of this internal politics between power centres plays out under 
the shadow of the General Director’s Office that casts its authority in an extremely 
vertical manner, and where other forms of pressure seem to converge from other 
power centres –outside CONAGUA– with other interests rather than sustainable 
groundwater management.  The result in the end reflects a lack of consensus, lack of 
coordination, and drawbacks and contradictions.   
 
Furthermore, it is possible to take a step further in the interpretation of the role of the 
State in the institutional development of the MSPs for groundwater resources 
management, COTAS, and probe into a deeper layer of causality. Returning again to 
Poulantzas and Jessop it is possible to also consider the State as a social relation, 
and not necessarily as a neutral and autonomous coordinator of socio-political 
relations in the interest of a participatory, democratic and sustainable groundwater 
resources management, but rather as an entity whose orientation and strategies are 
determined precisely by the nature of the socio-economic relations surrounding 
groundwater use, and that are, in turn, defined by the balance of social forces in 
society.  So, how can we envision the orientation of the Mexican State, if in reality the 
Mexican society is one of the most unequal societies in the world, with a Ginni 
Coefficient of 48.1, a conservative official poverty headcount of 52.3%, ranking 48 
out 65 in the OECD’s 2012 PISA Study, and a growing multi-dimensional social 
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exclusion, and systemic violence? The question is then, what type of State formation 
may exist in Mexico when the Mexican society also shows some extremely worrying 
characterisitcs?  
 
In my opinion, the Neoliberal Statehood formation not only has failed to support the 
much-warranted institutional development of the MSPs, but also has more directly 
and openly failed to protect groundwater resources management. Furthermore, it has 
done so at the same time that is seems to be protecting the socio-economic and 
political interests of dominant domestic and increasingly more international elites who 
continue to rampantly over-exploit groundwater resources management.  It is then 
that by continuing with the use of centralist, hierarchical and regulatory instruments 
and by refusing to truly support socio-political governance arrangements that 
groundwater over-exploitation continues rampantly. It is clear for most of the Laguna-
Seca Aquifer’s groundwater users who are the largest groundwater users of the 
aquifer: the large-landholders and irrigated districts.  These large landholders not 
only have huge groundwater concessions, but also have the financial resources to 
drill deep wells and buy more powerful pumping equipment, therefore eluding –for 
the time being– some of the problems that other farmers are now experiencing 
pumping groundwater. Actually, large landholders are also turning their lands into 
industrial parks, retaining the same amount of groundwater volumes. It is important 
to recall that the large-landholders do not participate as members of the Laguna-
Seca COTAS, as membership is voluntary, and thus they are not subject of any form 
of transparency and social scrutiny.   
 
I believe that the Mexican water polity seems to be ‘trapped’ in a ‘descending spiral’, 
whereby dominant and powerful domestic and international economic interests 
somehow influence or even define the role of the State in groundwater resources 
management.150 The Mexican State, more then actually managing water resources in 
a participatory, democratic and sustainable manner, seems to be focused in the 
reproduction of the legal, institutional and socio-political conditions that continue to 
allow for groundwater over-exploitation. The Mexican State seems to be acting like a 
‘typical’ Neo-liberal capitalist state, enabling the reproduction of dominant economic 
and political interests that allow for the process of capital accumulation to continue –	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 This situation is acquiring greater visibility due to extremely contentious topic regarding 
‘fracking’ and the use –and pollution– of extremely scarce groundwater resources. Mexico 
ranks sixth in the world in proven shale-gas reserves, most of the fields being localised in the 
already water-stressed regions of the country.  
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that in the case of groundwater management is accumulation by dispossession–, and 
regardless of any environmental and social equity considerations. Whether this 
regressive and unsustainable situation allows also for the perpetuation of this form of 
capitalist Statehood formation remains to be seen, and as social conflict for the use 
of dwindling groundwater resources escalate.  On this aspect and interpretation of 
the role of the State in water resources management, Aboites, Cifuentes, Jimenez, 
and Torregrosa (2008) seem to share this view on the orientation and nature of the 
State in the Mexican water polity:  
 
“Our central thesis is that water resources management shows with great 
fidelity the inequality and inequity that characterises the Mexican society, an 
old historical problem that has worsened in the current national and 
international economic and political context of the previous decades. 
Furthermore, with great concern we see in the water sector a State’s 
performance well below a satisfactory level and an extremely disorganised 
intervention on its behalf.  The State should not only regulate and manage 
water uses for economic development, it should foster measures that enable a 
profound behavioural change in society and of the practices that are putting in 
grave risk the mid and long-term viability of the society-Nature relationship.” 
(Jimenez, Torregorsa and Aboites, 2008: 7) 
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Chapter 8: Overall End Comments 
 
8.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter presents some overall end comments to this PhD thesis.  It is divided in 
retrospective and prospective reflections.  The first section provides some reflections 
regarding the long-duration and my professional involvement during the doctoral 
research process. Then I proceed to provide some considerations regarding the 
integration of the research questions and the heuristic analytical device. Following, I 
comment on the actual application of this device, and the limitations and 
appropriateness of its operationalization. Finally, the second section presents some 
prospective reflections, considering some research opportunities for the future.  
 
8.1. Retrospective Reflections 
 
• The Long-Duration and my Professional Involvement 
 
I would like to start the retrospective reflections regarding this doctoral research 
process by commenting that I am happy that this process took the time that it did, 
because of a number of reasons. As stated before, finishing earlier would have 
meant, of course, that the phenomenon under study would have hardly had some 
years happening, and so the consequences of the implementation of Neo-liberal 
State-Strategies would have only initially been felt. If I had delivered my thesis as 
planned, lets say in 2003, most probably the conclusion would have probably 
depicted a more promising conclusion regarding the prospects and challenges of the 
COTAS.  The thesis would also have not engaged so thoroughly in studying the role 
of the State in this process. So the long-duration allowed for the phenomenon to 
develop and for the consequences to take more form, allowing for a greater richness 
in my scholarly investigation.  
 
Also, after years of experience in the water policy sector and of a very close 
involvement with the phenomenon under the study, I think that I was able to gain an 
interesting insight into the causes and factors –operating at different layers– 
influencing its development and unfolding.  Actually, when I come to think about it, I 
was being part of the process of State transformation myself, although my 
inexperience did not really allowed me to truly understand the scope and magnitude 
of the transformation process underway.  My professional involvement also helped to 
look at the same process –its dynamics and consequences– from the perspective of 
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a UN Officer. My work in UN-Habitat allowed me to gain first hand experience of the 
drawbacks and contradictions of the Neoliberal State-strategies, this time by helping 
other stakeholders to address some of the grave drawbacks resulting from their 
implementation, specially in peri-urban areas of cities across the country. So again 
this long-duration allowed me to gain a different perspective –perhaps more insightful 
and mature– regarding the phenomenon under study.  My years as an external 
consultant of CONAGUA have also been influential in the writing of my doctoral 
research.  More recently, I have been able to participate in a ‘task force’ that is 
currently making a diagnostics of the water resources challenges in the Mexican 
water polity in order to provide policy recommendations for an ‘integral water sector 
reform’, also as mentioned before.  This has enabled me again to re-assess the 
complexities of the CONAGUA and the Mexican water polity, and its prospects and 
challenges; and of course the efforts undertaken for my doctoral research have been 
extremely helpful. So in a way during all these years both by doctoral research and 
my professional involvement worked as a ‘circular’ feedback mechanism.  
 
- Some Words on the Integration of the Research Questions and the Heuristic 
Analytical Device 
 
The research questions were gradually integrated as I became more familiar with the 
scholarly literature, through my engagement with the fieldwork, and through my 
professional involvement.  In honesty, the first research questions considered were 
the ones related specifically to the socio-political governance arrangements, and 
oriented at analysing their prospects and challenges (i.e. following a standard and 
perhaps more narrow New Institutionalist perspective). Later, a second group of 
questions emerged, this time regarding the democratic performance of such socio-
political governance arrangements, and driven by critical scholarly concerns 
regarding to their democratic credentials, as already established in the previous 
chapters. Soon through my engagement with the literature, I found out that the 
associative and deliberative democratic theorists were working on this relationship 
and were offering interesting research pathways that I decided to operationalize in 
my doctoral research. A coincidental meeting with John Dryzek at Nuffield College in 
Oxford was also very inspirational.  
 
It was not after some years of my professional involvement and engagement with the 
specialised literature, how I arrived at fathoming that the phenomenon of the 
establishment and institutional development of socio-political governance 
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arrangements was truly embedded in a wider and deeper process of Neo-liberal 
State transformation, and that it was just merely one of the various State-strategies in 
its repertoire (i.e. a phenomenon embedded in another one of greater magnitude). 
Consequently, the consideration made was that definitely there was a need to 
address a wider historical-institutional context (i.e. to follow more of a Historical 
Institutionalist approach). This is also when I came across with the more recent 
theoretical developments in the field of water resources management and water 
governance, and when the MSPs concept emerged as an ad-hoc option that helped 
to establish more precise research questions regarding the institutional design 
features of the COTAS. At that time, the doctoral research started to acquire a more 
precise focus –and perhaps a more ambitious one.  As such the phenomenon under 
study started to demand a greater understanding of the role of the State and power 
in the context of socio-political governance arrangements, a situation that prompted 
my engagement with the theorisation on the phenomenon of the State and power.  
This engagement with the concept of the State and the more recent governance 
studies literature eventually led me to encounter a  pathway to study the role of the 
State in establishment of the MSPs for groundwater resources management: the 
meta-governance notion. 
 
Very importantly, the idea of designing a heuristic-analytical device came to mind 
after reviewing David Harvey’s Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference.  So 
after some reckoning it became more clear that I was actually in front of a complex 
phenomenon that had various forms of manifestation, with slightly different 
temporalities, and that required for its study a more ‘sophisticated’ analytical 
framework. Consequently, there was need to capture different aspects of a wider 
phenomenon with different forms of manifestation, and with causalities that operated 
at different ‘layers’. So I devoted efforts to develop the heuristic-analytical device.  
 
• On the Implementation of the Heuristic-Analytical Device: The Appropriateness 
and Limitations of its Operationalization 
 
The first moment of analysis in reality represents a long-engagement with the 
literature review, and whereby I encountered an interesting body of literature that 
sought to describe and analyse a comprehensive phenomenon, the governance 
phenomenon. If I reflect on such engagement, I can say that it has been extremely 
interesting to see how the literature evolved through time.  Initially, the books on the 
subject matter were mapping out the ‘terrain’ and attempted to describe and explain 
	   327 
this phenomenon through a more ‘generalist’ perspective.  The literature was also 
beginning to identify ‘hot spots’, topics that deserved more attention.  Several years 
later the literature had definitely evolved and became more specific. New 
complementary approaches have been developed –such as the State centric-
relational approach. Some more precise analytical tools have been concoted, for 
example to address issues of institutional development of socio-political governance 
arrangements, ways to assess the performance of socio-political governance 
arrangements, matters concerning meta-governance strategies and capacities, ways 
to improve the effectiveness of socio-political governance, ways to assess the 
democratic performance of socio-political governance arrangements, and some other 
‘new dilemmas’.  Consequently, the application of the first moment of analysis did not 
only directly produced the development of the explanandum, but it has been really an 
educational experience.  In terms of the doctoral research efforts were made 
throughout this long PhD process to incorporate these new developments, a situation 
that has been challenging, but that has also represented an interesting opportunity to 
make efforts to maintain the doctoral work timely and relevant.    
 
The literature on associative and deliberative democracy has, to my mind, remained 
less prolific and innovative than the one on the governance phenomenon. There 
have been new efforts, specially seeking to analyse new ‘associative and deliberative 
institutions’ for example in the field of environmental politics, but the current 
approaches are very similar to the ones established some time ago, and by the 
‘classic authors’ on the subject matter. Notwithstanding, this situation I still consider 
that both theories, the associative and deliberative democratic theories, did provide 
theoretical means to contribute to the definition of the research problem and to 
support an insightful case study analysis. The assessment of the democratic effects 
of the Laguna-Seca COTAS attests to this opinion. 
 
The theoretical engagement with Historical Institutionalism represents the underlying 
foundation of the PhD thesis, and so its analytical prowess has been made more 
explicit and more ‘active’ in the present version of this thesis, and as a result of the 
constructive comments made during my viva-examination. I think this action has 
contributed to more clearly establish analytical variables, and present information 
and insights in a more orderly fashion.  This new form of engaging with HI also gave 
the opportunity to more clearly establish the State and power as two central elements 
in the study of socio-political governance arrangements, and to develop the 
necessary theoretical and analytical elements to be able to study the role of the State 
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in the implementation of State-strategies, the establishment and institutional 
development of the MSPs for groundwater management; and more broadly the role 
of the State in water resources management.  Still the use of an HI approach 
represents some implementation challenges, because it demands a careful definition 
of elements to include as part of the descriptive and analytical narratives, as well as 
the definition of boundaries. There is always the possibility to simply over-extend the 
narratives, disregard important facts, emphasize facts that perhaps have not been so 
influential or consequential, and simply lack the writing skills to make such narratives 
interesting and worthwhile.  
Another important comment to make on performing the first moment of analysis is 
that is has also been interesting to see the evolution of the governance debate after 
many years.  Initially, the water governance debate was mostly imbued with notions 
of governability, a situation that as mentioned in the thesis created important 
limitations mainly in terms of policy research and institutional reform.  Gradually, the 
debate evolved in an interesting manner, and I think it has currently caught up with 
the mainstream governance debate in the political sciences, a situation that has 
opened up an opportunity for more critical analysis and progressive policy 
recommendations. In this sense, the governance and water governance concourses 
seem to have become more permeable and interconnected, a situation that seems to 
be benefiting both.   
 
After all this time, the gradual definition and refinement of the research problem was 
supported by the engagement with the aforementioned theoretical literature and also 
by my experience working in the Mexican water polity.  Definitely the literature 
provided me with the identification of a research problem and also with the necessary 
analytical concepts to support the design of the heuristic-analytical device, but it was 
my experience working with CONAGUA what really prompted me to study the role of 
the State in water resources management, and the prospect and challenges of the 
MSPs for water resources management, including their democratic performance.  
This orientation derives from the consideration that the Mexican water polity really 
needs new institutional settings that can enable greater social participation, 
stakeholder cooperation and democratisation. 
 
The theoretical engagement produced the design of the heuristic-analytical device 
that, in turn, supported a structured, sequenced and layered assessment of different 
elements and through different ‘moments of analysis’ that focus on different aspects 
of the research subject and problem.  Each moment builds on its preceding one and 
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somehow the findings of each moment also contribute to the ‘integrity’ or the ‘validity’ 
of the overall findings, almost like going through layers of reality –a central concern 
of critical realism.  To my mind, after the sequence was completed, the device 
offered a clear presentation of the explanandum and a ‘comprehensive’ narrative of 
that presents an explanans.  
 
The second moment of analysis attempted a Historical Institutionalist assessment of 
the State-building and Neo-liberal State-transformation process in the Mexican water 
polity.  In my opinion, the application of this moment of analysis managed to recreate 
the most important features of the historical-institutional context –the main 
ideologies, ideas, institutions, policy processes and socio-political struggles– of three 
distinct Statehood formations, highlighting the most consequential situations and 
aspects. It centres its attention in the Neo-liberal Statehood formation and the 
implementation of a number of State-strategies aiming to modify the orientation and 
characteristics of the State, and the relationships between the State and society. My 
intention with the application of this moment of analysis was to provide a thorough, 
but focused historical-institutional description and exploration of the wider context 
where the actual process of the MSPs establishment and institutional development 
was taking place, and in order to carefully embed it in history.  Although the chapter 
may feel a ‘bit’ long, it is my impression that the information presented and insight 
developed regarding the Mexican water polity and the process of Neo-liberal State 
transformation allows to ‘grasp’ the complexity of the phenomenon under study, and 
functions a bit like ‘gyroscope’ that allowing the reader to orient him/herself in it.   
 
The third moment of analysis probes into a next layer of the phenomenon under 
study. It starts again by providing some general historical-institutionalist 
considerations of the development of groundwater management policy in the 
Mexican water polity, highlighting important drawbacks in the role of the State and its 
centralist, hierarchical and regulatory instruments.  It allowed presenting the most 
important drivers behind the establishment of the MSPs for groundwater resources 
management, to later provide a critical institutional analysis.  Then with the aid of the 
‘paradoxical’ case of the State of Guanajuato COTAS, it underscores and highlights 
the drawbacks and contradictions in the role of the State in the establishment and 
institutional development of the MSPs.  It is fair to say that perhaps there could have 
been another route to implement this third moment of analysis, like for example 
undertaking a comparative analysis of three or five different COTAS, and analyse 
carefully their institutional development path. That maybe could have provided an 
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interesting input regarding institutional design considerations and their interplay with 
contextual-background conditions. In my opinion this would have required of a more 
sophisticated model of institutional analysis, like the Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework developed by E Ostrom  (2005).  To my mind, there is once 
caveat in the pursuit of this approach, the COTASs’ institutional development is 
unfortunately rather limited and meagre, and so it seems not worthy to attempt more 
complicated forms of institutional analysis. Also, I think that the doctoral research has 
proved that the main problem lies elsewhere: in the role of the State.  
Figure 27: The IAD Framework developed by E Ostrom (2005) 
‘A more sophisticated framework’ 
 
 
Source: Ostrom E, (2005) 
 
 
The fourth moment analysis seeks to investigate a different layer in the relationship 
between cause and effect in the process of establishment and institutional 
development of the COTAS, and by identifying a number of potential democratic 
effects and the preconditions that seem to affect their achievement. With this action 
some insights were presented on the developmental, public sphere and institutional 
effects of the Laguna-Seca COTAS. These insights provided a more comprehensive 
understanding of the functioning, and the prospects and challenges of the Laguna-
Seca COTAS. It is possible to consider that these prospects and challenges seem to 
be shared by most of the COTAS in the country. I acknowledge that some of the 
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findings resulting from the application of this moment of analysis are a somewhat 
vague and imprecise, but still I believe that the overall situation and tendency is clear 
and telling.  The production of more concrete information regarding the specificities 
of the Laguna-Seca COTAS’s potential democratic effects and the preconditions that 
affected their attainment would have required a much more extensive fieldwork, that 
was beyond the reach of my doctoral research.  Some words regarding future 
research on these matters are presented in the next section of this chapter.  
 
The application of the fifth moment of analysis shifts the main focus again to the role 
of State. This moment of analysis represents an effort to identify and assess the 
State-meta-governance strategies and capacities.  Again it follows a basic 
comparative approach between the CONAGUA’s incipient meta-governance 
‘strategies’ and the CONAGUA State Office in Guanajuato ones.  The findings allow 
us again to distinguish that the central State is moving extremely slow and 
uncommittedly in this endeavour, and the State of Guanajuato is considering a more 
progressive approach. This moment of analysis operates also at a different layer, 
and reinforces the findings regarding the role of the State in the establishment and 
institutional development of the COTAS.  I acknowledge that the information 
presented is somewhat plain, specially regarding the CONAGUA’s approach, but this 
is because the approach is itself rather plain and fussy.  In the case of the State of 
Guanajuato, what I attempted to emphasise was the intention to put the COTAS at 
the centre of stakeholder coordination, a strategy that if it happens it could really 
represent a step forward in developing a more empowered and participatory socio-
political water governance.  
 
Finally, the sixth moment of analysis probes more directly into the relationship 
between the role of the State and its orientation as derived from the characteristics of 
its ‘strategic field’ and the nature of the ‘power blocs’ and the social forces behind it.  
The image here represented is of a capitalist State that allows for the status quo to 
remain in favour of the unsustainable, undemocratic and unequal use of groundwater 
resources. In retrospect, I would have liked to better structure this moment of 
analysis in order to be able to more clearly identify the social forces behind the State 
and more clearly characterise the power dynamics behind this status quo. 
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8.3. Prospective Reflections 
 
I approach this last prospective section with great enthusiasm, because I feel that 
this doctoral project opened-up a range of opportunities for future scholarly and also 
professional research, not only to complement it and to complete some of the tasks 
left undone on this occasion, but to actually spin-off other research possibilities.  I will 
devote then some final remarks on this.  
 
To complement this doctoral research it would be interesting to study in more depth 
the power centres, power blocs and social forces behind the statuo-quo in terms of 
groundwater resources management in the country, but also more particularly in the 
State of Guanajuato.  
 
As mentioned in the thesis the Querétaro Valley COTAS has ceased to exist, mainly 
because there is an apparent sense of water security derived from the construction 
of a mega-aqueduct that according to calculations will grant water security for the 
next 100 years. It seems that an interesting research could be to critically analyse 
this water security strategy, who has gained –and will gain–, and who has lost; and to 
assess what is happening now to the aquifer.  Maybe in this case a ‘counterfactual 
social science approach’ could be deployed to study other ‘water demand’ 
approaches, determine their potential costs-benefits and compare them to the actual 
‘hard-infrastructure-supply’ solution.  
 
Another interesting possibility would be to carry out a comprehensive and 
comparative institutional analysis of the 14 COTAS in the State of Guanajuato          
–probably using the IAD framework or some modified version of it– and to be able to 
develop some statistical generalisations.  By carrying out the comparative case study 
in the same State, this could help to isolate some variables and convey greater 
importance to considerations regarding social agency, local leadership and the 
interplay of local networks of power.  This could throw some interesting findings 
regarding to ‘strategic indeterminacy’ (Olin Wright, 2010), this is to say to the always 
present possibility of many different levels and pathways for the formation of 
countervailing power.  
 
One other interesting research possibility that derives from the engagement with the 
present doctoral research could be to study the actual process of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ implied in the increasing land and groundwater grabbing process that 
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has increased in the last years in several regions of the country. It will be interesting 
to hypothesise how this form of capital accumulation actually obstructs the realisation 
of sustainable groundwater resources management and environmental justice.  
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Annex C: Listing of Key Informants 
 
CONAGUA and other government agencies: 
 
-Mr Jorge Avelleyra, Manager of Social Participation, CONAGUA’s State Office in Guanajuato 
 
-Mr Guillermo Chávez, former Manager for the River Basin Councils and Auxiliary Bodies, 
CONAGUA Central Office 
 
-Mr Guillermo Chavez Guillén, Manager of Groundwater Management, CONAGUA Central 
Office 
 
-Mr Ramón Gámez, Technical Manager at the CONAGUA’s State Office in Querétaro 
 
-Mr Hector Garduño, former Manager for the REPDA, CONAGUA Central Office 
 
-Mr Fernando González, former General Director of the CONAGUA Central Office 
 
-Mr Vicente Guerrero, former State-Director CONAGUA State Office in Guanajuato 
 
-Mr César Herrera, former Deputy Director for Planning and Programming, CONAGUA-
Central Office 
 
-Mr Cristobal Jaime, former General Director of the CONAGUA Central Office 
 
-Mr José Alfredo Jimenez, Deputy Manager for the River Basin Councils and Auxiliary 
Bodies, CONAGUA Central Office 
 
-Mr Sergio Lustanou, former State-Director of the CONAGUA’s State Office in Querétaro 
 
-Ms Lydia Mead, Deputy Manager for the River Basin Councils and Auxiliary Bodies, 
CONAGUA Central Office 
 
-Mr Jorge Montoya, former Manager of Social Participation, CEAG-Guanajuato 
 
-Dr Luis Rendón, Manager Irrigation Districts, CONAGUA-Central Office 
 
-Mr Fernando Reyna, former Secretary to the General Director of the CONAGUA, CONAGUA 
Central Office 
 
-Mr Emiliano Rodriguez, Deputy Director of Planning and Programming, CONAGUA-Central 
Office 
 
-Mr Ricardo Sandoval, former General Director, CEAG-Guanajuato 
 
-Mr Juan Gabriel Secovia, Director of Social Participation Promotion, CEAG, Guanajuato 
 
-Mr Juan Carlos Valencia, former Manager for Planning and Programming, CONAGUA 
Central Office 
 
-Ms Lourdes Villegas, Deputy Manager, Deputy Manager for Social Participation, CONAGUA’ 
State Office in Querétaro 
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COTAS y Comité Estatal Hidráulico (CEH) 
 
- Samuel Aguilera, President, Comite Estatal Hidráulico, Guanajuato 	  
-Mr Deni Berenci, Treasurer, Laguna-Seca COTAS, Guanajuato 
 
-Mr Alfonso Cobo, former President, Queretaro Valley COTAS, Queretaro 
 
-Mr Salvador Charre, Technical Manager, Sierra Gorda COTAS, Guanajuato 
 
-Mr Jesús Edgar, Technical Manager, Acambaro-Hitzeo COTAS, Guanajuato 
 
-Mr Jose Antonio Urquiza, former Treasury, Queretaro Valley COTAS, Queretaro 
 
-Mr Manuel Garcia, President, Laguna-Seca COTAS, Guanajuato 
 
-Mr Wilfredo Gordillo, Member, Querétaro Valley COTAS 
 
-Mr. Ignacio Cordoba Urrutia, President, Comondu, COTAS, Santo Domingo, Baja California 
 
Mr José Manuel Castillo, Technical Manager, Comondu COTAS, Santo Domingo, Baja 
California 
 
-Ms Lilia Esqueda, Techncial Secretary, Laguna-Seca COTAS, Guanajuato 
 
-Mr Pedro Arellano, Technical Assistant, Laguna-Seca COTAS, Guanajuato 
 
-Ms Gretel Aguilar, Technical Assistant, Laguna-Seca COTAS 
 
-Mr Aurelio Navarrete, former President, Comité Estatal Hidraúlico, Guanajuato 
 
-Mr Tomñas Villarreal, President, Cuatro Cienegas COTAS, Coahuila 
 
 
IMTA 
 
- Dr Sergio Vargas, former Social Participation Technical Officer, IMTA-Morelos 
 
-MSc Denise Soares, Social Participation Technical Officer, IMTA-Morelos 
 
-Roberto Romero, Social Participation Technical Officer, IMTA-Morelos 
 
-Daniel Murillo, former Social Participation Technical Officer, IMTA-Morelos 
 
 
International Organisations and Independent Consultant 
 
-Dr Stpehen Foster, GW-Mate, World Bank 
 
-Dr. Luis Garcia, consultant World Bank 
 
-MSc Eudardo Mestre, consultant World Bank 
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-Dr Salvador Peña, independent consultant 
 
Academics: 
 
-Dr María Luisa Torregrosa, Professor & Researcher, FLACSO-Mexico 
 
-Dr Judith Dominguez, Professor & Researcher, COLMEX-Mexico 
 
-Dr Karina Kloster, Professor & Researhcer, UAM-Azcapotzalco 
 
-Dr. José Luis Lezama, Professor & Researcher, COLMEX-Mexico 
 
-Dr Blanca Jiménez, Profesor & Researcher, Faculty of Engineering, UNAM-Mexico 
 
-Dr Boris Marañon, Professor & Researcher, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, UNAM-
Mexico 
 
-Dr Diana Lopez, Researcher, Faculty of Social and Politcial Sciences, UNAM-Mexico 
 
 
 	  	  	  
	  
 
